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Summary 
This thesis considers the social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. It explores the socio-legal issues that arise when involuntary childlessness is given a 
gendered meaning and how this contributes to the social stigmatisation of involuntarily 
childless women in this developing region. 
The social stigmatisation of involuntarily childless women in Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
widely documented in the social science literature. This body of literature on the gendered 
meaning of infertility and its impact on involuntary childless women has helped to change 
attitudes and perspectives on involuntary childlessness in the international public health 
framework. This has led to calls that infertility should no longer be treated as the ‘Cinderella 
of reproductive health rights in the developing world.’ The World Health Organisation (WHO) 
recently designated infertility as a global public health concern and has canvassed for wider 
access to assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) in the developing world. The case for 
wider access to ARTs in the developing world has been made on a number of grounds, 
including those of human rights and social justice. International public health policy makers 
have also canvassed for wider access of affordable ARTS based on the notion of universal 
access to reproductive health care. 
This thesis queries why the law, unlike medicine and other disciplines, has been slow to 
respond to the gendered social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness in developing 
regions of the world such as Sub Saharan Africa. It explores whether the law can facilitate 
wider access to affordable ARTs based on the notion of universal access to reproductive 
health care as canvassed by international public health policy makers. It also considers 
whether law in its regulatory function can be used as an agent of change to combat and curb 
the social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childless women in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction and Framework of the study 
1.0 Introduction  
This chapter set outs the general framework of this thesis. It provides perspective on why the 
study has been undertaken and identifies the methodological approaches adopted 
throughout the thesis. It explains its aims and objectives and undertakes a general literature 
review of scholarly works that relates to the thesis’ objectives. It set outs the outline of the 
chapters of the thesis and concludes with an explanation of the underlining motivation for the 
undertaking of the research.  
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
Infertility and involuntary childlessness are traumatic human conditions. Many couples desire 
to have biological children of their own and when there is an inability to reproduce, it creates 
a sense of personal loss and tragedy. The World Health Organisation (WHO) views the 
medical condition of infertility as a global health problem and accepts that it is more of a 
critical health problem in the developing world. A 2012 WHO study based on previous data 
gathered from the Demographic and Health Surveys estimate that one in four couples in 
developing countries is infertile.1 Several of these infertile or involuntary childless people are 
located in what some scholars have described as pro-natal2 states. Some of these states fall 
within the Sub-Saharan African region which consists of countries that lie geographically 
south of the Sahara desert.3  
Unlike other areas of the world where infertility is viewed as a personal traumatic experience, 
the condition of being involuntary childless in Sub-Saharan Africa is treated as a public 
                                                          
1 Mascarenhas M., et al National, Regional, and Global Trends in Infertility Prevalence since 1990: A 
Systematic Analysis of 277 Health Surveys (2012) 9(12) PLOS Medicine pp 1-12. 
2  Pennings G., Ethical issues of infertility treatment in developing countries (2012) Facts, Views and 
Vision in Obstetrics and Gynaecology 17-23. 
3 Middleton J., Encyclopaedia of Africa South of the Sahara (African studies, Yale Univ. Vol 4, 1997). 
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condition that threatens the continuing existence of the family structure and the community 
at large. The perceived existentialist threat that involuntary childlessness is meant to cause 
to the society has led to the social stigmatisation of the condition.  There is substantive 
evidence4 particularly in the social sciences and medical disciplines that shows that women 
especially bear the brunt of this social stigmatisation even when male infertility is the cause 
of the inability to procreate.  
The stigmatising social construction of infertility and involuntary childlessness has been 
found to affect the social status, economic wellbeing and inherent worth of women. Yet only 
up until recently, public health specialists have treated infertility and involuntary 
childlessness ‘a life choice that has gone awry’ 5 and which did not deserve too much 
attention. This led to some describing infertility as the ‘Cinderella of reproductive health.’ 6 
Malthusian’s concerns of over-population particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia have 
been raised as key reasons why infertility has been neglected by health bodies involved in 
reproductive health care.7 Consequently international reproductive health bodies focused 
more on reproductive health policies that aided population reduction, rather than those that 
promoted fertility in regions that are considered as over-populated. Yet the narratives of 
many involuntarily childless people in Sub-Saharan Africa establish that infertility and 
involuntary childlessness are matters that deserve attention due to the impact that the social 
                                                          
4 See for example Dyer S.,The value of children in African countries: insights from studies on infertility 
(2007) 28 J Psychosom Obstet Gynaecol pp 69–77;Dyer SJ., Abrahams N., Hoffman M., Van der 
Spuy ZM., ‘Men leave me as I cannot have children’: Women’s experiences with involuntary 
childlessness. (2002a) 17 Hum Reprod 1663–1668 and Hollos M., Proﬁles of infertility in southern 
Nigeria: Women’s voices from Amakiri. (2003) 7 Afr J Reprod Health pp 46–56. 
5 McVicker K., Ordinary Miracles: A Journey through primary and secondary infertility p 22. 
6 Dyer S., Barrenness among plenty (2007) 13(2) South African Journal of Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology p 32 available at http://www.sajog.org.za/index.php/SAJOG/article/download/76/52.  
(accessed July 29, 2015).   
7 Obono O., Life Histories of Infertile Women in Ugep, Southern Nigeria (2004) 19(2) African 
Population Studies p 63. 
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stigmatisation of these conditions have on the wellbeing of involuntary childless  women in 
the region.8 
This thesis therefore explores and considers the reasons why involuntary childlessness 
should not just be viewed purely from economic and demographical concerns of over-
population, but from a discourse on tragedy that highlights the devastating impact that the 
social stigmatisation of infertility has on involuntary childless men and women in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness and infertility can also 
be viewed from a rights-based discourse particularly within the context of whether the 
involuntary childless in Sub-Saharan Africa have the right to procreative liberty or autonomy 
over reproductive matters.9 Procreative liberty or reproductive autonomy has been effectively 
utilised as a rights-based mechanism to provide women in both the developed and 
developing regions of the world with greater access to birth control and abortion services. 
However, the clamour for reproductive autonomy as the basis for providing infertile people 
particularly in developing regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa with access to affordable 
assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) is rarely championed. This thesis will explore why 
this is the case. The thesis will also consider whether there is a case for widening access to 
ARTs for involuntary childless women within this part of the developing world. The argument 
for the case for wider access to ARTs is undertaken within the framework of the tragic 
narrative of the social stigmatisation on infertility in the Sub-Saharan African continent.  
In developing a case for providing wider access to ARTs in Sub-Saharan Africa, this thesis 
will also consider the arguments that have been raised against the provisioning of affordable 
ARTs in this region. As stated earlier, one of the key arguments against the widening of 
access to ARTS in this region of the world has to do with demographical concern on 
overpopulation. The other argument is premised on child justice considerations. The key 
                                                          
8 See for example Hollos M., Larsen U., Obono O., Whitehouse B., Suffering infertility: The impact of 
infertility on women’s life experiences in two Nigerian communities. (2010) 42(6) J Biosoc Sci. pp 
787–814.  
9 Robertson J., Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press: 1996) 281 pp. 
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child justice argument against the widening of access to reproductive technologies has to do 
with concerns surrounding who should bear the social and moral burden of child orphans 
(and other children who do not have families to take care of them) in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Child adoption has therefore been canvassed as a key way of addressing the needs of the 
involuntary childless in Africa and other parts of the developing world. According to that 
argument, this constitutes a much better way of managing the needs of the involuntary 
childless within this region as opposed to providing wider access to expensive Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies (ARTs). Proponents for the case of utilising child adoption as a 
tool for meeting the needs of the involuntary childless within the region have also raised 
health prioritisation concerns such as infant mortality and HIV/AIDS to argue against the 
case for widening access to ARTs within the region. 
While this thesis accepts that these are valid concerns, it will argue that the tragic discourse 
of infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa raises complex cultural and social concerns that may 
impact on the parenting decisions of individuals within this region. It will therefore argue that 
child adoption on its own cannot serve as the sole or key mechanism in managing the needs 
of the involuntary childless within this region. This in part is due to the pluralistic nature of the 
law governing family structures within the Sub-Saharan African continent which means that 
child adoption is not only regulated by Western received law, but also in the customary and 
religious laws of the African communities. In determining whether child adoption can ever 
serve as the sole or key option in managing the needs of the involuntary childless, there 
needs to be some consideration of the customary or religious rules that operate alongside 
Western received law.  
The study therefore seeks to explain from a discourse on tragedy what it means to be 
infertile or involuntary childless in a pro-natal African community and why there is a human 
rights case for advocating wider access to ARTs in the Sub-Saharan African community. To 
provide further perspective on what this thesis sets out to do, the following section outlines 
its purpose and the research questions that it seeks to address. 
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1.2 Purpose and Query of the Research 
The key purpose of this thesis is to explore the social stigmatisation of infertility in Sub-
Saharan Africa and how this affects the status of involuntary childless women within this 
region. It also seeks to investigate what role law can play in widening of access to assisted 
reproductive technologies (ARTs) and in combating the social stigmatisation of involuntary 
childlessness and its deleterious effect on involuntary childless women in the region.  
In line with this two-pronged objective, this thesis seeks to explore the following questions: 
i. How is infertility perceived in Sub-Saharan Africa and how do public attitudes to 
infertility affect the status of involuntary childless women in this region of the 
developing world? 
ii. What is the social meaning of motherhood in Sub-Saharan Africa and how does 
the social construction of motherhood affect the legal status and identity of 
involuntary childless women in the region? 
iii. How effective is the current management of infertility and involuntary 
childlessness in sub-Saharan Africa and how do the demographical concerns of 
over-population as well as child justice concerns impact on the reproductive 
health care rights of infertile women in the region? 
iv. Can widening access to Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTS) in Sub-
Saharan Africa enhance the reproductive making choices of involuntary childless 
women in the region? If yes, how can widening access to ARTs contribute to the 
reduction of social stigmatisation of infertility in African communities?  
These questions prove critical to evaluating the role that law can play in tackling the social 
stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa. They help to 
inform and interrogate whether the law’s role should be limited to the sole regulatory purpose 
of widening access to ARTs or if it should be deployed to address the wider concerns of 
tackling social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness.  It is hoped that a consideration of 
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these queries will provide further legal perspectives on whether the solutions offered to 
tackle the conditions of infertility and involuntary childlessness are effective in catering for 
the needs of women within the region. 
1.3 Theoretical Approach and Methodology 
The key theories employed in this thesis to address these research queries are drawn from 
works undertaken within the theoretical schools of regulation, socio-legal studies and legal 
pluralism. This three-pronged theoretical approach has been employed for a number of 
reasons. First the reason for adopting a socio-legal theoretical approach is that the problem 
domain of this thesis is polygenic in nature and deserves a wider consideration beyond the 
black letter of the law. This is because the issues connected with social stigmatisation of 
infertility extend beyond the field of law to other disciplines, including the social sciences, 
medicine and humanities. An inter-disciplinary discourse therefore needs to be undertaken 
to provide further understanding of the tragic nature of involuntary childlessness in Sub-
Saharan Africa. This is because the formulation of legislative or regulatory mechanisms 
requires a proper understanding of the complex socio-cultural environment in which 
involuntary childless women operate in the Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The socio-legal approach is therefore best placed to deal with an exploration of a legal issue 
that is contextualised in multiple disciplines. As explained by Wheeler and Thomas, socio-
legal studies help to provide ‘an interdisciplinary alternative and a challenge to doctrinal 
studies of law.’10  ‘Schiff11 also points out that socio-legal studies focus on the intersection 
between the analysis of law and the analysis of the social situation to which the law applies. 
In this sense, as Cotterrell 12 explains, socio-legal studies help to explain why  legal study 
must involve an evaluation of the social conditions that underpin the formulation and the 
                                                          
10 Wheeler S., Thomas PA., ‘Socio-Legal Studies’ in DJ Hayton, (ed), Law’s Future(s) (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2002) 271. 
11 Schiff D., Socio-Legal Theory: Social Structure and Law  (1976) 39(3) The Modern Law Review  
287. 
12 Cotterrell R., Law’s Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995; Cotterrell R., Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006. 
 
 
 
7 
 
development of law. Similar arguments have also been offered by Hazel Genn13 who argues 
that systems of justice can only be effective when law makers have a fuller understanding of 
the external dynamics that influence how people resolve disputes or how they perceive the 
functionality of the law.   
Another leading scholar in the socio-legal jurisprudence is Austin Sarat14 whose works 
include that on the welfare of the poor and on capital punishment. He explains that law can 
be ineffective in its application if the law maker fails to look at the social context in which the 
law should apply.  These works follow in the tradition of sociological jurisprudence 
championed by Roscoe Pound, an eminent American jurist.  Pound did not only limit his 
discourse strictly to a jurisprudential diagnosis of the social context in which the law 
operates. He also considered how the law could serve as a tool for social reformation. He 
conceived law as a tool of social engineering that could be utilised to influence, change and 
shape societal norms and attitudes.15  This is a matter that will be further considered in 
chapter seven of this thesis. 
It is pertinent to note that the socio-legal approach has also been utilised by other scholars in 
other jurisdictions of the world to evaluate reproductive issues especially in the area of 
assisted treatment for infertility. Beinstein16 for example deployed a socio-legal approach to 
investigate why medical developments in artificial insemination developed into popular 
practice despite the uncertainty of the legal framework after the Second World War. Socio-
legal theory has also been adopted by works such as Callahan and Roberts17 to critique the 
meaning of reproductive autonomy and procreative liberty. This thesis in the same way 
                                                          
13 See for example Genn H., Paths to Justice: What People do and think about going to Law (Oxford: 
Hart, Publishing 1999) 382 pp; Genn H., A Paterson., Paths to Justice Scotland: What Scottish 
People Do and Think About Going to Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2001)  391 pp. 
14 See for example Sarat A., The Law Is All Over: Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of 
the Welfare Poor, (1990) 2(2) Article 6 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities p 374 at p 379. 
15  Pound R. 1870-1964 Social Control through Law (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1968) 138 
pp.  
Bernstein G., The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look At Artificial 
Insemination (2002) 7 Washington Law Review 1035. 
17 Callahan J., Roberts D., A Feminist Social Justice Approach to Reproduction –Assisting 
Technologies: A Case Study on the Limits of Liberal Theory (1996). Faculty Scholarship. Paper 1155 
available at  http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1155  (accessed May 17 2015). 
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adopts a socio-legal approach to evaluate its problem domain area of the negative 
feminisation of infertility and the role that law could play in tackling this problem. This is 
driven by a deep passion for the welfare and equality of involuntary childless women within 
the Sub-Saharan African region.  
In deploying a socio-legal theoretical approach, the thesis is able to consider whether there 
is a singular or homogeneous approach in promoting women’s rights, especially in 
developing parts of the world like Sub-Saharan Africa. In its discourse of the negative 
feminisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa, it queries 
whether there is a social justice case to provide wider access to assisted reproductive 
technologies (ARTs) to infertile women in the region that would provide real choice for 
women in reproductive matters and enhance their status in their family structures and 
community. 
In problematizing the negative feminisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness, the 
utilisation of the socio-legal theoretical approach enables the thesis to investigate the social 
and cultural norms that influence and shape societal attitudes in Sub-Saharan Africa, the site 
of investigation. The deployment of the socio-legal theory helps to interrogate the central 
hypothesis on the role that law can play in tackling the social stigmatisation of infertility and 
involuntary childlessness.      
 
This thesis also utilises the theory of legal pluralism as part of its wider socio-legal discourse. 
This is due to the fact that many African countries practice what can be described as a legal 
pluralist system. Stewart 18 defines legal pluralism as the: 
‘recognition of differing legal orders within the nation-state or it can validate open 
ended concepts of law which do not depend on state recognition.’ 
                                                          
18  Stewart A., Entitlements, Pluralism and Gender Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa (2007) Warwick 
School of Law Research Paper Series available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1531167 p 194 at 
p 203. 
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The pluralist nature of legal systems in Africa is especially evident in the regulation of family 
structures. The problem domain of this thesis which focuses on the social stigmatisation of 
involuntary childlessness and its impact on involuntary childless women is situated within the 
regulation of family structures. The legal pluralist theory is therefore utilised to explain the 
difficulties and limitations of adopting a purely Western legal approach to tackling the social 
tragedy of involuntary childlessness in Africa. This is particularly relevant to the exploration 
of my fourth research query which explores the demographical and child justice concerns 
that have been raised by some to limit the access of ARTs in sub-Saharan Africa. While 
there are many theoretical approaches to legal pluralism, the leading theoretical works in this 
area include Griffiths19, Moore20 and Vanderliden.21 Other works that rely on the legal 
pluralist theoretical approach are Chiba,22 Menski23 and Stewart24 which consider the role 
that customary law and religious rules play in non-Western jurisdictions. 
Finally, although the theoretical framework of this thesis is primarily situated within the socio-
legal theoretical framework; there are sections where regulatory theory is deployed. This 
theoretical approach is discussed extensively in other literature.25 The aspect of regulatory 
theory that is relevant to this thesis is the public interest concept of regulation which argues 
that regulatory intervention is necessary to protect and provide benefit to the public.26 While 
                                                          
19  Griffiths J., What is Legal Pluralism (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 24. 
20  Moore SF., Social Facts and Fabrications: Customary Law on Kilimanjaro, 1880-1980 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press); Moore SF., Moore, Sally Falk. Law as Process (New Jersey: 
Transaction Publishers, 2d ed. 2000). 
21Vanderlinden J., Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later, 28 J. Legal Pluralism & Unofficial L. 
149 (1989). 
22 Chiba M., Legal Pluralism: Toward a General Theory through Japanese Legal Culture (Tokai 
University Press, 1989) 236 pp. 
23 Menski W., Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa 
 (Cambridge University Press: 2006). 
24 See for example Stewart (note 18) above. 
25 See for example leading works such as Peltzman S., (1976) Towards a more general theory on 
regulation  19(2) Journal of Law and Economics 245-248; Breyer S., Regulation and its Reform 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 1982);  Ogus A., Regulation: Legal Form and Economic 
Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1994);  Lange B., (1998)  Understanding Regulatory Law: Empirical 
versus Systems- Theoretical Approaches 18(3) Oxford J Legal Studies 449;  Baldwin R., and Cave 
M., Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
1999).  
26 Hantke-Domas M., (2003) The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non- Existence or 
Misinterpretation 15 European Journal of Law and Economics p 165. 
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not completely discountenancing the role of public interest in economic regulatory theory as 
expounded by its leading proponents such as Posner;27 this thesis focuses more on the 
public interest nature of regulation in the development of the law which Sir Matthew Hale, 
Chief Justice of the King Bench was said to have ‘first articulated’.28 The deployment of 
regulatory theory is utilised in chapter seven of this thesis which discusses whether there is 
need for regulatory intervention to foster wider access to reproductive technologies. The 
public interest perspectives of regulatory intervention and its development of the law will 
complement the underlining socio-legal inquiries of this thesis especially with regard to the 
consideration on whether strict state law situated in the human rights framework can achieve 
its regulatory objective of eliminating the negative feminisation of infertility and involuntary 
childlessness in a pluralist environment where other non-state rules and norms hold sway. 
This thesis will refer to the works of Black29 on decentred regulation to examine this point. 
The nature of this work is theoretical rather than empirical in nature, based essentially on 
library based desk top research. That work has been necessary in developing a strong 
theoretical framework surrounding a problem domain which is complex and wide-ranging in 
the concerns it embraces. This research has involved the expository review and analysis of 
primary sources of black letter law (legislation and case law where applicable) and 
secondary sources in the form of academic monographs, edited volumes, peer reviewed 
articles and other authoritative works comprising of reports and materials from international 
and other multilateral agencies. Where necessary, I have also explored some grey literature 
developed by reputable non-governmental organisations30 that directly work in the field of 
reproductive health care rights for involuntary childless people in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The 
exploration of the desktop based literature surrounding my problem domain area focuses not 
                                                          
27 Posner R., Theories of Economic Regulation (1974) 5 Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Sciences pp 337-352. 
28 See further discourse in Matheny R Taxation of Public Utilities (Lexis Nexis, 2014) Release 21 
Update at 2.02. 
29 See for example Black J., Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-
Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory World. (2001) 54(1) Current Legal Problems pp 103-146 
30  See for example, the Walking Egg Foundation: Global Access to Infertility Care website 
http://www.thewalkingegg.com/about . 
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just on the black letter concept of what is legal but also on other norms and rules, including 
customs and beliefs that help to shape how society regulates the management of infertility 
and involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
The country case jurisdiction for this investigation is Nigeria. Chapter four of this thesis 
provides the key reasons why Nigeria has been chosen as the key country case study 
jurisdiction for this study. Where necessary, a comparative study shall also be undertaken of 
the legal framework of other Sub-Saharan African countries. This is mainly done in chapter 2 
which focuses on public attitudes in Sub-Saharan Africa and in chapter 5 which considers 
whether child adoption should be considered as the sole infertility management option for 
resolving the parenting needs of involuntary childless people. Chapter 7 which inter alia 
focuses on the social engineering role that law can play in combating the social malaise of 
the social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness also contains an element 
of comparative study of the legal framework of Nigeria and South Africa.  
1.4 General Review of the Literature 
This thesis seeks to explore key issues surrounding the social stigmatisation of involuntary 
childless women in pronatalist developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Based on 
existing literature, I intend to chart out the social, cultural, economic, religious and legal 
issues affecting involuntary childless African women and how these issues contribute to their 
social stigmatisation within their communities. For the purpose of getting a better 
understanding of the issues surrounding the social stigmatisation of infertile women in Sub-
Saharan Africa, I have undertaken an interdisciplinary literature review which examines the 
available literature on the subject. From the literature reviewed, I discovered that infertility 
and involuntary childlessness in Africa has been the focus of a number of research studies 
cutting across disciplines such as law, humanities, medicine, developmental and 
demographical studies and core social sciences areas such as sociology and anthropology. 
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There are several broad themes that cut across the extensive research on infertility and 
involuntary childlessness in different parts of the developing world including Sub-Saharan 
Africa which is the focus of the investigation of this thesis. Some of the core themes that are 
of some relevance to the queries set out in this thesis are outlined in this review. The first 
theme of research considers the socio-cultural meaning of infertility. It explains what means 
to be infertile. Pearce31 and Okonofua’s32 works which focus on the social meaning and 
consequences of infertility in Nigeria point to the level of disenfranchisement that infertile 
people face in pronatalist societies where procreation is considered as paramount to the 
continued existence and prosperity of the community. One of the key issues identified by 
Pearce33 in her sociological research is the sense of marginalisation that infertile women 
experience in their community. The same concern is also expressed in Upton’s34 work in 
Botwana and similar concerns are also raised by Kielman35 in her research undertaken in 
Tanzania and as well as in Dyer’s36 research undertaken in South Africa.  
These scholarly works within this stream provide insight into the ensuing social 
stigmatisation that arise from a pronatalist socio-cultural construction of infertility. Of 
particular interest to this thesis is the fact that the literature within this stream of research 
shows that the marginalisation and stigmatisation of infertility normally has a gendered effect 
on women. Writers such as Van Balen37  develop this theme further through the undertaking 
of a comparative study on the social impact of infertility in the Sub-Saharan African and 
Indian Sub-Continents. Both sub-continents point to a high level of the stigmatisation of the 
                                                          
31 Pearce T., She will not be listened to in public: Perceptions among the Yoruba of Infertility and 
Childlessness in women. (1999) 7 (13) Reproductive Health Matters pp 69-79. 
32 Okonofua F., Harris D., Odebiyi A., Kane T., Snow R., The social meaning of infertility in Southwest 
Nigeria (1997) 7 Health Transition Review pp 205-220. 
33 Pearce (note 31) above. 
34 Upton R., Infertility makes you invisible: Gender, health and the negotiation of infertility in Northern 
Botswana (2001) 27(2) Journal of Southern African Studies pp 349-362. 
35 Kielman K., Barren ground: Contesting identities of infertile women in Pemba, Tanzania. In M. Lock 
& P. Kaufert (eds), Pragmatic Women and Body Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998) pp 127- 163. 
36 Dyer S., Abrahams N., Hoffman M., Van der Spuy Z Men leave me as I cannot have children: 
women’s experiences with involuntary childlessness (2002) 17 (6) Human Reproduction pp 1663-8. 
37 Van Balen F, Bos HMW., The social and cultural consequences of being childless in poor resource 
areas (2009) 1(2) F, V & V IN OBGYN from p 106.  
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medical condition of infertility yet the level of social stigmatisation, family harassment and 
isolation seemed to be more profound in the Indian continent than in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, as Van-Balen’s work shows this does not in any way minimise the debilitating 
social meaning and effect of infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa especially when due 
consideration is given to the fact that incidences of divorce and marital conflicts within this 
sub-continent are attributable to the condition of  infertility.38 This important study also shows 
that the level of economic insecurity experienced by infertile women in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
higher than the Indian sub-continent. This first stream of research is therefore important to 
the underlining concern of this thesis on whether the social stigmatisation of involuntary 
childlessness provides a case for advocating for the widening of affordable assisted 
reproductive technologies in Sub-Saharan Africa even if some regions of this sub-continent 
are poorly resourced. 
Within this theme of research there is also scholarship which explores whether there is a 
difference between the ‘biological meaning of infertility’ and the ‘social construction of 
involuntary childlessness’.39 Early works on this point include Matthew and Matthew40 who 
distinguish between infertility and involuntary childlessness. While not particularly focused on 
poor resourced regions in the developing world, these writers provide interesting insights 
highlighting the importance of that distinction in practice. One of the key issues highlighted in 
their work and in the later work of Gayle Letherby41 is the fact that women can be 
‘involuntary childless’ and not necessarily ‘medically infertile.’ This is a very critical point that 
will be further investigated in this thesis particularly from the perspective that women in 
Africa normally bear the brunt of the stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness even when 
they are not medically diagnosed as infertile. This critical area of scholarly research forms 
the basis for the reason why this thesis utilises the term involuntary childlessness instead of 
                                                          
38 Ibid at p 115. 
39 Matthews, R. and Matthews, A. M. Infertility and involuntary childlessness: the transition to non-
parenthood, (1986) 48 Journal of Marriage and the Family, pp. 641–649. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Letherby G., Challenging Dominant Discourses: identity and change and the experience of 
‘infertility’ and ‘involuntary childlessness (2002) 11(3) Journal of Gender Studies p 277 at 278. 
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confining it to the more narrowly medical defined condition of infertility, particularly when the 
social stigmatisation is due to shrouded male infertility. 
The second stream of research seeks to diagnose from a demographical and as well as an 
anthropological perspective, the prevalence of infertility in populous areas of the world such 
as Sub-Saharan Africa. Ulla Larsen,42 for example has conducted extensive demographical 
research that provide useful evidence on the extent of the problem of infertility in Africa and 
its local variants. She has also undertaken empirical research to ascertain if there is still a 
prevailing ‘infertility belt’ in Africa. The conclusions of her research confirms that primary and 
secondary infertility are still prevalent in the central region of the Sub-Saharan African 
continent and that more needs to be done to tackle the social implications associated with 
this issue. Similar research has also been undertaken by Marida Hollos and Bruce 
Whitehouse in West Africa on the social impact that fertility decline has had on involuntary 
childless women.43  Similarly, demographical perspectives on the extent of the degree of 
fertility decline in the North Africa is discussed in Roudi-Fahimi and Mederios Kent’s44 work. 
Although North Africa is not the focus of this thesis’ investigation, Roudi-Fahimi and 
Mederios Kent’s work does provide some interesting findings which are of comparative 
interest to this research. This is because they show that fertility decline is not necessarily 
attributable to infertility. Their research showed that other social causes such as the delay in 
marriage may cause fertility decline.45 This again confirms why the biological condition of 
infertility is distinguishable from the social condition of involuntary childlessness.  
                                                          
42 Larsen U., ‘Sterility in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (1994) 48(3) Population Studies pp 459-474; Larsen U., 
Infertility in Central Africa (2003) 8(4) Tropical Medicine and International Health 354; Primary and 
secondary infertility in Sun-Saharan Africa (2000) International Journal of Epidemiology 285-291 and 
Larsen U., Primary and secondary infertility in Tanzania (2003) 5 Journal of Health and Population in 
Developing Countries pp 5-15.  
43Hollos M., Profiles of infertility in Southern Nigeria: Women’s voices from Amakiri (2003) 7 African 
Journal of Reproductive Health 46-56; Whitehouse, B. and Hollos, M. (2014), Definitions and the 
Experience of Fertility Problems: Infertile and Sub-fertile Women, Childless Mothers, and Honorary 
Mothers in Two Southern Nigerian Communities. (2014) 28 (1) Medical Anthropology Quarterly pp 
122–139.  
44 Roudi-Fahimi F and Medirous Kent R., Challenges and opportunities--the population of the Middle 
East and North Africa. (2007) 62(2) Population Bulletin pp 1-20. 
45 Ibid at p 8. 
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The third strand of research focuses on the reproductive health care seeking behaviour of 
infertile people and the social challenges surrounding infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Scholars like Silke Dyer46 have undertaken extensive empirical research on the health care 
seeking behavioural patterns of infertile people within the region and have provided country 
specific information on the social challenges of infertility from a public health perspective. 
Marcia Irhorn and Frank Van Balen in their edited collection also provide further evidence for 
the growing role that assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) plays in Africa and other 
parts of the developing world in tackling infertility.47  
Works under this theme, particularly those of Dyer, establish that the treatment seeking 
behaviour of involuntary childless people is not just necessarily confined to conventional 
medicine, but other forms of alternative treatment. This wide ranging quest for treatments 
that can achieve procreation confirm that involuntary childless women are prepared to seek 
other alternative sources if they feel their desired reproductive goal can be achieved through 
these sources. Marcia Irhorn describes this pursuit as the ‘quest for conception’.48 She also 
highlights the important point that monotheistic religions such as Islam practised in North 
Africa and other parts of the African continent do not necessarily prohibit the use of ARTs 
but rather proactively encourage infertile couples to take steps to find a solution that would 
help them overcome infertility. This is a very important point in the sense that there are 
stereotypes about whether involuntary childless people assume a fatalistic attitude to their 
condition due to their adherence of religious or cultural beliefs. However, works like Irhorn 
                                                          
46 See for example Dyer S., Abrahams N., Hoffman M., Van Der Spuy ZM., Infertility in South Africa: 
Women’s Reproductive Health Knowledge and Treatment Seeking Behaviour for Involuntary 
Childlessness.  (2002)  17(6) Human Reproduction pp. 1657–1662. See the unpublished PhD thesis 
of Bunting L., Help Seeking Behaviour and Risk in the Context of Female Fertility (Cardiff University, 
2008) pp 1-375 which discusses generally the help seeking behaviour of couples in their engagement 
with fertility medical services. 
47 Irhorn M, Van Balen F, Infertility around the globe: new thinking on childlessness, Gender and 
Reproductive Technologies (California, University of California Press: 2002) 
48 Irhorn M., Quest for Conception: Gender, Infertility and Egyptian Medical Traditions (Pennsylvania: 
University of Pennsylvania Press) 472 pp. See also the unpublished thesis of De Kok C., Constructing 
infertility in Malawi: Management of Interpersonal, Normative and Moral Issues in Talk (University of 
Edinburgh, 2006) 2006 pp 1-273. 
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establish that this is not necessary the case. It is interesting that the same proactive attitude 
to do something about infertility or involuntary childlessness is also evident in traditional 
African cultures49 where women, in particular, will proactively seek assistance from 
traditional healers or other alternative methods outside conventional medicine to see how 
they can achieve conception. Current works like Egede50 explained how the behaviour 
seeking treatment to overcome infertility and involuntary childlessness may lead to women 
being exposed to harm. Building on this stream of research, this thesis will further argue that 
in light of the fact that involuntary childless people are proactive in seeking for means to 
reproduce, there is a case for prioritising wider access to affordable medical treatment. This 
of course will fall into the debate on whether there is a right to reproduce and if there is to 
what extent states are duty bound to facilitate this right. This is a critical concern of the fourth 
research stream on infertility and involuntary childlessness identified below. This concern will 
also be further explored in chapters six and seven of this thesis. 
The fourth strand of research on infertility focuses on the prioritisation of health care 
resources in Africa. The key questions addressed in this strand of research relates to the 
health economic concerns of resource allocation. Proponents of this school such as 
Okonofua51 argue that infertility and involuntary childlessness should be best handled 
through preventive treatment rather than the utilisation of expensive ARTs which may not 
yield the desired results. This school of thought posits that the provisioning of ARTs would 
be too expensive to implement in developing countries and would end up draining scarce 
resources that could utilised for more serious health problems such as infant mortality, 
HIV/AIDS and Malaria.52  
                                                          
49 Koster-Oyekan, W., Infertility among Yoruba Women: Perceptions on Causes, Treatment and 
Consequences. (1999) 3(1) African Journal of Reproductive Health 13-26. 
50 Egede H., Shrouded Gender and Reproductive Issues in Child Welfare and Protection Proceedings 
(2011) 23 Denning Law Journal pp 202-226. 
51 Okonofua F., ‘The case against new reproductive technologies in developing countries’ (1996) 103 
British Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology p 957. 
52 Malpani S., ‘Inappropriate use of new technology: Impact on women’s health’ (1997) 58 
International Journal of Gynaecology & Obstetrics pp 159 at 161. 
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This strand of research argues that preventive treatment is more effective than fertility 
treatment since sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) have been found to be one of the key 
causes of infertility and involuntary childlessness in the region. A 2001 modelling study 
undertaken by White, Zaba, Boerma and Blacker53  provides evidence that demonstrate how 
the introduction of better STD treatment, including a wider use of antibiotics into the public 
health system has helped to reduce the number of primary infertility cases in the Sub-
Saharan African region. This approach to infertility can be likened to the health economic 
approach adopted at the early stage of the HIV epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa where it was 
recommended that rather than provide expensive Western anti-retroviral drugs to poor 
Africans; public health resources should focus on preventive measures to reduce further HIV 
infections. 54 The thematic concern of how the allocation of scarce resources can affect the 
provisioning of fertility treatment for the infertile and involuntary childless in the region is of 
key interest in this thesis and is extensively discussed in chapter six of this thesis which 
addresses the concern on whether there is a binding right to universal reproductive health 
care and whether state funding should be prioritised to achieve this right. 
In contrast to the previous stream of research, the fifth thematic area of research on infertility 
and involuntary childlessness in developing regions of the world, including Sub-Saharan 
Africa argues for the widening of access to reproductive health care including ARTs for 
involuntary childless patients. Key writers within this stream of research are Ombelet and 
Cooke55 argue that while preventive treatment is vital in tackling infertility problem in Africa, 
this should not detract from the right of infertile patients to access the highest attainable 
reproductive health care, including Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs). Providing 
                                                          
53  White RG., Zaba B., Boerma T., Blacker J., Modelling the dramatic decline of primary infertility in 
Sub-Saharan Africa in Boerma T. and Mgalla Z., (Eds.) Women and infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa: a 
multi-disciplinary perspective (Amsterdam, Netherlands, Royal Tropical Institute, KIT Publishers, 
2001). Pp 117-148.  
54 Bertozzi S., Padian NS., Wegbreit J., DeMaria LS., Feldman B., Gayle H., Gold J., Grant R., Isbell 
MT., HIV/AIDS Prevention and Treatment in Jamison DT., Breman JG., Measham AR., Alleyne M., 
Claeson DB., Evans DB.,  Prabhat J., Mills A., Musgrove P., (eds.) Disease Control Priorities in 
Developing Countries (Washington DC: World Bank, 2nd edition 2006) Chapter 18. 
55 Ombelet W., Cooke I., Dyer S., Serour G and Devroey P., Infertility and the provision of infertility 
medical services in developing countries. (2008) 14 Human Reproduction Update 14: pp 605-621. 
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the highest attainable reproductive health is enshrined in soft law international instruments 
such as Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD) 56  and the Beijing Platform and Declaration for Action57. Proponents 
within this stream of research advocate that the socio-cultural significance of infertility within 
these countries and its deleterious consequences on involuntary childless people makes it 
imperative for infertile people to have wider access to different forms of fertility treatment, 
including ARTs.58  
International Health Organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the 
European Society for Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) have lent their 
support to this school of thought. In a major research study sponsored by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) on current practices and controversies in assisted reproduction, 
recognition was given to the fact that infertility is a disease and should be treated as a public 
health issue of global concern.59 As a follow up from this crucial WHO conference, some 
international fertility specialists are currently working on a plan of action that would explore 
the safety and efficacy of introducing low cost or affordable ARTs in Africa and other 
developing regions of the world60 Again, their arguments for the need for low cost ARTs is 
premised on the growing awareness of the scale of the problem of infertility in Africa and the 
socio-cultural challenges that this reproductive health disease poses for infertile African 
women. What appears to be lacking in this effort is the deliberate and meaningful 
engagement between law and the medical field to determine whether there is a binding right 
to provide reproductive health care to the infertile in the form of fertility treatment. It appears 
that the clinicians who are currently undertaking ground breaking research in this area are 
                                                          
56 Adopted in Cairo, Egypt, September 1994. 
57 Adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, September 1995.  
58 Hamberger L., Janson P., ‘Global Importance of Infertility and its Treatment: Role of Fertility 
Technologies’ (1997) 58(1) International Journal of Gynecology & Obstetrics p 149. 
59 Vayena E., et al. eds., Current practices and controversies in assisted reproduction. Geneva, World 
Health Organization, 2002. 
60 Pilcher H., IVF in Africa: Fertility on a shoestring, (2006) 442 Nature 975; Ombelet W., The Walking 
Egg Project: Universal access to infertility care – from dream to reality (2013) 5(2) Facts Views Vis 
Obgyn. 2013; 161–175; Ombelet W., Global access to infertility care: The Walking Egg Project (2014) 
Facts Views Vis Obgyn pp 1-3. 
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unclear on this point as to whether there exists a hard law regime that provides for a binding 
right to access to ARTs.61 This thesis therefore seeks to address and provide insight on this 
point from a legal perspective. 
This is not to say that there has not been earlier work undertaken on the legal status of 
ARTs in regions of the world such as Sub-Saharan Africa. Key among these works is that of 
Yusuff62 who discusses whether there is a right to reproduce in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
conjunction with this query, Yusuff also considers the availability of reasonable access to 
infertility treatment. However, in his discussions, he appears to ignore the current 
developments undertaking in the field of public health to make access to ARTs more 
affordable. This thesis will therefore contribute to the discussions on this point particularly 
with regard to the argument that ARTs should not be provided on a wider basis to the 
involuntary childless, due to the fact that it entails expensive curative treatment.  
The sixth major strand of research on involuntary childlessness and infertility in Africa 
focuses on the regulatory framework for fertility treatment in Sub-Saharan Africa. In his 
recent 2015 work, Yusuff63 again provides further perspective on why the social issues of 
infertility in this sub-continent makes the regulation of assisted reproductive technologies 
(ARTs) imperative especially from an ethical point of  view. Some of the key concerns in his 
work relate to donor gametes and their legal status which extend beyond the focus of this 
thesis. It is also important to refer to the previous doctoral research work in this area 
undertaken by TBE Ogiamen which considered the legal implications of providing artificial 
                                                          
61 Ombelet, 2013 (note 60) at p 163.  
62 Yusuff A., ‘Legal Enhancement of Reasonable Access to Infertility Treatment in 
Nigeria’ (2007) 17(1) Lesotho Law Journal p 157; Yusuff A., Infertility Treatment and the Conceptual 
Dilemma of Involuntary Childlessness: Is there a right to reproduce? (2008/9) 1 Journal of Public Law 
and Jurisprudence p 65.        
63 Yusuff A., Assisted Reproductive Technology in Irehobhude IO., Nwabueze RN., (eds.) 
Comparative Health Law and Policy: Critical Perspective on Nigerian and Global Health Law 
(Farnham, Ashgate, 2015) pp 237-266 and Yusuff A. Legal Justification for Statutory Control of 
Access to IVF Services: A Pragmatic Perspective (2013) 2(1) Humberside Journal of Social Sciences 
pp 32-43. 
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conception in socially conservative regions of the world as Sub-Saharan Africa.64 While 
these studies are important in the sense that they provide interesting discourse on the 
regulation of ARTs in Sub-Saharan Africa, they do not primarily focus on the issue of 
whether law and regulation can be utilised to develop a rights regime to confront the 
negative feminisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness, especially through the 
widening of access to ARTs. This latter concern is a key area of focus for this thesis and it is 
hope that it will make an important contribution to the question as to the regulatory role that 
law can play in combating the malaise of social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness in 
Sub-Saharan Africa as well as facilitating further positive rights to reproductive health care 
for involuntary childless people within the region. 
The seventh strand of research approaches infertility and childlessness from a disability 
rights perspective. The social construction of infertility and its impact as a disability concern 
is well established in industrialised parts of the world such as the United States of America. 
From the literature review, this appears not to be the case in developing regions of the world 
such as Sub-Saharan Africa, where the construction of infertility as a disability concern is still 
at its fledgling stage. However, scholars like Irhorn and Bhardwaj65 have provided useful 
insights to the debilitating and disabling effect that the social stigmatisation of infertility has 
on involuntary childless people in regions of the world where social worth is quantified 
through reproductive capability. They have canvassed that the social construction of 
infertility, with its associated stigmatising effect on women within developing regions such as 
Africa and Asia, should be treated and recognised as a disability rights issues.66 While the 
disability question is beyond the scope of this thesis, this strand of literature also has some 
value towards building the case that infertility is not just a private tragedy but one that has 
deleterious gendered social consequences which to some extent socially disables 
                                                          
64 Ogiamen T., ‘The Legal aspects and implications of artificial conception in Nigeria’ (1989) Ph.D 
Thesis Essex,pp 40-458. 
65 Inhorn M., Bharadwaj A., Reproductively Disabled Lives: Infertility, Stigma, and Suffering in Egypt 
and India. In Ignstad B., Reynolds S., (eds) Disability in Local and Global Worlds, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007) 78-106. 
66Ibid. 
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involuntary childless people and makes them feel inferior to others.67 There is therefore 
some basis for arguing from a social justice and human rights perspective for greater 
reproductive rights for involuntary childless women within the region and especially the right 
to access affordable ARTs that will enable them to procreate if they so desire. This point will 
be further explored in chapters six and seven of this thesis. 
The final strand of research which is also critical to the research on involuntary childlessness 
undertaken in this thesis is situated in feminist and gender equality literature. This strand of 
research includes inter-disciplinary works in the social sciences, humanities and in law. 
These works focus on the reproductive identity of women and the role that reproductive 
choice and autonomy can play in gender empowerment and in facilitating greater 
reproductive rights for women. This thesis engages in chapter three with African feminist 
works developed within this field especially from the African Motherist perspective as 
postulated by African feminists as Acholonu.68  This school of African feminism does not see 
the quest of motherhood as necessarily detracting from other feminist concerns such as 
gender equality and women’s welfare. Yet it is questionable whether works such as 
Acholonu that present Motherism as an alternative to Western feminism fully appreciate the 
impact that the veneration of motherhood has on groups of African women who want to 
reproduce but are unable to do so due to infertility or involuntary childlessness. As Awua69 in 
his critical appraisal of ‘woman to woman violence’ points out, the exploitation of women is 
not necessarily confined to acts of male domination but could also arise in the interactions 
that women have with themselves. No place is this more profound than in family structures 
where there is an inability to conceive. Awua argues that in such situations the social 
stigmatisation suffered by involuntary childless women is in many cases instigated by her 
                                                          
67 Sifris R., Reproductive Freedom, Torture and International Human Rights: Challenging the 
Masculinisation of Torture (Abington:Routledge, 2014) at 5(a)(i) (online resource). 
68 Acholonu C.,  Motherism: An Afrocentric Alternative to Feminism (Abuja: Afa Publications, 1995).  
69 Awua BI., Woman to woman violence: A survey of women characters in Mariama Ba’s So Long a 
Letter and Flora Nwapa’s Efuru in  Okoli FC., Okoye IK., Okeke V., Ojukwu UG., (eds) Gender 
Studies: A  Reader (Nsukka, Great AP Express Publishers Ltd: 2012 ) p 139 at p 143.  
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fertile counterpart.70 This fertile counterpart in a polygamous setting could be a second wife 
or in other structures, the ‘mother in law’ or ‘sister in law.’  This thesis develops further on 
this theme in chapters three and four by arguing that the risk of the social stigmatisation of 
infertility and involuntary childlessness is further heightened by the Motherist strand of 
African feminist discourse that defines motherhood as being central to a woman’s identity. 
The feminist thematic research on reproductive rights particularly research undertaken  
within the legal discipline, further considers the role that key international human rights 
instruments such as CEDAW can play in dealing with female issues such as involuntary 
childlessness. Key among these works is the seminal ground breaking research undertaken 
by Anne Hellum71 which explores the weaknesses of treaties such as CEDAW in fostering 
gender empowerment and female development in post-colonial states in Africa. This 
literature review discusses Hellum’s work quite extensively since it is highly relevant to this 
thesis’ inquiry. 
It is important to note that Hellum’s work is premised on the grounded theory which applies 
inductive methods to analyse empirical data on the experience of childless women in a case 
study African jurisdiction- Zimbabwe.  Through this inductive process, Hellum identifies 
through her field work in Zimbabwe, that childless women and men adopt ‘multiple points of 
identification’72 in navigating their relationships in pluralist African societies. In assuming 
these identities, the childless individual may utilise a number of options which may involve 
recourse to modern methods of infertility management or those rooted in African traditions. 
Hellum argues that Women’s rights instruments particularly those at the international level 
fail to understand the complex system of norms that govern the lives of women in pluralist 
                                                          
70 Ibid. 
71 Hellum, A., Gender and Legal Change in Zimbabwe: Childless Women and Divorce from a Socio-
Cultural and Historical Perspective, in Adelman S., and A. Paliwala (eds.), Law and Crisis in the Third 
World, (London: Hans Zell Publishers. 1993); Hellum A., Stewart, J., A Women's Human Rights and 
Legal Pluralism in Africa: Mixed Norms and Identities in Infertility Management in Zimbabwe 
(Zimbabwe: Mond Books, 1999). See also Boerma J., Mgall Z., Women and Infertility in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: A Multi-Disciplinary Perspective (London, Royal Tropical Institute Press, 2001) 300 pp.  
72 Ibid at p 232. 
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societies like Africa. This may be put down to the fact that international rights instruments 
are generally steeped in Western modernisation approach which sets out to hierarchize 
Western received law above the other rules and values that regulate a pluralist African 
society. This point will be further taken up in the development of this thesis particularly with 
regard to how law can be utilised to social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary 
childlessness that arises out of socio-cultural norms and values of traditional African 
societies. It is important to note that Hellum’s empirical study on infertility management in 
Zimbabwe precedes the enactment of the Maputo Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights of Women in Africa.73 However, this thesis takes cognisance of further 
works by Hellum74 and other writers75 on the role of the Maputo Protocol which do not 
necessarily focus on involuntary childlessness, but are still useful sources of information in 
explaining the development of women’s rights in Africa. However, unlike these works, this 
thesis in its consideration of the Maputo Protocol will focus on the question on whether there 
are apparent failures in the Maputo Protocol in tackling gendered consequences of infertility 
and involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa. This point will be further taken up in 
chapter four of this thesis.  
Other interesting findings in Hellum’s research include the role that class and religion play in 
infertility management options. However, in discussing the role that class and religion play, 
Hellum appears to have restricted her discussion on religion to Christian perspectives and 
indigenous African beliefs on infertility. Understandably, this may be because her field study 
was confined in to a jurisdiction where Christianity constitutes the majority religion 
constituting 70% of the population while Islam is a minority religion constituting 2% of the 
population.  Due to the fact that this thesis focuses primarily on Nigeria as its site of 
                                                          
73  Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, Maputo, CAB/LEG/66.6 (Sept. 
13, 2000); reprinted in 1 Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J. 40, entered into force Nov. 25, 2005.  
74 Hellum A., Sinding Aasen H., (eds) Women’s Human Rights. (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press: 2013) 698 pp; Hellum A., Human Rights, Plural Legalities, and Gendered Realities: Paths are 
Made by Walking (Harare: Weaver Press: 2007) 472 pp. 
75  Derman B, Hellum A, Sandvik (eds) Worlds of Human Rights: The Ambiguities of Rights Claiming 
in Africa (Leiden, Netherlands, Brill: 2013) 352 pp. 
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investigation; it will focus not only on the role that Christianity and traditional African beliefs 
play in infertility management but also on the role that Islamic law plays in the legal 
regulation of family structures in Africa. 
Finally, while Hellum’s work is deeply rooted in the application of the grounded theory in 
establishing an empirical analysis on women’s rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, this thesis has 
not found it necessary to undertake any fieldwork investigation or to gather empirical data 
through interviews and participant interviews to frame its analysis. This is partly due to the 
fact that unlike the period when this key work of Hellum was undertaken, there are current 
field studies on infertility and involuntary childlessness in Africa especially for example in 
Nigeria which is the site of this investigation.76 Based on the availability of already published 
data, this thesis, as highlighted in its methodology section, is premised on desktop 
expository research. In framing its analysis, it has relied on the existing body of literature that 
provides empirical evidence on the social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary 
childlessness which is a primary concern of this thesis.   
One of the findings that emerges from this literature review is that since Hellum’s ground 
breaking research, there has been limited research work undertaken within African legal 
feminism on involuntary childlessness in Sub- Saharan Africa. Further, there appears to be 
no major work that has been undertaken, on grounds of women’s welfare and equality, that 
advocates for the development of a rights regime that confronts the negative feminisation of 
infertility in the region, and which provides involuntary childless women with greater 
reproductive health care that enables them to reproduce if they so desire. This thesis 
therefore seeks to address these issues and by so doing, it is hoped that it will provide 
further contributions to the existing legal literature and also from a policy perspective 
enhance the status and welfare of involuntary childless women within the region. 
                                                          
76 See Hollos for example (note 43) above;  Sule J., Erigbali P., Eruom L., Prevalence of Infertility in 
Women in a South Western African Community (2008) 11 African Journal of Biomedical Research pp 
225 – 227; Araoye M., Epidemiology of Infertility: Social Problems of Infertile Couples (2003) 22(2) 
West African Journal of Medicine pp 190-6. 
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In seeking to contribute to the body of literature in this subject, this thesis will consider 
whether the challenge of social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness can 
best be addressed through the law facilitating wider access to ARTs. It will also evaluate 
whether the underlining causes of social stigmatisation can best be resolved through an anti-
discriminatory legal framework premised on the tenets of human dignity and respect that 
protects the inherent worth of involuntary childless women within this continent.  
1.5 Outline and Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis has eight chapters. The first chapter provides the introduction and framework of 
the study through a description of the problem domain and the aims and objectives of the 
research. It also discusses the methodological approaches employed in the research and 
reviews the existing literature dealing with the domain area of the thesis.   
The second chapter explores public attitudes towards infertility and involuntary childlessness 
and how this contributes to the social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness. Adopting a 
socio-legal approach, it explores how public attitudes to infertility and childlessness are 
shaped and demonstrated in the culture, language and religion of African communities. It 
seeks to understand the meaning and consequences of involuntary childlessness. It 
explores how public attitudes towards women revolve round the notion that they are to be 
socially valued by their procreative contributions to family and society. It explains further that 
the social meaning of involuntary childlessness in Sub–Saharan Africa encompasses a 
notion that women, regardless of whether they are diagnosed as medically infertile will 
always be depicted as the ‘public face of involuntary childlessness.’ This has been described 
in the literature as the ‘feminisation of infertility’77 and has contributed enormously to the 
gendered social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness.  
                                                          
77 Odinga  A.,  I am not Tassa, He is not a Man like other Men: Feminising Infertility and Masculinising 
Fertility in South Nyanza in Tamele S (eds) African sexualities: A reader  (Pambazuka Press, Oxford: 
UK 2011) p 463. 
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The third chapter further develops on the social meaning of infertility and involuntary 
childlessness highlighted in chapters two. It queries why African concepts of feminism have 
failed to tackle the negative feminisation of infertility. In particular, it considers why key 
regional instruments such as the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol)78 fail to fundamentally 
address the social stigmatisation associated with the negative feminisation of infertility. It 
concludes by arguing for the reinforcement of the reproductive status and identity of 
involuntary childless women in African feminism.   
The fourth chapter continues with the socio-legal discussion of the reproductive identity of 
involuntary childless women. This chapter not only informs itself from a socio-legal 
perspective, it also adopts a legal pluralistic approach to explain how motherhood is 
conceived within the legal framework of a case study African state. It also explores how 
traditional African attitudes on the procreative value of motherhood as embodied in 
indigenous customary law can impact on the self-worth of involuntary childless women in the 
region.   
Having explored the social meaning of involuntarily childlessness and the deleterious effects 
on women in the Sub-Saharan African region in chapters two to four;  the fifth chapter moves 
on to explore the case for child adoption. This is because child adoption is constantly touted 
as the primary way of resolving the needs of involuntary childless people in overpopulated 
regions of the world such as Sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter addresses the demographical 
concerns of over-population within the African region and the child rights justice argument 
that requires the infertile and involuntary childless to bear the social burden of providing 
parentless children with a home and family. Again, deploying a legal pluralistic 
methodological approach, the chapter highlights the limitations of the child adoption 
argument in tackling the social stigmatisation of infertility and its discriminatory impact on 
involuntary childless women in the region. In line with the underlining hypothesis, this 
                                                          
78  Adopted by the Assembly of the African Union in Maputo, Mozambique on July 11, 2003. 
 
 
 
27 
 
chapter advocates for a multipronged approach to infertility management which includes not 
only child adoption, but wider access to assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). 
Building on the discussions in chapter five, the sixth chapter considers other infertility 
management options apart from child adoption. Specifically it consider the current 
international public health initiatives to widen access to assisted reproductive technologies 
(ARTs) in Sub-Saharan Africa It highlights how these international initiatives have evolved 
out of the social science discourse of the tragedy of infertility and its social impact on 
involuntary childless women in Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries. It 
considers whether there is a right to universal access to ARTs. It also highlights some of the 
unintended consequences that may arise from these well intentioned initiatives and sets the 
basis for the discussion in chapter seven on the role of law and regulation in tackling these 
concerns.  
Following from chapter six, the seventh chapter specifically discusses the role of law in 
safeguarding the reproductive health care rights of involuntary childless women in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The chapter also evaluates the equally vital regulatory role that the law can 
play in combating the social stigmatisation surrounding infertility and involuntary 
childlessness highlighted in chapter two of the thesis. The discussion in this chapter is 
undertaken from the perspective on how law can serve as a tool for social change and 
empowerment.  The recommendations and conclusions of this thesis study are presented in 
chapter eight of thesis.  
1.6 Motivation for the Thesis 
In concluding this introductory chapter, I would like to provide a personal note on my 
motivation for this thesis. My career as a practising lawyer and currently as a legal academic 
has primarily been situated in the field of commercial law. However, my interest in the 
research domain of this thesis developed as a result of my personal experience, as an 
African woman, of infertility and involuntary childlessness. I have also had the privilege of 
community engagement with other involuntary childless African women both in Africa and in 
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the African Diaspora in the United Kingdom. This engagement has come about through my 
continuing role as an ordained minister in one of Africa’s largest churches.79 In this role, I 
have observed (and also participated) in prayer sessions for the gift of biological children. I 
have discovered from my own personal experience that a prayer petition for biological 
children is not only a cry for the fulfilment of a procreative desire, but it also an anguished cry 
for help to be delivered from the social recrimination and stigmatisation that surrounds 
infertility and involuntary childlessness, in African communal life, where women engage and 
interact. This of course is not a new phenomenon, nor is it restricted to Africa alone. The 
body of literature shows that this stigmatisation of infertility and childlessness is present in 
other regions of the world such as Asia and the Middle East.80  
This social recrimination and stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness in 
these pro-natal societies has created what some have described as ‘the tragic figure of a 
desperate infertile woman isolated in her tragedy.81 This tragedy of infertility is so aptly 
described in the Biblical narrative of Elizabeth, an elderly priestess who testified that her 
giving birth to a biological child in her old age had removed her reproach (or social shame) 
“from among people.” 82 One key feature of the discourse on the tragedy of infertility in a 
jurisdiction like Sub-Saharan Africa is how infertile people handle involuntary childlessness 
and the stigmatisation surrounding it. The narrative set out in the literature suggests that 
they embark on desperate quest for treatment to achieve the desired goal of biological 
parenthood.  
This is why this thesis argues that one of the key ways in which actual or perceived social 
stigmatisation of involuntarily childless women can be best addressed is through the 
widening of access to affordable assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) to involuntary 
                                                          
79 The Redeemed Christian Church of God, see discussions on the size and influence of this 
denomination in works such as Adogame A., Towards a Christian Disney Land? Negotiating Space 
and Identity in the New African Religious Diaspora in Kane A., and Leedy TH., (eds) African 
Migrations: Patterns and Perspectives (Indiana University Press, 2013) 173. 
80  See for example Van Balen (note 37 above) and Inhorn (note 65 above).  
81 Throsby K., Negotiating ‘normality’ when IVF fails in Bamberg M., Andrews M., (eds) in Considering 
Counter Narrative: Narrating, Resisting and Making Sense (New York, John Benjamin, 2004) at p 64. 
82 The Gospel according to Saint Luke Chapter 1 verse 25 (The New King James version). 
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childless women in developing regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa. The development of this 
hypothesis was predicated on the work undertaken by the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
and the ESHRE special task force ‘Developing Countries and Infertility.’ 83 The work of these 
organisations seeks to positively tackle the stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary 
childlessness in the developing world by providing wider access to infertility treatment that 
would hopefully enable infertile couples achieve biological parenthood.  
Yet this thesis goes beyond the initial hypothesis on whether widening access to 
reproductive treatment is the best way of tackling the social stigmatisation of infertility and 
involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa. My personal experience with involuntary 
childlessness suggests that while this may be a key way of addressing the concern, the 
tragedy of infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa is more complex that perceived. 
As my research progressed, I began to query what role the law could play in tackling the 
malaise of the social stigmatisation of infertility? In this sense, my hypothesis became more 
defined in that it queries whether there is justice case for seeking wider access to ARTs? 
Yet, in another sense as I embarked on the research for this thesis, the justice case became 
broader since it is impossible to consider providing access to ARTs without also considering 
the underlining cause of the stigmatisation of infertility within this jurisdiction. This is because 
if the justice case is limited only to widening access to ARTs, then it may amount to 
providing a placebo without a definitive cure as it would not address the key justice concern 
on why an infertile or involuntary childless woman should be treated by her community as a 
‘tragic figure’ deserving of recrimination and reproach.  
In summary, the personal motivation for writing this thesis is to consider how law can help to 
develop a rights regime that will not only provide wider access to assisted reproduction but 
that would also enhance the status and identity of involuntary childless women in sub-
                                                          
83 Ombelet W., Van Balen F., Expert meeting on Social Aspects of Accessible Infertility Care in 
Developing Countries organised by Social Study group of the European Society of Human 
Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) Special Task Force on developing countries and 
infertility, Genk, Belgium, December 11-12, 2009. F,V & V, ObGyn 2010, Monograph pp 66-72.  
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Saharan Africa. The greatest joy for me would be the day when an involuntary childless 
woman is not considered by society as a tragic figure of reproach, but as fortunate and 
empowered woman deserving of the same rights and respect as those who are fertile. It is 
hoped that this thesis would significantly contribute to the current research on involuntary 
childlessness in developing regions of the world such as Sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis 
also embodies elements of social activism in that it is also written in the expectation that it 
may be used in future by policy makers to shape a rights regime that tackles the 
stigmatisation of infertility and its discriminatory impact on involuntary childless women in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.   
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Chapter Two 
Public Attitudes and the Negative Feminisation of Infertility and Involuntary 
Childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa 
2.1  Introduction 
Infertility and involuntary childlessness are normally treated as personal reproductive matters 
in regions such as Europe and North America. In these regions, the management of infertility 
and involuntary childlessness was handled within the “quasi private realms of medicine, 
reproductive choice and the market.”1 The debate has however arisen on whether infertility 
should be considered within the public realm due to the growing use of assisted reproductive 
technologies (ARTs). The ongoing deliberations on the role that ARTs play in infertility 
management has moved this condition from one that can be considered as a personal 
reproductive concern to one that deserves more public scrutiny.2 Yet it would appear that the 
nature of the public societal debate on infertility and involuntary childlessness in the West is 
predominantly concerned with the ethics of ARTs, stem cell research, the number of 
embryos to be used and so on. The converse seems to be the case when it comes to Sub-
Saharan Africa. In this region of the world, the public debate on infertility and involuntary 
childlessness appears to focus more on the societal worth of infertile people.3 
Why is this so? Does this have anything to do with the theory that public opinion within this 
region is fundamentally shaped by traditional socio-cultural beliefs and values?4 If this is the 
case, what are the traditional values that govern and shape public attitudes to infertility? The 
                                                          
1 Inhorn M., Van Balen F., Infertility around the globe: new thinking on childlessness, Gender and 
Reproductive Technologies (California, University of California Press: 2002) p 67. 
2 Bickerstaff L., Technology and Infertility: Assisted Reproduction and Modern Society (New York: The 
Rosen Publishing Group, 2009) p 6. 
3 Daar AS., Merali Z., Infertility and social suffering: the case of ART in developing countries. In: 
Vayena E., Rowe PJ., Griffin PD., (eds.) Current Practices and Controversies in Assisted 
Reproduction. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization; 2002; Van Balen F., Bos HMW., The 
social and cultural consequences of being childless in poor resource areas. (2009) 1 Facts View Vis 
Obset Gynaecol 106–121. 
4 Bratton M., et al Public Opinion, Democracy and Market Reform in Africa (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005).  
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question also arises if there is one singular set of values that defines public attitudes to 
infertility and involuntary childlessness? These questions will be further considered in this 
chapter.  
There are several reasons why it is important at the early stage of this thesis to consider the 
public attitudes surrounding infertility and involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
which is the investigation site for this thesis. First, the existing literature points to the fact that 
public attitudes to infertility have contributed to the prevailing social stigmatisation of infertility 
and involuntary childlessness within this region. This evidence is provided by the social 
science disciplines as well as the public health disciplines.5 If this is the case, it becomes 
necessary to scrutinise at this early stage of the thesis how public attitudes contribute to the 
stigmatisation of a condition that would ordinarily be considered in other regions of the world 
as a private reproductive tragedy. This early consideration of public attitudes in this thesis 
sets the context for further discussions in this thesis especially chapter four which focuses 
on the construction of motherhood and the role it plays it defining the identity and status of 
adult womanhood. 
Second, public opinion is normally considered as central to law making and the justice 
system. If this is the case, it is critical that law policy makers have an understanding of public 
attitudes or opinion on a matter before embarking on any legislative programme or reforms.6 
                                                          
5 See for example Weinger S., Infertile' Cameroonian Women: Social Marginalization and Coping 
Strategies 2009 8(1) Qualitative Social Work pp 45-64; Fledderjohann JJ., Zero is not good for me: 
implications of infertility in Ghana (2012) 27(5) Human Reproduction pp 1383-1390;  Van Balen F., 
Bos HMW., The social and cultural consequences of being childless in poor resource areas. (2009) 1 
Facts View Vis Obset Gynaecol pp 106–121; Dyer SJ., The value of children in African countries: 
insights from studies on infertility (2007) 28 J Psychosom Obstet Gynaecol pp 69–77. 
6 Calvo E., The Responsive Legislation: Public Opinion and Law Making in a highly disciplined 
legislature (2007) 37(2) British Journal of Political Science pp 263-280 but see opposing views from 
scholars such as Walter Lippman who argued that public opinion was too ill informed and too biased 
to be a guide for policies and laws that needed to be both effective and serve the public interest. 
Discussed in Bond J., Smith S., The promise and performance of American democracy (Cengage 
Learning, 2010) p 297.  While accepting that not all public opinion should be taken into account in law 
making, Dicey’s seminal lectures on the relation between law and public opinion in England during the 
Nineteenth Century, (Indianapolis Liberty Fund 2008) did acknowledge that there was role for “law 
making public opinion” that “told on the course of legislation.” Further discussions available in 
Mannheim H., Criminal Law and Penology in Ginsberg M., Law and Opinion in England in the 20th 
century (University of California Press, 1959) p 264. 
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The necessity of having recourse to public opinion in the place of law making has been 
debated in the administration of justice. This debate is more pronounced in the criminal 
justice system where it has been argued that there should be some ‘congruence between 
public opinion and criminal justice arrangements.’7 Understanding the role that public opinion 
can play in law making, this chapter undertakes a socio-legal inquiry into public attitudes 
towards infertility and involuntary childlessness. This is done for the purpose of determining 
what role law and policy can play in tackling the social stigmatisation of infertility and 
involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa. This will help to ensure the development of 
sociologically informed legislation that not only provides access to affordable ARTs but will 
also tackle the underlining issues surrounding the social stigmatisation of infertility and 
involuntary childlessness. 
Although there has been extensive coverage in the literature8 on the social meaning of 
infertility and involuntary childlessness in the Sub-Saharan African region and the social-
cultural dynamisms that play a role in shaping public attitudes towards infertility within the 
region, there appears to be limited evidence or research that examines the influence at all 
that the law can play in shaping or reforming public attitudes towards involuntary 
childlessness in this sub-continent.9 The primary work on this point remains the ground-
breaking research undertaken by Hellum in the 1990s which considered inter alia the key 
                                                          
7  Wood J., Cannon J., Public Opinion and Justice (Willan Publishing, 2009) 37.  
8 See for example Okonofua F., Harris D., Odebiyi A., Kane T., Snow R., The social meaning of 
infertility in Southwest Nigeria (1997) 7 Health Transition Review 205-220. 
9  The key text which does point to some role of law in infertility management in Africa is Hellum A., 
Women's Human Rights and Legal Pluralism in Africa: Mixed Norms and Identities in Infertility 
Management in Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe: Mond Books, 1999). Apart from this book, I could find very 
limited scholarly evidence on the question on how law can tackle the specific problem of social 
stigmatisation of infertility. The other book which is supposed to be of a multidisciplinary nature is 
Boerma J., Mgall Z., Women and Infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Multi-Disciplinary Perspective 
(London, Royal Tropical Institute Press, 2001) 300 pp. However, it does not provide a complete legal 
treatise on how law can be used to bolster the rights of women or reduce gender specific 
stigmatisation. There are general works dealing with the law’s role in combating discrimination against 
women. See for example Okome, Mojbol Olfnk. "Domestic, Regional, and International Protection of 
Nigerian Women against Discrimination: Constraints and Possibilities." (2002) 6(3) African Studies 
Quarterly 6, no. 3: [online] URL: http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v6/v6i3a2.htm (accessed January 25 
2014); Aniekwu N., The additional protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights: 
indications of capacity for African municipal systems (2009) Law Democracy and Development pp 22-
35 and Johnson S., Nigeria, its women and international law: beyond rhetoric (2004) 4(2) Human 
Rights Law Review pp 229- 255. 
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constraints that a system of hierarchy of rights10 particularly rooted in Western received law 
could face when trying to provide an equality regime for African women of multiple 
identities.11 While Hellum does provide some discourse on the procreative beliefs that guide 
social attitudes to infertility, she does this strictly from the realm of social attitudes premised 
on indigenous beliefs. Where she discusses the role that religion plays in shaping such 
beliefs, she focuses again on traditional religious beliefs and Christian beliefs. This is 
understandable since the context of her research was focused on infertility management in 
Zimbabwe. This thesis while considering similar indigenous beliefs and the practice of 
Christian beliefs in another identified case study country- Nigeria, goes further to explore 
how public attitudes towards infertility is also shaped by Islamic beliefs. In exploring the role 
that cultural and religious beliefs play in the shaping of public attitudes towards infertility and 
involuntary childlessness, this thesis argues that crafters of laws must have a clear 
understanding of these rules if they are to achieve empowerment and equality for women.   
The third and final reason for undertaking this socio-legal inquiry on public attitudes on 
infertility and involuntary childlessness is to investigate whether the current effort in the 
international public health sector to facilitate wider access to affordable assisted reproductive 
technologies (ARTs) in Sub-Saharan Africa is the appropriate remedy for tackling the social 
stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness within the region. In recent times, 
there has been an intensified effort to medicalise what would ordinarily be considered as a 
social construction of involuntary childlessness. Many in the medical field particularly at the 
international level have premised their efforts to widen access to ARTs on the key concern of 
minimising the gendered consequences of infertility. These proponents have intensely 
argued that the impact of the gendered consequences of infertility on women advances a 
strong social justice cause for widening access to ARTs in developing parts of the world, 
including Sub-Saharan Africa. It is therefore necessary to get a clearer understanding on the 
                                                          
10 Hellum, Ibid at p 413. 
11 Ibid, discussed in 10.3 from p 179. 
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magnitude of the gendered consequences that infertility may have on women and, how if at 
all, these consequences are influenced and triggered by public attitudes to childlessness.  
In undertaking this socio-legal inquiry on public attitudes towards infertility and involuntary 
childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa, this chapter will first consider the key dynamisms that 
shape public attitudes within this region. The key dynamisms to be considered are language 
and identity and the religious beliefs in African societies. This is followed by a consideration 
of the gender construction of infertility and involuntary childlessness within this region. This 
chapter will serve as the foundation for the subsequent discourse in chapters three and four 
that explore the meaning of motherhood in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the possible role that 
African legal feminism can play in combating the social stigmatisation of involuntary childless 
women in the Sub-Saharan African region. It will also form the basis for some of the 
recommendations in the concluding chapter of this thesis on the role that law can play in 
strengthening the reproductive rights of involuntary childless women in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
2.2 The Construction of Public Attitudes in Sub-Saharan Africa 
This section of this chapter considers how public attitudes are shaped and formed in sub-
Saharan Africa. It is pertinent to note that some works in the body of literature on public 
attitudes interchangeably use the phrase ‘public opinion’ in place of ‘public attitudes’.12 Other 
works treat ‘public opinion’ as embodying public attitudes, values and related behaviours.13 
This chapter will adopt the latter construction of public opinion as embodying public attitudes 
and values.  
Before any further exploration is made on how public opinion is formed in Africa, cognisance 
must be taken of the formidable body of sociological and political science literature14 on the 
                                                          
12 See for example Jelen T., Public attitudes toward Church and State (M.E Sharpe, 1995). 
13 Peters JD., ‘Historical tensions in the concept of public opinion’ in Glasser TL., Salmon CT., (eds) 
Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent (New York: Guilford Press:1995) 3 ; Allott AN., 
The People as Law-Makers: Custom, Practice, and Public Opinion as Sources of Law in Africa and 
England  (1977) 21(1) Journal of African Law, pp. 1- 23. 
14  See for example key works including the early works of, Mackinnon WA., On the Rise, Progress 
and Present State of Public Opinion in Great Britain, and other Parts of The World (London: Saunders 
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formation, shaping and the measurement of public opinion. It is however recognised that 
most of the scholarly literature on public opinion have ‘germinated from Western culture’15. 
Although this chapter would undertake some level of theoretical engagement with the ideas 
set out in the Western literature on public opinion, it will focus more on indigenous African 
theoretical and philosophical concepts that shape public opinion within this region of the 
world. These concepts are the Ubuntu (communitarianism) or Omoluwabi as defined in 
Nigerian parlance which is the site of investigation for this thesis. It will also explore Peter 
Ekeh’s16 seminal work on the two publics in post-colonial Africa. 
 
Identifying ‘public attitudes’ can be a difficult task and this issue has been the subject of 
extensive discussion. Much of this discussion can be found in political science and 
sociological literature. It has been said that the focus of political science literature on public 
opinion relates to the role that public opinion plays in democracy and governance17 while the 
sociological literature focuses on public opinion as ‘a product of social interaction and 
communication.’18 This thesis first turns to the sociological literature before providing a brief 
outline of the political science literature on public opinion. In arguing that public opinion is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and Otley, London; 1928); Lippmann W., Public Opinion: An Important work on the Theory of public 
Opinion in relation to Traditional Democratic Theory (Minnesota MN: Filiquarian Publishing, 1922 
reprinted 2007); Jean Jacques Rousseau who is described by some as the first theorist to extensively 
discuss public opinion in France. He saw public opinion along with mores as akin to a form of law “not 
engraved on marble or bronze, but in the hearts of citizens; which is the true constitution of the state, 
see  Rousseau J., The Social Contract further discussed in Crocker L., (ed.) The Social Contract and 
the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (New York, Washington Square Press, 1967) p 58; 
Habermas J., The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society  (Cambridge, 1989, MIT Press) obtained from Sheehan C, James Madison and the 
Spirit of Republican Self- Government (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009) at p 64;  Zaller 
J., The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion which considers the ways in which public opinion is 
formulated and expressed (Cambridge University Press, 1992); Burstein P., The impact of public 
opinion on public policy: a review and an agenda (2003) 56(1) Political research quarterly 29-40; 
Wilson  FG., A theory of public opinion (New Jersey :Transaction Publishers, 2013).   
15  Wilson F., A Theory of Public Opinion (Transaction Publishers, 2013) p 19. 
16 Ekeh P., Colonialism and the two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement (1975) 17(1)   
Comparative Studies in Society and History pp 91-112. 
17 This is why V.O Key describes public opinion as the “opinions held by private persons which 
governments find it prudent to heed.” See Key V.O., Jr Public Opinion and American Democracy 
(1961) Alfred Knopf.  
18 Davison W., Public Opinion in Encyclopaedia Brittanica available from 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/482436/public-opinion accessed January 24 2014. 
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product of social interaction and communication, scholars like Lazarsfeld and Katz19 
developed the two step flow theory which is premised on the thinking that public opinion is 
first shaped by opinion leaders who are in turn influenced by the mass media. This raises 
very interesting considerations from an African perspective when trying to evaluate how 
public opinion affects women in their family structures and communities. First, it is important 
to define who the opinion leaders are who shape public opinion.  
 
As Hellum’s work extensively shows there are many social actors or third parties that 
Africans turn to when faced with challenges within their family structures. Key among the 
parties identified is the traditional healer. This is because as Hellum explains matters to do 
with health and wellbeing are seen as rewards for complying with the social beliefs of their 
community.20  She points to Gelfand’s work which explains that traditional healers are 
considered as: 
 
‘…mediators of the moral messages from the ancestral spirits, they are regarded as 
being of great importance in retaining the ethics and morals of the nation than the 
mother, the father and the grandparents of a child.’21 
 
While it is true that the traditional healers serve as ‘moral arbiters’ for those who believe in 
animism and traditional beliefs, the fact cannot be ignored that many parts of Sub-Saharan 
Africa have been exposed to the influencing impact of two monolithic faiths of Christianity 
and Islam.22 As the authoritative 2010 Pew Forum report on Islam and Christianity in Sub-
Saharan Africa shows, a vast majority of the population in this sub-continent are religiously 
                                                          
19 Katz E., and Lazarsfeld PF., Personal Influence: the Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass 
Communications, 1955.  
20 See Hellum (note 9 above) at p 55. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Pew Forum, Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, 
Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2010).  
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affiliated to these two monolithic faiths.23 It is therefore argued that when it comes to shaping 
public attitudes on infertility particularly in religious conservative countries like Nigeria (the 
site of this thesis’ investigation), religious clerics in these two faiths such as the priest and 
the pastor in the case of Christianity and the Imam in the case of Islam also serve as the key 
opinion makers that people will turn to in their personal and family matters.  
 
The two step wave theory postulated by Lazersfeld and Katz also points to the role that the 
mass media can play in influencing public opinion on a matter. The existing literature that 
discusses the stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness in Africa is not 
categorical on what role the formal mass media such as press have played in influencing 
public attitudes on these issues.24 While there is still debate on the extent to which the press 
has contributed to the stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness in this region, 
there appears to be some evidence to show that the African film industry particularly the 
Nollywood (Nigerian) genre does focus considerable attention on the theme of infertility and 
involuntary childlessness. For example, in 1997, the incumbent executive director of the 
Nigerian National Film and Video Censors Board25 placed infertility and childlessness at the 
top of the common themes that feature in the ‘hundreds of films’ he had viewed. 
 
In several of these films, the public or social face of infertility or involuntary childlessness is 
the woman who is portrayed as a ‘tragic social figure’ who must take all measures to tackle 
her condition of ‘barrenness’ so she can find social acceptance among her community. The 
table beneath show some examples of Nollywood films that depict the woman as the face of 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 However, findings from the expert study meeting of the ESHRE social study group did highlight the 
role that popular mass media such as radio jingles could play in minimising the social stigmatisation of 
infertility and involuntary childlessness. See Ombelet at p 67 (note 83) in chapter one of this thesis.   
25 Ademola J., ‘Producers face challenges of new direction in film content’, 1(3) (1997)The Classifier  
pp. 4, 8 cited in Hayes J., Political Critique in Nigerian Video Films (2006) 104(421) African Affairs p 
511. 
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infertility, even in cases where there is male fertility as is seen in the case of Mother of 
George26 in column 3 below.  
 
Table 1 
Popular Nollywood Films on Involuntary Childlessness and Infertility27 
 Film Genre Title of Film Year 
1 Nollywood Blind Choice 2010 
2 Nollywood Soul after Soul 2013 
3 Nollywood Mother of George 2013. Premiered at 
the 2013 Sundance 
Film Festival and the 
Maryland Film 
Festival28 
4 Nollywood Barren Women 2013 
5 Nollywood Childless Widow 2014 
 
 
Moving from the theories within sociological research on how public attitudes or opinion is 
shaped and formed, the discipline of political science also provides equally important 
theories on how public opinion is formed and shaped. They include the classical theory, 
democratic theory espoused by scholars such as Dahl, the political culture theory 
propounded in key works like the Civic Culture29 by Almond and Verba and lastly, 
                                                          
26 Anderson J., Family Problems with Delicate Solutions: ‘Mother of George’ A Film by Andrew 
Dosunmu New York Times, August 29, 2013 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/movies/mother-of-george-a-film-by-andrew-dosunmu.html?_r=0 
(accessed May 17 2015). 
27 Some of the films referred to above are discussed in Amakwa B., The Problem of Infertility, the 
Human Life Review March 18, 2013 and from “Nollywood Forever Movie Reviews,” 
www.nollywoodforever.com .      
28  Anderson (note 26 above). 
29 Almond G., Verba S., The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes in Five Western Democracies (Princeton 
University Press, 1963). 
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modernisation theory. The key political theory that this chapter will focus on with regard to 
public attitudes towards infertility and involuntary childlessness in post-colonial Africa is 
modernisation theory. Modernisation theory as propounded by Marx, Nietzsche, Lerner and 
Bell seeks to decentralise or minimise the role that culture and traditional beliefs should play 
in shaping public attitudes and the development of the political process30. Modernisation 
theorists argue that the growth of modernisation will cause the decline of culture and 
religious belief in shaping society.  
 
The role of modernisation theory in shaping the law’s response to public attitudes towards 
infertility in post-colonial Africa is an important issue for consideration. This is because as 
Hellum points out in her work, the development of international treaties such as CEDAW is 
largely premised on modernisation theory which views the ‘underdevelopment and gender 
inequality’ in developing regions of the world as largely attributable to traditional values and 
social structures.31 The proponents of modernisation theory will therefore advocate that to 
reduce stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness, adherence to traditional 
values and beliefs should be deemphasized. 
 
This poses some difficulties for pluralist societies in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is because as 
Hellum again points out, many post-colonial Africans do not live their lives solely through the 
framework of modernising influences of received Western culture. They also hold dearly to 
their traditional beliefs and customs. This is supported by empirical research conducted by 
Inglehart. 32 As a political cultural theorist, Inglehart conducted research to evaluate the 
impact of modernisation in different parts of the world. Case study examples drawn from 
different regions, including Sub-Saharan Africa, establish that culture and religion still plays a 
                                                          
30 Inglehart R., Modernisation, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values American 
Sociological Review, 2000, Vol .65(1), pp.19-51. 
31 Hellum (note 9 above) at p 45. 
32 Inglehart (note 30 above) at pp 20-22 and 49. 
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dominant role in influencing social and political processes.33 This does not necessarily imply 
that states in the developing world would necessarily ignore modernising influences such as 
economic development and other forces of development like the internet.34 However, as 
Ekeh’s35 seminal work shows the pluralistic nature of many post-colonial African states does 
appear to make it completely impossible for modernisation to completely obliterate the role 
that traditional beliefs and cultures play in African societies especially their family structures.  
 
The dual allegiance, so to speak, that Africans have towards modernising influences and 
their traditional cultural beliefs and values is an issue that is extensively addressed in 
Ekeh’s36 work on the two publics in post-colonial Africa. In his theoretical statement, he 
argues that despite urbanisation, formal education and the existence of a thriving middle-
class, many African still pay strict allegiance to what he describes as the primordial public.  
He distinguishes this primordial public from the civic public. He describes the primordial 
public as a moral structure that consists of family (largely extended), kin and ethnic 
groupings.37 On the other hand, Ekeh argues that the civic public is: 
  
 
‘amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the private realm 
and in the primordial public.’38 
 
The amoral nature of the civic public may explain why many post-colonial Africans view this 
‘public’ with some suspicion and why they deem the ‘primordial public’ as having more of a 
legitimising and moral framework. 39 Ekeh considers that there is a divergent or conflicting 
relationship between these two publics as illustrated in figure 2 below.  
 
                                                          
33 Ibid at p 22 above. 
34 Inglehart R., Welzel C., Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development 
Sequence, Cambridge University Press, 2005 p 280. 
35 Ekeh (note 16 above). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid at p 92. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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Figure 1: Ekeh’s Theory of the Two Publics 
 
 
This is typical of the dialectical conflict between modernising influences and traditional 
rooted beliefs. 40 Ekeh’s post-colonial Africa suggests that if there is a choice between which 
public should take priority, the primordial public will prevail. Yet, in shaping and formulating 
public attitudes, many within the school of modernisation theory would like to see the amoral 
civic public and its modernising structures play a greater role than the primordial public 
rooted in traditional beliefs and cultural values. This is a point that will be considered in 
subsequent chapters of this thesis particularly in chapter seven which discusses the role that 
law and regulation can play in tackling the social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary 
childlessness. Yet, as we will see in this chapter, the primordial public rooted in African 
communitarianism still plays a fundamental role in post-colonial Africa particularly in the 
shaping of public attitudes towards social issues including the social stigmatisation of 
infertility and involuntary childlessness. This point shall be addressed in the next section of 
this chapter. 
2.3  Shaping Public Attitudes by an African Social Ordering Rule: An Appraisal of 
the Omoluabi or Ubuntu Principle 
This section of this chapter explores further the notion of African communitarianism 
embodied in the Nigerian principle of Omoluabi (the way of human being) or the South 
                                                          
40 Geertz, C., (ed.) Old Societies and New States: Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa. (New York: 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) and Warren, B., Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism. (London: Verso, 
1980) cited and discussed in Hayden G Making Public Sector Management Work for Africa: Back to 
the Drawing-Board ADB Economic Research Working Paper No 80 (Tunis November 2005) pp 8-9. 
Civic Public (The amoral post-colonial state)
Pre-mordial Public (consisting of family, kin and 
ethnic groupings)
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African principle of Ubuntu. This is because these primordial communitarian concepts41 can 
provide further insightful discourse on how public attitudes are formed and shaped, 
particularly as it applies to family structures in Africa. It is anticipated that these ontological 
concepts steeped in the African consciousness of group solidarity and communalism may be 
able to shed some light on why a private tragedy like infertility and involuntary childlessness 
has become an issue of the public realm and why it is socially stigmatised in many traditional 
African societies. Because Nigeria is the case study of this thesis, the term Omoluabi (the 
way of human being) will be used as an interchangeable term for the more popularly known 
South African term- Ubuntu.  
 
The interchangeable use of Omoluabi with Ubuntu and vice-versa has academic support. 
This is because the Ubuntu principle is seen to apply continent wise even if different names 
are used to describe it. Ramose for example42 argues that Ubuntu (or Omoluabi) is ‘the 
wellspring flowing from African ontology and epistemology.’ He sees the wide applicability of 
Ubuntu (or Omoluabi) in Africa. He further asserts that this philosophy extends beyond the 
‘Nubian desert to the Cape of Good Hope’43 and from ‘Senegal to Zanzibar.’44 He points out 
that there is a ‘philosophical affinity and kinship between the indigenous people of Africa’45 
that encourages the wide application of the Ubuntu (Omoluabi) principle in Africa.  
 
Similarly, Chigara46 confirms a continent wide application of the Ubuntu principle. He treats 
the Humwe principle as synonymous to the philosophy of Ubuntu. Humwe (like Ubuntu or 
Omoluabi) is the Shona word for ‘in this together’ or for ‘us all.’ He describes Ubuntu, 
Omoluabi or Humwe as an ‘African social ordering principle’ predates colonialism and other 
                                                          
41  Shutte, A., Ubuntu: An Ethic for New South Africa. (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster, 2001) 228 pp. 
42 See abstracts of Ramose’s utilised In Epistemology and the Tradition in Africa in Coetzee PH., & 
Roux APJ., (Eds.), African Philosophy Reader (2nd ed.) London: Routledge p 270. 
43 Ibid at p 271 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Chigara B., The Humwe Principle: A Social Ordering Grundnorm for Zimbabwe and Africa in Home 
R., (ed.) Essays in African Land Law (Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2011) p 119. 
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forms of globalisation. Chigara is also of the view that the continent wide social ordering 
principle of Humwe, Ubuntu or Omoluabi should be utilised more regularly by African 
governments to order societal issues rather than a reliance on legal principles and rules that 
are far removed from African social realities. The role that Omoluabi, Ubuntu or Humwe can 
play as a social ordering rule to address the social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary 
childlessness is an issue that this thesis will explore further in chapter seven when it 
considers how law can be utilised as social engineering tool to initiate change and reform.   
 
In response to the question on whether Omoluabi, Ubuntu or Humwe can actually be 
characterised as a continent wide principle, Chigara provides a useful table47 of the 
equivalent concepts of Ubuntu (Humwe) in a selection of African states. Using Chigara’s 
research as a primary source, this thesis has developed figure 2 below setting out the 
regional variants of Ubuntu in Sub-Saharan Africa. One key commonality of all the regional 
variants is the focus that human beings exist for one another and that ‘the promotion of 
individual welfare {is} through communal preservation of the inherent dignity of a 
community.’48 
 
It is important to note that not everyone subscribes to the view that there is a continent wide 
application of the Omoluabi or Ubuntu principle. Vans Binsbergen who view Ubuntu from a 
Western perspective has questioned whether there is empirical evidence to show that ‘the 
South African indigenous philosophy of Ubuntu’ applies on a continent wide basis as 
asserted by its proponents.49 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 Ibid at p 118.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Van Binsbergen WMJ., Intercultural Encounters: African and Anthropological Lessons Towards a  
Philosophy of Interculturality (Munster: Lit Verlag 2003) Chapter 14.   
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Figure 2: African Regional Variants of the Ubuntu Principle  
 
 
While Van Binsbergen is uncertain on whether there is credible evidence to suggest a 
continent wide application of Ubuntu, the proponents of Ubuntu such as Ramose and Bewaji 
insist that African communalism as conceptualised in Ubuntu applies continent wide.50 The 
political system of African socialism as propounded by Senghor and Nyerere and Nkrumah’s 
concept of Pan-Africanism are provided as cardinal examples of the social ordering principle 
of Ubuntu, Humwe and Omoluabi. However, other scholarship continues to question whether 
there is a continent wide ancient African social ordering rule like Ubuntu, Humwe and 
Omoluabi. For example Simiyu51  who premises his scholarship on Western centric works 
                                                          
50 Bewaji JAI., Ramose B., The Bewaji, Van Binsbergen and Ramose debate on Ubuntu (2003) 22 (4) 
South African Journal of Philosophy pp 378-414. 
51 Simiyu, V. G., The Democratic Myth in the African Traditional Societies, in Oyugi, WO., Gitonga, A., 
(eds), Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa, (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1987) chapter three. 
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such as Fortes and Evans- Pritchard52  questions whether there is true ‘African 
communalism or communitarianism.’ His scepticism is premised on the fact the political 
realities on ground in many African countries does not show an adherence to an idealist 
Africanist social ordering principle that promotes communalism or a sense of humanness 
based on the notion of African fraternity.   
Yet the recent case law development particularly in the Southern part of Sub-Saharan Africa 
places some emphasis on the role that an ancient ‘African social ordering principle’ such as 
Ubuntu, Humwe or Omoluabi can play in the development of the legal and constitutional 
framework of a modern African state. One such case law example is the landmark South 
African constitutional court case of S v. Makwanyane.53 In this case the South African 
Constitutional Court deliberated on the competence and validity of the death penalty as set 
out in s.277 of the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977. In invalidating the use of the 
death penalty as the competent sentence for murder, the Constitutional Court invoked the 
ontological concept of Ubuntu with its emphasis on the value of human life and dignity. It 
held that the use of the death penalty could be seen as ‘inhumane punishment’ which 
divested the convicted person of ‘dignity and treats him or her as an object to be eliminated 
by the state.’  This went tantamount to the principle of Ubuntu which deems human dignity 
and life as integral to human personhood. In this regard, while ‘heinous crimes’ such as 
murder were to be deemed as antithetical to Ubuntu in the same way, the death penalty was 
also antithetical to Ubuntu since it is cruel, inhuman and degrading.54 The court further 
opined that a move away from the retributive objective of the death penalty was in line with 
the constitutional provision on National Unity and Reconciliation. This provision enjoined all 
South Africans to move from ‘vengeance to appreciation… from retaliation to reparation and 
                                                          
52 See discussions of Simiyu’s views in Kimmerle H., Ubuntu and Communalism in African Philosophy 
and Art in Van den Heuvel H., et al (eds) Prophecies and Protests: Ubuntu in Global Management 
(Amsterdam: Rozenberg Publishers, 2006) at p 84. 
53 S v. Makwanyane (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3. 
54 Ibid at paragraph 225 and 226. 
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from victimisation to Ubuntu’.55  The Court went on to affirm the constitutional enforceability 
of the principle of Ubuntu by stating that: 
‘The notion of Ubuntu expressly provided for in the epilogue of the Constitution, the 
underlying idea and its accompanying values are also expressed in the preamble. 
These values underlie, first and foremost, the whole idea of adopting a Bill of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in a new legal order. They are central to the 
coherence of all the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 - where the right to life and the 
right to respect for and protection of human dignity are embodied in Sections 9 and 
10 respectively.’56 
It is important however to note that while the Constitutional Court upheld the centrality of the 
role that Ubuntu played in South African democratic and constitutional framework, it did not 
go as far as to allege that it was a continent wide principle. There are other judicial cases57 
within the South African legal framework where Ubuntu has been copiously applied. Yet it 
still remains unclear whether there is similar judicial recognition of this principle in other Sub-
Saharan African jurisdictions. This does not necessarily imply the absence of the existence 
of a universal African principle of communalism and humanness, but rather that other African 
jurisdictions may not have witnessed the same degree of judicial activism in this area as the 
South African jurisdiction. That said, noted academic scholars58 continue to maintain that 
there is a continent wide social ordering principle which goes by many names, including 
Ubuntu, Omoluabi, Humwe and Alaafia to mention a few. 
Again, the Constitutional Court in the Makwanyane’s case provides further judicial 
perspective on the true essence of Ubuntu as a social ordering principle. For instance, 
Mokjoro J explains Ubuntu as follows: 
                                                          
55 Ibid at paragraph 233. 
56 Ibid at paragraph 307. 
57 See for example Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 4 SA 415 (CC); MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal 
v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC). 
58 See Shutte (note 41), Ramose (note 42), Chigara (note 46) and Bewaji, Ramose (note 50). 
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‘Metaphorically, [ubuntu] expresses itself in umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, describing 
the significance of group solidarity on survival issues so central to the survival of 
communities.’ 59 
Langa J also further describes Ubuntu as: 
‘...a culture, which places some emphasis on communality and on the 
interdependence of the members of a community.’60 
Madala J viewed  
‘Ideas of humaneness, social justice and fairness.’ ’61 
The idea that Ubuntu promotes group interdependence and communal solidarity that is 
central to the survival of African communities may explain why as Ekeh argues that Africans 
feel they owe more of a moral obligation to their primordial public than to an amoral civic 
public. This is why he goes on to argue that ‘good citizens of the primordial public’ will give to 
the primordial public and ask for nothing in return. 62 In referencing good citizenship with the 
obligation to the primordial public, Ekeh without categorically mentioning the concept of 
Ubuntu or Omoluabi confirms the essence of this social ordering principle that Africans 
wittingly or unwittingly subscribe to in their daily living. 
Yet, some scholars particularly from the modernising school of thought will question the 
place of the primordial public in modern Sub-Saharan Africa and whether ideals such as 
Ubuntu, Humwe and Omoluabi should continue to hold sway or influence the attitudes and 
the way of life of modern Africans. This is because Ekeh’s theory of the ‘primordial public’ 
was developed in 1975, a period in African history, where fledging democratic post-colonial 
states were just taking root. However, there is literature to show that the primordial public 
                                                          
59 Ibid at paragraph 309. 
60 Ibid at paragraph 224. 
61 Ibid at para 237. 
62 Ekeh (note 16 above) p 108. 
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continues to have relevance in modern African society.63 What is however of current concern 
is whether like Ubuntu, it can be argued that there is one singular primordial public64 that 
universally influences public attitudes and opinion on social matters in Africa. In other words, 
how many primordial publics exist and how many should one individual pay moral allegiance 
to? Ekeh’s65 work however suggests that the primordial public is a localised concept 
revolving around family, kinship and ethnic ties.  
This appears to be a good position to adopt about the primordial public taking into 
cognisance the diversity of cultures and ethnic groupings in the African continent. The 
patrilineal and the matrilineal concepts of lineage are good examples that confirm that 
localised differences that African have towards approach to community issues. 66 This again 
may support a middle level approach to the debate on whether there exists a continent wide 
social ordering principle in the sense that while Africans may be guided by ideals such as 
group solidarity and commonality as symbolised by Ubuntu or the Omoluabi principle, there 
are local and regional variants and colourations of this principle that cannot be overlooked or 
dismissed.  
 
Having debated extensively whether there exists a universal social ordering principle that 
shapes or govern public attitudes on a continent wide basis in Africa and having come to 
some conclusion that this principle does exists, but not without some localised or regional 
variants, the next question for consideration is how this social ordering principle which goes 
by various names such as Ubuntu, Omoluwabi and Humwe affects the perception of 
                                                          
63 Cornwell R., The Collapse of the African State in Cilliers J., Mason P., (eds) Peace, Profit or 
Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War Torn African Societies (Johannesburg, Institute for 
Security Studies: 1999) chapter four. 
64 See for example Anders G., Like Chameleons: Civil Servants and Corruption in Blundo G., Lemeur 
PY., (eds.) Governance of Daily Life in Africa: Ethnographic Explorations of Public and Collective 
Services (Netherlands: Brill, 2009) at p 134. The author criticises Ekeh’s primarily on the basis that he 
seems to be suggesting that there is one universal primordial public in Africa. 
65  Ekeh (note 16) at p 107. 
66  Oheneba- Sakyi Y., Takyi B., African Families at the turn of the 21st century a (Greenwood 
Publishing 2006). 
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Africans when it comes to infertility and involuntary childlessness in family structures. This 
point will be further explored in the next section of this chapter. 
 
2.4 Procreation and Child Bearing: An Existentialist Issue for African Communities 
It has been posited in scholarly literature that child bearing is considered as the primary 
purpose for contracting marriages in traditional Sub-Saharan African countries.67 Some 
works go further to explain that since child bearing is so central to African family structures, 
unresolved childlessness can constitute a ground  for divorce and remarriage. 68 Why is 
procreation so important to the African community? Does it have to do with the Ubuntu 
notion that individuals owe a moral obligation to contribute to the continuing existence of 
their community or primordial community? If this is the case, can an individual be considered 
to be a good citizen (Omoluabi) if he or she fails to provide procreative value to the 
existential survival of his or her community? Could this be the reason why the infertile or 
involuntary childless person is perceived as an unfortunate or tragic figure due to societal 
perceptions that all individuals owe a procreative obligation to their family structures and 
society at large? These are not easy questions to answer but they will be explored in this 
section of this chapter and also in chapter four of this thesis that deals with the socio-cultural 
construction of motherhood in a given African case study jurisdiction. 
 
An exploration of the literature also shows that there is a link between the family structures in 
Africa and the concept of group solidarity or Ubuntu which sees persons as existing through 
other persons. There is strong support for the idea that African communalism or Ubuntu 
revolves around group interdependence and survival and that no individual lives for himself 
or herself and that all must contribute to the community’s survival and continuing existence. 
                                                          
67  Tangwa GB., ART and African Sociocultural Practices; Worldview, Belief and Value Systems with 
Particular  Reference to Francophone Africa in  Vayena E., Current Practices and Controversies in 
Assisted Reproduction in the Report of a meeting on Medical, Ethical and Social Aspects of Assisted 
Reproduction. (Geneva, World Health Organisation, 2001) pp 17–21; Mbiti J., African Religions and 
Philosophies (Oxford, Heinemann, 1990) p 130. 
68 Araoye M., Epidemiology of Infertility: Social Problems of Infertile Couples (2003) 22(2) West 
African Journal of Medicine p 193. 
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As earlier stated, Ubuntu and its emphasis on group interdependence was given judicial 
recognition in S v Makwanyane earlier cited. 69  Group interdependence in many African 
countries begins with the family structure which cosmologically is said to consist not only of 
the current living but also of the unborn and the dead.70  The principle is embodied in the 
customary land tenure systems of African countries such as Zimbabwe, Ghana and Nigeria 
where communal land is held not just for the living but also for the unborn and the dead.71 If 
the unborn and the dead are considered to be as important as the living, it may explain why 
each individual is encouraged to add procreative value to the community. By reproducing, 
the individual is linking living family members to other unseen members of the family- the 
unborn and the dead. This is why in some African communities, such as the Yoruba ethnic 
group based in West Africa, children are highly valued because they are seen as being the 
reincarnation of venerated ancestors. 72 
 
Involuntary childless couples are therefore faced with a cosmological dilemma or tragedy 
when they are unable to reproduce. This is because they are unable to contribute to that vital 
link between the living, the unborn and the dead. In this sense, they may be considered as 
failing in providing the group interdependence expected in the social ordering principle of 
Ubuntu, Omoluabi or Humwe. In this regard, they may be considered as not good citizens of 
their community and this may explain some reason why they are socially stigmatised. This is 
because procreation is a group survival issue for the Ubuntu or primordial public and the 
involuntary childless in not being able to reproduce may be seen to threaten the existential 
nature of their primordial public or Ubuntu. This may explain why biological parenting is 
                                                          
69  See S v Makwanyane (note 53) at para 308. 
70 Cobbah J., African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African perspective (1987) 9 Human 
Rights Quarterly p 309. 
71 Oshio P., The indigenous land tenure and nationalisation of land in Nigeria (1990) 10 Boston 
College Third World Journal at p 46; Gough K., Yankson P., Land markets in African cities: The Case 
of Peri-Urban Accra, Ghana (2000) 37(13) Urban Studies p 2490; Hansungule M., Who owns land in 
Zimbabwe? In Africa? (2000) 7 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights at pp 308-9. 
72 Zeitlin M., Megawangi R., Kramer E., Colletta ND., Babatunde ED., Garman D., (1995)  
Strengthening the family- Implications for international development  (United Nations University Press: 
Tokyo) available at http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu13se/uu13se00.htm#Contents 
(accessed March 6, 2009). 
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highly venerated in many African societies. This point will be further considered in chapters 
three and four of this thesis. 
 
The procreative value that individuals are to contribute to group survival and the preservation 
of the community may explain why infertility and involuntary childlessness are not 
considered to be private tragedies but matters of ‘public concern.’ An output of this perceived 
threat to the existential continuity of the group may explain why the Ubuntu feels entitled or 
justified to express some public concern when one of its members is ‘barren’ ‘fruitless’ or 
‘childless’. The use of these words particularly ‘barren’ or ‘fruitless’ is to convey the 
displeasure of the Ubuntu that the involuntary childless have failed to provide or contribute 
their procreative quota to the community’s continuing existence and survival. Procreation is 
therefore not seen as an individual or private decision but one that displays the communality 
and interdependence between members of the community. 73 
 
Ordinarily this interdependence and communality of the group should be positively 
welcomed and some consideration of this point will be further discussed in the concluding 
chapter of this thesis where further discussion will be made on the positive role that African 
community solidarity can play in the advancement of a gender empowerment and justice 
case for the provisioning of affordable technologies in the Sub-Saharan African continent.  
However, in this chapter that deals with public attitudes to infertility and involuntary 
childlessness, it is necessary to highlight the negative effects that the Ubuntu’s intervention 
in private family matters can have on women. 
This is because in the case of infertility and involuntary childlessness, the Ubuntu’s or group 
intervention in procreative matters can often result in the censure, stigmatisation or an 
evocation of pity from the group towards its infertile and involuntary childless members. 
Sadly, in many cases, where there is group censure or stigmatisation on the inability to 
                                                          
73 See Langa’s statement in S v Makwanyane (note 60 above) where Ubuntu, Humwe or Omoluwabi 
is seen as connoting group inter-dependence and communality. 
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reproduce, it is often against women. This has been described by works like Odinga as the 
‘feminisation of infertility’74. This thesis goes further to describe it as the ‘negative 
feminisation of infertility.’ This is because not all issues that are feminised are necessarily 
detrimental to women.75 But in the case of the gendered stigmatisation of infertility and 
involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa, the feminisation of this condition can be 
characterised as negative. 
The negative feminisation of infertility can be seen in several facets of traditional African 
societies; for example in African socio-cultural linguistics and religious beliefs. These two 
underlying dynamisms of traditional African societies are explored in the next section 
particularly within the context of how they contribute to the shaping of public attitudes and 
opinions towards infertile and involuntary childless women.  
2.5 The Language of Infertility and the Negative Feminisation of Infertility 
Socio-cultural linguistics has been described as: 
‘The broad interdisciplinary field concerned with the intersection of language, culture 
and society.’ 76 
This recourse to the field of socio-cultural linguistics is undertaken as part of the socio-legal 
inquiry of this thesis to decipher if there is what has been described as a ‘language of 
infertility’77that obtains in Sub-Saharan Africa. An exploration of the socio-cultural linguistics 
will also consider whether the language of infertility is predominantly directed at women or at 
men or both. This consideration of the language of infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa will help 
to test whether there is truly a negative feminisation of infertility in this region as 
hypothesised in this thesis and in the general corpus of literature on this subject area. 
                                                          
74 Odinga A.,   I am not Tassa, he is not a man like other men': feminising infertility and masculinising 
fertility in South Nyanza, 1945-1960 in Tamale S., (ed.) African Sexualities: A Reader (Oxford: 
Pambazuka Press, 2011) chapter 48. 
75 Strangleman T., Work and Society: Sociological approaches, Themes and Approaches  (Routledge 
2008) p 136. 
76 Llamas C., Watt D.,  Language and Identities (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010) p 18 
77 Diamond R., Couple Therapy for Infertility p 6. 
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As has been debated in language and identity literature, language plays a critical role in 
determining the social identity of people. 78 An exploration of the corpus of literature on the 
social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness in Africa suggests that there is a socio-
cultural language of infertility.79 It also shows that the language of infertility is in most cases 
disparaging against women.80 Linguistic narratives cutting across different African societies, 
establish that involuntarily childless women are socially portrayed in many dialects as having 
a lower social status81 than their counterparts who are able to produce. 
Before I consider any further the linguistic description of infertility in African languages, it is 
important to note that the negative symbolisation of infertility is not limited to the Sub-
Saharan African region alone. In other regions of the world, ‘the language of infertility’ has 
been deployed to symbolise a state to be pitied, shunned or feared.82 As such infertility has 
been defined in popular parlance as a state of being barren, unfruitful and fallow while 
fertility is positively defined as the highly prized state of being fruitful and productive.83 It may 
however be argued that this is not necessarily the case today in parts of the world today 
such as the industrialised West where feminism has made great strides or where there are 
demographical concerns of overpopulation such as in the case of China.  
                                                          
78 See works such as Edwards J., Language and Identity: An Introduction (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2009) and Joseph J Language and Identity: National, Ethnic, Religious (Palgrave- 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2004) at p 13 which argues that language and identity are 
‘ultimately inseparable’ and Barker C., Galasinski D., Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis: A 
Dialogue on Language and Identity (Sage Publications, London, 2001). 
79 See for example, Pearce T., She will not be listened to in public: Perceptions among the Yoruba of 
infertility and childlessness in women. (1999) 7 (13) Reprod Health Matter pp 69–78; See the early 
text of Abraham RC., Dictionary of Modern Yoruba (London: University College Press, 1958) cited in 
Ember C., Ember M., Encyclopaedia  of Medical Anthropology: Health and Illness in the World 
Cultures. (London: Springer, 2004) at p 1038 where infertile Yoruba women are described as Agon 
which literally means to despise or hold in contempt. 
80  Ibid. 
81 Olarinmoye A., The image of women in Yoruba folktales (2013) 3(4) International Journal of 
Humanities and Social Science p 138 at p144. 
82 Sifris R., Reproductive Freedom, Torture and International Human Rights: Challenging the 
Masculinisation of Torture (Abington: Routledge, 2014) at 5(a) (i) (online resource) pp 82-86. 
83 Ibid. 
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This however does not mean that fertility and its positive values are not affirmed in these 
countries.84 Yet the cultural language of infertility which demeans women has also been 
deployed from time to time even industrialised nations. A recent example in the public realm 
was the misogynistic depiction of Julie Gillard (former Australian Prime Minister) as being 
‘deliberately barren’ with her leadership credentials being called into question simply 
because she had no children.85 This labelling of Gillard as ‘deliberately barren’ is a clear 
case of the gendered construction of involuntarily childlessness as it is highly debatable 
whether such deplorable language would have been utilised against childless male 
politicians. 
Other high income OECD countries such as Japan also display some level of a negative 
linguistic depiction of involuntary childlessness. Again the disparaging language of infertility 
appears to be primarily targeted at childless women. Takeremu86 argues that Japanese 
terminology such as ‘Umazume’ which is literally translated as the ‘stone woman’ as well as 
the Japanese phrase ‘Kashite sannen konaki wa saru’ which is translated as that ‘a wife 
should leave her husband if she fails to bear a child within three years of marriage’ also 
typifies the negative feminisation of infertility.  
While there may be some empirical gap in the evidence to fully establish a global language 
of infertility, the foregoing does show that it is not only in Sub-Saharan Africa where one can 
point to a language of infertility which denigrates involuntary childless person and treats 
them as being of a lower social standing than fertile people. This clearly is a human rights 
concern and deserving of consideration under the current international anti-discrimination 
framework. This thesis seeks to draw attention on how the language of infertility can affect 
                                                          
84 The positive description of fertility and its connection with identity also explains to some extent the 
thriving fertility industry in North America and why many infertile couples in this region patronise the 
industry so they can be seen as fitting an American ideal, see Tyler May E., Barren in the Promised 
Land: Childless Americans and the Pursuit of Happiness (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
1997). 
85 Kent J., The Making of Julie Gillard (Victoria, Penguin, 2010) p 281. 
86 Takeremu N “Women in the Language and Society of Japan: The Linguistic Roots of Bias 
(Mcfarland, North Carolina, 2010) p 101. 
 
 
 
56 
 
the status and standing of involuntary childless women in Sub-Saharan Africa and why legal 
and regulatory interventions are required. It is to this specific context that I now turn.  
In many African languages and dialects, infertility and involuntary childlessness are generally 
characterised as conditions to be despised, scorned, pitied and shunned. Among the Yoruba 
ethnic group predominantly situated in Nigeria and other parts of West Africa, the term ‘agon’ 
which literally means ‘to despise or hold in contempt’87 is used to describe women unable to 
have children. Among the Igbo, another West African ethnic group, an involuntary childless 
woman is described as ‘Mgbaliga, Nwanyi-iga’ which literally can be translated as ‘the sterile 
woman’, ‘the barren woman’ or even in a more disparaging way as ‘a sterile monster who 
has maternal organs for mere decoration’.”88  It is said that the deplorable characterisation of 
an involuntarily childless woman will lead her to consult a ‘Dibia’ (the native doctor) who in 
many instances will only be able to provide psychological relief.89  
There is evidence to show that the disparaging language of infertility also applies beyond 
West Africa. In other parts of the Sub-Saharan African continent such as East and Southern 
Africa, the same negative language of involuntary childlessness also obtains. In the Zulu 
language prevalently used in South Africa, a married woman who is unable to have children 
is described as ‘Inyumba’ (barren or fruitless).90 In East African countries such as Uganda, 
the Swahili word ‘Mgumba’(the infertile one) is used to describe women who cannot have 
children.91  The more humiliating terminology of ‘Tassa’ (infertile chicken) is used by the Luo 
indigenous groups in Tanzania and Uganda. This word is used to describe married women 
who cannot have children.92 
                                                          
87 See Ember and Ember (note 79) above. 
88Okereke D., Africa's Quiet Revolution: Observed from Nigeria (Northampton: Paragon, 2012) p 294. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Buthelezi T., Lexical reinforcement and maintenance of gender stereotypes in isiZulu (2004) 11 (2) 
Alternation 396. 
91  Boerma JT., Mgalla Z., Women and Infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Multi- Disciplinary 
Perspective (Royal Tropical Institute , 2001) p 190. 
92  See Odinga (note 74 above) where the Swahili origin of Tassa is noted and further explanation is 
provided on how this term has now replaced the Luo word for infertility “lur”.  
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Even linguistic terminologies that are designed to be positive can unwittingly help to 
reinforce the same message as derogatory terms like Tassa. The Walking Egg Foundation93 
which aims to provide affordable ARTs to developing countries is an example where a 
linguistic term reinforces the pro-natalist cultural perception that a woman’s primary purpose 
in life is to ‘hatch eggs.’ This may be due to a failure to understand the symbolic power of the 
language of infertility and the cultural forces that interpret it.  Yet the Foundation claims that 
the ‘Walking Egg’ concept is to symbolise the relationship between science and art in 
explaining human identity and reproduction and that the term is meant to draw attention to 
infertility in developing regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa.94  While not dismissing the 
beneficial gains that can be derived from providing affordable fertility treatment to childless 
couples in the African region which is the focus of this thesis; as stated above, the use of the 
‘Walking Egg’ may only help to reinforce the socio-cultural notion that a woman’s primary 
purpose is to procreate or ‘hatch eggs’ or produce the ‘fruit of the womb’ for her Ubuntu. 
There is also the concern that Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs) may not 
necessarily produce a live birth. It is therefore important that nothing is done to suggest that 
if involuntarily childless women who are provided with affordable ART treatment  fail to do so 
that would mean that they are less socially valued that those who go on to ‘hatch eggs’. This 
thesis therefore recommends that international bodies who seek to provide the developing 
world with affordable ARTS treatment should ensure that their programmes are developed in 
a culturally sensitive manner that would be beneficial to female patients from developing 
parts of the world such as Sub-Saharan Africa. 
While the literature does highlight a negative feminisation of involuntary childlessness in the 
use of language in African culture, it would be wrong to create the impression that 
derogatory language is reserved only for involuntarily childless women. To do so will paint an 
incomplete picture of the socio-cultural linguistic narrative on involuntarily childlessness. This 
                                                          
93 See the Walking Egg Foundation website available at http://thewalkingegg.com/  
94 Ibid see the history and philosophy of the Walking Egg. 
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is because involuntarily childless men are also socially stigmatised African languages. In a 
leading South African research study95, men who are involuntarily childless are described as 
‘tjoekee’ (failure)96 or ‘incabi’ (castrated cows).”97  
The degradation of male infertility in this manner has been given as one of the key reasons 
why male infertility is shrouded in many African societies. This is because masculinity is 
typically linked with fertility.98  A man who is socially perceived as infertile will be viewed by 
his peers as ‘impotent’ or ‘incabi’ (a castrated cow). It has been argued that the 
characterisation of infertility as synonymous with loss of masculinity is why there is an active 
and concerted societal effort to mask male infertility and to treat infertility as strictly a female 
problem.99 
It is reprehensible that this type of disparaging language is still socially permitted today, 
particularly in the context of the globalisation of rights where we see a growing trend to 
prohibit hateful and offensive speech that stigmatises people on the basis of their colour, 
race, gender, disability, religion, nationality or sexuality. It may be argued that the reason for 
this has to do with the fact that the prohibitions against hateful speech exist mainly at the 
national level and that international human rights regimes are not equally as comprehensive 
in targeting hateful speech outside the Article 20 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil, 
and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) restrictions100 and those set out in the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.101 The General 
                                                          
95 Dyer SJ., Abrahams N., Mokoena NE., Van Der Spuy ZM., You are a man because you have 
children: Experiences, reproductive health knowledge and treatment-seeking behaviour among men 
suffering from couple infertility in South Africa (2004) 19(4) Human Reproduction pp 960-7. 
96 Ibid at p 964. 
97 Ibid. The demeaning and dehumanising linguistic depiction of male infertility is one factor why many 
men choose to mask their infertility in Africa. 
98 See also similar findings by Horbst V., Focusing on Male infertility in Mali: Kinship and impacts on 
biomedical practice in Bamako in Brockopp J., Eich T., (eds). Muslim Medical Ethics: Theory and 
practice, (South Carolina, South Carolina University Press, 2008) pp118-37. 
99 Horbst V., Male perspectives on infertility and assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) in Sub-
Saharan contexts (2010) F.V. & V in ObGyn at p 23. 
100 Article 20 prohibits “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence.”   
101 Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 
December 1965 entry into force 4 January 1969, in accordance with Article 19 
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Comment No. 34 on the ICCPR highlights that there are hate speeches of concern which are 
not covered under Article 20(2) and that contracting states are only required to provide legal 
prohibitions for the specific forms of speech set out in article 20 which focus narrowly only on 
‘advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence.’102   
Current trends in international law and politics however suggest that although there does not 
exist a comprehensive international legal regime that prohibits all hate speeches, other 
measures have been adopted at the international level to censure hateful speech or 
behaviour that discriminates against certain groups. For example, some Western countries 
have placed the protection of sexual minorities as an aspect of the conditionality for 
allocating aid to developing countries, particularly countries in Africa.103 It is however not 
difficult to see why the decision to tie up aid with the protection of minorities has been 
viewed in many parts of Africa as neo-colonialism and paternalism. 104  
Further, there are legitimate queries on why these Western countries appear to be so 
focused on the rights of one set of minorities in Africa as opposed to others. Why for 
example have these countries not exhibited a similar resolve in safeguarding the rights of 
vulnerable involuntarily childless people in regions of the world where stigmatisation 
abounds because of their inability to reproduce? Are these groups of involuntarily childless 
people not also deserving of protection? Can involuntarily childless people not also be 
                                                          
102  See OHCHR Towards an Interpretation of Article 20 of the ICCPR: Thresholds for the prohibition 
of incitement to hatred: Work in progress A study prepared for the regional expert meeting on article 
20, organised by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Vienna, February 8-9 2010. 
103 McVeigh, K., 2011 Gay rights must be criterion for US aid allocation, instructs Obama. The 
Guardian, 7 December 2011. 
104  Kratz A., Is Aid Conditionality an Answer to Antigay Legislation? An Analysis of British and 
American Foreign Aid Policies designed to Protect Sexual Minorities (2013) 7 Vienna Journal of 
International Constitutional Law p 14 available from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2183810 (accessed February 1, 2014); Akanji O, 
Epprecht M.,  Nyeck S.,  Human Rights Challenges in Africa: Sexual Minority Rights and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights in Epprecht M.,  Nyeck SN., (eds.,) Sexual Diversity in Africa: 
Politics, Theory and Citizenship  (McGill Queens Press, 2013) at p 30. 
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classified as ‘reproductive minorities’ for the purpose of fostering a culture of anti-
discrimination and respect for human dignity towards a socially stigmatised group? 
The characterisation of involuntary childless people as ‘reproductive minorities’ is particularly 
apt for Africa where the literature105 talks about the phenomenal paradox of ‘barrenness 
amid plenty’.106 Regrettably, it would appear that the politics of demographics and concerns 
to do with over-population in the African continent107 have overshadowed the need for a 
human rights framework that protects the rights of minority groups of involuntary childless 
people who live in over-populated regions. Notwithstanding these demographical concerns, 
much more needs to be done to develop a rights framework that expressly safeguards and 
protects the human dignity of ‘reproductive minorities.’  
The narrative of the language of infertility has so far focused on disparaging words depicting 
infertility in African dialects and how these words could have a dehumanising effect on 
infertile people in the region and place them in lower standing than their fertile counterparts. 
But it is necessary to point out that there are other words that are used to identify or describe 
involuntary childless women that are not overtly abusive. Depending on the context, such 
words may be affectionately used to describe other groups of women who are not infertile or 
involuntary childless. However, these words when directed at involuntarily childless women 
can depict a state of inconspicuousness and pity. Pearce108 discusses one such word in her 
work dealing with perceptions of infertility and childlessness among the Yorubas (a dominant 
ethnic group in West Africa).  The word is ‘Iyawo’ or ‘young wife’ is normally affectionately 
used in the extended African family to describe a woman who has just got married.109 
However, the word can also be derisively used to describe an older involuntary childless 
woman to buttress the point that she is of a lower social standing than married women who 
                                                          
105  Van Balen F., Involuntary childlessness: a neglected problem in poor resource areas (2008) 1 
Human Reproduction pp 25-28. 
106 Ibid at p 25. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Pearce (note 79) above at p 74.  
109 Ibid. 
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have children.110 The latter are warmly described as ‘Iya ni wura’ or ‘mother is gold.’ 111The 
socio-cultural relevance of this distinction will be more extensively discussed in chapter four 
on the social relevance of motherhood in Africa. 
As Pearce112 further points out, no matter how long a woman has been married, she can be 
described as ‘Iyawo’ or a young wife whose views particularly on domestic matters should 
not be taken seriously in the family structure.113 This subtle, but denigrating use of the 
language of infertility promotes a disenfranchisement of involuntary childless women which 
prevents them from equally participating in the family structure as their reproducing peers. 
This is why this thesis strongly canvasses for more to be done from an anti-discrimination 
perspective to address the socio-cultural language of infertility. Having examined the role 
that the language of infertility plays in shaping public attitudes of involuntary childlessness in 
the Sub-Saharan Africa continent, the following section considers the inter-connected role 
that religion plays in the formation of public opinion on this issue. 
2.6 Religious perceptions of infertility and the Contribution to the Social 
Stigmatisation of Involuntary Childlessness 
Beyond linguistic characterisations, public attitudes towards infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa 
can also be discerned through African religious beliefs and practice. A caveat is however 
raised at the onset of the discussion of the religious characterisation of infertility. This is 
because there are different expressions of the religious faiths practised in Africa and it would 
be wrong to generalise or to attribute to any faith one singular religious characterisation of 
infertility.114 
                                                          
110 Ibid. 
111 Makinde T., Motherhood as a Source of Empowerment of Women in Yoruba Culture (2004) 13(2) 
Nordic Journal of African Studies p 164 at p 165. 
112 Pearce (note 79) above at p 74 
113 Ibid. 
114 See for example Gellar S., Varieties of Religious Doctrines and Institutions in Africa and their 
Impact on Democratisation Process, Paper presented at the International Conference on Religious 
Ideas and Institutions and Transition to Democracy in Africa, Los Angeles CA, May 18-19, 2007 which 
highlights the  “heterogeneity and pluralism” of Africa’s dominant religions namely Christianity, Islam 
and African traditional Religion.  
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It must also be emphasized that is not the intention of this thesis to present religious faith in 
Africa as singularly promoting the negative depiction of infertility especially since the 
literature shows that religious faith has played some role in reducing social stigmatisation 
associated with infertility.115 For instance it has been demonstrated in the body of literature 
that churches in Africa have and continue to provide tremendous support to involuntarily 
childless couples.116 Likewise in the case of the Islamic faith, Irhorn has argued that this faith 
offers its adherents with a:     
‘potent ameliorating force, mitigating the social stigmatisation of infertility in a setting 
in which this affliction is viewed as quite threatening for all the reasons described.’ 117  
Notwithstanding that faith plays a positive role in supporting infertile couples through the 
traumatic experience of infertility, it does not detract from the fact that there are negative 
depictions of infertility within the religious practices of African churches and mosques. For 
instance, some expressions of evangelical Christianity in Africa tend to treat infertility as a 
female problem when devising support programmes for infertility despite the fact that 
infertility is depicted as both a male and female problem in Judeo-Christian beliefs.118 
Examples of the feminisation of infertility can be found in many African churches where 
programmes on infertility are specifically designed ‘waiting mothers’119 or ‘women seeking 
the fruit of the womb.’120 While these terms may not be perceived as ostensibly disparaging 
or demeaning, they do inadvertently help to perpetuate the idea that infertility and involuntary 
childlessness are ‘female problems.’ 
                                                          
115 See Pearce (note 79 above) at pp 76-77. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Inhorn M., Infertility and Patriarchy: The cultural policies of gender and family life (University of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 1996) p 258 
118 See Deuteronomy 7 verse 14. 
119 A term used to describe involuntarily childless women who desperately want to experience 
motherhood. This term is not just confined to Africa. It is also used for involuntary childless women in 
other jurisdictions.  Moravec M., Motherhood online (Cambridge scholars publishing)  p 213 
120 Adewale O., Predilection for African Indigenous Practices in the Pentecostal Tradition of African 
Indigenous Churches with reference to Christ Apostolic Church Agbala Itura (2009 18 Cyberjournal 
for Pentecostal- Charismatic Research) http://www.pctii.org/cyberj/cyberj18/adewale.html . 
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The response to the criticism that the church has contributed to the feminisation of infertility 
may be explained on the basis that it is mostly women and not men that congregate to 
churches to solicit prayers regarding involuntary childlessness. This may explain why the 
church has focused its attention on involuntary childless women and provides support to 
help them through the traumatic experience of infertility and involuntarily childlessness.121 
But this begs the question on why the church is not doing more to confront the societal 
taboos that shroud male infertility? It can be argued that there is some place for the church 
with its considerable influence in many African countries to play an active role in confronting 
such taboos and in promoting greater openness about male infertility. 
It is not only in some expressions of Christianity practised in Africa that infertility is treated as 
a feminine problem. Islam, Africa’s other predominantly practised faith also appears to 
feminise infertility. Some have argued that this is connected to the high regard that Islam has 
on the woman’s role in procreation. For example, a hadith states: 
‘Paradise lies at the feet of mothers.’ 122  
If a woman is venerated for her role as a mother, it is inevitable that this may lead to 
gendered consequences for involuntary childless women.  Some literature on the treatment 
of involuntarily childlessness in Muslim majority jurisdictions point to the fact that where the 
woman is considered to be responsible for the condition or state of involuntary childlessness 
in her marriage and for bringing ‘bad luck or a curse to her family’123 due to the inability to 
reproduce. So although it may be argued that Islam provides its adherents with religious 
convictions to help them through infertility,124 it is also clear that that it does also have the 
potential in certain quarters in Sub-Saharan Africa and other regions of the world to foster 
                                                          
121 Fledderjohann JJ., Zero is not good for me: implications of infertility in Ghana (2012) Human 
Reproduction; Egede H., “Shrouded gender and reproductive issues in child welfare and protection 
proceedings” (2011) 23 Denning Law Journal 202; Nanyu Yebei V., Unmet needs, Beliefs and 
Treatment Seeking for Infertility among Migrant Ghanian Women in the Netherlands (2000) 8(16) 
Reproductive Health Matters pp 134 at p 138. 
122  Cohen- Mor D., Arab women writers: An anthology of short stories (State University of New York 
Press, New York, 2005) p 13. 
123 Ibid. 
124 See Inhorn (note 117) above. 
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some measure of social stigmatisation against the childless, particularly the childless 
woman. In the predominantly Muslim region of Pemba in Tanzania for example, there is 
relevant literature that shows that a woman who fails to attain the venerated institution of 
motherhood is viewed as ‘a woman who eats without producing fruit’.125 Even when 
involuntary childlessness is as a result of male infertility, a woman mays still face religious 
censure for being responsible for couple infertility. 
 
While the focus in this section has been on the religious characterisation of infertility in 
Christianity and Islam (the two dominant faiths) in Africa, it is also pertinent to discuss the 
role that African traditional religion, which has been characterised by some as a minority 
religion, plays in the shaping of public attitudes to infertility and involuntary childlessness in 
the region.126 Again, it is important to note that there is no singular religious characterisation 
of infertility in African traditional religion since it has been pointed out that these ‘traditional 
religions are essentially local and adhered to by specific kinship based societies.’127  
Notwithstanding the localisation of traditional African religious practices, there are some 
common trends that have been disclosed in the literature which again demonstrate a 
feminisation of infertility in traditional African beliefs.  
To begin with, the treatment seeking behaviour of involuntary childless people demonstrates 
some reliance on traditional African healing and indigenous medicine to tackle infertility.128 
Again, the literature points to the predominance of the use of traditional African healing 
among infertile women as compared to their male counterparts.129 The reason for this is 
                                                          
125 Lock M., Kaufert P., Pragmatic women and body politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 
1998) at pp 140-1. 
126 Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life / Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa 
http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Belief_and_Practices/sub-saharan-africa-chapter-
3.pdf . 
127 Gellar (note 114) at p 3. 
128 Obiesesan K., Adeyemo A., Infertility and other fertility related issues in the practice of traditional 
healers and Christian religious healers in South Western Nigeria (1998) 27(1-2) African Journal 
Medical Science pp 51-5. 
129 Rinne E., Water and Healing- Experiences from the Traditional Healers in Ile- Ife (2001) 10(1) 
Nordic Journal of African Studies pp 41-65; Koster- Oyekan W., Infertility among Yoruba women: 
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explained in Mbiti’s130 seminal work on African religions and philosophy earlier cited in this 
chapter.131 He states that: 
‘The supreme purpose of marriage is to bear children to build a family, to extend life 
and to hand down the living torch of existence. ‘132 
He further observes that: 
‘it is a very tragic thing when no children come out of a marriage. Then people do not 
consider it to be a marriage, and other arrangements are made to obtain children in 
the family.’133  
In another work on traditional African beliefs,134 involuntary childlessness has been 
described as a serious calamity due to the fact that in some African societies, childless 
people cannot become ancestors after death.135  In societies where the veneration of 
ancestors is so fundamental this may have severe consequences on people who are unable 
to reproduce. This may explain why as Mbiti argues that ‘other arrangements have to be 
made to obtain children for the family’.136 These ‘other arrangements’ include polygamy, 
traditional surrogacy, traditional healing, divorce and re-marriage.137 While these 
arrangements may benefit the family structure, it does come at a price for the involuntary 
childless woman who even when there is shrouded male infertility is still viewed in the 
African society as the ‘public face of infertility.’  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Perceptions on Causes, Treatment and Consequences (1999) 3(1) African Journal of Reproductive 
Health pp 13-26. 
130 Mbeti (note 67) p 110. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Opoku K.,  West African Traditional Religion (F.E.P International, Accra, 1978) p 125 cited and 
discussed in Nyengele M., African Women’s Theology, Gender Relations, and Family Systems 
Theory: Pastoral Theological Considerations and Guidelines for Care and Counselling (Peter Lang 
Publishing Inc., New York, NY, 2004) at p 222. 
135 Ibid.  
136 Mbeti (note 67) above. 
137 Tangwa (note 67) above. 
 
 
 
66 
 
If this gendered public face of infertility was sympathetically portrayed by the Ubuntu, then it 
would not matter. But unfortunately, women who are treated as the public face of infertility in 
the African communal society are portrayed in very uncomplimentary terms. Mbiti for 
example in his authoritative work extensively discussed in this chapter describe the childless 
wife as the:  
‘dead end of human life, not only for genealogical level, but also for herself.’ 138  
He goes further to state that: 
‘the childless wife bears a scar which nothing can erase. She will suffer for this, her 
own relations will suffer for this; It is an irreparable humiliation for which there is no 
source of comfort in traditional life.’ 139 
Mbiti’s disparaging description of the state of the involuntary childless woman should not be 
lightly dismissed. This is because he is considered as a leading figure in the field of African 
traditional religion and philosophies. It could be said that his work merely seeks to highlight a 
dominant misogynistic traditional African religious ideology and does not necessarily mean 
that he supports this viewpoint of infertility and involuntary childlessness. Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, it is important that this degrading depiction of the involuntary childless woman 
in Mbiti’s work must not remain unchallenged in contemporary Africa. This is particularly 
critical in light of medical evidence that establishes that several of the cases of involuntarily 
childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa can be directly attributed to male infertility.140 It is 
therefore untenable to describe an involuntary childless woman as the ‘dead end of life’141 
when there has been failure to reproduce. Such parochial notions must and should be 
confronted and discredited by educational, policy and legal mechanisms as they only help to 
                                                          
138 Mbiti (note 67) pp 107 to 108.  
139 Mbiti (note 67 above) chapter 11 at pp 107-8  
140 Parekattil S., Agarwal A., Male infertility: Contemporary Clinical Approaches, Andrology, ART 
(Springer, 2012) p 144. 
141 Mbiti (note 67) above at p 107. 
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perpetuate the gendered social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Another reason why these misogynistic traditional religious and philosophical views should 
be confronted and discredited is the self-harm factor which has in some instances been 
present in the treatment seeking behaviour of involuntary childless women.  There is some 
evidence in the literature that shows that involuntary childless women will in some cases 
adopt desperate measures sometimes to the point of self-harm in order to satisfy societal 
demands of procreation.142 This is why this thesis strongly advocates for a rights framework 
that sanctions the misogynistic social constructions of childless women which foster and 
perpetuate the notion that involuntary childless women have no societal worth or value to 
African societies until they procreate.  
As this chapter nears the conclusion of its exploration of public attitudes towards infertility 
and involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa, it must be stated that there are differing 
views on the level of social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness that 
exists in the region. Some argue that, unlike what has been depicted in works such as Mbiti, 
there is no generalised hostility or stigmatisation against infertile people in the larger African 
society. They argue that in some cases the social stigmatisation is merely perceived, and not 
an actual reality.143 This school of thought also maintains that where there is social 
stigmatisation of infertility, it is to be found among poorer or non-educated involuntary 
childless people. It is for this reason that education and economic empowerment are seen as 
vital keys in dealing with social stigmatisation. 144  
But this leads to the vital and critical question that has silently been waiting to be expressed 
up till this stage. The question is what is meant by social stigmatisation and how can we 
                                                          
142 Egede (note 121) above at pp 220-225. 
143  Donkor, E.S. and Sandall, J. (2007).  The Impact of Perceived Stigma and Mediating Social 
Factors on Infertility-Related Stress among Women Seeking Infertility Treatment in Southern Ghana. 
(2007) 65(8) Social Science and Medicine pp 1683–1694. 
144 Ibid p 1692. 
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determine when people are actually stigmatised? It is necessary to consider this question 
before this chapter draws to a conclusion.  This is because it will help to determine whether 
the negative public attitudes to infertility and involuntary childlessness that has been 
described so far in this thesis actually amount to a form of social stigmatisation.  
To provide some further understanding on this critical issue, it is necessary to turn to the 
body of literature145 that addresses social stigmatisation. Social stigma has been described 
as ‘a sign or mark that designates the bearer as defective and therefore meriting less valued 
treatment than normal people.’146 Other leading works like Crocker, Major and Steele147 go 
further to characterise those who are stigmatised by society as being considered to ‘possess 
some attribute and characteristic that conveys a social identity that is devalued in some 
social context.’148  
From the appraisal of public attitudes to infertility and involuntary childlessness so far that 
has been undertaken in this chapter, it is clear that involuntary childless people especially 
women are considered by many traditional African communities to bear the marks or 
characteristics of ‘barrenness’, ‘fruitlessness’ and ‘unproductivity’ which are considered to be 
unacceptable within the social context that they live in. This is because procreation is seen 
as being vital to the survival and well-being of the primordial public or the Ubuntu in which 
they live in. It is little wonder that some like Mbiti most uncharitably describe the involuntary 
childless as being the ‘dead end of human life.’149 Further, empirical studies150 conducted in 
the social sciences also establish a pattern of the social stigmatisation of the conditions of 
infertility and involuntary childlessness. It is therefore difficult to treat the social stigmatisation 
                                                          
145 See for example Heatherton TF., Klerck RF., Hebl MK., Hull JG., The Social Psychology of Stigma 
(New York: The Guildford Press 2003) 450 pp. 
146 Crocker, Major and Steele’s work referred to in chapter 4 of Heatherton’s book (ibid) at p 88.  
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Mbiti (note 67 above). 
150 Dyer S.,The value of children in African countries: insights from studies on infertility (2007) 28 J 
Psychosom Obstet Gynaecol pp 69–77;Dyer SJ., Abrahams N., Hoffman M., Van der Spuy ZM., Men 
leave me as I cannot have children: Women’s experiences with involuntary childlessness. (2002a) 17 
Hum Reprod pp 1663–1668 and Hollos M., Proﬁles of infertility in southern Nigeria: Women’s voices 
from Amakiri. (2003) 7 Afr J Reprod Health pp 46–56. 
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of the conditions of infertility and involuntary childlessness as mere figments of the 
imagination of involuntary people as some would argue. 
Yet, this is not to say that African traditional societies do not attempt to provide some relief or 
remedy for the social tragedy of these conditions. These mechanisms include social 
parenting, fostering, adoption and traditional methods of surrogacy and male sperm 
donation.  It is therefore important to further explore whether Mbiti’s dire prognosis that there 
is ‘no source of comfort in traditional life’151 is valid in the light of the evidence that African 
societies do attempt to provide the involuntary childless with some traditional coping 
mechanisms and support.152 The effectiveness of these mechanisms will however be further 
evaluated in chapters four and five of this thesis which deal with the socio-cultural 
construction of motherhood and the institution of child adoption in Sub-Saharan Africa 
respectively. 
2.7   Conclusion 
This chapter has explored public attitudes153 to infertility and involuntary childlessness in 
Sub-Saharan Africa by considering the key theoretical African concepts of the Ubuntu and 
the primordial public in the shaping of public opinion within the continent. The concept of 
Ubuntu and the primordial public highlight the role that group solidarity and communalism 
plays in traditional family structures in Africa. The chapter considered the dynamics of the 
socio-cultural linguistic narratives and religion in shaping the social response of African 
communities to infertility and involuntary childlessness.  
                                                          
151 Mbiti (note 67) above. 
152 Sundby J., Infertility in the Gambia: Traditional and Modern Health Care (1997) 31(1) Patient 
Education and Counselling p 29. 
153 The thesis accepts that public attitudes are always constantly evolving, see Crespi I., The Public 
Opinion Process: How People Speak (New York: Routledge, 1997) p xi. Accordingly, it does not 
necessarily imply that public attitudes regarding the negative feminisation of infertility as identified in 
the sources and literature reviewed in this chapter will not evolve or that it necessarily the only sole or 
dominant way of thinking by all groups in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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This chapter concludes on a reflective note which could help to shape further thoughts in this 
thesis on the appropriate rights’ framework that would help to combat the social 
stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness in the region. If the whole notion of 
the humaneness and fairness of African communalism is to believed, then the African civic 
amoral state as the protector of family life as set out in Article 18(2) of the African Charter 
should be involved in the facilitation of a rights framework that will help to ameliorate the 
plight of childless women within the primordial public. To conclude that there is ‘no source of 
comfort in traditional life’ for the childless woman would make a mockery of the notion of 
Ubuntu and African communalism which is said to be premised on respect and human 
dignity. 
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Chapter Three 
The African Feminist Response to Social Stigmatisation of Infertility and Involuntary 
Childlessness 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter two depicted the negative feminisation of infertility in many parts of the Sub-
Saharan African continent and explained the deleterious consequences that the gendered 
stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness has on women within this region. 
Developing on this theme, this chapter will consider the African feminist response to the 
negative feminisation of infertility to provide further focus on how women’s issues are 
problematized and tackled within the local context in which they operate in.  
The concern of the present chapter is to consider how feminism has responded to this 
gendered stigmatisation of feminism in Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, this chapter is 
concerned with the position if any that African feminism has adopted on the negative 
feminisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness. The chapter begins by providing an 
overview of what African feminism is and also explores its different expressions especially 
Womanism and Motherism. This of course speaks to schools of thought rather than adopting 
a homogeneous position in respect of what will promote women’s welfare. The chapter will 
first consider whether these trends of African feminism can actually be described as 
indigenous to Africa. It will further explore whether Womanism and Motherism as main 
schools of African feminism help to perpetuate the negative feminisation of infertility or if 
these schools foster and enhance the social identity of the involuntary childless in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Recognising from the onset that the discussion on African feminism is not 
just situated within legal scholarship, this chapter utilises interdisciplinary literature to explore 
the role that African feminism can play in charting out a rights regime for the involuntarily 
childless women.  
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3.2  The Meaning of Feminism from an African Perspective 
There have always been questions as to whether African women that seek to advance the 
welfare of women within their socio-cultural context should characterise themselves as 
‘feminists’. This is due to the fact that some sections of postcolonial Africa have warily 
viewed the concept of women’s liberation as foreign, unAfrican, anti-family and anti-men.1 
Similarly, many leading African female voices have expressed reservations in identifying with 
feminist ideas which are perceived to be based on the experiences of western women and 
not those of African women.2  
Concerns like these have generated the debate on whether feminism as a discipline exists in 
Africa or if the African movements or research that promote women’s rights are derived from 
other ideological concepts or theories of female identity outside Western feminism.3 
Although this chapter shall in some sections refer to Western feminist perspectives,4 its 
primary objective is to explore the role of African feminism in reconstructing the reproductive 
identity of an involuntarily childless woman in a way that reinforces her legal personhood in 
society. There are several schools of thoughts under African feminism. They include African 
Womanism, STIWANISM, Femalism, Negofeminism, Gynism and African Motherism. These 
theoretical perspectives have been touted as African alternatives to Western feminism and 
                                                          
1  Sunderland J., Language and gender in African Contexts, Proceedings of the BAAL Annual 
Conference, Newcastle University, 2009; Adichie N., We should all be feminists (London: Fourth 
Estate, 2006) 64 pp. 
2 Acholonu C., Motherism: the Afrocentric Alternative to Feminism (Afa Publications 1995). Feminist 
discussions of Acholonu’s work can be found in Ekpa A., Beyond Gender Warfare and Western 
Ideologies in Emenyonu E., (ed.) Goatskin and Wisdom: New critical perspectives of African 
Literature (New Jersey: African World Press Inc. 2000) p 27. 
3  See generally literature such as Sotunsa M., Feminism: The Quest for an African Variant (2009) 
3(1) Journal of Pan- African Studies p 227.    
4 Kingdom K., What is wrong with Rights? Problems for Feminist Politics of Law (Edinburgh University 
Press, 1991); Fineman M., Tomadsen N.,  At the Boundaries of Law, Feminism and Legal Theory 
(Routledge, 1991) ; Bridgeman J., Millns S., Feminist Perspectives on Law: Law Engagement with the 
female body (Sweet and Maxwell, 1998);  Smart C.,  Feminism and the Power of Law (London: 
Routledge, 1989). 
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they are viewed as providing a clearer feminist picture of the African woman’s identity and 
role in society.5   
 
A brief summary of what these schools stand for is set out in table 2 below. However, the 
objective of this chapter is not to provide a descriptive narrative of these theories but rather 
to critically examine how African feminism views the social stigmatisation of infertility and 
involuntary childlessness perpetuated through the negative feminisation of infertility. It also 
considers whether African feminism can develop a rights’ regime for involuntarily childless 
women. The two schools of African feminism that have been identified as relevant to this 
thesis’ investigation are Womanism and Motherism.6 However, it is important to provide a 
short summary of the schools of African feminism that have developed particularly in post-
colonial Africa and table 2 provides this summary below. 
Table 2: Schools of African Feminism 
Femalism Femalism focuses on the self-actualisation and self-reclamation’ of African 
women.7  
Womanism The African variant of Womanism was developed by Okonjo- Ogunyemi8 to 
enable African women engage in feminism in accordance with their cultural 
environment.  
Motherism There is also a debate on the origins of this theory. Early discussions on 
Motherism are seen in Western feminist literature in works such as Temma 
Kaplan.9  However, Acholonu is viewed as the originator of its African variant. 
Stiwanism The acronym Stiwanism10 is coined by Ogundipe-Leslie and stands for social 
transformation in Africa, including women. 
Nego- 
Feminism 
Nnameka in her work conceives the theoretical concept of Negofeminism and 
focuses on complementarity and collaboration between genders.  
Gynism Gynism focuses on the ‘equality of man and woman.’ Like Negofeminism, 
equality is negotiated on the gender complimentarity of the two sexes.’11 
                                                          
5 Maduka C., Feminism, Womanism and Motherism in African Literary Discourse, European 
Conference on African Studies (ECAS 2009), Leipzig, 4-7 June 2009 available at http://www.aegis-
eu.org/archive/ecas2009/panels_round_tables/73.htm pp 2, 8 -10 (accessed September 11, 2015); 
Alkali M., Talif R., Wan Yahya W., Jariah Mohd J., Dwelling or Duelling in Possibilities: How 
(Ir)relevant are African Feminisms? (2013) 13(3) GEMA Online: Journal of Language Studies pp 237-
238.  
6 Acholonu C., Motherism: The Afrocentric Alternative to Feminism.  (1991) 3 Women in 
environmental development Series, pp 209-225 discussed in Saunders B., Foblet M., Changing 
Genders in Intercultural Perspectives  (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002 ) p 117. 
7 Nnameka O., The Politics of (M)Othering: Womanhood, Identity and Resistance in African Literature 
(London: Routledge,1997). 
8 Alkali M., et al (Note 5 above) at p 239. 
9  See for example, Kaplan T., Female Consciousness and Collective Action: The Barcelona Case, 
1910-1918 (1981) Signs 3 pp. 545-66. 
10 Maduka (Note 5 above) at p 12. 
11 Maduka (Note 5) p 11. 
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3.2.1 The “indigenousness” of African feminism 
As table 2 above has shown, there is some debate on whether the feminist concepts of 
Womanism and Motherism can be said to have theoretically developed from indigenous 
African scholarship. Arguments have been put forward that these theories originated from 
African-American literature and not purely from African scholarship.12   
Womanism in its theoretical development has been championed by African American 
feminists such as Alicia Walker.13  She describes a womanist as: 
‘A black feminist or feminist of color… A woman who loves other women, sexually 
and /or nonsexually. Appreciates and prefers women’s culture, women’s emotional 
flexibility (values tears as a natural counterbalance of laughter), and women’s 
strength. Sometimes loves individual men, sexually and/or non-sexually committed to 
survival and wholeness of entire people, male and female… Womanist is to Feminist 
as purple to lavender’ 14 
 
For the most part, Womanism has been embraced by African feminist scholars as it is seen 
as providing an ‘African centred paradigm for women of African descent.’15 Yet, some 
African scholars question whether Womanism as propounded by its African-American 
proponents can be said to be truly representative of the global black experience since a key 
concern of Womanism is focused on ‘the historical experiences of African-Americans in their 
quest for racial emancipation.’16 Further, Walker’s definition that Womanism consists of 
women loving other women sexually is also seen as antithetical to traditional African 
                                                          
12 Saulnier C., Feminist theories and social work: approaches and applications (New York: Haworth 
Press, 1996) chapter 6. 
13 Walker A., The Colour Purple (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983) 245pp. 
14 Walker A., In Search of Our Mothers Garden (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983) xi. 
15 Hudson Weems C., Nommo: Self-Naming and Self-Definition," a revision of "Self-Naming and Self-
Definition: An Agenda for Survival" in Sisterhood, Feminisms and Power (African World Press, 1998) 
chapter one (not numbered). Available at the author’s website at 
http://web.missouri.edu/~hudsonweemsc/ (accessed September 11 2015. 
16 Okojo-Ogunyemi C., Womanism: The Dynamics of the contemporary Black Female Novel in 
English 1983 Signs 11(1)1. Autumn, pp 63 - 80. 
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values.17 These concerns have led some scholars like Hudson-Weems to canvass for a 
redefinition of Womanism that reflects African cultural values and traditions.18 Others like 
Okonjo-Ogunyemi, while accepting the fundamental differences between African Womanism 
and African-American Womanism, do not see the need to classify them differently since both 
variants of Womanism celebrate ‘black roots, the ideals of black life while giving a balanced 
representation of black womanhood.’19  
African Womanism itself raises an interesting discourse on whether it can be characterised 
as being representative of the experiences and identities of all African women. If African 
Womanism depicts black life and womanhood, what is its relevance to other racial groupings 
such as Asian East Africans, Caucasian South Africans and Arabic North Africans who can 
also rightly be described as being of African descent?20  In this regard, African Womanism 
can be subject to the same criticism levelled against the universality of feminism as it ignores 
‘the possibility that women will bond politically across ethnic and racial boundaries.’’21  
In response to the concerns on whether African Womanism adequately encapsulates the 
needs of women in Africa, other ideological concepts such as Motherism have been 
presented as being more representative of the African female identity and its needs. Some 
exploration is required to determine if Motherism is an African indigenous feminist theory?  
As explained in table 2 above, the term Motherism appears not to have been coined in 
indigenous African scholarship. Some view Temma Kaplan22, a Western scholar as the early 
validator of the feminist movement of Motherism which she described ‘as a form of women’s 
collective action spurred on by the fact that they were mothers.’23 She went further to argue 
                                                          
17 Sotunsa (note 3) above at pp 230-1. 
18 Hudson-Weems (note 15) above where she coined the concept of ‘Africana Womanism’ as an 
African centred paradigm for women of African descent. 
19  Okonjo- Ogunyemi (note 16) at p 72.  
20 Ogundipe-Leslie M., Recreating ourselves: African women and critical transformations (Trenton, 
New Jersey: African World Publishing 1994) p 215 and more generally chapter 18. 
21 Hook B., Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (London: Pluto Press, 2000, 2nd edition) p 3. 
22 See for example Gasa N Women in South African History: They Remove Boulders and Cross River 
(Cape Town: HSRC  Press 2007) p 267. 
23 Gouws A., (Un) thinking Citizenship: Feminist Debates in Contemporary South Africa (UCT Press 
2005) p 200. 
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that Motherism served as a form of consciousness where women could mobilise themselves 
when they felt there was a threat to their children or to the community. In this sense, 
Motherism as expressed by collective female mobilisation is practised not only within the 
African sub- continent, but in other regions of the world such as Latin America and Asia 
especially in periods of social unrest.  
Notwithstanding the arguments on the indigenous nature of African feminism as 
demonstrated in the discourse on Womanism and Motherism, African scholars such as 
Acholonu asserts that this concept of feminism is an ‘African alternative to feminism focused 
on the centrality of motherhood in the African female experience.’ 24 Other arguments that 
have been presented on why Motherism and Womanism are considered as representative of 
African feminist values, is that unlike Western feminism, these schools of feminism are not 
particularly concerned with gender construction. Consequently these strands of African 
feminism refuse to accept the notion of a dominant patriarchy governing African traditional 
societies. Proponents of African feminism contend that neither of the two genders have 
dominant control over all the spheres of social life in an African society.25 The reason for this 
is explained below. 
‘…Several African societies reflect systems with ranging degrees of dual-sex 
hierarchies in which men and women exist in parallel and complementary positions 
and roles within the society.’26  
Beyond recognising gender complementarity, African Motherism also disassociates itself 
from Western notions of feminism in that it ardently defends the maternal role and function of 
women in society. It argues that a woman’s maternal role should be seen as positive and not 
                                                          
24 Quoted in Sotunsa (note 3) above at p 231. 
25  Nzegwu N., Gender equality in a dual sex system: the case of Onitsha 2001 1(1) JENDA. A journal 
of Culture and African Women Studies (available online at 
http://www.africaknowledgeproject.org/index.php/jenda/article/view/30) last accessed March 19 2014. 
26  Maduka (note 5) at p 17. 
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restrictive.27 Feminists in this school portray motherhood as a form of empowerment for 
African women.28 They further argue that motherhood confers on women a level of 
dominance in African society due to its pre-eminence in African cosmology. 29  
Although this thesis does not necessarily disagree with the objectives of African feminism, 
which in its different variants seeks to disassociate itself from aspects of Western feminism 
considered as being inappropriate to the African social context, it questions whether African 
feminism especially Motherism can serve as a force for good in eradicating the social 
stigmatisation associated with involuntarily childlessness.  This is because Motherism in its 
veneration of motherhood may unintentionally help to perpetuate the social stigmatisation 
associated with involuntarily childlessness. But conversely, Motherism in conjunction with 
Womanism, if deployed purposively, could aid the facilitation of a rights’ regime for women 
particularly in the area of championing the wider availability of ARTs for involuntary childless 
women. However, before determining the role that these key strands of African feminism can 
play in developing a rights’ regime for the involuntary childless women, it is necessary to 
further explore how the conditions of infertility and involuntary childlessness are viewed by 
African feminists. This issue will be further considered below. 
3.3 Interdisciplinary African Feminist Discourses on Involuntarily Childlessness 
Much of the discourse on Motherism and other variants of African feminism is situated in the 
fields of humanities and social sciences. This chapter will therefore adopt an inter-
disciplinary approach to this discourse. This is because African feminism like its Western 
counterpart cannot be fully explored within the precincts of just one discipline but rather 
through ‘different networks of interdisciplinary conversation.’30  The theoretical development 
                                                          
27 Howe S.,The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo: asserting motherhood: rejecting feminism?(2006) 7(3) 
Journal of International Women’s Studies p 47. 
28  Makinde T., Motherhood as a Source of Empowerment of Women in Yoruba Culture (2004) 13(2) 
Nordic Journal of African Studies pp 166-167. 
29 Oyewunmi O., Abiyamo: Theorizing African motherhood 2003 4 JENDA A journal of Culture and 
African Women Studies (available online at 
http://www.africaknowledgeproject.org/index.php/jenda/article/view/79 ) last accessed March 19 2014. 
30 Osha S., Introduction: African feminisms (2006)  XX:5-9  Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy 5 
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of African feminism is situated in the humanities and the social sciences, particularly in 
African literary works and sociological anthropology.31 This interdisciplinary discourse begins 
first with an exploration of the key feminist literary works, particularly the African novel. 
These works provide some perspective on how African feminism views the condition of 
infertility and involuntary childlessness. The deployment of literary works in understanding 
the social and cultural context of law is not new and has been utilised by leading legal 
academics like Manji.32  This thesis will therefore explore the Motherist’s attitude to the plight 
of the involuntary childlessness as set out in the African novel and other genres of African 
literary works. 
3.3.1 The Involuntary Childless Discourse in African Feminist Literary Works 
Motherism is expressed in many African feminist literary works dealing with infertility and 
involuntary childlessness. This is because motherhood is viewed as being socially 
empowering in African feminism. The literary works therefore narrate the tragic 
circumstances of infertile and involuntary childless women who are unable to attain to this 
desired role of motherhood. It is said that there is a genre of infertility fiction in African 
feminist literature.33 This raises a pertinent question on why infertility and involuntary 
childlessness resonates so much in African literature. Nwapa, a prominent African novelist 
explains it this way: 
 
‘African women writers have been accused of dwelling too much on barrenness. 
They are told by their male critics to write on “more important” themes...the problem 
                                                          
31 Makhalisa B., Baby Snatcher in the Underdog and other Stories (Gweru:Mambo 1984); Nwapa F., 
Efuru (London, Heinnemann 1970);  Nwapa F., One is Enough (Trenton NJ: African World Press 
1992); Okoye I., Behind the Clouds (Harlow: Longman, 1982); Vera Y., ‘It is hard to live alone’ In Why 
don’t you carve other animals (Toronto: TSAR 1992). 
32 See for example Manji A., Law, Literature and Labour in Sembene Ousmane’s ‘Les Bouts de Bois 
de Dieu’ (2005) 25(2) Legal Studies 320-336, Manji A., Like a Mask Dancing’: Law and Colonialism in 
Chinua Achebe’s ‘Arrow of God (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society pp 626-642. 
33 Murphy L., Metaphor and the slave trade in West African literature (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University 
Press, 2012) see p149 and chapter five more generally. Murphy provides a list of this genre of 
infertility literature which include Nwapa’s Efuru and Idu, Emecheta’s Joy of Motherhood, Aidoo’s 
Anowa, Okoye’s Behind the Cloud, Makuchi’s the Healer to mention a few. 
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that a woman faces in the world is the pain of not being able to bring forth a child 
from her womb... a wife is more often than not betrayed and abandoned by her 
husband if she does not have a child. Therefore the desire to be pregnant, to 
procreate is an overpowering one in the life of the woman. She is ready to do 
anything to have a child.’34 
This explanation provided by Nwapa shows that the African feminist fully appreciates public 
attitudes towards infertility and involuntary childlessness. It also provides a good summary 
on the gendered consequences of involuntary childlessness within Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Nwapa not only identifies the emotional tragedy of involuntary childlessness but also points 
to the social and economic disenfranchisement that a woman may experience in her family 
structure if she is unable to have children.35 
Since the tragedy of infertility and involuntary childlessness is viewed as such an important 
theme for African feminist writers as stated above, it is necessary to explore how the African 
feminist responds to this tragedy in the genre of infertility fiction. One of the key concerns 
would be to identify the strands of African feminism that dominate the infertility fiction genre. 
In Emecheta’s Joy of Motherhood36 for example, the themes of Motherism and Womanism 
appear to be the key African feminist schools utilised to tackle the issue of infertility. At the 
early stage, Nno-Ego, the protagonist of the novel shares the view of her society that social 
empowerment is to be gained through the achievement of biological motherhood. She 
therefore embarks on a reproductive autonomous journey to achieve this status. When her 
first marriage fails to achieve her reproductive goal, she leaves her abusive husband and 
remarries. It is clear that love or sexual attraction is not the central objective for embarking 
                                                          
34 Nwapa F., ‘Women and Creative Writing in Africa’ in Nnaemeka O., (ed.) Sisterhood, Feminisms 
and Power: From Africa to the Diaspora (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1998) pp 89-100 discussed 
in Olaniyan T., & Quayson A., (ed.) African Literature: An Anthology of Criticism and Theory (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2007) p 531 and referenced in Ode R., Tse PA., Articulation of Women and 
Gender Issues in Drama and Theatre from Classical Greece to Post Independence Nigeria (2013) 
7(1) Creative Artist: A Journal of Theatre and Media Studies p 32 at p 49.  
35 See discussions on this in Okonofua F., Harris D., Odebiyi A., Kane T., Snow R., The social 
meaning of infertility in Southwest Nigeria (1997) 7 Health Transition Review p 205. 
36 Emecheta B., The Joy of Motherhood (Oxford: Heinemann, 1979).  
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on this marriage but rather a desire to have children. Two key reasons appear to motivate 
her desire to have children, first the sense of obligation she feels to her natal family, 
particularly her father. The second is based on a Motherist notion that motherhood is an 
empowering social status and that a woman is not complete if she remains childless.37  
In this sense, it would appear that Emecheta in this novel fully supports and adopts a 
Motherist approach to the dilemma of involuntary childlessness. Through her protagonist, 
Emecheta appears to encourage childless women to take proactive steps to achieve the 
empowered status of motherhood.38 Yet, at the end of the novel, there is the sense of bitter-
sweet realisation that the attainment of biological motherhood does not necessarily provide 
the sense of social achievement that Emecheta’s female protagonist so desperately craved 
for.  While Nno-Egu is able to find some acceptability among her community through the 
realisation of her dream of having her own biological children, there is that appreciation that 
a woman’s lot in life is more than biological motherhood.39 In addressing this point, 
Emecheta adopts a Womanist approach which moves beyond treating motherhood as the 
centrality of an African’s woman experience as expounded by Acholonu and other 
proponents of African Motherism. However, this does not mean that Emecheta completely 
discards a Motherist approach to infertility and involuntary childlessness. Instead, she adopts 
a realist approach to the tragedy of involuntary childlessness that portrays the harsh reality 
that many involuntary childless women would never be satisfied with a childless state, but 
will do all within their power to achieve biological motherhood. 
This Motherist viewpoint is diametrically opposed to the position occupied by Western 
feminists who abhor the notion that womb power should be seen as a symbol of social 
empowerment for women as touted in the infertility genre of African feminist fiction.40 The 
response to this criticism is that the African feminist does not live in vacuum. She 
                                                          
37 Ibid, see chapter 5 captioned ‘a failed woman.’ 
38 Emecheta (note 36) pp 31-36 (chapter 3), p 62 (chapter 5). 
39 Ibid, see chapter 18 on the Canonised Mother. 
40  For example, see Raymond J., Women as wombs (Melbourne: Spinifex Press, 1994). 
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understands the societal dynamics of the traditional African society where all must contribute 
procreative value in their family and community at large. Consequently, African feminism 
does not necessarily seek to reform African traditional views of womb power which it views 
as an empowering, potent and liberating force.41  This superiority of womb power may 
explain why the genre of African feminist fiction presents a narrative where involuntarily 
childless women refuse to accept their state of involuntary childlessness, particularly when 
male infertility appears to be the cause.  
This proactive decision of the female protagonist to take ‘her life in her hands’ and her 
refusal to accept that she is barren when there is shrouded male infertility or impotence is 
not only discussed in African feminist novels, it is also dramatized by male African writers. 
For example, Bekederemo, one of African leading playwrights in his play Song of Goat42 
depicts the tragedy of male reproductive problems such as impotence43 and the impact this 
has on families. Ebiere, the female protagonist in Clark- Bekederemo’s work enters into an 
illicit relationship with her brother in law as a coping mechanism when faced with her 
husband’s impotence. Although this results in a tragic outcome for Ebiere and her lover, 
Clark-Bekederemo and Emecheta’s works show the different ways in which African women 
in traditional societies confront involuntary childlessness, especially in instances of shrouded 
male infertility44 or undiagnosed infertility.  
The genre of infertility fiction also explores female infertility, particularly of the secondary 
type. This is portrayed in Nwapa’s Efuru45 where the mechanism of traditional surrogacy is 
                                                          
41 Makinde (note 28) and Oyewunmi (note 29) above. 
42 In Clark JP., Three Plays (Oxford University Press, 1970). 
43  It is said that male infertility is often shrouded in many African communities because it is often 
equated with male impotence which is seen as a social stigma. See Parrott F., At the hospital I learnt 
the truth: diagnosing male infertility in rural Malawi (2014) 21(2) Anthropology and Medicine pp 174-
188. 
44 This practice is so vividly described in Nfah- Abennyi JM., The Healer in Your Madness, Not Mine: 
Stories from Cameroon (Ohio University Press, 1999) see in particular pp 1-11. It is however 
interesting to note that the female protagonist in this novel refuses to accept a situation where her 
infertility is resolved through forced insemination by a traditional healer and this sets her on a 
destructive path which produces tragic consequences for her and her community, see pp 1,2 and 10-
11. 
45 Nwapa F., Efuru (Oxford: Heinemann, Reissue Waveland Press 2013) 221 pp.   
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adopted. Efuru contracts a wife for her husband when she finds out that she is unable to 
have any more children after the death of her only child. This form of marriage is called the 
woman to woman marriage which will be discussed further in chapter four of this thesis.  
However, there are some limitations to the notion that women can pursue their reproductive 
goals and aspiration at all cost. In particular there are questions on whether the African 
feminist literary writer offers support to women who fail to achieve biological motherhood 
despite having embarked on an autonomous reproductive journey to achieve life birth. Since 
“womb power” is eulogised by African feminism, how are women who remain involuntary 
childless for the rest of their lives treated? It would appear that it is only in Nwapa’s Efuru 
where there is some allusion to the fact that an African involuntarily childless woman can find 
social meaning and justification in society through works of social benevolence and religious 
adherence.46 Aidoo’s Anowa47 on the other hand paints a sad tragedy of the state of an 
involuntary childless woman. Despite her quest for vindication that she is not medically 
infertile or responsible for her involuntary childlessness, Anowa commits suicide after her 
husband’s shrouded male infertility is brought to light. While it is not fully explained why she 
takes her life, it may be argued that Anowa’s tragic death could be attributed to the failure of 
the realisation of reproductive aspirations and the sense of well -being that comes from a 
fulfilled marriage. However, as Opoku Akyemang rightly surmises, it will seem that the real 
tragedy here is the: 
‘...silence over alternative avenues of growth for the intelligent, independent woman... 
Anowa’s suicide is the ultimate symbolic act of taking complete control over her 
destiny and thereby making a noble exit of a world of no exit...Ultimately what 
                                                          
46 See F Stratton’s discourse on how Efuru overcomes the stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness 
through self-realisation and adherence to traditional beliefs, F Stratton, Contemporary African 
Literature and the Politics of Gender (Routledge, 1994) at pp 95- 96. Self-realisation and a strong 
belief in the omniscience of God are also seen as the liberating factors for the infertile female 
protagonist in A Konadu’s A Woman in her Prime (Heinemann, 1967). 
47 Ata Aidoo A.,The Dilemma of a Ghost and Anowa :Two Plays (Harlow: Longman:1995) 128 pp. 
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matters is not the death of Anowa; it is the questioning of the unfair traditional props 
which would render the Anowas of the society deviants.’48  
Opoku-Akyemang’s statement above sets out so poignantly the plight of the involuntary 
childless woman who through ‘unfair traditional props’ seems to have no status or identity in 
the traditional African society outside her procreative role. As earlier highlighted, it would 
seem that the primary avenue for growth that the African feminist novel offers a woman who 
is involuntarily childless is to embark on an autonomous reproductive journey to achieve 
biological motherhood, especially when male infertility is responsible for her involuntary 
childlessness. While this may seem to a liberating alternative, it still does not address the 
fact that there are some women who will remain childless for life.  As stated earlier, it 
appears that it is only in the novel Efuru, where the fictional narrative on childlessness 
envisions a situation where a childless woman can have social relevance in her traditional 
community through her role as a traditional priestess. In this sense, we see the application of 
Womanism (and to some extent Stiwanism) which provides opportunities for a childless 
woman to realise self-identity beyond motherhood. 
3.3.2 African Feminism and Involuntary Childlessness in Social Science Literature  
Apart from the African literary field in the humanities, the interdisciplinary feminist 
conversation on the negative feminisation of infertility can be found in the discipline of the 
social sciences especially in the subjects of anthropology, population studies and sociology.  
The key focus of the social science conversation on involuntarily childlessness will be 
explored in the anthropological and sociological disciplines. This is because these fields 
have contributed significantly to the literature on the social stigmatisation of involuntary 
childlessness. 49 It is worth noting that the social stigmatisation of infertility that have been 
                                                          
48 Okpoku-Agyemang NJ., A Reading of Ama Ata Aidoo’s Anowa In Egejuru PA., Katrak KH., (eds.) 
Nwanyibu: Womanbeing and African Literature (Asmara: African World Press, 1997) pp 30-31. 
49 See for example, Gerrits T., Social and cultural aspects of infertility in Mozambique (1997) 31(1) 
Patient Education and Counseling 39–48; Pearce T., She Will Not Be Listened To In Public: 
Perceptions among the Yoruba of Infertility and Childlessness in women (1999) 7 (13) Reproductive 
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dramatically portrayed in the social science literature has been deployed by international 
public health bodies such as the World Health Organisation and the European Society for 
Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) to justify the need to provide wider access 
to affordable reproductive technologies in Sub-Saharan Africa.50 It therefore is necessary to 
consider how African feminism in the social sciences have addressed the infertility question 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Feminist anthropology, particularly in the phase of its development in the 1970s is premised 
on the second wave of feminism and its notions of ‘exposing sexism in public and private 
life.’51 Like other fields within feminism, feminist anthropology in its early development laid 
emphasis on the idea of a universal culture of male domination or patriarchy prevalent in 
many regions of the world.52  As such, early anthropological research on non-Western 
cultures portrayed the women of these cultures as either invisible or helpless in a society 
dominated by men.53 Ethnic minority anthropologists such as Lourde also agree that male 
dominion which causes the ‘oppression of women knows no ethnic or racial boundaries.’54 
Yet these ethnic minority anthropologists recognise that these experiences of oppression are 
not necessarily uniform or identical.55 The realisation that women’s experiences while in a 
sense universal vary from region to region is also evident in the anthropological discourse on 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Health Matters 69-79.; Inhorn MC., Van Balen F., (eds.) Infertility around the Globe: New Thinking on 
Childlessness, Gender, and Reproductive Technologies: A View from the Social Sciences (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press; 2002) 358 pp ; Hollos M., Profiles of Infertility in Southern Nigeria: 
Women’s Voices from Amakiri (2003) 7(2) African Journal of Reproductive Health/La Revue Africaine 
de la Santé Reproductive pp 46–56. 
50 Vayena E., Rowe PJ., Grifﬁn PD., Current Practices and Controversies in Assisted Reproduction. 
Report of a meeting. World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, 2002, 383–385; Vayena E., 
Rowe JP, Peterson HB., Assisted Reproductive Technologies in Developing Countries: Why Should 
We Care? (2002)  78 Fertil Steril pp 13–15. 
51  Di Leonardo M., Introduction: Gender, Culture and Political Economy: Feminist anthropology in 
historical perspective in Di Leornardo M., (ed.) Gender at the crossroads of knowledge: Feminist 
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involuntary childlessness. This is also true in the case of the anthropological discourse on 
involuntary childlessness in African anthropological literature. 
It is pertinent to note that a significant section of the anthropological research on infertility 
and involuntary childlessness in Africa is situated in Western scholarship. Predominant 
among these works are the works of Retel-Laurentin, 56 Feldman-Salvelsberg,57  Larsen,58 
Hollos59 and Irhorn60. Western anthropological works on infertility has its historical origins in 
the colonial era where it was observed that colonial anthropologists painted a picture of the 
rise of infertility among indigenous communities within their colonies. 61 Several theories 
were developed to explain the cause of the rise of infertility within colonially occupied 
territories, including those situated in Africa. The explanations touted by the colonialists for 
the rise in infertility amongst indigenous communities included the role of diet, behavioural 
patterns of promiscuous ‘self-aborting women’62 and the psychological impact of colonialism 
on indigenous communities. 63  On the psychological impact that colonialism may have had 
on indigenous communities; scholars such as W.H.R Rivers went as far as to argue that this 
fostered a sense of melancholy and defeatism that stymied the ability of these communities 
to reproduce.64  
This early research on infertility in Africa is seen to be tainted with an imperialist coloration 
that portrayed local people as debauched or depraved in their behavioural practices or at 
                                                          
56 Retel Laurentin A., Infécondité en Afrique Noire. Maladies Et Consequences Sociales, (Masson et 
C.ie Editeurs, 1974) 196 pp. 
57 See for example Feldman- Savelsberg P., Plundered Kitchens and Empty Wombs: Fear of Infertility 
in the Cameroonian Grassfields. (1994) 39(4) Social Science pp 463-474.  
58 See for example Larsen U., Primary and Secondary Infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa (2000) 29(2) 
Int. J. Epidemiol pp 285-291. 
59 See for example Hollos M., (note 49 above). 
60 Irhorn M., (see note 49 above); see also Irhorn M., Missing Motherhood: Infertility, Technology, and 
Poverty in Egyptian Women’s Lives. In: Ragone H., Twine FW., (eds) Ideologies and Technologies of 
Motherhood: Race, Class, Sexuality and Nationalism (New York: Routledge, 2000) pp 136-168. 
61  Lock M, Nguyen VK., An Anthropology of Biomedicine (Sussex: Blackwell Publishing:2010) p 1766  
62 Ibid.   
63 Ibid. 
64 River’s work is discussed in N Hunt’s on Colonial Medical Anthropology and the Making of the 
Central African Infertility Belt in Tilley H., and Gordon RJ., (eds) Ordering Africa: Anthropology, 
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best emasculated and childlike and unable to carry out the most basic of all adult human 
endeavour- reproduction.65 This criticism of the early research led to the undertaking of a 
combined clinical/ethnographic approach towards the evaluation of the causes of infertility. 
For example, the medical anthropological research undertaken by Retel-Laurentin identified 
sexually transmitted infections (STIs) as a primary cause of infertility.66 The same criticism 
meted out against earlier colonial works which associated infertility with promiscuous 
behavioural acts of the indigenous communities could also be applied to Retel-Laurentin due 
to the identification of STIs as the primary cause of infertility. Yet it can be argued that her 
work was predicated on ethnographic scientific data and not on stereotypical colonial 
presuppositions. More fundamentally her work is seen as largely sympathetic to African 
infertile women since she focused on the human suffering of involuntarily childlessness67 
and canvassed for wider treatment of STIs through the use of penicillin. It is interesting that 
Retel-Laurentin’s findings on the role of STIs as a key cause of infertility is still considered by 
public health specialists to be the key cause of infertility within the region. 68 
Although medical anthropological research has focused on the clinical and ethnological 
investigations on the causes of infertility and the resulting infertility belt in Africa, it will be 
incorrect to state that feminist concerns on the oppression of women through sexual 
asymmetry and gender inequalities has been completely ignored. For example, Retel-
Laurentin’s approach to female infertility among her infertile patients was described as 
feminist and full of empathy for their human plight.69 In the same way the more current 
feminist anthropological scholarship illustrated by the works of Irhorn, Hollos and Larsen also 
highlight the gendered consequences of infertility and its harmful social consequences on 
African women. Their works investigate how motherhood as a natural role for a woman 
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66 Leonard L., Problematising Fertility, Scientific Accounts and Chadian Women Narratives in Inhorn 
M., Van Balen F., (eds.) Infertility around the Globe: New Thinking on Childlessness, Gender and 
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67 Hunt N., (note 64) above at p 267. 
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Surveys Comparative Reports, No 9 (World Health Organisation, Geneva, 2004).  
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impacts on a childless woman. Yet, unlike works on involuntary childlessness situated within 
the first phase of second wave feminism which were more concerned with ‘structural 
stratification than on acknowledging or alleviating infertility’70 these anthropologists do not 
trivialise the traumatic experiences of infertile women within the African sub-continent. 
Instead, they deploy their research to point to a social problem that can be tackled through 
public health initiatives such as the widening of access to infertility care.  
These empathetic feminist response to involuntarily childlessness is situated in what 
Thompson describes as the phase two feminist thinking on infertility and the role of 
reproductive technologies.71 It must however not be forgotten that the discussion on the 
feminist anthropological perspective to involuntary childlessness has so far been situated 
within the context of Western feminism. It is therefore necessary to consider how indigenous 
African feminist anthropologists discuss infertility.  
An in-depth analysis of the literature reveals that feminist anthropological research on 
infertility has also be undertaken by indigenous African anthropologists.72 These indigenous 
African scholarly works focused on the social and cultural meaning of infertility and 
involuntary childlessness as well as the coping mechanisms that traditional African societies 
provide to alleviate the social tragedy of involuntary childlessness and infertility. Key among 
these works are Nzegwu73 and Amadiume’s74 works.  
Like their counterparts in the field of humanities, it would appear that anthropologists and 
sociologists such as Nzegwu and Amadiume also call for proactivity on the part of 
involuntary childless women in the effective utilisation of traditional mechanisms that would 
                                                          
70 Thompson C., Fertile ground: Feminists Theorise Infertility in Irhorn M, Van Balen F (eds) Infertility 
around the Globe: New Thinking on Childlessness, Gender and Reproductive technologies (note 49) 
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71 Ibid at p 56. 
72 See for example Nzegwu N., Family Matters: Feminist Concepts in African Philosophy of Culture 
(Albany: State University of New York, 2006) 330 pp; Amadiume I., Male Daughters, Female 
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aid them in achieving parenthood, if so desired. These African feminist anthropologists 
refuse to accept a fatalistic sense of helplessness for the involuntary childless woman. 
Nzegwu for example emphasizes that it is not the end of the world if women are not able to 
have their own biological children. She sees this as a metaphysical pact that they have 
made with their ‘Chi’ (personal god). 75 Since this is the case, she urges them to play the 
hand that they have been dealt. She further argues that society has provided involuntary 
childless women with ‘the social space’76 for empowerment which includes having children 
by other male partners if involuntary childlessness is as a result of male infertility, or utilising 
the traditional surrogacy system called the ‘woman to woman marriage. 77 She also points 
out that they can also utilise the traditional institution of foster parenting. Amadiume also 
emphasizes the same point when she argues that there are alternative traditional routes 
outside biological motherhood whereby an involuntary childless woman can find social 
empowerment. Like Nzegwu, she also points to the ‘woman to woman marriages’ 78 as one 
such means of empowerment.  
The refusal by these African anthropologists to make biological motherhood the centrality of 
a woman’s status appears to be situated more in the feminist school of Womanism rather 
than in Motherism. This is depicted in their underlining concern which focuses on the need 
‘for the development and self-definition of the Black female subject.’79 The self-definition of 
the black female is seen in the argument that life for an infertile woman should not begin and 
end with motherhood. This does not mean however that anthropologists like Nzegwu and 
                                                          
75 In Igbo, Chi is described as the “personal life force” or personal god (idol). See Onukawa MC., The 
Chi Concept in Igbo Gender naming (2000) 70(1) Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 
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Amadiume completely ignore the cultural value of biological motherhood. Nzegwu for 
example argues in her other discourses on the African family structure that mothers are 
considered as wielding significant power in society due to the fact that everyone is seen to 
have been gestated in a womb.80 In this sense, it may be said that Nzegwu retreats once 
more to the school of Motherism by arguing that reproductive power creates autonomy for 
mothers in the family. This assertion that biological motherhood provides a woman with a 
superior status over a woman who is not a mother is a theme that this thesis will revisit in 
chapter four when it considers the different constructions of motherhood in traditional African 
societies. 
African Motherism which celebrates the power of the womb is also seen in works such as 
Oyewunmi.81 She evokes the Yoruba terminology “Ikunle Abiyamo” (the kneeling of the 
mother in labour) to explain the special role that biological motherhood occupies in African 
societies and cultures. She argues that a woman who achieves the revered status of Ikunle 
Abiyamo is said to have more superior identity than any other socially constructed identity in 
the African community because she has been involved in the birthing and the bringing forth 
of new life necessary for the continuity of the African society. This deification of motherhood 
or what can be characterised as the ‘cult of motherhood’ helps to promote public attitudes 
that an African woman’s identity in society is tied up to her ability to conceive. It is 
questionable why African feminists should participate or promote a cultural concept which 
disenfranchises women who are not able to fit into the so called revered social construction 
of Ikunle Abiyamo due to involuntary childlessness. In its bid to distinguish itself from 
Western concepts of feminism through its eulogy of motherhood; African feminism appears 
to have inadvertently placed a group of women at a disadvantage. The veneration of the 
concept of Ikunle Abiyamo leaves the involuntary childless with no other alternative for social 
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empowerment or identity than to find ways in which they can attain this social construction of 
Ikunle Abiyamo. 
Yet, paradoxically, the emphasis on Motherism in African feminism may help to serve this 
thesis’ objective in arguing for a case for wider access to affordable reproductive 
technologies in Sub-Saharan Africa. If Motherism which is one of the dominant trends of 
African feminism recognises and affirms the centrality of motherhood in the African society, 
then it could be argued that there is an African feminist case for widening access to 
reproductive technologies for the infertile or involuntary childless woman. This would enable 
this group of disenfranchised women gain access to the means to achieve their procreative 
goals and also enhance their status in their communities. 
Yet in arguing for wider access to affordable reproductive technologies, it must be 
recognised that not all women regardless of whether they have access to affordable 
reproductive technologies will go on to attain the role of Ikunle Abiyamo (the natal mother). 
This raises the question on how the rights of these women can best be protected. Should 
they be dismissed as ‘the dead end of human life’ as some claim?82 Surely, African feminism 
can serve as a rallying force for this group of women beyond advancing a case for widening 
access to affordable reproductive technologies? The next section of this chapter will 
consider whether African legal feminism is best placed out of the fields of African feminism to 
lead the development of a rights regime for involuntary childless women within the region. 
  
3.4.  African Legal Feminism: Leading the Way in the Development of a Rights 
Regime for Involuntary Childless Women? 
The preceding sections of this chapter have been concerned with an inter-disciplinary 
discourse on how African feminism addresses the social stigmatisation of involuntary 
childless women. The discourse showed that that African feminists in humanities and social 
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sciences celebrate biological or natal motherhood and actively encourage involuntary 
childless women to pursue their quest for biological motherhood. However, the discussion on 
how the pursuit for biological motherhood can be actualised through a reproductive rights’ 
regime is not fully considered in these fields of African feminism.  As such it is important to 
consider what role if any that African legal feminism can play in facilitating a clear 
reproductive rights regime. One key way this can be done is through the concept of 
reproductive autonomy or procreative liberty.  
Some of the key places where documentation on African legal feminism can be found are 
the African Gender Institute (the Institute), Cape Town and the Women and the Law in 
Southern Africa (WLSA) research trust. The Institute for example publishes the Feminist 
Africa which to date has nineteen journal issues on African feminism. Issue 15 (2011) of this 
journal is a special edition which focuses on the role law and judicial reforms have played in 
feminist struggles in Africa. Unlike the evidence found in the social literature, it is fascinating 
to see that the gendered stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness is barely 
mentioned in this special edition. Rather the focus of this edition appears focus on the 
‘uncharted areas of gender and sexuality.’  This may be understandable considering that 
sexuality has become a key area of concern in other jurisdictions and African legal feminists 
may feel impelled to follow suit so they do not lag behind in an area of research that has 
become important in the field of gender and equality. 
 
Yet, the apparent failure to give the negative feminisation of infertility and involuntary 
childlessness the same equal attention as other issues dominating African legal feminism is 
a bit disquieting. It is difficult to understand why African feminist legal scholars have not 
provided significant contributions to the literature on how a feminist rights’ regime can be 
developed to strengthen the reproductive rights of infertile women. This lack of interest in an 
important reproductive issue which is associated with gender inequalities is particularly 
baffling, when consideration is given to the fact that African feminists in the fields of 
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humanities and social sciences have long been at the forefront of this important debate. Why 
then have their counterparts in the legal field been reticent about an issue that affects a 
number of women in the Sub-Saharan African region?  
It would be wrong however to create the impression that there is no legal scholarship on this 
subject. As earlier highlighted in chapter one, Anne Hellum has written extensively on this 
issue and 83 may be described as a ‘Retel- Laurentin’84 in this field in the sense that she 
offers a sympathetic European perspective on the plight of African childless women85. Her 
co-authored empirical Zimbabwean research study illustrates how the norms of a legally 
pluralist society affects infertility management. Yet, it would appear that there are few 
indigenous African legal feminists that provide the same level of scholarship on this point as 
they have done for other issues that affect African women such as female genital mutilation 
(FGM). Rather many indigenous African legal feminists appear to be bemused about the 
negative feminisation of infertility. Banda for example on her discourse on Hellum’s works 
appears to be mystified at ‘the extraordinary length to which infertile women go to have 
children.’86 She however recognises that the desperate quest to have children arises from 
the socio-cultural identity given to motherhood in this jurisdiction and the role that African 
customary law has played in perpetuating this notion that motherhood is central to a 
woman’s identity.87 In the same manner, writers such as Adjetey88 who provides a detailed 
treatise on the African perspective of reproductive autonomy ignores the plight of infertile 
and/or involuntary childless women in this discussion. She analyses customary family 
structures such as the traditional Sororate marriage which is practised when a wife dies or 
leaves her matrimonial home before giving birth and is replaced by her sister. What is 
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87 Ibid at pp 92 and 93. 
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interesting is her failure to connect this practice to the negative feminisation of involuntary 
childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa. She rightly identifies the privileging of male rights in 
this type of marriage but fails to critique whether this form of marriage fosters the idea that 
women are only valued for their procreative capability. 
It is only in works such as Odinga89 that we see an indigenous African legal feminist critique 
of the negative feminisation of infertility. This work provides a case note of judicial cases 
determined at the customary court level in the predominantly Lou regions in East Africa. In 
these cases the women defied the socio-cultural norms that shrouded male infertility and 
treated involuntary childlessness as a woman’s problem. 90 It is interesting to note that unlike 
Adjetey, Odinga in her analysis of one of the cases highlights the disempowering effect that 
Sororate marriage can have on childless women. In the case of Olum d/o Odingo v Godu 
Asiyo,91 the plaintiff, Olum Asiyo was a replacement bride for her older sister who could not 
have children. Olum Asiyo brought a divorce petition against her husband on grounds of 
male infertility. She was able to successfully prove that husband’s previous marriage to three 
other women, including her older sister were childless due to his infertility. Odinga is also 
able to point to the narrative that fertility also plays a central role to male masculinity and 
sexuality in Africa. This narrative sometimes gets ignored in other feminist literature in the 
humanities and social sciences where the focus is on the centrality of motherhood for a 
woman’s identity. 
While works like Odinga confirm some engagement by indigenous African legal feminists in 
the debate on the negative feminisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness; there are 
still unanswered questions on why the key human rights instruments that deal with gender 
equality and women’s rights have failed to provide a distinct and clearly defined legal regime 
                                                          
89 Odinga  A.,  I am not Tassa, he is not a man like other men: Feminising infertility and Masculinising 
Fertility in South Nyanza in Tamele S (eds) African sexualities: A reader  (Pambazuka Press, Oxford: 
UK 2011) p 463 
90 Ibid see pp 465-468. 
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to confront the negative feminisation of infertility and childlessness and the discriminatory 
impact that it has on involuntary childless women.  This is a theme that Hellum92 focuses on 
in great detail in her research. However, in her empirical 1999 study on infertility 
management in Zimbabwe, she focuses primarily on the shortcomings of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)93 in addressing the 
gender issues connected with infertility. This work did not discuss the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo 
Protocol)94 which had not yet been adopted as at the time of her 1999 study. 
As discussed in chapter two of this thesis, Hellum in her 1999 study and subsequent works95 
points to the role that modernisation theory has played in the formulation of CEDAW and its 
inability to understand the social realities that women experience in non-Western societies. 
She also argues that Westernised law is often based on a hierarchized system of law that 
fails to understand the importance of the role that non-formal rules and norms play in legally 
pluralist societies such as Africa.96 This is a theme that this thesis intends to further consider 
in chapter seven which explores how law and regulation can shape a rights regime for 
involuntary childless women. Using the grounded theory approach, Hellum argues that 
CEDAW and other international instruments are unable to address the legal issues 
surrounding involuntary childlessness due to the failure to understand the ‘complex realities’ 
that women faced in their daily interaction as subjects both of Western received law and 
non-Western received law.97 
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Musembi98 who contributed to Hellum’s 2013 edited work99 further builds on this theme in 
her comparative study of CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol. Although this work does not 
focus strictly on infertility management in Africa, it provides further interesting perspectives 
on the interaction between formal law and state action and ‘so called’ non-formal rules and 
norms situated in custom and religion. This is an important point as has been pointed out in 
chapter two of this thesis, the negative feminisation of infertility is often perpetuated through 
the application of rules situated in customary law and religion. Yet as Musembi100 points out, 
the national laws, including the constitutional framework of several African states give full 
recognition to religious and customary rules that perpetuate discriminatory practices against 
women. Musembi’s observation is quite critical as it highlights the point that rules in 
customary law and religious law in non-Western jurisdictions are not considered to be 
informal but are afforded the same status as state law and Western received law.  
In tackling discrimination against women in general, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (the Committee) has adopted an abolitionist approach that 
seeks for the total legislative prohibition of such practices, regardless of their recognition 
within the national legal framework. From an internationalist perspective, this position of the 
Committee is justified in the sense that, state parties to the Convention are required to 
transpose into national law, the obligations they freely entered into at the international level. 
However, scholars like Musembi101 question the effectiveness of adopting an abolitionist 
approach to deep rooted cultural practices when such matters are best tackled through 
‘social education and mobilisation.’ 102  While social education and mobilisation both have a 
place in modifying customs and changing public attitudes, this thesis argues that legislative 
prohibition does have a key role to play in eliminating discriminatory practices. Again this is a 
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point that will be further explored in chapter seven of this thesis when considering the 
appropriate rights regime for the involuntary childless. 
One clear example, where legislative action has been effective in combating a discriminatory 
and harmful practice against women has to do with the case of the prohibition of female 
genital mutilation (FGM) which is stridently tackled within the framework of the Maputo 
Protocol which as Musembi explains addresses the cultural realities of women in Africa.103 
Article 5 of the Protocol requires state parties to take all legislative and other measures to 
eliminate harmful practices that negatively affect the human rights of women. Article 5(b) 
identifies FGM as one of the harmful practices that impact the rights of women in this region. 
States under this sub-article are required to take appropriate measures to prohibit through: 
‘legislative measures backed by sanctions, of all forms of female genital mutilation, 
scarification, medicalisation and para-medicalisation of female genital mutilation and 
all other practices in order to eradicate them.’ 
Apart from the Maputo Protocol, other applicable UN General Assembly resolutions104  also 
underscore the need for states to adopt national legislation to end this harmful practice.  The 
United Nations Division on the Advancement of Women and the CEDAW committee have 
also canvassed for legislative prohibition of FGM at the national level.105 This abolitionist 
approach to FGM demonstrates the role of law in effecting social change. Sub-Saharan 
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African countries like Kenya106 have also adopted this abolitionist approach to FGM by 
enacting national legislation prohibiting this harmful practice.  
This thesis therefore queries why CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol have not been similarly 
deployed to tackle the wrongs associated with the gendered stigmatisation of infertility and 
involuntarily childlessness in the Sub-Saharan African region. Unlike the practice of FGM, 
the negative feminisation of infertility is not distinctly identified under Article 5 of the Maputo 
Protocol as a harmful practice that affects the rights of women. Two key reasons are 
considered below as providing some explanation for the dismissiveness of the needs of 
involuntary childless women in CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol.  
First, it may be argued that the gendered consequences of infertility were not fully 
understood at the time when these instruments were formulated. Accordingly, the negative 
feminisation of infertility was not seen as a key human rights issue that deserved legal 
intervention.107 Second, it would appear that feminism at the time of the development of 
these rights instruments sought to deemphasize the centrality of a woman’s identity as being 
primarily connected to procreation.108 Consequently, the prevailing feminist movement during 
the development of the gender rights framework canvassed for reproductive autonomy that 
would enable women to choose not to have children or to reduce their family size.109  
Existing scholarship110 shows that the Western feminism discourse on gender equality was 
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one of the key institutionalised ideologies that shaped the CEDAW Convention. Sicard for 
instance argues that111: 
 
The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW, 1979) was the first international text to reflect the changes of the 1960s 
and 1970s and the impact of Second Wave Feminism. 
 
The fact that CEDAW was shaped by second wave feminism may explain why its provisions 
on reproductive autonomy focused more on fertility control, than on the right to procreate. 112 
The emphasis on fertility control can be gleaned in the main provisions of the Convention 
and in the general recommendations of the CEDAW Committee. For instance, Article 16(e) 
provides women with the rights to: 
 
‘Decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to 
have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise 
these rights.’ 
The CEDAW Committee in its General Recommendation 24113 on Article 12 on the right to 
health also requires that women be provided with safe and reliable means of contraceptives, 
sex education that helps women in the spacing of their children and access to safe abortion. 
Yet this Recommendation makes no mention on the need to provide affordable fertility 
treatment for the involuntary childless. This thesis accepts that it is important to provide 
women with greater autonomy over reproductive matters. However, in limiting reproductive 
autonomy to fertility control, the second wave feminists who helped to shape CEDAW 
                                                          
111 Sicard A., UNSCR 1325: Recalling CEDAW and DEVAW. An analysis of the genesis of UN 
Resolutions on Gender-Based-Violence (British International Studies Association, Aberystwyth, 
2014). 
112 McCulley C., Radical Womanhood: Feminist Faith in a Feminist World (Boulevard, Chicago: 
Moody Publishers, 2008) p 132 where she argues that one of the key features of second wave 
feminism is its ‘unwavering commitment to abortion.’  
113 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health), 
Adopted at the Twentieth Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, in 1999 (Contained in Document A/54/38/Rev.1, chap. I). 
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missed a salient opportunity to provide infertile and involuntary childless women with wider 
reproductive choice over the right of family formation. More fundamentally, CEDAW which is 
the primary international regime that seeks to address all forms of discrimination against 
women also failed to provide robust anti-discrimination regime to combat gendered 
stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness.  
 
It is understandable why international feminist groups that championed CEDAW may have 
failed to appreciate the socio-cultural implications of involuntary childlessness in Africa and 
other pro-natalist parts of the world and why this may have contributed to the failure to tackle 
the social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness with the same gravity as other 
discriminatory practices against women.  It is however difficult to offer any defence for the 
similar neglect of the social stigmatisation of infertility in the Maputo Protocol which is 
considered as the key regional instrument on the rights of women in Africa. Again, to 
understand why the Maputo Protocol is dismissive of the plight of involuntary childless 
women, it is necessary to revisit the historical development of the passage of this instrument. 
 
The emergence of the Maputol Protocol is said to have been as a result of the campaigns of 
‘an increasingly vocal and visible African women’s rights movement.’114 This rights 
movement campaigned for rights of women which they believed were of particular concern 
to African women. They also campaigned against the narrow scope of rights afforded to the 
women in the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples Rights adopted in 1981.  For 
instance, feminists strongly oppose the emphasis that Article 18(2) of the African Charter on 
Human Rights has given to state protection of the family as the custodian of morals and 
traditional values. They feel that articles of this nature could be used to trump the rights of 
women and subject them to further gender inequalities in a traditional African family 
structure. Many African feminists pointed to the fact that a lot of the discriminatory and 
                                                          
114 Viljoen F., An Introduction to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa (2009) 16 Wash. & Lee J.C.R. & Soc. Just p 11 at p 18. 
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harmful practices that affected women occurred in the family structure. 115They identified 
FGM, discriminatory practices against widows and vulnerable elderly women, domestic 
violence and child marriages as some of the harmful practices that took place in the 
family.116 To address these concerns; the women rights campaigners sought for a more 
gender specific instrument that underscored and protected the rights of African women and 
granted them more autonomy in family and social life. These campaigns successfully led to 
the culmination of the Maputo Protocol which specifically prohibited harmful practices 
against women in Africa such as domestic violence (Articles 3 and 4) female genital 
mutilation (FGM-article 5), abusive behaviour against widows (Articles 20 and 21) and 
vulnerable elderly women (Article 22). 
A closer reading of the Protocol reveals that missing from this list of harmful practices is the 
negative feminisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness. Again, the question has to 
be asked why African legal feminists in their campaign against harmful practices against 
women failed to lead the way in tackling the gendered stigmatisation of infertility and 
involuntary childlessness in the region. Could it be like their Western counterparts that they 
sought to deemphasize the procreative role of women? One clear way of achieving this was 
to treat reproductive autonomy from the perspective of fertility control rather than use it as a 
vehicle to promote the reproductive decision to procreate. It is pertinent to note that years 
before the Protocol came into existence, that feminists like Adjetey117 had canvassed for an 
African concept of reproductive autonomy that should be developed along the lines that 
would enable African women to have more control over their reproductive decisions 
particularly in the areas of fertility control and family planning. 
Interestingly, Article 14 of the Maputo protocol which sets out the legal framework for health 
and reproductive rights for women places at the vanguard of the regime of rights in Article 
                                                          
115 Banda F., Blazing A Trail: The African Protocol on Women's Rights Comes Into Force (2006) 50(1) 
Journal of African Law pp 72-84.  
116 Ibid, pp 75 – 81. 
117  Adjetey (note 88) above at p 1352. 
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14(1) (a) the right of women to control fertility.  Article 14(2) goes further to require states to 
take appropriate measures to provide women with wider access to medicalised abortion. 
Apart from a brief mention in Article 14 (1) (b) that women have the right to decide whether 
to have children or not, there is no clearly defined reproductive rights regime that provided 
infertile and/or involuntary childless women with the right to access fertility treatment. Again 
this shows the glaring failure of African legal feminists to tackle a concern which is treated a 
feminist issue by other African feminists in the Humanities and Social Sciences.  
3.5 Conclusion 
As gleaned in the multi-disciplinary discourse on African feminist attitudes to the negative 
feminisation of infertility, it is clear that Motherism, one of the dominant African schools of 
feminism views reproductive autonomy as the right not only to control fertility but also to 
proactively exercise the right to procreate if so desired.  It is therefore unclear why African 
legal feminism has not adopted the Motherist perspective of reproductive autonomy to allow 
for involuntary childless women to have a wider access to fertility treatment that will enable 
them to reproduce if so desired.  
Understandably, African legal feminists may be concerned that the adoption of the Motherist 
perspective in binding legal regimes may unwittingly encourage the subordination of women 
in the family structure and make nonsense of the concept of reproductive autonomy. But 
thinking of this nature ignores the emergence of the third wave feminism that seeks to listen 
to the aspirations and concerns of other women outside the West.118 This wave of feminism 
understands and accepts the diversity of women’s experiences across the world. This 
recognition of diversity does not in any way signify cultural relativism which encourages the 
subordination of women. Rather it recognises that while there can be the diversity of female 
experiences, there still exists a commonality of rights and freedoms to be enjoyed by all 
women regardless of their background or culture.. Indeed it could be argued that the real 
                                                          
118 See works such as Zack N., Inclusive Feminism: A Third Wave Theory of Women’s Commonality 
(Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005) pp 2-4. 
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objective of true feminism, whether derived from Western or non- Western jurisprudence is 
to advance the welfare and wellbeing of women.119  
It is on the basis of a third wave feminism that recognises diversity in commonality that  it 
may be possible for African legal feminists to lead the way in the shaping of the rights regime 
for the infertile and involuntary childless woman. Drawing from other schools of African 
feminism situated in the humanities and social sciences, African legal feminism can broaden 
the concept of reproductive autonomy in Africa to include not only the right to fertility control 
but one that celebrates the reproductive aspirations and choices of African women who want 
to reproduce. They cannot continue to be dismissive of this group of women when their 
counterparts in the Humanities and Social Sciences have long been advocates that 
involuntary childless women should be allowed to pursue their reproductive ambitions of 
achieving biological motherhood if they so desire.  This thesis realises that this is no easy 
feat as this may entail a radical rethinking by legal feminists on what reproductive autonomy 
should mean for women in non-Western cultures. But as Hellum120 argues, it is necessary 
that those who are involved in advancing gender rights and equality should be conversant 
and acquainted with the ‘complex realities’ that women face in the societies they live and 
interact in. African feminists in the Humanities and Social Sciences have demonstrated that 
they are painfully aware of what it means to be childless in a typical African community. This 
thesis argues that African legal feminists must not only come to a fuller understanding of this 
problem, but they must also seek to offer legislative solutions to tackle this discriminatory 
practice as they have done with other practices like FGM.  To give further perspective on the 
negative feminisation of infertility and its social stigmatisation, the next chapter of this thesis 
will focus on the socio-cultural differentiations between biological motherhood and non-
biological motherhood and how these differentiations further feed into the narrative of social 
stigmatisation of infertility.  
                                                          
119 Billson JM., Fluehr-Lobban C., Female Well Being: Towards a Global Theory of Social Change 
(London:Zed Book, 2005) p 374. 
120 Hellum (note 95) above at p 108. 
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Chapter Four 
Reproductive identity: Constructions of Motherhood and the Status of Infertile 
Women in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
4.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the analysis of African feminism, especially its Motherist school of 
thought, establishes that far from condemning the cultural value that African societies place 
on the institution of motherhood, African Motherism celebrates this institution. Motherhood 
for many is seen as central to full womanhood.  Since this is the case, it raises the further 
question on what type of motherhood is considered as symbolising full womanhood. Is 
biological motherhood the only construction of motherhood that is recognised in African 
socio-cultural norms or are other types of non-biological motherhood equally as important?  
This chapter will consider this issue and further explore how the cultural construction of 
motherhood plays into the narrative of the negative feminisation of infertility in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Nigeria, a case study jurisdiction, has been selected for this discourse on the socio-
cultural constructions of motherhood. The evidence for this discourse is gathered from 
existing quantitative and qualitative studies on the case study ethnic groups situated within 
this country.  
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Nigeria has been chosen as the investigation site for the discourse of this chapter for a 
number of reasons. First, it is pro-natal country where motherhood is esteemed and where 
adult male and females are expected and encouraged to add procreative value to their 
community.1  Second, it is also the largest populated country in Africa and will provide a 
case study on what it means to be infertile in a region when fertility is seen as a sine qua 
non. Third, there are scholarly works that specifically document the constructions of 
motherhood in Nigeria, which this thesis shall rely on in shaping the discourse of this 
chapter.2 Fourth, Nigeria is a country where traditional African religion is practised alongside 
with the dominant world religions of Christianity and Islam and would therefore provide 
interesting perspectives on how motherhood is construed. Lastly, Nigeria operates a pluralist 
legal system and provides a useful illustration of the complex social and religious structures 
that shape and influence the construction of motherhood in the Sub-Saharan African 
continent.  
The constructions of motherhood is considered, using five ethnic groups in Nigeria as case 
studies. Three of these ethnic groups namely, the Igbos, Yorubas and Hausa/Fulani are the 
largest and dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria, while the other two (Izons (Ijaws) and Yakurrs 
(Ekois) although relatively smaller groups have been the focus of recent anthropological 
studies on infertility.3 The research findings from these studies will be fully relied on as they 
provide empirical evidence on how motherhood is construed and interpreted in these groups. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Dimka R., Dein S., The Work of a Woman is to give Birth to Children: Cultural Constructions of 
Infertility in Nigeria  (2013) 17(2) African Journal of Reproductive Health pp 107 and 112. The author 
of this thesis also has first-hand knowledge of the cultural connotations of this issue from her 
experience as an involuntary childless woman. 
2 See for example, Oyewunmi O., Abiyamo: Theorizing African Motherhood 4 Jenda: A Journal of 
Culture and African Women Studies; Akujobi R., Motherhood in African Literature and Culture (2011) 
13(10 CLC Web: Comparative Literature and Culture available at http://dx.doi.org/10.7771/1481-
4374.1706 (accessed July 29 2015). 
3 See for example Hollos M., Profiles of infertility in Southern Nigeria: Women's Voices from Amakiri. 
(2003) 7 (2) African Journal of Reproductive Health p 46. 
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Figure 3: Map of Ethnic Groups in Nigeria 4 
 
The chapter is divided into the following sections. The first section provides a synopsis of the 
case study indigenous groups in Nigeria that are considered in this chapter. This leads to a 
brief introduction of the Nigerian pluralistic legal system and its regulation of family structures 
in Nigeria. This is followed by a discussion on how customary law is framed in Nigeria. A 
detailed case study analysis is provided about the construction of motherhood under 
Nigerian customary law. This is based on qualitative evaluation of the customary laws 
gathered from four case study groups, namely the Yorubas, Igbos, Ijaws and the Yakurrs. 
The chapter then considers the construction of motherhood under Shariah law as key branch 
of the Nigerian legal system. The position of Islamic personal law is interpreted using the 
evidence gathered from the last case study group, the Hausa-Fulanis. The purpose for this 
detailed study on the customary and religious laws in Nigeria is to consider how motherhood 
is depicted within a case study African country and to evaluate if the socio-cultural 
construction of motherhood contributes to the perpetuation of the negative feminisation of 
infertility that has been discussed in chapter two of this thesis. The chapter concludes by 
considering what influence if any that State law characterised by the Nigerian constitution, 
                                                          
4 Map Source: Ulrich Lamm. All the case study groups are included in this map. Yakurr is also known 
as Ekoi. 
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national legislation and received English law may have on the contemporary construction of 
motherhood in Nigeria.  
4.2 Background and Context of the Case Study Groups 
Before considering how motherhood is construed in a legally pluralist society like Nigeria, it 
is necessary, to provide some background and context of the indigenous groups that have 
been chosen as case studies for the discourse on the constructions of motherhood in 
Nigeria. The Federal Republic of Nigeria is the largest black African country and is roughly 
composed of 250 indigenous groups. 5 It is situated in West Africa and borders between 
Cameroon and Benin. The population of Nigeria as of 2013 is estimated at 173.6 million 
people.  Nigeria emerged as a nation state in 1914, when the British government 
amalgamated Northern and Southern protectorates and the colony of Lagos which at that 
time were under its colonial authority. Prior to British colonial rule, the indigenous peoples 
that constitute Nigeria today existed in what historians have termed as traditional empires 
and kingdoms with their distinctive indigenous cultures and values.6 Many of these 
communities, like their counterparts in other parts of what is known today as West Africa 
were actively engaged in trading and commercial activities. With these activities, came the 
inflow of religious beliefs such as Islam and Christianity, which were not considered to be 
indigenous to Africa. 7 
It is said that Islam was first introduced into the region that is currently known as Nigeria in 
the 11th century.8 The Kanuri King of Kanem is seen as the first key convert to Islam. The 
spread of Islam in Northern Nigeria gained more momentum in the 14th century due inter alia 
to the involvement of pre-colonial kingdoms in the Trans-Saharan Africa trade. This provided 
freedom of movement for traders and travelling missionaries such as the Wangaras who 
                                                          
5 Vaidya A., Globalization: Encyclopaedia of Trade, Labor, and Politics, Volume 1 (Santa Barbara 
ABC-CLIO Greenwood, 2005) p 557. 
6 Collins R., and Burns J., A History of Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge: 2008) Chapter six at pp 78-
94. 
7 Haynes J., Religion in Global Politics (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge: 2014) at p 105.  
8  Falola T., Hearton M., A History of Nigeria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p 29. 
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travelled to regions such as Kano and Borgu. These missionaries came not only with their 
trade, but with their religion.9 The mid- 14th century,10 witnessed several conversions to Islam 
in the Hausa ethnic community. Key among these conversions in the ruling oligarchy was 
the conversion of King Yaji of Kano who was said to have accepted Islam in 137011. 
There were also Fulani pastoralists who settled among the Hausa communities in Northern 
Nigeria by the 15th century. Unlike their host Hausa communities who continued to widely 
practise animist beliefs alongside their adopted Islamic faith, the Fulani pastoralists were 
deeply devout in their faith. In response to the widespread practice of animism among Hausa 
Muslim converts, a Jihad (a holy war) was waged in early 19th century by Fulani reformists. 
This jihad came to be known as the Fulani jihad and was spearheaded by a number of 
Fulani purist, chief among them was Uthman Dan Fodio.12  
The Islamic reforms brought about by the Fulani Jihad were reflected in the daily lives of the 
people, including their family structures.  The Islamic reformers saw marriage and family life 
as priority areas for reform. Uthman Dan Fodio, for example, advocated that both men and 
women should be properly educated in the Islam, including instructions on marriage and 
family life. His call for women to be educated in the Islamic faith was seen as unprecedented 
and was received with hostility by some who felt this would go contrary to the Islamic 
practice of Purdah (cloistering of women).13 While, Uthman Dan Fodio like other Islamic 
scholars sanctioned purdah and the veiling of women, he equally believed in Islamic 
education for women as he believed that this would help them become better wives and 
mothers.  He emphasised the importance of Islamic education for women as he felt it would 
wean them from the dependence on traditional practices such as bori rituals (spirit 
possession), charms and worship of ancestral spirits which they heavily relied on especially 
                                                          
9  Akinwumi O., Raju A., (1990) The Wangarawa factor in the History of Nigerian Islam: The example 
of Kano and Borgu 29(4) Islamic Studies pp 375. 
10 Insoll T., (2005) Religion, Islam: Growth of: Western Africa in K Shillington, Encyclopaedia of 
African History (New York: Routledge 2005) p 1264. 
11 Falola and Hearton (note 8) above at p 29.  
12 Insoll (note 10) above at p 1264. 
13 Bivins M., (2007) Telling stories, making histories (Heinemann: Portsmouth) pp 117. 
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when faced with domestic challenges such as infertility, pregnancy complications, child birth, 
infant mortality and children’s health. 14 
Subsequent British colonisation did not diminish the reforms that the Fulani Jihad brought to 
bear on the societal fabric of the Hausa-Fulani communities in Northern Nigeria. The British 
through the political process of indirect rule15 left local governance largely in the hands of 
Islamic rulers, intervening only when enforcement of Islamic (Sharia) law went contrary to 
natural justice, equity, good conscience and public policy. Such matters generally had to do 
with the criminal aspects of Sharia law and not with Islamic personal law relating to 
marriage, inheritance and the custody of children. Consequently, Sharia law continues to 
regulate the private life of Muslims in the Hausa-Fulani communities in Northern Nigeria and 
recent legislative reforms have reintroduced the criminal elements of Sharia law in several of 
the states within this region.16   
Apart from the traditional kingdoms situated in the Sahel region of current Northern Nigeria, 
there were other notable pre-colonial states and communities living in the rain forest, coastal 
and Delta regions of what is known today as South West, South East and South-South 
Nigeria.17 These forest based communities included the Yorubas, Igbos and Benins. Other 
communities such as Itsekiris, Izons (Ijaws), Efiks and Yakurrs lived in the Delta region of 
the Niger River and coastal area of the South-South region. Beginning with the Yorubas, this 
background context provides a brief historical synopsis of family life in the five case study 
communities chosen for this study on the social construction of motherhood in Nigeria.   
Historically, Yoruba families were structured according to patrilineal descent. The Yoruba 
pre-colonial family structures were polygamous, typified by a man living communally in a 
                                                          
14 Ibid at p 122. 
15 Haynes (note 7) at pp 110 – 111. 
16 Korieh C., Nwokeji G., Nnameka O., Religion, History, and Politics in Nigeria: Essays in Honor of 
Ogbu U. Kalu (Maryland: University Press of America, 2005) pp 119-121. 
17 Ofiaja N., Africa: A Basic Text on Land, People, and Culture (New York: Mellen Press) chapter 
seven which discusses the forest kingdoms and communities of the lower Niger and the Niger Delta 
River. 
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compound with his wives, children and other extended kin.18   The cosmological value of 
children may have changed since many Yorubas have adopted Islam and Christianity as 
their religious beliefs. Yet, adoption of these world faiths does not appear to have diminished 
the view that children as the ‘highest good’19 or the ‘wealth’ of Yoruba family structures. This 
historical traditional symbolism of children and their link to the invisible ancestral world helps 
to explain the high birth rates among the Yorubas today. 20 
In the same way, the Igbo family structure is not greatly dissimilar to the Yoruba family 
structure. It is also historically structured after patrilineal descent.21 This however does not 
mean that there are not a few clans of Igbo descent that practise a matrilineal model.22 The 
Igbos also practised polygamy and having many children who are also seen to be vital for 
economic, social empowerment and preservation of the lineal line. Unlike their Yoruba 
counterparts, early Islamic conversion was not noticeable among the Igbo community. 
Historically, the world faith that the Igbos accepted was the Christian faith, with specific focus 
on Catholicism and Anglicanism. Igbo conversion to Christianity heralded some changes to 
pre-colonial family structures seen as repugnant to Christian values reflected in colonial 
legislation and common law principles. This will be discussed in more detail in subsequent 
sections of this chapter.  However, there is general acceptance that like other indigenous 
groups in modern Nigeria today, many Igbo Christian adherents have retained several of 
their traditional customs alongside their Christian faith.23 This is reflected in the Igbo socio-
cultural constructions of motherhood to be discussed further in this chapter. 
                                                          
18   See an analysis of the Yoruba family structure in Roberts K., Yoruba family, Gender, and Kinship 
Roles in New World Slavery Falola T., Childs M., (Eds.) The Yoruba Diaspora in the Atlantic World 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press: 2004) pp 248 to 259. 
19 Zeitlin M., Babatunde E., The Yoruba family: Kinship, socialization, and child development In Zeitlin 
M., Megawangi R., Kramer E., Colletta N., Babatunde E., Garman D., (eds) Strengthening the family - 
Implications for international development (Tokyo: United Nations Press, 1995) online text available at  
http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu13se/uu13se0d.htm (accessed August 4 2015. 
20 Cadwell J.,(1987) The cultural context of high fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa, Population and 
Development Review 409; A Adepoju (1977) Rationality and Fertility in the traditional Yoruba Society, 
Southwest Nigeria 
21  Korieh, Nwokeji and Nnameka (note 16) at pp 15 and 87.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid at p 21. 
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The Ijaws (Izons or Ijos) live in the creeks of the Niger Delta. Historically, the Ijaws were said 
to have operated a stateless community structure. This is why some early writings on this 
ethnic group have labelled them as a “tribe without rulers.”24 The Ijaws like other coastal 
communities in the Niger Delta engaged in international trade as far back as the 15th 
century. They provided palm oil and later on slaves to European traders, including the 
Portuguese and the British.  The Ijaw communal relationships are established through 
kinship ties. The Ijaw communities25 practise the matrilineal family descent26 with many Ijaw 
women maintaining ‘close ties with their maternal lineages.’27   
Although the Ijaws were among the first to have contact with European traders, they did not 
readily adopt the Christian faith and many strictly adhered to their traditional forms of 
worship. 28 Some historians argue that the early Ijaw groups that adopted the Christian faith 
such as the Brass Ijaws did this for economic advancement. Ayandele for example asserts 
that the Brass Ijaws adopted a veneer of Christianity when their trading partnership with the 
Europeans was at its peak, but as fortunes declined they renounced what ‘they stigmatised 
as the white man’s religion.’29   Notwithstanding what may seem to some historians as a half-
hearted acceptance of Christianity among this community, there are many Ijaws in the 
contemporary Nigerian society practise the Christian faith.30 Historians like Minihan link this 
                                                          
24 Leis P., Palm Oil, Illicit Gin and the Moral Order of the Ijaw (1964) 66(4) American Anthropologist p 
829 available online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1525/aa.1964.66.4.02a00060/pdf 
(accessed August 4 2015). 
25  Note a few exceptions to this rule such as the Patanis whose family structure is patrilineal. See 
Leis N., (1974) Women in Groups: Ijaw Women Associations in Rosaldo M., Lamphere L., Bamberger 
J., (eds) Woman, Culture and Society (California: Stanford University Press: 1974) at p 226. 
26  The matrilineal descent is still practised in Ijos (Ijaws) communities to date. 
27 Kritz M., and P Makinwa –Adebusoye P., Determinants of Women's Decision-Making Authority in 
Nigeria: The Ethnic Dimension (1999) 14(3) Sociological Forum p 399 at p 404. 
28  See an interesting detailed historical discourse on the intricate relationship between the 
Brass/Nembe community, the Church Missionary Society (CMS) and the Royal Company in chapter 9 
of Ayandele E., Nigerian Historical Studies (London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd, 1979) pp 192 to 
203. 
29 Ibid at p 192. 
30 Shoup J., Ethnic Groups of Africa and the Middle East: An Encyclopaedia (Santa Barbara: ABC 
Clio: 2011) at p 130. Shoup estimates that about 95% of the Ijaw ethnic group are Christians. Notable 
amongst them is the former Nigerian president, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. 
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to the missionary work carried out among the Ijaws in the 19th century.31  Just as we have 
seen in other ethnic communities, some Ijaw Christians practise their Christian faith 
alongside indigenous beliefs. This syncretism of beliefs is also reflected in the norms that 
govern family structures, including the construction of motherhood. Evidence for this is 
provided in recent anthropological studies carried out Hollos and Larsen32 in identified Ijaw 
towns. 
The final case study focuses on the Yakurrs who live in the upper Cross River region in 
ancestral towns known as Umor, Ekoli, Ilomi, Nkoibolokom and Yakurr be Ibe.  The common 
origin of Yakurr communities was ‘reinforced by frequent inter-marriages.’33  Historically, the 
Yakurrs (and even to date) practise the double unilineal descent which is consider as a rare 
anthropological system34 which involves societal recognition of two co-extensive kinship 
groupings,35 namely the matrilineal and patrilineal descent. These kinship groupings are said 
to bestow different benefits, for example marriage payments; inheritance of transferable 
wealth can be claimed through matrilineal descent while inheritance of land and provision of 
“cooperative labour” is claimed through patrilineal descent. 36   
Pro-natalism among the Yakurrs also has a historical basis as evinced by Yakurr oral 
traditions. For example the long-practised customary Leboku festival (annual new Yam 
harvest celebrations) is historically associated with traditional Yakurr religious beliefs 
                                                          
31 Minihan J., (2002) Encyclopaedia of the Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups Around the 
World (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002) pp 770. 
32 Hollos M, Larsen U, Obono O, Whitehouse B., The problem of infertility in high fertility populations: 
Meanings, consequences and coping mechanisms in two Nigerian communities ((2009)  68(11) 
Social Science & Medicine pp 2061–2068. This article however confirms the fact that while there may 
be some element of syncretism in belief, several members of the Ijaw community adhered quite 
strictly to their Christian faith as demonstrated by the refusal of many women to practise a ritualistic 
dance called Seigbein which is seen as ‘UnChristian.’  
33  Obono O., (2001) Matriclan Priests and Pronatalism among the Yakurr of Southeastern Nigeria 
(2001) 16(1) African Population Studies pp 15-42. 
34 There are also sub-groups within the Igbo and Ijaw communities where the double unilineal system 
is also practised. See E Uchendu, Masculinity and Nigerian Youths 16(2) Nordic Journal of African 
Studies p 279 at p 280.  
35 Ibid at p 4. 
36 Hollos M, Larsen U, Obono O, Whitehouse B., When Reproduction is not a choice: Infertility in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Unpublished Paper available from 
http://uaps2007.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=70312 . 
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associated with human and agricultural fertility.37 Today, the historic cultural link of the 
Leboku festival with human fertility is not lost on infertile women who find this festival 
distressing as it serves as a painful reminder of their involuntary childlessness. One infertile 
woman explains that during the Leboku festival ‘...it is difficult not to notice one’s own 
unhappiness.’38  However, it would seem that earlier celebrations of the Leboku festival 
among the Yakurrs may have provided a support group for infertile women known as the 
Kekonakona which enabled them to participate in Yakurr traditions, including the Leboka 
festival. They participated in these traditions by seeking help from traditional priests who 
purportedly invoked prayers for fertility. However it is pertinent to note that the recent study 
conducted by Hollos, Larsen, Obono and Whitehouse established that with the increasing 
influence of Christianity in Yakurr community, the Kekonakona support group  has all but 
died out as most young women today see it as ‘a quaint reminder of by-gone tradition.’39 
This extensive background history of these five identified case groups and how family 
lineage and structures are conceived is given to provide some context for the detailed 
discussion of the construction of motherhood in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
Before this discourse is undertaken, it is necessary to introduce the Nigerian pluralistic legal 
system and how family structures are regulated under its three primary branches- 
customary, Islamic, State law and received Common Law. This appraisal of the Nigeria legal 
system is provided below. 
It is necessary to add this caveat that in some instances that it would be difficult to 
distinguish indigenous customary practice from religious beliefs. This is because many 
Nigerian indigenous communities practice their local customs and laws alongside with their 
adopted beliefs of Christianity and Islam. For example, it would be difficult to examine the 
                                                          
37 The earliest written historical account of the Leboku (Liboku) festival is documented in Forde D., 
Integrative Aspects of the Yako First Fruits Rites (1949) 79 (1/2) The Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2844498 
(accessed August 4 2015). 
38 Obono O., Life Histories of Infertile Women in Ugep, Southern Nigeria (2004) 19(2) African 
Population Studies p 63 at p 71. 
39  See Hollos, Larsen, Obono and Whitehouse (note 36) above at p 22. 
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customary practice of groups like the Hausa-Fulanis and Yorubas (to some extent) without 
considering the place and role that Islam (and Sharia law) plays on their family structures 
and their construction of motherhood. This is why the discussion of the norms and practices 
of the Hausa/Fulanis on what it means to be a mother is discussed within the framework of 
Islamic (Sharia) law rather than under the broad head of customary law.  This is not to say 
that like other indigenous groups, that the Hausa-Fulanis do not practice ‘a syncretistic blend 
of Islam and local cultural features that shape women’s lives.’40 Yet, it is more useful to 
discuss the regulation of family matters of the Hausa-Fulanis within the regulatory framework 
of Islamic law. This is because Islamic law is a key governing law in several states in 
Northern Nigeria where the Hausa and Fulani groups are located.41 It is however vital to note 
that Islam like other world religions has its different variants. Consequently, the writer 
accepts that the constructions of motherhood that will be discussed in later sections of this 
chapter may not necessary be the experience of all practising Muslims.  
4.3      Introduction to the Nigerian Pluralistic Legal System and its Role in Regulating 
Family Structures 
Nigeria is a country which has a pluralistic legal system comprising of customary law based 
on the indigenous beliefs of its people, Shariah (Islamic law), statutory and received 
common law. These three broad legal systems provide their own constructions of what 
constitutes lawful family structures in Nigeria.  Further these legal systems regulate, 
influence and determine who can lawfully and socially be classified as a mother in Nigeria. 
As notable scholarly works on Nigerian family law establish, the system of law that governs a 
person’s family life is dependent on what type of marriage contracted.42   
                                                          
40 Cole C., and Mark B., Women in Twentieth Century Hausa Society in Cole C., and Mark B., (Eds), 
Hausa women in the 20th century  (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press 1991) at p 6. 
41 See Ostien P., Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999-2006: A Sourcebook: Vol. I (Ibadan: 
Spectrum Book, 2007) which provides demographic data on the Northern states that practise full 
Sharia law.  
42  Kasumu A.,  Salacuse J., Nigerian Family Law  (Butterworths: 1996) p 1. 
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If a person marries under customary law, his family life will generally be governed by 
customary law. The same position applies to marriages contracted under Islamic law or 
statutory law. But in certain instances, this may be a false dichotomy since there is a 
symbiotic relationship between the three systems of law, in matters relating to a person’s 
family life. For example the fact that a person marries under customary law does not mean 
that parental rights and responsibilities would be strictly governed by customary law alone. 
Under Child Welfare legislation such as the Nigerian Child Rights Act 2003, all Nigerian 
parents regardless of how marriage has been contracted are obligated to carry out 
responsibilities to their children in connection with their care, maintenance, upbringing, 
education, training, socialization, employment and rehabilitation.43 
Nigerian family law can be classified into four broad areas (1) celebration of marriage, 
including its validity, matrimonial relief including divorce; (2) nullity and other matrimonial 
suits; (3) relationship between parent and children covering legitimacy, legitimisation, 
guardianship, parental rights and obligations; and (4) family and property. 44 
The examination of motherhood can be contextualised with these four broad areas of family 
law, particularly the third and fourth relating to the relationship between parent and child and 
family and property. A discussion of motherhood must take into account how these broad 
areas of family law are interpreted within the Nigerian plural legal system. This discourse first 
begins by considering how a woman can become a mother under Nigerian customary law 
before moving on to consider what forms of motherhood are legally recognised under 
customary law and practice? The potential legal issues these questions raise and what effect 
they have on involuntarily childless women will be further considered in this chapter. The 
examination of the customary legal system is premised on the customary norms and 
practices of the case study ethnic groups chosen for this study. Before this case study 
                                                          
43  See s 20, Child Rights Act 2003 CAP 119. 
44 Okonkwo C., (ed) Introduction to Nigerian Law (Sweet & Maxwell: 1980) at p 287. 
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analysis is undertaken, it will be useful to explain how customary law is framed within the 
Nigerian legal system.   
Nigerian customary law is often native law and custom.45 Eminent jurists such as Salacuse 
has described customary law as ‘unwritten indigenous law.’46  Federal legislation does not 
expressly define what is meant by native law and custom. The Evidence Act 2011 which in 
sections 68 and 70 allows for the admissibility of opinions of experts versed in native law and 
custom does not provide a clear definition of what is meant by native law and custom. 
However it does define a custom as ‘a rule which, in a particular district has from long usage 
obtained the force of law.’ By including the words ‘particular district’ the Evidence Act 
recognises that the system of Nigerian customary law is not homogenous nor does it apply 
as a uniform code of law in all parts of the country. This is because Nigeria, probably more 
than any other African country is made up of diverse ethnic groups and cultures which apply 
varying localised customary rules and laws. Consequently, what may be considered as 
customary law and practice in one community may not be recognised as such by other 
communities.47 It would therefore be wrong to generalise all concepts of motherhood under 
Nigerian customary law as the same.  
The fact that customary law is to some extent localised raises further questions on whether 
there is a monolithic Ubuntu (Omoluabi) norm that African communities subscribe to.48 From 
a post-colonial perspective, some legal scholars have tried to chart a customary African 
system of jurisprudence and justice49 based on social ordering principles such as Ubuntu, 
Omoluabi (the way of a human being), Humwe and Ujamaa (cooperation). While these 
                                                          
45 Uwakah O., Due Process in the Nigeria’s Administrative Law System: History, Current Status and 
Future (Maryland: University Press of America, 1997) p 87. 
46 Salacuse J., A Selective Survey of Nigerian Family Law (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press: 
1965) at pp 2-8 cited in Uwakah O., at p 87 ibid. 
47 See further discussion in Okonkwo C., Introduction to Nigerian Law (Sweet and Maxwell: 1980) pp 
42-43. 
48 The concept of Ubuntu had been earlier discussed in chapter two in the context of the role it played 
in public attitude towards infertility and other social issues. See chapter two of this thesis at section 
2.3. 
49 Oyango P., African customary law: An introduction (Nairobi, Law Africa, 2013) chapter 8.  See Oba 
A., The Future of Customary Law in Africa in Fenrich J., Galizzi P., Higgens T., (eds) The Future of 
African Customary Law (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011) chapter three.  
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African philosophical concepts connote what it means to be human and the importance of 
communality and inter-dependence of members of society, they do not detract from the fact 
that African customary law is largely localised.  
The notion that there is a monolithic African jurisprudence enshrining the Ubuntu principle is 
also questionable when consideration is given to fluidity and evolution of customary law. If 
customary law is capable of evolution and development, it raises the question on whether 
the normative concept of Ubuntu is immutable. Writers like Himonga50 dismiss this concern 
by asserting that Ubuntu while maintaining its immutability, it is still able to evolve and play a 
vital role in the shaping of customary law and rules. Using the South African legal system as 
a case study; Himonga points to the transformative role that Ubuntu has played in the 
development of living customary law as well as other branches of law. He considers a set of 
South African cases51 where the courts have utilised the concept of Ubuntu as living 
customary law to shape formal customary law particularly where the latter no longer 
represents the norms and values of the people it is meant to regulate.52 In this way, it is 
claimed that Ubuntu and other African social ordering principles have the transformational 
capabilities which continue to remain relevant to the modern African society. This is why 
Himonga and others view these social ordering principles as necessary ingredients for 
preserving the transcendental ideals of customary law premised on communality and inter-
dependence of society.53 
This point will be further discussed in chapter seven of this thesis which discusses whether 
social ordering principles such as Ubuntu and Omoluabi, even if we cannot characterise 
them as a monolithic African jurisprudence, can still be utilised as tools of social engineering 
                                                          
50 See Himonga C., The Living Customary Law in African Legal Systems in the 21st century and  
beyond with specific reference to South Africa in Fenrith J., Galizzi P., and Higgens T., (eds.) The 
Future of African Customary Law, Ibid at p 45. 
51 See for example Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others (CCT 49/03) [2004] ZACC 
17; 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC); 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (15 October 2004). 
52 See note 50 at p 34. 
53 Ibid. 
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to combat the social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness in the Sub-
Saharan African continent. 
The organic and transformational nature of customary law is also recognised by the Nigerian 
Supreme Court in the case of Oyewunmi v Owoade Ogunesan54. Obaseki JSC in the lead 
judgment of the court stated that: 
Customary law is the organic or living law of the indigenous people of Nigeria 
regulating their lives and transactions. It is organic in that it is not static. It is 
regulatory in that it controls the lives and transactions of the community subject to it. 
It is said custom is a mirror of the culture of the people. I would say that customary 
law goes further and imports justice to the lives of all those subject to it. 55 
The judicial recognition that customary law regulates and imports justice into the lives of 
those subject to is clearly demonstrated in property disposition. It is said that many Nigerians 
pattern their personal lives after customary laws and around 80% of property disposition in 
Nigeria is settled under customary law.56 This is not just unique to Nigeria alone as the 
literature points to several other countries within Sub-Saharan Africa where personal and 
family life is subject to customary law.57  
Because of the critical role that customary law plays in the lives of ordinary Nigerians, 
Section 16 of the Nigerian Evidence Act58 requires that if a custom has not been judicially 
noticed by a court of superior adjudication, it would have to be established as a fact. The 
burden of proving the specific rule of customary law lies with the person alleging its 
existence. Evidence can be adduced to prove that persons or the class of persons 
                                                          
54  [1990] 3 NWLR Pt 137 p 182. 
55 Ibid at p 182.  
56 Yekini A., Yekini, Abubakri Olakulehin, Women and Intestate Succession in Islamic Law (May 3, 
2008). Islamic Law and Law of the Muslim World Paper No. 08-49. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1278077 orhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1278077  (accessed August 
4 2015). 
57 Ndulo M., African Customary Law, Customs, and Women's Rights (2011). Cornell Law Faculty 
Publications. Paper 187.http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/187 at p 88. 
58 Evidence Act 2011 which repeals the Evidence Act Chapter 112 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
1990. 
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concerned in the particular area regard the alleged custom as binding upon them.59 The 
courts can adduce customary law through the opinions of persons having special knowledge 
of native law and custom, opinions of native chiefs or from any book or manuscript.  60 
A custom may also be judicially noticed by the court, if it has been acted upon by a court of 
superior or co-ordinate jurisdiction in the same area to an extent which justifies the court 
asked to apply it to assume that the persons or the class of persons concerned in that area 
look upon the same as binding in relation to circumstances similar to those under 
consideration.61 A rule of customary law will not be enforced, if it is contrary to public policy 
and not in accordance with natural justice, equity and good conscience.62 This requirement 
had its historical basis in colonial governance which applied the rule to restrict the practice of 
native customs considered as repugnant to Western values. While this provision has 
certainly helped to nullify certain indigenous customs detrimental to the rights of women and 
children, in some instances, its application has had unintended consequences on the rights 
of involuntary childless women in Nigeria.63  
The foregoing discussion on the framing of indigenous customary law sets the basis for a 
further evaluation of the socio-cultural construction of motherhood in the Nigerian customary 
law system. The discourse on this point will be primarily centred on the customary rules of 
four of the case study groups in this chapter, namely, the Yorubas, Ibos, Ijaws and Yakurrs. 
As stated earlier, the case study groups of the Fulanis and Hausas will be used to discuss 
the construction of motherhood under Islamic law as practised in a legal pluralist state like 
Nigeria. 
 
                                                          
59 Section 19 of the Nigerian Evidence Act 2011. 
60  Obilade A., The Nigerian Legal System (Spectrum Books: Ibadan 2005) discussing the previous 
Evidence Act, Chapter 112 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. The current provisions under the 
Nigerian Evidence Act of 2011 are sections 68, 70 and 73 of the Act. 
61  Sections 16(1) and 17 of the Nigerian Evidence Act 2011. 
62  Section 18(3) of the Nigerian Evidence Act 2011. 
63 See section 4.4 of this chapter for further discussions on this point. 
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4.4 The Construction of Motherhood under Nigerian Customary Law 
The discourse on the construction of motherhood under Nigerian Customary law will focus 
on two key issues. First, it will consider whether motherhood is equal to womanhood in the 
four case study groups that have been selected for this discussion. Second, and following 
from the discussion of the first issue, it will evaluate whether biological motherhood can be 
considered as superior over non- biological motherhood. 
4.4.1 Motherhood: The Symbolism of Adult Womanhood in Sub-Saharan Africa 
In other jurisdictions such as the industrialised West, the legal feminist framework of rights 
for women separates the identity of womanhood from the experience of motherhood.64 This 
distinction has in many ways enabled involuntarily childless women within this region to 
more strongly separate their gender identity from their reproductive identity.65 The customary 
laws of the four case study groups reveal a contrasting picture to the Western construction of 
womanhood. This is based on predominant perspectives of African ontology that subscribe 
to the notion that full womanhood is symbolised by motherhood.66 Before examining the 
legal position set out in customary law, it is necessary to understand the customs and 
cultures that help to shape customary law regarding the identity of womanhood and 
motherhood in Africa.  
It is said that: 
In many African societies, motherhood defines womanhood. Motherhood, then is crucial 
to a woman’s status on African society. To marry and mother a child (a son preferably), 
                                                          
64  See Ireland M., Reconceiving Women: Separating Motherhood from Female Identity (New York: 
Guildford Press 1993) 195 pp. 
65 Ibid at p 20 where she states that feminism provides a supportive platform for infertile women to 
‘construct alternative ways of viewing and shaping their lives.’ 
66 See further discussions on this issue in Evwierhoma M., Scripting women into the mainstream? : 
The women of tomorrow in “The angel” and “The sisters” in G Adeoti (Ed.), Muse and mimesis critical: 
Perspectives on Ahmed Yerima’s Drama (pp 313-320) (Ibadan: Spectrum Books) pp 313-320; See 
also Banda F., Women, Law and Human Rights: An African Perspective (Bloomsbury) p 92. 
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entitles a woman to more respect form her husband’s kinsmen for she can now be 
addressed as ‘mother of…’ 67  
In the same way, Stephens68  asserts that:  
Motherhood is widely recognised as an essential aspect of women’s lives in Africa, more 
important than marriage in terms of identity, social status, and political and religious 
authority. 
Tamale,69 a leading African feminist also makes the following observation about a woman’s 
identity being tied up to her domestic role as wife and mother.  
The domestic role of mother, wife and homemaker becomes the key constructions of a 
woman’s identity in Africa.70 
This trend of thought is also found in the customs and norms of the Yorubas, Igbos (Ibos), 
Izons (Ijaws) and Yakurrs; four of the case study groups featured in this study. Opara who 
examines Igbo customary practices on infertility and childlessness argues that women can 
be excluded from female community groups on the grounds of infertility or involuntarily 
childlessness.71 Exclusion from the Igbo (Ibo) societal life on grounds of childlessness can 
include prohibition from participating in Igbo (Ibo) female cultural associations such as 
Umuada (daughters of lineage)72 and Ndinne (Christian mothers) on grounds of 
childlessness. However, some other experts in Igbo customs query whether an infertile or 
childless Igbo woman can be excluded from her natal Umuada (daughters of lineage) group 
as alleged in Opara’s work. This is because membership in the Umuada (daughters of 
                                                          
67 Evwierhoma M., ibid at p 318. 
68 Stephens R., History of African Motherhood: the Case of Uganda, 700 to 1900 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013) p1.  
69 Tamale S., Gender Trauma in Africa: Enhancing women’s access to resources (2004) 48 (1) 
Journal of African Law p 50 at p 52. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Opara C., ‘The barren woman as an outsider in Igbo society of Nigeria’ (2006) 29(1) Curare p 27. 
72 In Opara’s article, they are erroneously described as married daughters. But as other Igbo writers 
show membership of Umuada is open to married and unmarried daughters of lineage. See note 73. 
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lineage) is based on ancestry and not procreative ability. 73 Yet, Opara’s work does show the 
challenges that involuntary childless women face in several traditional community groups 
that treat motherhood as the key consideration for determining full womanhood.   
Scholarship on the Yoruba customary rules also establishes that motherhood is also 
depictive of adult womanhood. As we saw in chapter two of this thesis, scholars versed in 
Yoruba customs and traditions such as Makinde argue that women achieve more social 
esteem in their society when they become mothers. This is due to the weight that is attached 
to motherhood in Yoruba cosmology because ‘the preservation of humanity depends on the 
role of mothers in society.’74  
The social construction that motherhood is synonymous of full womanhood is also held by 
the Ijaws as evidenced in recent research studies75 undertaken by Hollos within these 
communities.76 This research shows that a woman‘s social status is enhanced if she has 
children.77 An infertile woman who has not experienced biological motherhood is considered 
an ‘unfortunate being.’78 She is also unable to participate in traditional rites that confirm her 
passage from adolescence to womanhood.79 To attained Erera (matured womanhood) in 
Izon traditional norms, a woman must not only have married but must have also experienced 
pregnancy.80 Additional research undertaken among the Yakurrs also shows that 
motherhood ‘represents normative fulfilment of what is considered to be female destiny.’81  
                                                          
73  Nwapa F., Priestesses and Power among the Riverine Igbo, (1997) 810 Annals, New York 
Academy of Sciences at p 420.  Nwapa explains that the Umuada comprises of ‘all daughters born in 
a clan or village, married or not wherever they may be.’ 
74 Makinde T., ‘Motherhood as a source of empowerment of women in Yoruba Culture’ (2004) 13(2) 
Nordic Journal of African Studies p 164 at p 167. 
75 Hollos M., Profiles of Infertility in Southern Nigeria: Women's Voices from Amakiri (2003) 7(2) 
African Journal of Reproductive Health pp 45-46 available at 
http://www.bioline.org.br/request?rh03023 (accessed August 4 2015). 
76  Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid.  
79  Ibid.  
80 Ibid.  
81  Obono (note 38) above at p 2068. 
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Beyond the academic scholarship on the social construction of motherhood as its 
association with full womanhood, there is Nigerian case law that establishes that 
motherhood enhances the legal and social status of women under customary law. This is 
especially evident in intestate succession where a woman in many instances can only inherit 
or continue to benefit from spousal property through the agency of her children. The Yorubas 
and the Igbo are the two key ethnic groups whose customary law on intestate succession 
has been extensively adjudicated on by the Nigerian courts.  With regard to Yoruba 
customary law, the early case of Lewis v Bankole82 is viewed by Nigerian family law 
specialists83 as the case that sets out the basic rule on Yoruba intestate succession.  
This basic rules states that upon the death of his father, the eldest son (the Dawodu) 
succeeds to the headship of the family. The rule also permits that the children of the 
deceased regardless of gender can inherit the property of the deceased, to the exclusion of 
other close relatives such as brothers, uncles, sisters, aunts and cousins. Although female 
children can inherit property from their father when he dies intestate under Yoruba 
customary law; the same cannot be said for a wife whose husband dies intestate. This 
discriminatory restriction on the ability of widows under Yoruba customary law to inherit the 
property of a deceased spouse is clearly depicted in the case of Akinnubi v Akinnubi84, the 
Nigerian Supreme Court held in this case that: 
It is a well settled rule of native law and custom of the Yoruba that a wife could not inherit 
her husband’s property. Indeed, under Yoruba Customary Law, a widow under an 
intestacy is regarded as a part of the estate of her deceased husband to be administered 
                                                          
82 (1908) 1 NLR 80. 
83 See for example Nwogugu E., Family Law in Nigeria (Heinemann, Nigeria, 1990 republished by 
Ibadan: HEBN Publishers, 2014) 2014 edition at p 436. 
84 See for example Akinnubi v Akinnubi (1997) 2 NWLR Part 486 p 144. An academic commentary of 
this case is provided in Uzodike E., Nigeria: Developments in Nigerian Family Law 1991-97 in 
Bainham A., (Ed.) The International Survey of Family Law (The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer: 1999) at 
p 330. 
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or inherited by the deceased family, she could neither be entitled to apply for a grant of 
letters of administration nor appointed as co-administratrix.85 
In Akinnubi, the widow in question had children, but was deemed as lacking the legal 
capacity under Yoruba customary law to institute an action for herself or to act as a guardian 
ad ilem for her minor children. However, the Supreme Court following its earlier decision in 
Ologunleko v. Ikueomelo86 held that the respondent (widow) could sue as the next of friend 
for her infant children. The position in Ogunleko’s case that widows under Yoruba law can 
act as next friends for their infant children is set out below: 
‘There being no known provision under Yoruba native law and custom prohibiting a widow 
from suing as the next friend of the legitimate infant heirs of her deceased husband, 
therefore I take the firm view that the plaintiff/respondent (widow) has full capacity or 
standing to sue the appellants as her children’s next of friend.’87 
These two cases illustrate the revered status of motherhood in Yoruba customary law. The 
widow is treated as a mere chattel or property in intestate succession but will have a level of 
standing with regard to her husband’s estate if she sues as the next of kin for her infant 
children. Obviously, if her children are of legal age, they can act for themselves and in many 
cases will ensure that their mother is taken care of. The case of the childless widow is 
different, she has no children to act as their next of kin. She is merely regarded as a part of 
the estate of her deceased husband with no recourse to any remedy under Nigerian family 
law. This is why there is a strong argument particularly within the field of Human Rights law 
to treat such practices as discriminatory and contrary to provisions of the 1999 Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  
Yet the Nigerian Supreme Court up until recently has been very slow in treating such 
customs as discriminatory, repugnant and contrary to natural justice. Works such as 
                                                          
85 Ibid. 
86 (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 273) 16 at p 62 cited in Nwogugu E., in note 78 above at p 414. 
87 Ibid. 
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Ssenyejo88 show that this judicial approach is not peculiar to Nigeria alone. In other African 
countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe, women have also been discriminated against in 
the matter of intestate succession. Ssenyejo points to cases such as the Zimbabwe 
Supreme Court decision in Magaya v Magaya89 to illustrate what she and other feminists 
have described as the tendency of African courts to ‘give more weight to cultural practices 
that support patriarchy and discrimination than they do to the rights of women.’90 
Moving back to the discussion on customary rules of the case study groups selected for the 
study of the social construction of motherhood; up until recently, Igbo customary law did not 
permit female children to inherit from their father’s estate if he died intestate. In addition the 
Igbo widow just like her Yoruba counterpart was not generally permitted to inherit directly 
from her husband’s property if he died intestate. Even when she acted as the next of friend 
for infant children, she had to have male children for them to have standing in law to benefit 
from the estate of the deceased. There are several Nigerian Supreme Court cases that up 
until recently affirmed this to be the settled position of Igbo customary law on intestate 
property succession. 
The first case under consideration is the Nigerian Supreme Court case of Nzekwu v 
Nzekwu.91 The widow and her daughters (the appellants) contested the validity of an Igbo 
customary law that prevented them from inheriting or dealing with property in intestate 
succession. The Supreme Court upheld the customary position that prohibited the widow of 
disposing the property of her deceased spouse. It also affirmed the position that female 
children could not inherit property under Igbo customary law. It however held as repugnant 
and contrary to the natural justice the custom that required that she be evicted from the 
property of the deceased.  
                                                          
88 Ssenyejo M., Human Rights of Women in Africa in Abass A., (ed) Protecting Human Security in 
Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at p 199. 
89 [2013] ZWHCC 67.   
90 Ibid. 
91 Nzekwu v Nzekwu [1989] 2 NWLR [Pt. 104] 373. 
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Another key Nigerian Supreme Court case that demonstrates the difficulties that women face 
in intestate inheritance is Mojekwu v Mojekwu. 92 To provide some context, it is necessary to 
refer to the facts of the case. The appellant had sought a declaration in the lower court 
(Court of Appeal) that as the surviving male relative of the deceased that he was entitled to 
inherit his property. He relied in particular on the custom of Oli-Ekpe which prohibited 
females from having any inheritance rights in intestate property. This custom provided that 
where a man died intestate and without male issue, other male relatives would have the right 
to inherit his property. 
At the Court of Appeal level, the Court found the custom relied upon by the appellant did not 
apply in this case. Significantly, LJ Tobi (as he then was) went further to hold that the Oli-
Ekpe and other customs that discriminated against women were repugnant and contrary to 
the fundamental rights provided to all Nigerians in the Nigerian Constitution. He also held 
that Nigeria had treaty obligations under Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) to protect women from all forms of discrimination. 
On further appeal to the Nigerian Supreme Court,93 the Court upheld the decision of the 
Court of Appeal by finding that the facts in this case did not allow for Oli-Ekpe custom to 
apply. It however disapproved the Court of Appeal’s position on the discriminatory impact 
that customs could have on women. Uwaifo J.S.C who gave the lead judgment held that: 
‘...the learned Justice of Appeal was no doubt concerned about the perceived 
discrimination directed against women by the said Nnewi “Oli-ekpe custom. But the 
language used made the pronouncement so general and far-reaching that it seems 
to cavil about, and is capable of causing strong feelings against, all customs which 
fail to recognize a role for women. For instance, the custom and tradition of some 
communities which do not permit women to be natural rulers or family heads.’ 
 
                                                          
92 Mojekwu v Mojewku [1997] 7 NWLR 283. 
93 Mojekwu v Iwuchukwu (2004) 4 S.C (Part II) 1. See the lead judgment of Uwaifo J.S.C. 
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‘The import is that those communities stand to be condemned without a hearing for 
such fundamental custom and tradition they practice in their native communities. It 
would appear for these reasons, that the underlying crusade in that pronouncement 
went too far to stir up a real hornet’s nest even if it had been made upon an issue 
joined by the parties, or properly raised and argued. I find myself unable to allow that 
pronouncement to stand in the circumstances, and accordingly I disapprove of it as 
unwarranted.’ 
 
Academic commentary94 has strongly criticised the refusal of the Supreme Court to support 
the Court of Appeal’s position that discriminatory customs of this nature should not have any 
place in modern Nigerian society. This does not mean that the Supreme Court in other 
instances has not found other customs as being repugnant to natural justice, equity and 
good conscience and the expectations of a contemporary society. An example is Okonkwo v 
Okagbue 95 where the Court struck down a custom that permitted a woman to marry a dead 
man. It held that: 
‘A conduct that might be acceptable a hundred years ago may be heresy these days 
and vice versa. The notion of public policy ought to reflect the change. That a local 
custom is contrary to public policy and repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience necessarily involves a value judgment by the court. But this must 
objectively relate to contemporary mores, aspirations, expectations and sensitivities 
of the people of this country…After all, custom is not static.”96 
                                                          
94 See Nzegwu N., Family Matters: Feminist Concepts in African Philosophy of Culture (Albany: State 
University of New York, 2006) p 117. Although the author gives some kudos to the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, she argues that it does not go as far enough to tackle gender inequality matters against 
women particularly in intestate succession. Contrast with Oba A., Broaching the limits of gender 
equality in Nigeria: Augustine Nwafor Mojekwu v Mrs. Theresa Iwuchukwu (2007) 47 Indian Journal of 
International Law pp 289-297 where the writer argues that the Supreme Court was justified in 
‘upholding the notion of cultural pluralism in human rights.’ 
95 [1994] 9 NWLR (Part 368) 301.  
96 Ibid. 
 
 
 
127 
 
The case above demonstrates the preparedness of the Nigerian Supreme Court to strike 
down customs that it finds inimical to the aspirations of a modern Nigerian society. This has 
raised questions on why it has been so reticent to prohibit customs that are specifically 
detrimental to women especially with regard to intestate succession. It could well be that  
Nigerian courts like many other patriarchal structured judicial systems in Africa find it difficult 
to go against the prevailing and entrenched norms that deemed women as inferior to men 
especially in societies where male primogeniture applies. 97   
The Nigerian Supreme Court has however had the opportunity to revisit its previous 
decisions on whether female children can inherit from the estate of their father when he dies. 
In a welcome development, the Nigerian Supreme Court in the recent case of Ukeje v 
Ukeje98 struck down a customary rule that prevented female children from inheriting the 
estate of a deceased father.   
In this case, the plaintiff/respondent was a female child born out of wedlock. She filed an 
action against the deceased’s wife and son seeking to be recognised as daughter of the 
deceased and seeking leave from the court to be included as administrator to his estate. To 
establish her paternity, she relied on her birth certificate, a guarantor’s form, the judgment 
from her divorce case as well as photographs evincing her relationship with the deceased. 
The appellants/defendants contended that the documents were not genuine and that her 
claim to the estate of the deceased was invalid. Both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeal 
found for the plaintiff that she was the daughter of the deceased. What was significant in 
both judgments was the findings that the plaintiff could benefit from the estate of her 
deceased father. On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision of the Court of 
Appeal was upheld. The Supreme Court in its lead judgment delivered by Bode Rhodes-
Vivour J.S.C held that regardless of the circumstances surrounding the birth of a female 
child, such child is entitled to an inheritance from her late father's estate. Consequently, the 
                                                          
97Nzegwu (note 94) above. 
98 Ukeje v Ukeje (2014) LPELR-22724(SC). 
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The Widow's status in Customary Intestate Succession
Nigerian Supreme Court Cases
Akinnubi v Akinnubi
It is a well settled rule of 
native law and custom of 
the Yoruba that a wife could 
not inherit her husband’s 
property.
Ologunleko v. Ikueomelo
There being no known 
provision under Yoruba 
native law and custom 
prohibiting a widow from 
suing as the next friend of 
the legitimate infant heirs 
of her deceased husband.
Nzekwu v Nzekwu
A widow has the right to 
reside in her matrimonial 
home and to make use of 
farmland but she has no right 
to sell her deceased 
husband's house and or 
farmland.  The custom that  
daughters cannot 
inherit from their fathers is 
upheld.
Ukeje v Ukeje
This recent Supreme 
Court case held that 
customs prohibiting 
daughters from inheriting 
in intestate succession is 
unconstitutional but is 
silent on the right of 
widows, particuarly
those without
children. 
Igbo customary law which disentitles a female child from partaking in the sharing of her 
deceased father's estate is in breach of section 42(1) and (2) of the Constitution, a 
fundamental rights provision guaranteed to every Nigerian. The said discriminatory 
customary law is void as it conflicts with section 42(1) and (2) of the Constitution.  
Ukeje’s case is therefore a welcome development in the field of human rights. In refusing to 
follow Igbo customary rules of male primogeniture in intestate succession, the Nigerian 
Supreme Court has signified that this case marks a paradigm shift in the way matters 
relating to women should be dealt with by the judiciary.  
However in spite of this positive decision from the Nigerian Supreme Court in permitting 
female children the right to inherit where there is intestate succession, it still remains to be 
seen how the Court will deal in future with the controversial issue on whether a widow can 
inherit the property of her husband under customary law when he dies intestate. Arguably, 
the precedent set in Ukeje that the customary rule which prevent female children from 
inheriting from their parents is discriminatory under s.42 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution 
should also apply in the case of a widow especially if she is childless. However, until this is 
properly considered by the Nigerian Supreme Court, it appears that the position set out in  
Table 3: Why Motherhood Matters  
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early cases such as Akinnubi and Nzekwu will continue to apply on this particular point. 
Again, the refusal of the courts to bolster the rights of widows in intestate succession is not 
peculiar to Nigeria. The same position obtains in Zambia where a married woman is 
considered to be ‘property because she has been bought, so how can property own 
property?’99 This distasteful statement begs the further question ‘what has a married woman 
been bought for’? Literature on African marriage customs show that the bride price or 
marriage payment is normally structured around fertility.100 This may explain why a widow 
can only participate in her husband’s property if she has children. Even then as Table 3 
above demonstrates, any interest she can claim in spousal property would normally be 
through the agency of her children. 
 
This connection between motherhood and the right to property under intestate succession 
provides some perspective as to why motherhood matters in many communities in Sub-
Saharan Africa.101 
The pernicious state of the childless widow highlighted above provides some justification for 
why many involuntary childless women embark on a relentless quest to achieve biological 
motherhood. It also explains why African feminists particularly in the Womanist and 
Motherist schools of feminism do not ignore the social realities of their cultures and why they 
also view motherhood as a form of social empowerment for women. Yet, it raises the 
interesting point on whether married women can have an interest in intestate succession 
through the agency of non-biological motherhood. This issue will be further considered in the 
next section of this chapter. 
                                                          
99 See COHRE, Bringing Equality home, promoting and protecting the inheritance rights of women: A 
survey of Law and Practice in Sub-Saharan Africa (Geneva, Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction: 
2004) at p 143. 
100 Comaroff J., (ed.) The Meaning of Marriage Payments, Studies in Anthropology (London: 
Academic Press: 1980) p 7. 
101 This explains the major drive for judicial reforms on the rights of women in customary intestate 
succession throughout the Sub-Saharan African continent. See Hallward-Driemeier M, Tazeen H., 
Empowering Women: Legal Rights and Economic Opportunities in Africa (Washington: World Bank, 
2013) chapter 3. 
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4.4.2 The Superiority of Biological Motherhood over Non-Biological Motherhood 
The theme that a woman’s power lies in her womb as ‘the agency of life’102 resonates 
throughout much of the literature on African motherhood.  Leading African feminists like 
Nzegwu,103 claim that motherhood as an identity is only assumed through the actual delivery 
of a child.’104  She goes on to argue that in Igbo tradition that: 
 ‘The basis of a mother’s power is her provision of the critical organ that housed all 
children during their most vulnerable state of life. She willed them into being and 
sustained them through the gestational period. She ate for them, breathed for them, 
expelled their waste, and deployed her blood to work for them, all the while preserving 
their distinct identity. Regardless of whom they would later become in life (monarch or 
pauper), everyone travelled through the birth canal and was expelled through a mother’s 
vagina. For this reason, no one could be superior to mothers given that they were born by 
a mother.’105 
This viewpoint suggests that biological motherhood is more superior to other constructions of 
motherhood. Other literature which focus on the Nigerian case study groups showcased in 
this chapter also appear to subscribe to this position. For example, it is argued that the 
Yoruba view true motherhood as synonymous with biological motherhood. Motherhood 
occurs at the point of birth. Makinde goes further to argue that motherhood in Yoruba 
tradition is symbolised by the two most important human organs which depict the process of 
childbirth - the breasts and the vagina.106 This cultural context of motherhood is not peculiar 
to these large ethnic groups in Nigeria. The anthropological studies conducted by Hollos and 
                                                          
102 Oyewunmi O., Abiyamo: Theorizing African motherhood 2003 4 JENDA A journal of Culture and 
African Women Studies (available online at 
http://www.africaknowledgeproject.org/index.php/jenda/article/view/79 ) last accessed March 19 2014. 
103  Nzegwu N., 2004. The Epistemological challenge of motherhood to Patriliny. JENDA: A Journal of 
Culture and African Women Studies, 5. Available at http://www.jendajournal.com. 
104  Ibid. 
105  Ibid at p 15.  
106 See Makinde (note 74) above at p 166. 
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Whitehouse among the Ijaws and Yakurrs (the other case study groups in this chapter) also 
confirm that a woman’s identity is tied up to her ability to give birth. 107   
There is however other scholarship, including leading Nigerian literary works,108 which 
provide an alternative perspective of motherhood that does not necessarily envision 
gestation. Achebe, who is considered as one of Africa’s foremost novelists provides an 
interesting narrative of the features of African motherhood. Using the Igbos (one of my 
featured case study groups) as the key community for his epic work Things Fall Apart, 109  he 
presents a definition of motherhood that appears to go beyond biological motherhood. He 
uses his vast insight on the socio-cultural constructions of Igbo names to explain why 
motherhood is considered as supreme within the Igbo community.  Okonkwo, the protagonist 
in Things Fall Apart inadvertently kills a young man. Igbo tradition requires that he flee his 
fatherland and take refuge in his maternal homeland for seven years.  Initially, Okonkwo 
finds it difficult to accept banishment from his paternal land and sinks into deep depression.  
As a way of getting Okonkwo to accept his fate, Uchendu, his maternal uncle asks him why 
the name Nneka (mother is supreme) is commonly given to female children in Igbo culture.   
‘Uchendu: 
But there is just one question I would like to ask him. Can you tell me, Okonkwo, why 
it is that one of the commonest names we give our children is Nneka, or “Mother is 
Supreme?” We all know that a man is the head of the family and his wives do his 
bidding. A child belongs to its father and his family and not to its mother and her 
                                                          
107  See Hollos M., Whitehouse B., Infertility and the Modern Female Life Course In Two Southern 
Nigerian Communities  (2008) 47(1)  Ethnology pp 23-43 where it is pointed out that before an Ijaw 
woman can attain Erera (full womanhood) or a Yakurr woman obtain full Sanen (full womanhood), she 
must have gone through the process of pregnancy and childbirth.  
108 See below.   
109  Achebe C., (1962) Things Fall Apart (Oxford: Heinemann 1996) p 95. See also other works that 
discuss the principle of Nneka. Traore O., (1997) Why the Snake Lizard killed his mother: Inscribing 
and decentering “Nneka” in Things Fall Apart in Nnameka O., (ed.) The Politics of Mothering: 
Womanhood, Identity, and Resistance in African Literature (Routledge: London) p  52;  Kolawole M.,  
Womanism and African Consciousness (Trenton: African World Press, 1997) p 63 discussed in 
Uwasomba C., A Feminist Reading of Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart, The African Symposium: 
An Online Journal of African Educational Research Network available at 
http://www.ncsu.edu/aern/TAS7.2/TAS7.2.pdf#page=19 (accessed March 3, 2009).  
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family. A man belongs to his fatherland and not to his motherland. And yet we say 
Nneka—‘Mother is Supreme.’ Why is that? 
It’s true that a child belongs to its father. But when a father beats his child, it seeks 
sympathy in its mother’s hut. A man belongs to his fatherland when things are good 
and life is sweet. But when there is sorrow and bitterness he finds refuge in his 
motherland. Your mother is there to protect you… And that is why we say that mother 
is supreme. Is it right that you, Okonkwo, should bring to your mother a heavy face 
and refuse to be comforted?’110 
Achebe, through Uchendu’s response suggests that beyond her procreative role, an Igbo 
mother is considered to be supreme because she offers care, protection and nurture to her 
children. This refusal to see motherhood as solely associated with gestational childbirth is 
also taken up by Nwapa, another leading African novelist whose novel Efuru111  has been 
discussed in chapter three of this thesis. Wilentz in her discourse on Nwapa’s work 112 
explains that the fact that Efuru did not have biological children did not prevent her from 
carrying out a maternal role in her community. Instead, she was regarded as a community 
mother who served her community by passing on ‘her values and special powers… as a 
worshipper to interpret Uhamari to those around her, and… the next generation.’113  
These literary narratives extracted from African leading literary scholarship suggest that 
biological motherhood need not be considered as the only construction of motherhood. 
However, the determination of whether there exists an alternative cultural prototype that 
allows for a woman to assume motherhood outside biological motherhood still requires 
further verification outside fictional literature. This thesis therefore turns again to case law to 
determine the legal status of non-biological motherhood under Nigerian customary law. The 
                                                          
110  Ibid, Achebe at p 95. 
111 Nwapa F., Efuru (Oxford: Heinemann, Reissue Waveland Press 2013) 221 pp.   
112  Wilentz G., Afracentrism as theory: The discourse of diaspora literature (2000) 2(1) Passages p 
37 
113 Ibid at 47. 
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judicial cases on traditional surrogacy practised in some Nigerian ethnic groups, including 
our featured case study groups provides some interpretative guidance on this issue and is 
further considered below. 
The Nigerian Supreme Court decision in Meribe v Egwu114 which deals with the system of 
traditional surrogacy practised by communities such as the Igbos (a featured case study 
group) and the Ishans115 provides us with some insight on whether motherhood under 
Nigerian customary law is strictly limited to biological or gestational motherhood or whether 
the customary system of law permits for other constructions of motherhood, especially in the 
context of intestate succession. In this case, N, an involuntarily childless woman died 
intestate. Prior to her death she had contracted what is known under Igbo customary law as 
a ‘woman to woman marriage’.  In this family structure, a childless woman is entitled to 
‘marry’ another woman who will bear children for her. Children born under this system will be 
considered for all intent and purposes as the involuntarily childless woman’s issues. The key 
issue that the Nigerian Supreme Court had to deal with was whether the claimant born 
through a ‘woman to woman marriage’ could be considered as N’s son for the purpose of 
succession. The defendant in his defence contended that the institution of woman to woman 
marriage was illegal and contrary to public policy. The Nigerian Supreme Court in this case 
held that:  
  
‘Where there is proof that a custom permits marriage of a woman to another 
woman, such custom must be regarded as repugnant by virtue of the proviso to 
section 14(1) of the Evidence Act, and ought not to be upheld by the Court.’ 
 
It further held: 
The facts must, however, be closely examined to find out the true nature of the ‘woman to 
woman’ marriage. Where, as in this case, a barren wife has procured another woman for 
                                                          
114 [1976] 1 All NLR 266 
115  See Uzodike (note 84) above. 
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husband to marry, such arrangement is not caught by the proviso to section 14(1) of the 
Act. 
 
Let it be clear that this thesis is not concerned with that potential constructions of sexuality 
that may be embodied in the concept of ‘woman to woman marriage.’ However it is 
necessary to point out that a conservative Supreme Court may have struck down this 
custom due to underlining concerns that a woman to woman marriage could be viewed as a 
same-sex marriage which is antithetical to Nigerian cultural values. Otakpor116 alludes to this 
concern when he argues that there is a wrongly held belief that ‘woman to woman 
marriages’ is a kind of ‘primitive lesbianism or that the women involved are people of easy 
virtue.’117 He then explains that ‘the woman to woman marriage’ as envisioned in Igbo 
customary law is merely a ‘practical way of allowing a childless woman to have children.’118 
 
Although the Nigerian Supreme Court did disapprove of ‘woman to woman marriage’ and 
held the practice to be repugnant and contrary to public policy, it did recognise that there is a 
place for traditional surrogacy under Nigerian customary law. This is to be gleaned from its 
statement that an involuntary childless woman can lawfully procure another woman for her 
husband to marry strictly for the purposes of providing children for their marriage. Arguably, 
this recognition of traditional surrogacy appears to be one of the ‘other arrangements…made 
to obtain children in the family’ that was alluded to by Mbiti in his seminal work earlier 
discussed in chapter two of this thesis.119 
 
It is important to note that the Supreme Court’s decision in Meribe v Egwu has been strongly 
criticised in other works as ignoring the fact that ‘woman to woman marriages’ can be 
contracted for other reasons apart from the reason of providing a traditional surrogacy tool 
                                                          
116 Otakpor N., A woman who is a husband and a father: An essay in customary law (2008) 2(2) CALS 
Review of Nigerian Law and Practice. 
117 Ibid at p 71. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Mbiti J., Introduction to African Religion: Second Edition (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2015 
reissue) p 114 
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for an involuntarily childless couple. For example, Nzegwu120 points to the fact that woman to 
woman marriages were also contracted by single or widowed women for the purposes of 
social empowerment such as political advancement.121 In such cases, wealthy elderly Igbo 
women would ‘marry’ other women so they could take care of them or assist them in their 
domestic, market or agrarian concerns.122 These other considerations for contracting this 
type of marriage appears to have been judicially overlooked in this case.  
 
It is not only the failure of the Nigerian Supreme Court in Meribe v Ugwu to understand 
‘woman to woman marriage’ as practised by the Igbos (Ibos) in South East Nigeria that 
should be criticised. Questions need to be raised as to why the Nigerian Supreme Court held 
that traditional surrogacy is designed only for the benefit of men? This concern resonates 
with Western feminist works such as Raymond123 who argue that the system of surrogacy 
privileges men above women. In refusing to recognise the concept of ‘woman to woman 
marriage’ and in restricting traditional surrogacy for the purpose of a barren woman providing 
a child for her husband, the Nigerian Supreme Court appears to have sent a message that a 
woman’s role in marriage is primarily for the purpose of providing her husband with children. 
This judicial reasoning is similar to the position adopted by the Court in Akinnubi where a 
widow is considered as part of the property of a man and can only have a say in intestate 
succession when she is acting as a next of friend for her children below legal age. She is 
unable to assert any claim to his estate if he dies intestate, except to lend a voice to her 
children’s claim if they have not attained the age of adulthood.  It is therefore not surprising 
why many have argued that a woman’s power in traditional family life is tied up to womb 
                                                          
120 Nzegwu N., Family Matters: Feminist Concepts in African Philosophy of Culture (State University 
of New York, New York, 2006) pp 49, 195. See also example Nwoko K., Female Husbands in Igbo 
Land: South Eastern Nigeria (2012) 5(1) Journal of Pan African Studies, p 69 at pp 73, 74 and 75; 
Amadiume I., Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African Society (London: 
Zed Books Ltd, 1987) and Amadiume I., Family and Culture in Africa in Essed P., Goldberg D., 
Kobayashi A., (eds) A Companion to Gender Studies (Oxford, Wiley, 2009) at p 364 
121 Ibid. 
122  Armstrong A., et al Uncovering reality: excavating women’s rights in African family law (1993) 7 
International Journal of Law and Society at 317. 
123 Raymond J., Women as wombs (Melbourne: Spinifex Press, 1994) pp xxxvii-xxxviii,   
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power.124 It is therefore understandable why so many involuntary childless women within this 
region seek to have children at any cost. This is because they view womb power as a key 
way of strengthening their status in their family structure and community at large. 
 
Another form of traditional infertility management is what is known as the male helper 
system. In a sense this can be described as a traditional artificial insemination system or 
sperm donation. Many ethnic groups recognise this third party arrangement that allows a 
woman, whose husband is infertile, to experience motherhood through the assistance of a 
‘male helper’. In this case, a trusted male confidant (preferably a close relative of the 
husband) is invited to have sexual relations with the woman so she can have a child who will 
be passed off as her husband’s child. 125 The literary work of Clark-Bekederemo, a renowned 
African playwright and poet126 also suggests that the male helper is a system also known to 
the Ijaw (Izon) community. A key question arises on whether this traditional system of 
assisted reproduction is legally recognised by the Nigerian courts?  
We saw in the case of Meribe v Egwu that the Supreme Court recognised the validity of a 
traditional surrogacy arrangement while striking down the concept of a ‘woman to woman 
marriage’.  However, the case of a woman achieving motherhood through third party 
assistance from a male helper seems to be more uncertain under Nigerian customary law. 
The case law on this institution is more limited, but the case of Megwalu v. Megwalu 127 does 
provide some useful insight on how this traditional system of sperm donation is treated by 
the courts. It was held in Megwalu that ‘an admission by a wife in court that her child does 
not belong to her husband while she named another man as the father in a court document 
constitutes an admission of adultery.’128 Megwalu’s case therefore shows the uncertainty of 
                                                          
124  See for example, Makinde (note 74) above. 
125 Giwa Osagie O., ‘Social and Ethical Aspects of Assisted Reproduction in Anglo Sub Saharan 
Africa’. in Medical, Ethical and Social Aspects of Assisted Reproduction" (WHO: Geneva 2001). 
126 See Clark JP., ‘Song of a Goat’ in Three Plays (Oxford University Press, 1964).  
127 [1994] 7 NWLR (Pt 359) 718 CA.  
128 See Nwogugu E., Family Law in Nigeria (Ibadan: HEBN Publisher 3rd Edition, 2014) p 181 where 
this case was discussed. 
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adopting the option of a male helper since this will be considered as an admission of 
adultery especially if the husband disputes that he gave his consent to this arrangement. 
Apart from the traditional third party modes of assisted reproduction, the African traditional 
structures also provide for the institution of foster parenting. Existing literature129  establish 
that foster parenting is practised in the customary law of several ethnic groups in Africa, 
including Nigeria. Foster parenting (or guardianship) is also practised under Shariah law 
which will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter. In all the case study groups, 
a clear commonality arises on the legal status of foster parenting and that is that a woman 
who assumes foster parenting over a child acquires no legal right over it.130 Under the 
different local variations of Nigerian customary law, the child retains its family name and 
status and assumes no legal rights in the home of its foster parent. This is not dissimilar to 
the rules on fostering applicable under Western received law. Fostering in this case is also 
seen as a temporary arrangement where children still maintain their genetic links and ties 
with their biological parents. Due to the limited rights that are obtainable in customary foster 
parenting and also because of its temporary nature, many women do not find foster 
parenting a worthwhile parenting option. The social science narratives of involuntarily 
childless women who have undertaken foster parenting, particularly those from the Ijaw 
(Izon) and Yakurrs communities lend credence to this view.131  
An involuntarily childless woman also faces harsher barriers if she decides to explore 
adoption under Nigerian customary law. This is because customary adoption is completely 
different from statutory adoption that is developed on the basis of received Western law. 
There is debate on the status of customary adoption and whether it confers to adopting 
parents the same rights that they would have enjoyed had they adopted under statutory law. 
A fuller treatise on the status of child adoption will be provided in chapter five of this thesis 
which considers why the various types of child adoption may not be the panacea to address 
                                                          
129 Uzodike (note 84) above at pp 327 - 332. See also Atajoko-Omovbude O., Adoption of children in 
Nigeria: Practice and Procedure (Bloomington: Authorhouse, 2011) at p 11. 
130 Ibid. 
131  Hollos, Larsen, Obono and Whitehouse (note 36) above. 
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the social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness and infertility in the Sub-Saharan 
African region. This of course speaks to schools of thought rather than adopting a 
homogeneous position in respect of what will promote women’s welfare. However, it is useful 
to consider customary child adoption in this chapter because it provides some further insight 
on whether non-biological motherhood is equal in status to biological motherhood under 
Nigerian customary law.  
As discussed earlier, there is some debate as to the legal validity of customary child 
adoption. Some scholars for example argue that customary child adoption is only narrowly 
applied by a few traditional communities in Nigeria.132  It is further claimed that customary 
adoption was unknown to the Igbos (one of the featured case study groups) prior to 
colonisation in this study.133  This assertion that customary adoption was completely 
unknown to the Igbos before colonisation is disputed in other authoritative literature on 
customary law of Nigeria. In the authoritative text of the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies’ Restatement of Customary Law in Nigeria134, it is argued that custom in the South 
East of Nigeria (where the Igbos are situated) is not unified on the position of customary 
child adoption. This leading text provides some interesting evidence on the areas of the 
South Eastern Nigeria that practise customary child adoption and those that do not. This 
evidence is provided below.  
‘In the South East, custom is not unified on the recognition of adoption. For instance, 
communities in Enugu and Ebonyi States do not recognise the practice of adoption. 
Where it is done, the position in these communities is that such adoption does not make 
the adopted child a member of the family. It operates only as an assistance to the 
                                                          
132 See Nwaoga C., Socio - Religious Implications of Child Adoption in Igboland South Eastern Nigeria 
(2013) 4(13) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences at p 707. The author however accepts that this 
position has changed due to the impact of the era of colonialisation and also the current trends of 
globalisation. Yet, she still argues that while child adoption is now practised in Igbo land, it has its 
limitations particularly with regard to inheritance rights. 
133  Ibid. at p 707. 
134 Azinge E., (ed.) Restatement of Customary Law in Nigeria (Abuja: Nigerian Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies, 2013) pp 315 and 316. 
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adopted child; in Anambra State, communities such as the Okpunor and Nnewi do not 
recognise adoption while Amuo Okpara and Akwa communities recognise the practice; in 
Abia state, Abriba and Umauhia communities do not recognise the practice of adoption 
while in Ngwa land, adoption is an ancient tradition with the adopted child enjoying all 
the full rights of the biological children of the family; in Imo State, adoption is not 
recognised by the Nkwere and Owerri communities while Mbaise and Akokwa 
communities recognise the practice by virtue of the influences of Christianity.’135 
(Emphasis mine). 
There is also debate on whether customary adoption is also obtainable among the Ijaw 
ethnic group. The general position that can be gleaned from the Restatement of Nigerian 
Customary law is that customary adoption is widely unrecognised in this region. The key 
exception to this rule can be found in the Okrika community of the Ijaw ethnic group where 
adoption is recognised and adopted children are considered as having the same status of 
children born in an Igwa marriage. In understanding the status of customary adoption in the 
Okrika community, it is necessary to explain what an Igwa marriage means in Ijaw 
customary law. 
The Restatement on Customary Law in Nigeria defines an Igwa customary marriage as a 
marriage which confers: 
‘On a man limited rights over the woman. Bride price is paid but the children of the 
marriage belong to woman’s family. They cannot claim property in their father’s family.’136 
The fact that adopted children are considered to be the same as children from an Igwa 
marriage raises some interesting legal issues on the status of non-biological parenting. This 
is because the most significant barrier to an involuntary childless woman’s desire to adopt 
under Nigerian customary law is the claim that only male adults are allowed to adopt under 
                                                          
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid at p 274. 
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this system.137 Yet, the Okrika customary law that confers on adopted children the same 
rights as children from an Igwa marriage provides a promising outlook for involuntary 
childless women. This is because if she chooses to adopt, the child will be considered as 
belonging to her (and her maternal family). They can inherit from her or from the property of 
her maternal family. In other parts of Nigeria where adoption is seen as the man’s 
prerogative, an involuntary childless woman may be faced with some difficulty if her husband 
elects not to adopt. In a polygamous marriage for example, where the man can father 
children from another wife, there may be no motivation for him to initiate the process of 
adoption under customary law. This would leave the infertile woman with little or no relief 
under the customary law system. 
It is difficult to see how this position would be tenable under the provisions of the Nigerian 
constitution which expressly prohibits discrimination, but as we have seen in cases such as 
Nzekwu,138 Akinnubi139 and Mojekwu140, the courts have been reluctant to set aside 
entrenched customs even when they adversely affect the rights of women.  Until a test case 
is brought before the court on this aspect of customary adoption, it is unlikely that, apart from 
cases such as the Okrika customary adoption, an involuntarily childless woman would be 
able to adopt under customary law without her husband’s active involvement and consent.  
The limitations placed on the different types of non-biological types of motherhood discussed 
above establishes that biological motherhood in many cases will provide stronger rights 
under Nigerian customary law than non-biological motherhood. This provides some support 
for the case of widening access to affordable assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) in 
regions of the world such as Sub-Saharan African region where social empowerment and 
enfranchisement is connected with the ability to reproduce. To buttress this further, the next 
section of this chapter will consider the construction of motherhood under Islamic (Sharia) 
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law. This is because Sharia law is a fundamental part of Nigerian law and is widely applied in 
the family structures of the Hausa-Fulanis - the final case study group under consideration in 
this chapter.  
4.5 The Meaning of Motherhood under Islamic (Shariah) Law 
This section explores how motherhood is interpreted under the Nigerian Shariah legal 
system, using the Hausa-Fulani, the predominant ethnic group in Northern Nigeria as our 
case study. As earlier explained, the consideration of Shariah law is necessary as it is 
another key system that regulates family life within the Nigerian pluralist legal system. This is 
particularly so in Northern Nigeria, the home of the Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups who are 
reported to make up 29% of the Nigerian population.141 The Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups are 
considered to be a homogenous group in Nigeria due to inter- marriage and socio-religious 
affinities.142 
The majority of Hausa-Fulanis are Muslims who practice the Sunni version of Islam. Islamic 
law in most parts of Northern Nigeria is based on the Maliki code, a major jurisprudential 
school in Sunni religious law. Prior to the enactment of Islamic statutory laws in different 
states in Northern Nigeria, the Islamic legal system in Nigeria was viewed as a ‘special class 
of customary law.’ 143  This classification of Islamic law has been criticised since Islamic law 
has clear distinct features from customary law.144   
First, unlike customary law which in great part is based on oral unwritten customs, Islamic 
law is derived from written sources. Second, it is clearly systemised and has clearly defined 
schools of jurisprudential thoughts and lastly unlike indigenous customary law, Islamic law is 
viewed to have universal application and is not based on the localised customs of a specific 
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ethnic group as we see in the case of indigenous customary law. Nigerian Islamic scholars 
further assert that Shariah law ‘transcends national, tribal, racial and language barriers.’145  
These distinctions are important in understanding the meaning of motherhood in Hausa-
Fulani family structures, for unlike the discussion on customary law, the emphasis is not so 
much on local customs and practice but on how motherhood is construed under a well-
defined legal system that for all purposes has wider international and universal application 
than the other two systems of Nigerian family law. This point was raised obiter by Justice 
Wali (Justice of the Nigerian Supreme Court) in the case of Alhaji Ila Alkamaa v Alhaji 
Hassan Bello and Alhaji Malami Yaro where he asserted that Sharia law is not localised like 
customary law. He also opined that it has more universality than English common law.146  
It is therefore possible (unlike customary law) to draw widely from other jurisdictions around 
the world which practise the Maliki Islamic legal system.  Admittedly, there would be features 
of motherhood  that reflect the traditional values of the Hausa-Fulanis,147 but generally these 
features would not negate the fundamental constructions of motherhood provided under 
Islamic law, as interpreted by the Maliki jurisprudential system. The Maliki legal system is 
said to be derived from the key teachings of Malik ibn Anas, an Islamic scholar and its 
sources are deduced from two fundamental sources, the Qu’ran, and the Sunnah (includes 
the Hadiths (things prophet Muhammed said) as well as the things he did and refrained from 
doing).148 These are supplemented with secondary sources Ijma (Consensus),149 Qiyas 
(analogy), Istishab (legal presumption), al-Masalih Mursalih (juristic preference dictated by 
public welfare), Amal ahl al-Madianah (acts of the people of Medinah) and urf (customs and 
usage).150   
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An examination of some of the Hadiths (a primary source of Maliki legal system) reveals how 
highly motherhood is regarded in Islam.  For example, one specific Hadith states:  
O messenger of God, who among the people is the most worthy of my good 
company? The Prophet (P) said, Your mother. The man said then who else: The 
Prophet (P) said, Your mother. The man asked, Then who else? Only then did the 
Prophet (P) say, Your father. (Al-Bukhari and Muslim). 151 
Badawi in his treatise on the status of women152 points to another Hadith which declares that 
‘Paradise is at the feet of mothers’.153 It is interesting to see that just like the imagery of 
caring nurturers in Achebe’s Things Fall Apart154, mothers in Islam are viewed as deserving 
respect and honour because they ‘confer more benevolence on man than fathers.’ 155  
Consequently, many Muslim scholars believe that there is no higher role that a woman can 
aspire to in Islam than the role of a mother. For example, although Badawi acknowledged 
the economic rights of Muslim women, he still views their primary role as being that of wives 
and mothers.156  Mazrui, a renowned African historian points out that marriage and child 
bearing are also highly rated among African Muslims, including those of the Hausa-Fulani 
communities in Northern Nigeria.157  Some feminists will argue that these views of this nature 
on the role of Muslim women are derived from ‘a male centered approach to Islam’ and as 
such do not augur well for gender equality and the equal citizenship between men and 
women in the Islamic world.158 What concerns this thesis however is the fact that akin to 
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indigenous customary rules, biological motherhood is Islam is seen to be a venerated role 
that women should aspire to. 
Seeing how biological motherhood is eulogized in Islamic traditions, it begs the question on 
how other forms of motherhood are regarded under Islamic norms. Attention is first given to 
milk mothering which is practiced in Islam. A milk mother (wet nurse) provides her milk 
voluntarily or is contracted for a fee when family exigencies necessitate this requirement. 
There is evidence of the practice of milk mothering among the Hausa-Fulani for example in a 
situation where a woman dies in childbirth and a lactating relation nurses the baby in her 
stead.159 The milk mother is treated with respect in Islam and a man is expressly prohibited 
from having sexual relationship or contracting a marriage with a woman who has wet nursed 
him.160 This is because milk mothering in Islam is seen as creating a bond of kinship akin to 
that of blood kinship.161  
This raises interesting questions on the extent of legal rights that are conferred on milk 
mothers under Islamic norms? Further, are such rights (if any) equivalent and equal to the 
rights afforded to biological motherhood? These questions go to the very heart of whether 
forms of non-biological motherhood in Islam are afforded a higher status in Islamic law than 
under Nigerian indigenous customary law. Yet, it may be argued that this is a moot question 
since infertile women would not be able to lactate naturally. An examination of Islamic 
bioethics162 however shows that these questions are still worth considering due to current 
medical developments that make it possible to induce lactation in infertile women. Even in 
medieval times when many of Islamic legal rules on milk mothering were developed, there 
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were anecdotal accounts of infertile women who acted as milk mothers, even though they 
had never been pregnant.163 These accounts as supported by current medical 
developments, confirm the need to further explore the system of milk mothering which is 
recognised in Islam as a form of non-biological parenting.  
Before considering further the rights that non-biological mothers may enjoy under Islamic 
norms, it is necessary to explore the rights and duties that a biological mother has over her 
children. This will provide a further basis for determining whether milk mothers enjoy full 
rights of parenting under Islamic law. Some Muslim scholars have argued that women with 
children enjoy parenting rights under Sharia law as practiced in many Muslim countries in 
Africa. For example, they argue that a biological mother retains custody over her male 
children till they attain puberty. Likewise, she also has custody over her female children until 
they attain puberty or are old enough for marriage.164  This in theory is what obtains under 
Maliki law, but these rules are also affected by local Hausa customs165 where custodianship 
is normally restricted to the age of seven.166 Further, in the case of succession, a wife with 
genetic children would be entitled to a fixed share167 (fard) of the inheritance of her 
deceased spouse. This is not the case with a milk mother, even though she is considered to 
have a milk kinship with the child that she nurses. She does not have the right to inheritance 
and cannot exercise custody rights over the child that she nurses.168  Furthermore, she is not 
required to carry out parental responsibilities towards the child such as providing for its 
upkeep and maintenance, as this role is reserved for its birth parents. However, if she is 
contractually employed as a wet nurse, she owes a duty of care to a nursing child and must 
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avoid any action that will adversely affect the welfare of the child.169  These limitations on the 
rights that milk mothers have over the children they nurse confirms that similar to Nigerian 
customary law, non-biological motherhood is not considered as being on the same footing as 
biological motherhood in Islamic family structures.  
This leads to a consideration of the status of surrogacy under Islamic law. Is this form of 
non-biological parenting similar to the status of the milk mother? Atigehetchi in her work on 
'Islamic Bioethics: Problems and Perspectives170 points to the position adopted by the 
International Islamic Fiqh Academy in its seven session in Jeddah. This authoritative Sunni 
body ranks the surrogate mother at a similar level of a milk mother or wet nurse. Alongside 
with other Sunni scholars, the Fiqh Academy states that a surrogate mother cannot have the 
same rights as a biological mother who provides the ovum. Yet again, biological motherhood 
is considered as more superior to non-biological motherhood under Islamic law. Again, 
feminists view the inferior treatment of surrogate mothers and milk mothers as emanating 
from patriarchal interpretations of Islam where men control and commodify the bodies of 
women for their own purposes and objectives. 171 However, it is questionable whether a 
married woman who is reproductively capable will actually want a surrogate or wet-nurse to 
share the same rights and privileges that she has over her biological children. In this sense, 
it can be argued that patriarchy is not necessarily the only underlining factor for the 
inequalities between biological motherhood and non-biological motherhood.  
There are other views in Muslim scholarship, particularly from the Shia school of thought, 
that consider the surrogate mother to be the real mother of a child’.172 This is based on a 
verse in the Quran which states that ‘None can be their mother except those who gave them 
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birth.’ 173 While this school of thought may offer some legal status to a surrogate mother, it is 
unclear if the infertile or involuntary childless wife is also equally empowered. This is 
because she will be seen as the ‘rearing mother’ and not the ‘biological mother’ of a child 
produced through a surrogacy arrangement.174 Being classified as a ‘rearing or social 
mother’ may place her in no greater stead than that of an adoptive parent.   
This leads to the question on how child adoption is viewed in Islamic law. This is a very 
critical question that requires further consideration due to the fact that child adoption is 
always canvassed as the major reason for not widening access to assisted reproductive 
technologies (ARTs) in the developing regions of the world. This concern shall be dealt with 
in further detail in the next chapter of this thesis. But it is necessary at this stage to discuss 
the status of child adoption under Islamic law because of the case study appraisal of how 
motherhood is construed within the family structures of the Hausa/Fulani Muslim community 
in Nigeria.  
The key question to be considered within this case study is to determine whether the 
institution of child adoption provides a Hausa/Fulani Muslim involuntary childless woman 
with the equal standing as a woman who is able to conceive? This appraisal of the status of 
child adoption under Islamic law will be considered from the perspective of Maliki law which 
is the dominant school of thought in the practice of Sharia law in Nigeria.175  
Strictly speaking, Islamic law does not permit formal adoption.176 It is said that the Quran in 
Sura XXXIII verses 4-5 and 37 frowns at non-Islamic adoption practices that permit the 
severance of genetic ties between parents and their children. In so doing, the Quran rejects 
the practice whereby an adopted child is ‘assimilated in a legal sense into another family.’177 
This is not to say that Islam completely ignores benefits that may accrue from adoption, but 
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rather that it refuses to acknowledge a system that purports to create blood lineage (Nasab) 
between the child and the family adopting it. However, Islamic law does provides a system of 
guardianship or foster parenting that can provide some limited parenting rights to childless 
couples.178 This guardianship system is known as the Kafalah and will be further discussed 
in the next chapter of this thesis which considers whether child adoption in all its 
ramifications, serves a better infertility management option to affordable reproductive 
technologies (ARTs). However, some overview of the Kafalah system is provided in this 
case study on the construction of motherhood in the family structures of Muslim 
Hausa/Fulani communities in Nigeria. 
The guardianship system known as Kafalah is practised in several Muslim countries around 
the world, including North African countries such as Algeria, Egypt and Morocco.179 Nigeria 
also practises the Kafalah system. 180 This system enables a Muslim guardian to foster a 
child and provide for its upkeep and protection. Kafalah is acceptable under Islam because it 
does not involve a child changing his lineage.181  Kafalah is one of the civil causes that 
Shariah courts in Northern Nigeria are entitled to adjudicate on.182  It is treated as a 
recognised form of foster parenting practised among the Hausa-Fulani Muslim community. A 
key reason why Kafalah is practised among Hausa-Fulani Muslims is to provide for the care 
of orphans and less privileged children within the society. It is also enables a childless 
woman to raise a child if she has none.  In many cases, foster parenting among the Hausa-
Fulanis is normally carried out on a voluntary basis and may involve fertile siblings handing 
an infant child to an infertile sibling to nurse and to look after. Recent studies183 undertaken 
                                                          
178 Ibid at p 409. 
179 ISS/IRC Kafalah (Fact Sheet 51, 2007) ISS/IRC, Geneva, Switzerland (accessed March 2015). 
180 Termed as Al-Kafalah (guardianship) in Northern Nigerian State laws. See for example Sharia 
Courts (Administration of Justice and Certain Consequential Changes) Law 1999 Zamfara State of 
Nigeria Gazette No.1 Vol 1 15th of June , 2000, pp A1- A30 set out in chapter seven of Ostein P., 
Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999-2006: A Sourcebook (Volume 7: Ulama Institutions).    
181  Bargarch J., Orphans of Islam: Family, Abandonment and Secret Adoption in Morocco (Rowman 
& Littlefield: 2002) p 28. 
182 See for example section 5, Part III Jurisdiction, a law to establish Sharia courts to apply Sharia 
Law in Sokoto State, Law No 2 of 2000. 
183 Abubaker S., Lawan U., Yasir JN., Knowledge and attitudes towards child adoption and fostering 
among infertile women in Northern Nigeria (2013) 16(1) Sahel Medical Journal p 19 at p 20. 
 
 
 
149 
 
in Northern Nigeria where the Hausa-Fulanis are situated show that the system of Kafalah or 
fostering has a wider acceptability than adoption. This may point to the fact that adherents of 
the Islamic faith in Northern Nigeria understand the spiritual value that their faith attaches to 
foster parenting and that there is the reward of paradise for those who take care of orphaned 
children.184     
Yet, despite its acceptability in the religious and cultural practices of the Hausa –Fulani, only 
less than 40% of the respondents in the study were actually willing to foster a child under the 
Kafalah system even though 80% thought it was a good idea.185 This raises the question as 
to why fostering (Kafalah) has wide acceptability and yet not many infertile Hausa-Fulani 
women would actually go ahead to adopt this system as a form of non-biological parenting. 
The reasons may have to do with the fact that Kafalah confers limited rights on a non-
biological parent as compared to a biological parent. For instance, under the Kafalah 
system, a childless family may care, provide for the maintenance of a child. Yet, they are 
prohibited from giving the child their family name or providing it with inheritance entitlements 
that would normally accrue to biological children.186 These limitations may not provide 
infertile or involuntary childless couples with a strong incentive to accept Kafalah as a 
substitute for their desire to achieve full biological parenthood. But the same argument may 
apply to foster parenting under received Western law. Some may argue that this form of non-
biological parenting since it has cultural acceptance should be recommended as an effective 
way of tackling infertility particularly when consideration is given to the large numbers of 
orphaned children that need to be cared for. As earlier stated, this concern on whether non-
biological parenting such as fostering and adoption can be considered as viable ways of 
managing infertility instead of the widening of accessibility of ARTs will be further considered 
in the next chapter. 
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While there are many benefits that an infertile or involuntary childless woman may enjoy 
under the Kafalah system and other forms of non-biological parenting, it is impossible to 
ignore the fact that when it comes to intestate succession, a childless woman may also 
experience disenfranchisement under Islamic law. This is because a childless widow is 
entitled to less of her husband’s property than would have been the case if she had children 
for him.187 The disenfranchisement that a childless widow may experience under Islamic law 
suggests that biological motherhood under Islamic rules and customs affords a greater 
status to women than other constructions of motherhood. This again suggests that there is a 
basis to argue for wider accessibility to ARTs in a pluralist African community. This point will 
be further considered in chapter six of this thesis which explores whether there is right to 
universal reproductive health care. Before concluding this chapter’s discourse on the 
construction of motherhood in an identified Sub-Saharan country, it is necessary to briefly 
outline the impact that Nigerian statutory law and received English law has on the way 
motherhood is legally construed in Nigeria. 
4.6 Motherhood under Nigerian Statutory law and Received English law 
This chapter has primarily been concerned with the construction of motherhood under 
Nigerian customary law and Islamic law. This is because many Africans, including Nigerians 
conduct their personal and family matters within the context of these laws. However, the 
pluralistic nature of African legal systems makes it impossible to ignore the role that statutory 
law and received Western law play in determining the legal status of womanhood in 
countries such as Nigeria. It is for this reason that this chapter concludes with a brief 
consideration of how adult womanhood is construed under Nigerian statutory law and its 
received English law.   
One legacy of Nigeria’s colonial experience is that a significant section of its legislation and 
case law is based on English law. The English law that applies in Nigeria consists of 
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common law and doctrines of equity and statutes of general application in force in England 
on January 1 1900. English law made before 1960 can also apply directly to Nigeria by their 
own force. Extensive work has already been carried out on the impact of received English 
law on the Nigerian legal system.188 The focus of this thesis is not to rehash matters that 
have already been comprehensively addressed in other literature. Rather this thesis will 
confine its discourse on received English law on its impact on the construction of 
motherhood pre and post-independence.  A key aspect of English family law in Nigeria was 
to introduce the monogamous marital institution which entails marriage between one man 
and one woman to the exclusion of all. This was brought into force in Nigeria by the colonial 
administration first by the 1863 and 1884 Marriage Ordinances189 applicable to Lagos, the 
Marriage Proclamation 1906190, the Marriage Ordinance 1908191 which applied to the 
protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Marriage Proclamation 1907192 applicable to 
protectorate of Northern Nigeria. These pieces of legislation were subsequently repealed 
and replaced by the 1914 Marriage Act193 which applied throughout Nigeria.194  
To some extent, it can be argued that the legislation offered protection to infertile and 
involuntary childless women during this historical period. This is due to the requirement that 
marriages celebrated under the legislation had to be monogamous.  An infertile or 
involuntary childless woman could therefore have some assurance that the law would 
censure attempts made by her husband to procure children outside a subsisting ordinance 
marriage.195 However, the codification of the requirement of monogamy equally meant that 
she could not avail herself of cultural mechanisms such as male helpers to help her 
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conceive, if male infertility was the cause of the childless state of her marriage.196 Further, 
nothing in these statutes precluded her husband from divorcing her on grounds of the 
inability to reproduce. 
Nigerian statutory law has since evolved beyond the colonial legacy of English law and post-
independence law has further impacted on the construction of motherhood and parental 
rights within Nigerian family structures. It is pertinent to mention that Nigeria operates a 
federal system. Consequently, the laws made by the Federal Government apply throughout 
the country while legislation made by states is localised and applicable only to the legislating 
state. The current federal legislation that governs the family in Nigeria are the current 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1990, 197 Wills Act of 1837198 and the Child Rights Act 2003199. 
Cognisance is also taken of the application of the 1999 Nigerian constitution which is the 
grundnorm of the Nigerian legal system.200 
The Matrimonial Causes Act essentially retains the monogamous institution of marriage 
between one man and one woman. However, unlike the previous Marriage Act 1914, the 
Matrimonial Causes Act provides a wider definition of which children can be classified as 
children of a marriage contracted under the Act. Section 69 of the Act sets out the categories 
of children who will be deemed to be children of a marriage contracted under the Act. 
Children of the marriage include:-  
(a)        any child adopted since the marriage by the husband and wife or by either of 
them with the consent of the other;  
(b)        any child of the husband and wife born before the marriage, whether 
legitimated by the marriage or not; and  
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(c)        any child of either the husband or wife (including an illegitimate child of either 
of them and a child adopted by either of them) if, at the relevant time, the 
child was ordinarily a member of the household of the husband and wife, 
  
This section provides significant parental rights to an infertile woman by statutorily affirming 
the status of her adopted children. Arguably, section 69(c) may also allow for the 
legitimisation of children that she may have through the assistance of male donors if the 
child is considered at the relevant time201  to be a member of the household of the husband 
and wife.  
The Child’s Rights Act 2003 even goes further to provide wider parental rights relating to 
non-biological parenthood by creating a detailed statutory framework for child adoption. 
Section 129 of the Act stipulates who can adopt and this includes married couples, single 
people (provided that the children to be adopted are of the same sex as the prospective 
adoptive parent). Unlike some localised customs, where a woman cannot adopt without the 
permission of her spouse, this section of the Child Rights Act allows a woman to 
autonomously adopt and to assume full parental rights and responsibilities over such child. 
These include custody, maintenance, supervision and the education of the adopted child.202  
It therefore can be argued that current Nigerian statutory law bolsters the rights of non-
biological mothers especially if their marriages are contracted within the statutory framework. 
It can be further argued that the 1999 Nigerian Constitution which serves as the grundnorm 
of Nigerian law also further strengthens the status of non-biological parents. Reference can 
be made to s.42 (2) of the Constitution which expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of birth circumstances. This was the constitutional section relied upon by the Nigerian 
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brought under the Act or the time immediately preceding when husband and wife ceased living 
together. 
202 Section 141(1)(b) of the Child Rights Act 2003. 
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Supreme Court in the recent case of Ukeje v Ukeje203 when it refused to uphold as law a 
custom that prohibited female children from inheriting from their father’s estate if he died 
intestate. 
4.7 Conclusion 
It is commendable that the Nigerian legislative framework particularly through the Child 
Rights Act has evolved over the year to enhance the status of non-biological parenting. Yet, 
it remains the position that many Nigerians still conduct their personal affairs under 
customary law or Shariah law and as such may not bother to avail themselves of the 
statutory protection afforded under the Child Rights Act or the legislation that governs 
monogamous marriages. This is the persisting reality of a pluralistic society that is governed 
by a variety of rules and normative values. However, it can be argued that where there is a 
conflict between these pluralistic rules, the Nigerian legislative framework particularly the 
1999 Nigerian constitution should prevail.204  Yet it is worrying that states within Northern 
Nigeria where the Hausa-Fulanis are domiciled have refused to enact into state law the 
provisions of the Child Rights Act which they opine are contrary to their religious and cultural 
values. This is a point that will be further explored in the next chapter of this thesis. However, 
since the Constitution is the supreme law of the Nigerian legal system, there is no reason 
why religious or customary rules that treat non-biological parenting options such as foster 
parenting and child adoption as inferior to biological parenting should continue to apply. This 
is because such laws will be seen as breaching s42 (2) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution 
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of the circumstances of one’s birth.  
Yet the judicial cases that have ensued from the Nigerian Supreme Court such as Meribe v 
Egwu,205 Mojekwu v Mojekwu206 and Akinnubi v Akinnubi207 establish that the Court’s record 
in striking down laws that are discriminatory to women is far from satisfactory. While the 
                                                          
203 Ukeje v Ukeje (note 98) above. 
204 Section 1(3) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
205 Meribe v Egwu (note 114) above. 
206 Mojekwu v Mojekwu (note 92) above. 
207 Akinnubi v Akinnubi (note 84) above. 
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Ukeje v Ukeje208 decision is certainly a positive development in that it allows female children 
to inherit in customary intestate succession, the Supreme Court has still not gone far enough 
to tackle the discriminatory norms and practices that stop married women from inheriting 
under intestate succession. As the Akinnubi case demonstrates, a widow can only sue as 
next friend for her children. If she is childless, her situation becomes precarious under 
customary or Islamic intestate succession.  
This is why motherhood, particularly biological motherhood will continue to remain an 
important goal for women to attain in pronatalist Sub-Saharan African countries like Nigeria. 
While non-biological parenting options will offer some respite, most involuntary childless 
women will continue to seek ways in which they can achieve biological motherhood since 
having children of their own would bolster their prospects in family succession matters. This 
is one of the critical reasons why this thesis will further consider why child adoption, on its 
own, cannot serve as an effective infertility management option in pluralist African societies 
that are governed by a variety of laws and norms, including customary and Islamic law which 
do not take too kindly to the institution of child adoption. 
                                                          
208 Ukeje v Ukeje (note 98) above. 
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Chapter Five 
The status of child adoption in African pluralistic legal systems– a case for widening 
access to ARTs in developing countries 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Some discussion has been provided in the preceding chapter on the child adoption in a case 
study African jurisdiction. The discourse was undertaken for the purposes of determining 
whether non-biological constructions of motherhood could help in bolstering the status of the 
involuntary childless woman in the Sub-Saharan African continent.  This chapter extends 
that discussion and focuses on whether child adoption should be considered as the primary 
or sole infertility management option for involuntary childless couples in Africa. This is 
particularly relevant when consideration is given to the arguments that Africa is over-
populated and filled with orphaned or vulnerable children in need of a family life. This has led 
some to argue that the infertile and involuntary childless should bear the social burdens 
associated with over-population and children in need of care.1 While these are valid 
concerns, this chapter will present a contrary perspective on why child adoption should not 
be treated as the primary or sole mechanism for infertility management in legally pluralist 
communities within the Sub-Saharan African region.  
 
As has been stated in earlier chapters in this thesis, it is a known fact that most African 
countries practise legal pluralism which allows for the co-existence of multiple legal 
systems.2 As identified in chapter four of this thesis, two legal systems- Islamic (Shariah) law 
                                                          
1 Daar AS., Merali Z., Infertility and social suffering: the case of ART in developing countries In: 
Vayena E., Rowe PJ., Griffin PD., (eds.) Current Practices and Controversies in Assisted 
Reproduction. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization; 2002. p 15 at p 19. 
2 See Menski W., Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006: 2nd ed) 696 pp; Oba A., Islamic Law as Customary 
Law: The Changing Perspective in Nigeria (2002) 51 (4) International Comparative Law Quarterly p 
817; Church J., The Place of Indigenous Law in Mixed Legal System and a Society in Transformation: 
A South African Experience [2005] ANZLH-E Journal pp 94 and 104. 
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and customary law which are widely practised in several African countries alongside other 
legal rules such as English received common law do not recognise child adoption as 
construed under Western family law. This is not to say that these non-Western norms do not 
permit quasi-legal kinship relationships such as guardianship and fostering, however they do 
not recognise the legal kinship and parental rights that formal child adoption creates in 
Western legal systems. As discussed in chapter four of this thesis, the limited scope of the 
quasi-legal kinship rights provided in the customary and Islamic legal systems does raise 
some questions on why some continue to canvass that child adoption should be treated as 
the primary infertility management option in Sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the 
developing world.3 
 
It is for this reason that this chapter can be considered as important to the overall thesis 
which seeks to build a case for widening access to ARTs in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is 
because it seeks to counter the existing policy arguments raised by leading health activists 
such as Vekeman on this matter.4 He argues that there is no need to widen access to ARTs 
in Sub-Saharan Africa due to over-population and budgetary concerns that poor resourced 
states face.5 Toubia,6 while not accepting Vekeman’s view that ARTs should be limited due 
to overpopulation concerns, accepts that child adoption could be ‘a beautiful and rewarding 
alternative to biological parenting.’7 She however acknowledges the existence of social and 
legal barriers that limit the wide applicability of child adoption in many countries.8 This view is 
also supported by other policy makers9 who canvass that there should be community 
                                                          
3 Daar, Merali (note 1) above. 
4  Vekemans M., Infertility treatment: Luxury, Desire or Necessity (1994) 4 Reproductive Health 
Matters 93 which argues that treatment of infertility is a luxury especially in resource poor countries 
with over-population concerns. 
5 Ibid at p 93. 
6 Toubia N., Social Pressure is not the only reason why people want children (1994) 4 Reproductive 
Health Matters p 94.  This commentary is a response to Vekeman’s article. 
7 Ibid at p 95. 
8 Ibid. 
9  Oladokun A., Acceptability of Child Adoption as Management Option for Infertility in Nigeria: 
Evidence from Focus Group Discussions (2009) 13(1) African Journal of Reproductive Health 79 at 
89. 
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mobilisation and awareness campaigns to bolster wider social acceptability of child adoption 
in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa. This thesis however identifies with works such as 
Daar and Merali,10 Bharadwaj and 11 Shah12 that argue that it is inequitable to require the 
involuntary childless in developing regions to bear the social burden of adopting the growing 
number of orphans or to tackle, on behalf of the fertile, societal concerns to do with 
overpopulation.  
 
It important to note that these cited works are primarily situated in medicine and the social 
sciences; they therefore do not fully explore the legal status of child adoption under non-
Western legal systems as practiced in many regions of the developing world nor do they 
discuss the impact these systems may have on infertile couples who seek to find meaningful 
parental fulfilment through child adoption. This is not to say that there is an absence of 
literature within the legal discipline that addresses the status of child adoption in non-
Western legal systems. The literature referenced below shows otherwise.13 However, these 
legal works appear to focus more on the rights of children as provided by the adoption route 
and not on the legal impediments that may arise when child adoption is touted as the sole or 
primary means through which infertility of involuntary childlessness is managed in Sub-
Saharan Africa. This chapter therefore attempts to fill a gap in the literature by considering 
how the status of child adoption in a pluralist (mixed) legal system may make it impractical to 
adopt this mechanism as the primary mode of infertility management in the region.  
 
                                                          
10 Daar, Merali (note 1) above at pp 15 and 19. 
11 Bharadwaj A., Why Adoption is not an Option in India: The Visibility of Infertility, the Secrecy of 
Donor Insemination, and other Cultural Complexities (2003) 56 Social Science and Medicine p 1867  
12 Shah I., Treatment of Infertility: An Integral Part of Reproductive Health and a Necessity (1994) 4 
Reproductive Health Matters 96. 
13 See for example Parts V and VI of  O’Halloran K., The Politics of Adoption: International 
Perspectives of Law, Policy and Practice (London: Springer, 2nd edition, 2009) , Ruppel O., Shipila P., 
‘Adoption: Statutory and Customary Law aspects from a Namibian perspective’ in Ruppel O., (Ed.), 
Children’s rights in Namibia (Namibia: Macmillan Education, 2009) pp 189 - 200 and Wengi-Okumu 
J.,  Searching for a Child Centered Adoption Process: The Law and Practice in Uganda in Ncube W 
(ed.) Law, Culture, Tradition and Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa (Hampshire, 
Ashgate: 1998) pp 225-248. 
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It begins by considering the position of child adoption under African pluralism and explores 
whether it is right for policy makers to place the social burden of adopting less privileged 
children in Sub-Saharan African countries solely on infertile and involuntary childless 
couples within the region. It examines these issues against the backdrop on whether current 
international and regional frameworks on human rights and child adoption provide a 
fundamental right to adopt for involuntarily childless couples and the larger spectrum of 
potential adoptive parents outside the traditional confines of the best interest of the child. It 
concludes with recommendations for the widening of access to low-cost IVFs to provide for 
greater choice and autonomy for involuntarily childless people as well as the implementation 
of reforms of the child adoption framework applicable in mixed legal systems to guarantee 
and strengthen the parenting rights and responsibilities of involuntarily childless people in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
5.2  Western and Non- Western Perspectives of Child Adoption: Matters Arising 
In a botched adoption process, Iris Botros and her husband, Louis Andros as well as Suzan 
Haglouf and her Egyptian husband were convicted of child trafficking by an Egyptian Court in 
2009.14  According to the indictment, the couples had adopted new born children from a 
Coptic Christian orphanage and were arrested when they applied for US visas to travel back 
to the US with the children. Their defence team argued that the couples were merely trying 
to adopt children but unknowingly breached Egyptian laws that were based on strict Islamic 
laws that prohibited child adoption. They further argued that the case was a human rights 
case which affected the minority Copt community since Egyptian law did not provide legal 
mechanisms for non-Muslims to adopt in Egypt. Notwithstanding the arguments put forward 
by the defence, the defendants were found guilty of child trafficking and forgery and 
                                                          
14 See Goodwin M., Baby Market: Money and the New Politics of Creating Families (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) pp xix and xx where this case is discussed. 
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sentenced to two (2) years imprisonment.15 From a jurisdictional perspective, this case falls 
outside the remit of this thesis’ site of investigation which is Sub-Saharan Africa. However, 
as earlier mentioned in chapter four of this thesis, Islamic legal rules have a much wider 
application than localised customary rules. This mean that cases from other jurisdictions 
where Islamic law is practised can offer comparative examples of the legal restraints that 
prevent child adoption from being treated as the primary mechanism for infertility 
management in many developing countries that practise non-Western legal systems. It is 
interesting to note that Toubia, a Sudanese women health rights activist also makes this 
point in her earlier cited article.16  
 
As considered in the preceding chapter of this thesis, non-Western legal scholarship or 
jurisprudence situated within Shariah and indigenous customary law do not provide the 
same recognition to child adoption as Western legal jurisprudence. By Western 
jurisprudence, we mean the ‘overall attitudes of jurists in the West to questions of justice and 
law and the patterns of legal theory which have prevailed in Western Europe and the United 
States of America.’17 Conversely non-Western jurisprudence has been described as the 
‘working whole structure of law in non-Western countries individually or collectively.’18 Non-
Western jurisprudence therefore includes religious and customary laws derived from 
indigenous cultural sources of non-Western societies. This chapter does not intend to 
provide an extensive treatise on the debate of which system is more universal or superior to 
the other as there is already extensive literature on this point.19 Rather it seeks to examine 
how child adoption is construed under the two systems of legal jurisprudence and how these 
                                                          
15 Reuters ‘Egypt court jails U.S. couples over illegal adoptions’ Reuters News 17 September 2009 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/17/us-egypt-adoption-
idUSTRE58G2M720090917?pageNumber=1  accessed March 7 2011. 
16 See Toubia (note 6) above. 
            17 Curson L., Jurisprudence (Cavendish Publishing: London 2nd Edition, 1995) at p 13. 
18 Chiba M., Legal pluralism in Sri Lankan society: Towards a general theory of non-Western law, 33 
Journal of Legal Pluralism 1993 p 197 at p 199. 
19 See for example Menski in note 2 above and Chiba in note 18 above and Chiba M., (ed.) Asian 
indigenous law in interaction with received law (London and New York: KPI, 2006) and Chiba M., 
Legal Pluralism: Towards a general theory through Japanese legal culture. (Tokyo: Tokai University 
Press: 1989) 236 pp.  
 
 
 
161 
 
constructions may affect the parenting rights and benefits of infertile couples within regions 
where these legal systems are practiced on equal footing. 
 
Under Western jurisprudence, child adoption involves the transfer of a child from one filial 
relationship to another, whereby for legal purposes the child ceases to be the child of its 
natural parents and is regarded as the child of the adopter.20 This is said to be derived from 
the parent centred model of child adoption developed by ancient Roman law where adoption 
existed for the benefit of the parent rather than the child.21 The incessant clamour from 
different quarters that child adoption should be considered as a panacea for involuntary 
childlessness in the developing world is predicated on the faulty notion that Western 
jurisprudence, and its perspective of kinship and parenting rights, has universal application 
in all jurisdictions or that it is more superior to other systems of legal rules that are applied in 
legal pluralistic societies.22 But as the Iris Botros and the Suzan Hagoulf cases in Egypt23 
demonstrate, many countries within the developing world, where involuntary childlessness is 
prevalent, practise non- Western legal systems such as Islamic law and indigenous 
customary law. While these systems may provide for quasi-adoptive structures (such as 
guardianship (Kafalah) or fostering) it is questionable whether they provide the same legal 
recognition to child adoption as obtains under Western jurisprudence.  
 
As pointed out in the preceding chapter of this thesis, although different Islamic schools of 
thoughts may vary, they generally prohibit an institution of child adoption that entails the 
absolute transfer of parental rights to another and the severance of genealogy.24 The Islamic 
                                                          
20 Nolan L., Wardle L., Fundamental principles of family law (Buffalo: William Hein & Co Inc, 2nd ed 
2006) p 294; See also Bayme S., Rosen G., The Jewish Family and Jewish Continuity (New Jersey: 
KTAV Publishing House, 1994) p 174. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Chiba (note 18) above at p 197. 
23 Goodwin (note 14) above. 
24 Welchman L., Women and Muslim family laws in Arab States: a comparative overview of textual 
development and advocacy, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2007 at p 148. 
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position was succinctly expressed by the Bangladesh delegate on the draft article 21 of the 
United Nations Child Rights Convention (UNCRC) when he stated: 
 
‘[Draft article 21] is liable to give difficulties in Muslim countries since the 
understanding of the Bangladesh is that adoption is not a recognised institution under 
Muslim law.’ 25 
 
However, this is not to say that some Muslim countries such as Tunisia by a 1958 law and 
Somalia (through its Family Code prior to its degeneration as a failed state)26 do not provide 
statutory models of adoption that are not dissimilar to Western adoption.  But scholars argue 
that the Tunisian and Somalian statutory regimes on child adoption cannot be considered as 
standard Islamic legislative models, but rather state law that is based on received law.27 As 
pointed out in the preceding chapter of this thesis, Islamic law is not the only form of non-
Western jurisprudence that refuses to provide full legal recognition to the institution of child 
adoption. Many indigenous customary (native law) systems in Africa do not subscribe to the 
Western model of child adoption. In some cultures, adoption which entails the full severance 
of a legal relationship between a child and its natural parents is equated as being as bad as 
slavery and no child should be subjected to a situation where it is deprived of its legal kinship 
with its natural genetic family.28  
 
The conventional African customary law position revolves around the position that child 
adoption, even when permitted should not sever the legal relationship between a child and 
its biological relationship. This was successfully raised as a conflict of law issue in the UK 
                                                          
25. See UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/39 Annex IV p.2, at Article 11 and also O’Halloran K., The politics of 
adoption: International Perspectives on Law, Policy and Practice, (Springer Science, 2009) at p 381. 
26 See the Somalian Family Code. Law 23 of 11 Jan 1975; See also Pearl D., Menski W., Muslim 
Family Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell: 3rd edition, 1998) p 409. 
27 Ibid; see also Welchman (note 24) at p 148 where it is argued that the Tunisian model is a clear 
departure from ‘its Muslim Law sources.’  
28  See Re N (a minor) (adoption) [1990] 1 FLR 58 at pp 63 and 68. 
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case of Re N29 involving cross-racial adoption. Here a Nigerian father successfully 
challenged the action brought by white foster parents to adopt his child (who had been 
placed in their care) partly on the ground that the child adoption was not an ‘institution known 
in Nigeria and smacked of slavery’.30  The court accepted arguments that there was no 
concept of adoption31 in the Nigerian society and that an adoption order would cause shame 
and distress to the Nigerian birth father as he had an important role to play in the child’s 
life.32  
 
Beyond the politics of race in child adoption that this case raises,33 it is also relevant in 
providing some insight on the legal status of child adoption under African customary law. 
However, the case can be faulted on its finding that there was no concept of adoption in the 
Nigerian society. This is because at the time the action was instituted, child adoption was 
already statutorily recognised in some parts of Nigeria.34 Further, as pointed out in the 
preceding chapter of thesis, Nigerian case law also attests to some acceptance of customary 
law adoption. For example in the case of Re Estate of Aminatu A.G.V v Tunkwase35, the 
court in determining what choice of law to apply in the disposition of the estate of the 
deceased who was a Muslim and who died intestate, held in favour of her Ijebu native law 
and custom which allowed her adopted children to inherit from her estate as compared to 
strict Islamic law which would have prevented them from participating in the distribution of 
the estate.  
 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid at p 68. 
31 Ibid at p 64. 
32 Ibid at p 68. 
33 See for example Bartholet E., Where do black children belong? The politics of race matching in 
adoption. (1991) 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1163; Mears M., Adoption, Bigotry and Race [1990] New Law 
Journal 564 
34 See for example, pre-existing state legislation on child adoption prior to the enactment of the 
Nigerian Child Rights Act 2003. Discussed by Larry Chukwu in a paper Adoption of Children in 
Nigeria under the Child’s Rights Act 2003 available from 
http://www.law2.byu.edu/isfl/saltlakeconference/papers/isflpdfs/Chukwu.pdf  accessed March 7, 2010.   
35 (1945), 18 N.L.R. 88. 
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Yet in Re N, the Nigerian father purportedly relying on indigenous customary law rules was 
able to successfully claim that child adoption was unknown in Nigeria and to further argue 
that the foster parents who had lovingly raised his child from infancy were merely acting as 
caregivers36 and should not be allowed to assume the role as the child’s legal parents. It is 
recommended that should a similar conflict of law issue in relation to child adoption arise in 
the English courts that Re N on the status of child adoption under Nigerian law should be 
treated as bad law on the grounds that, at the time this case was heard, child adoption was 
known under Nigerian statutory law and to some extent under Nigerian customary law and 
practice. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the arguments raised on behalf of the father in Re N cannot be 
completely overlooked. This is because in terms of societal perception, child adoption under 
African customary law is normally considered in some communities as foster parenting or 
kinship guardianship. These quasi-adoption structures do not involve the severance of 
relationships with the biological family. This argument resonates with statements attributed 
to the Malawian father of David Banda, the first Malawian child, adopted by Madonna when 
he commented that he was not informed that the adoption process would mean that David 
would no longer legally be his son and that if he had been told this he would not have 
allowed for the adoption.37  Further, his comment that he thought the primary reason for 
Madonna, ‘adopting his son was to educate and take care of the child and that after this had 
been done that the child will return home,’38 supports the fact that many Africans conduct 
their affairs on the strict application of indigenous customary rules. These rules tend not to 
favour the practice of child adoption that legally severs kinship ties between a child and its 
biological parents.   
 
                                                          
36 A role actively encouraged in customary law providing it does not create legal rights that severe a 
child from its birth parents. 
37 BBC Father now backs adoption BBC News Thursday, 26 October 2006 available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/6086340.stm.  (accessed February 2, 2010). 
38 Ibid. 
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It would appear that this important point on the scope of parenting rights that are provided 
under child adoption is yet to be fully understood by those who advocate this framework as 
one of the primary key infertility management options for involuntarily childless people in the 
Sub Saharan Africa. It is therefore questionable whether there is any sustainable ground to 
continue to restrict access to affordable assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) primarily 
on the ground that the infertile should bear the social burden of raising HIV/AIDs orphans or 
other disadvantaged children without considering how child adoption is viewed under Islamic 
and customary rules within a pluralistic African legal system. 
 
This is not to say that in all African countries that child adoption is not fully recognised under 
customary law. South Africa, for example, as evidenced by its case law provides legal 
recognition of the institution of child adoption under customary law. In the 2001 case of 
Metiso v Padongelukfonds39, it was held that there was a legal duty to maintain minor 
children who had been adopted under customary law despite the fact that the customary 
adoption process did not comply with all the statutory requirements set out under South 
African law. Further in the case of Kewana v Santam Insurance Co Ltd40, a case decided by 
the then Trasnkei Appellate Division, it was held that an adoption by an unmarried woman 
under customary law was valid and provided the adopted child with a legally enforceable 
right to claim against the third party insurance for loss of support arising from the negligent 
killing of his adoptive mother in a bus accident. The position that child adoption under South 
African customary law (in this case Xhosa customary law) is valid and creates legally 
enforceable rights was also upheld in the recent case of Maneli v Maneli.41 In this case 
which involved child maintenance issues, the High Court had no difficulties in finding that the 
minor child had been adopted under Xhosa customary law which resulted in the 
                                                          
39 2001 (3) SA 1142 (T), 
40 1993 (4) SA 771 (TkA) Compare this with the Nigerian case of Dogbo v. Akinwande (1974) 8 Nig. 
L.J. 134. where the Western State Court of Appeal refused to uphold the lower court decision that 
dependants of a deceased aunt who had been in locus parentis to them could be treated as children 
under customary law who could claim under section 5 of the Torts Law. 
41 Maneli v Maneli (14/3/2-234/05) [2010] ZAGPJHC 22; 2010 (7) BCLR 703 (GSJ) (19 April 2010).  
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establishment of a legal parent/child relationship between the adoptive parents and the 
adopted child. 
 
It can be argued that the South African position is a progressive construction of the status of 
child adoption under African customary law. Yet it is still unclear whether the legal 
enforceable rights accruing from customary child adoption which was affirmed in the Kewane 
and Maneli cases respectively establish a continent wide recognition of full parenting rights 
under customary child adoption. As discussed in earlier sections of this thesis, African 
customary laws are in many instances largely localised42 and this localisation can result in 
varying rules, including rules relating to child adoption. Moreover it will seem that in 
recognising that customary law could create a legal parent/child relationship that the South 
African courts were more concerned with what was in the best interest of the child under 
customary law rather than in necessarily upholding the right of infertile people to adopt 
through this system.  
 
Another interesting point is also raised by Church43 in her piece on the status of child 
adoption under indigenous law in a mixed legal system. She points out that in deciding 
whether child adoption was possible under customary law, the South African court 
recognised that ‘there was a general familial right to support members within the same 
agnatic group at indigenous law’.44  This raises an interesting point on whether child 
adoption under customary law is restricted to situations where an adoptive parent can prove 
an agnatic (family kinship or clanship relationships) with the child, or whether this would 
equally apply to other groups of prospective adoptive parents without proof of such agnatic 
relationship with the child. Further, even when child adoption is permitted under customary 
law, is the judicial recognition of the familial right to support members within an agnatic 
group based primarily on the best interest of the child or on the parenting needs of the 
                                                          
42  Okonkwo C., Introduction to Nigerian Law (Sweet and Maxwell: 1980) pp 42-43. 
43 Church (note 2) above. 
44 Ibid at p 94 and p 104. 
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prospective adoptive parent? If this is the case then it would appear, that just like 
international child right laws on child adoption as embedded in the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)45 as well as the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the State, child adoption when recognised under customary law is 
primarily a child -centred system of adoption and not one that primarily seeks to meet the 
parenting needs of the child.  
 
This point is further explored by Ruppel and Shipila in their discussions on the Namibian 
perspective of customary child adoption46 where they point out that the familial right of 
customary child adoption or kinship care is a way of ensuring that in line with Article 30 of 
the United Nations Child Rights Convention (UNCRC) that a child’s interest is best served if 
it is raised within its community.47 It therefore will appear that customary child adoption even 
when recognised in certain African jurisdictions caters more for the benefit of the welfare of 
the child rather than any altruistic concerns for the parenting needs of infertile people. This is 
not to say however that the familial right of adoption or kinship care would not have some 
corollary effect of providing childless couples with some parental fulfilment. However, the 
concern here is whether customary law actually sets out to provide childless couples with a 
wide array of parenting rights or benefits or whether it strictly concerned with catering for the 
needs of younger members of the clan or extended family. These queries are further 
explored in the next section which considers the functions of child adoption under both 
Western and non –Western legal systems. 
  
5.3 An Appraisal of the Functions of Adoption under Western and non-Western 
Legal Systems 
So far this thesis has shown that both African customary law and Islamic law recognise the 
welfare function (or the best interest of the child goal) in the sense that their primary 
                                                          
45 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 
44/25 of 20 November 1989. 
46 Ruppel, Shipila (note 13) above at pp 195 and 196. 
47 However Ruppel and Shipila do question whether in all cases that kinship care does provide a 
loving, stable and permanent family environment for the child in line with the best interest principle, 
ibid at pp 196 and 197. 
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objective is to provide a loving home environment to children deprived of family life. 48 In this 
sense, the familial right of customary child adoption or kinship care and the Islamic system of 
sponsorship or guardianship known as Kafalah can be seen as similar to the Western child 
adoption model as they all focus on the best interest or the welfare of a child. 
 
However, while these systems under non-Western jurisprudence may be similar in function 
to Western child adoption, the latter (at least in its original form)49 goes beyond the best 
interest of the child concept for it also provides full legal recognition of the parenting rights of 
the adoptive parent. This is done by providing them with legal kinship ties comparable to 
those that biological parents have with their children. To this extent the Western model of 
child adoption still retains some strands of Roman adoption law in that child adoption cannot 
said to be strictly a child centred model, but one also that provides benefits and rights for the 
adoptive parents.50  It is this latter function of the Western model of child adoption that poses 
some concerns for non-Western legal rules such as Islamic law and customary law which 
focus on preserving the biological lineage and bloodlines between a child and its biological 
parents.51    
 
It is at this point that any similarity between the quasi-adoptive structures recognised under 
Islamic and customary law and that of statutory adoption derived from Western 
jurisprudence ends. While all these systems of child adoption are actively based on child 
welfare, there is continuing debate on whether the non-Western systems of law bestow full 
parenting rights similar to those that are operative under the Western model of child 
adoption. As earlier pointed out, Islamic law in particular forbids a situation where a child is 
severed from its kinship ties with its biological parents. Consequently, full rights granted to 
                                                          
48 O’Hallaran at pp 8 and 73 at note 13 above. 
49  Baymie, Rosen (note 20) above. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ishaque S., Islamic Principles on Adoption: Examining The Impact of Illegitimacy and Inheritance 
Concerns in Context of a Child’s Right to an Identity (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy 
and the Family pp 393 – 420. 
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adoptive parents will be deemed as completely inconsistent with the whole notion of what 
Islamic law considers as in the best interest of a child.52 
 
The refusal to provide full legal kinship rights to adoptive parents under non-Western rules 
such as Islamic law creates a major set-back for any infertility management plan that seeks 
to place child adoption as a primary management goal for tackling involuntary childlessness 
in the sub-Saharan African region. It is pointless to argue that infertile couples should 
actively pursue child adoption to resolve the pains of involuntary childlessness or that they 
should be made to bear the social burden of providing loving homes for less privileged or 
orphaned children with a home, if these non-Western rules which tend to be the predominant 
rules, that guide personal status and family life prevent them from exercising full parenting 
rights over non-biological children under their care. This may explain why there is not wide 
social acceptability that child adoption should be treated as the primary infertility 
management mechanism in a region of the world that is religiously and traditionally 
conservative. 
 
It is also important to point out that the prohibition on adoptive parents from assuming the 
role of full legal parents is entrenched in the legal rules under Islamic and customary family 
law rules that deal with issues such as the legal name change, inheritance, succession and 
property rights.53 Although the quasi-adoption structures provided under these systems allow 
for adoptive parents to provide for the maintenance of a child and to care for it just as its 
birth parents would have; they are excluded from enjoying key parenting rights such as given 
the child their family name54 or providing it with inheritance entitlements that normally would 
accrue to genetic (biological) children. This does not mean that they cannot provide property 
                                                          
52 Ibid, Ishaque at p 402 where it is stated that in tribal Arabia for example, a child’s interest is 
protected when there is a recognition of its lineage and kinship. 
53 Ibid, Ishaque at p 401. 
54 Ibid, Ishaque argues that guardians under the Kafalah system are forbidden from giving a child 
under their care their family name. This is because this will deprive a child of its original identity which 
is fundamental in Islam. 
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to children under their guardianship by a bequest in a will, but if they have not actively taken 
steps to do this and they die intestate, the right of their adopted children could be actively 
affected by other conflicting rights under customary or Islamic rules of family law.55  
 
If it is accepted that non-Western rules of Islamic law and indigenous customary law do not 
provide adoptive parents with a comprehensive regime of parenting rights such as the right 
to give a child a family name, bequeath inheritance or to treat an adoptive child at par with a 
biological child, what is left to consider in this chapter is to examine other rules in an African 
pluralistic system which operate on equal footing with Islamic and customary rules. These 
rules fall under statute law and the international treaties that have been ratified and 
transposed into domestic law by respective African states. The purpose of the examination 
of these rules is to consider whether these legal regimes provide involuntarily childless 
people with a more satisfactory model of child adoption that addresses their parenting 
needs. Some consideration of these rules have already been undertaken in the preceding 
chapter of this thesis. However, the analysis in the preceding chapter was done from the 
perspective of whether non-biological motherhood provides an infertile or involuntary 
childless woman with the same social status as her biological counterpart. The consideration 
of statutory child adoption in this chapter would be primarily undertaken from the perspective 
of whether child adoption in a pluralist system should be treated as the primary or sole 
means of infertility management in the Sub-Saharan African continent. A consideration of 
this issue begin below with an evaluation of the status of child adoption under International 
Law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
55 Ibid at p 407where it is stated that Islamic law permits a person during his lifetime to make a gift of 
one third of his or her assets to anyone related by blood or not but Islamic laws of inheritance is 
specific in restricting inheritance property to members of one’s biological family. See also p 411. 
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5.4  The Status of Adoptive Parents under International Law: An Examination of 
International Human Rights Law and International Conventions on Child 
Adoption 
 
It may be argued that there are relevant International Law rules which can be deployed to 
ameliorate or relieve involuntarily childless people from any untoward effect that non-
Western rules may have on the parenting rights under an African legal pluralistic framework. 
At the international level, several African states56, including those who operate pluralist legal 
systems are state parties to International Human Rights conventions such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)57 and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights (Banjul Charter).58 These international instruments recognise the 
right to family life59 and the freedom from discrimination60 which arguably are two primary 
rights that are affected by restrictions imposed by indigenous customary and Islamic legal 
rules that fail to recognise full parenting rights for adoptive parents. But the difficulty in 
pursuing this line of argument lies with the critical query on the extent to which International 
Human Rights rules such as the ICCPR or indeed the provisions of the African Charter 
actually provide for the right to family life?  
Even if they do, would the right to family life as construed in Article 18 of the African Charter 
(as the regional human rights instrument for Africa) allow for the right to found a family 
through the means of child adoption? This is relevant as it has been argued that other 
regional human rights regimes such as the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)61 provide for the right to marry and to 
                                                          
56 Further information on the ratification of the principal international and regional Human Rights 
treaties can be obtained from the United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights.  
57 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966. 
58 (Adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 
October 1986). 
59 Article 17 (ICCPR) and Article 18 (African Charter or Banjul Charter). 
60 Article 26(ICCPR) and Article 28 of the Banjul Charter. 
61 As amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14 Rome, 4. XI 1950. 
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found a family as contained in Article 12, and complemented by Article 8 which sets out the 
right to respect private and family life? 62 Yet case law from the European Court of Human 
Rights shows that both articles do not provide individuals with a right to adopt. In several 
cases such as X and Y v United Kingdom,63 Frette v France64 and E.B v France65 the ECHR 
refused to provide a favourable interpretation to article 8 that would permit a right to child 
adoption66  Further in X and Y v United Kingdom67, the Court ruled that article 12 could not 
be extended to include the right to adopt. It is said that the decision in E.B v France is a 
welcoming development since the court held that child adoption should not be refused on 
discriminatory grounds. It however refused to affirm that the ECHR permitted for a right to 
adopt under article 8.  More significantly as it relates to the concern of this thesis, the court 
of cassation held in Harroudj v France68 that France’s refusal to permit full legal adoption of 
a child living under Kafalah guardianship was not incompatible with articles 8 and 14 of the 
ECHR. The Harroudj case is interesting as it shows the growing recognition of the courts of 
the existence and application of non-Western rules of jurisprudence in a European nation.  
What is also interesting to note about this case is its recognition that Kafalah was one of the 
ways recognised in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child as safeguarding 
the rights of a child in a way similar to the western concept of child adoption. 69 Again, child 
adoption is viewed primarily from the perspective of best interest of the child and not 
necessarily from the perspective of meeting the parenting needs of a prospective adoptive 
parent. One of these parenting needs is the right to have a filial bond with a child. This in fact 
                                                          
62 But see Eljkhart M., The right to found a family as a still born right to procreate (2010) 18 (2) 
Medical Law Review 127 where it is argued that neither articles 8 or 10 lend themselves to this 
argument. 
63 (Application 7229/75) (1977) 12 DR 32 (EComHR). 
64 Rejected claims of a single homosexual man by precluding the right to adopt under article 8. 
65 October 2012, Application No.43546/02.   
66 The same applies in the US jurisdiction where the US constitution is seen as not providing a 
fundamental right to adopt. See Lindley for Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1989). 
67 See X and Y v United Kingdom (note 63) above. 
68 (Application No. 43631/09). 
69 Human Rights Europe, Court backs French Ban on Islamic ‘Kafala’ adoption, October 4, 2012 
available at http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2012/10/court-backs-french-ban-on-islamic-
%E2%80%98kafala%E2%80%99-adoption/ (accessed March 24, 2015). 
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was the reason why Mrs. Harroudj sought for the full adoption of the child that she had 
raised in Kafalah guardianship. Yet, based primarily on the principle of best interest of the 
child, the ECtHR did not see the need to treat the French national court’s refusal to grant full 
child adoption as incompatible with ECHR rights since the Kafalah system of guardianship 
protected the welfare of the child. 
 Harroudj therefore provides further food for thought for international health policy makers 
who are quick to advocate that child adoption should be treated as a primary mechanism for 
infertility management. As the Kafalah system of guardianship continues to gain a greater 
recognition and acceptance in different jurisdictions, including the industrialised West, it 
raises questions on why the institution of child adoption is still canvassed as the primary or 
sole mode of infertility management for involuntary childless couples.  This is a matter of 
concern when one considers that many couples will have their family structures governed 
not only by full child adoption that allows for filial bonding, but by religious and customary 
rules that forbid such filial bonds between an adoptive parent and the adopted child. 
If the ECHR human rights’ regime itself does not provide for a fundamental right to adopt, it 
raises a comparative point of interest on whether the regional human rights framework in 
Africa as set out in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights provides infertile 
couples within its jurisdiction with the right to adopt? If it does, the question arises as to the 
extent to which rights within the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights can negate 
the restrictions on child adoption as set out indigenous customary law and religious rules. 
Could it be argued that if the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights is domesticated 
into national law, it should prevail over these rules?70 It is worth noting however that the 
African Charter itself recognises the role that moral and traditional values play in the African 
society. For example, Article 1871  of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
                                                          
70 Evans M., Murray R., The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 
1986-2006 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 2008) pp 172 and 173. 
71 Particularly sub-article 2. 
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affirms that the family is the custodian of moral and traditional values that are recognised by 
the community. In this regard, the state has a duty to protect and assist the family in its role 
as the custodian of such values. It therefore can be argued that Article 18 of the African 
Charter on Human Rights will not exclude the application of religious or customary rules on 
child adoption since these rules can be said to be derived from the moral and traditional 
values of the community, which the foresaid article seeks to protect. However, some would 
contend that the wider provisions of Article 18, particularly its anti-discrimination regime of 
rights for women, children, the elderly and the disabled as set out under article 18(2) does 
not permit discriminatory practices in family life. To argue otherwise would amount to what 
some have argued as a ‘cynical misreading of the charter.’72  
 
There is however an uncertainty as to whether article 18 or other provisions of the African 
Charter can be used to canvass the right to adopt. Unlike the ECHR, where extensive case 
law has evolved to show that the right to adoption is not automatically founded as part of the 
right to family life under article 8 of the Convention,73 the same cannot be said for article 18 
of the African charter where there is a dearth of case-law on this point on child adoption 
issues, particularly at the level of the African Court of Human Rights74. There are however 
several decisions from the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights75 which 
provide for an interpretation of Article 18. The authoritative African Human Rights Case Law 
analyser database76 provides a list of the Commission’s decisions on the interpretation of 
Article 18 of the African Charter. These decisions are Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 
                                                          
72 Allison G., Powers S., Realizing Human Rights: Moving from Inspiration to Impact (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan: 2000) p 147. 
73  See X and Y v United Kingdom (note 63) and Frette v France (note 66) above. 
74 The Court was established under Article 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (the 
Protocol) adopted by Member States of the Organization of African Unity (OAU- predecessor body of 
the African Union) in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in June 1998.  
75 Inaugurated on November 2 1987 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
76 The database is jointly developed by the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa 
(IHRDA) and Human Rights Information and Documentation Systems (HURIDOCS). 
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& Interights v Egypt77 and Interights, ASDHO and Maître O. Disu/Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.78 Neither of these two cases focused on whether the right to family included the right 
to adopt. John K. Modise v. Botswana, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights79 
which is an earlier decision of the Commission on the right to family life also did not focus on 
child adoption. Rather the Commission’s decision addressed the concern on how the right to 
family life is impacted by the state in deportation proceedings. The Commission has also 
provided decisions on the Rights and Welfare of the Child further to the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the State.  One of its significant decisions on this issue is IHRDA 
and Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) (on behalf of children of Nubian descent in Kenya) 
v Kenya. 80This case dealt with the forceful conscription of Nubians in Kenya into the British 
army and the consequent refusal of the Kenya government to grant Kenyan citizenship to 
the children of Nubian descent. Again this decision does not address the issue on whether 
the right to family life includes the right to adopt. Due to the apparent dearth of case law from 
the African Commission on this matter, it remains unclear whether the right to family life 
under Article 18 of the African Charter does actually includes a binding right to adopt. 
 
The appraisal undertaken above shows that the ECHR and the African Charter on Human 
Rights do not expressly grant a right to adopt for the sole benefit of the infertile parent. 
However, unlike strict Islamic and customary African legal rules, this does not necessarily 
mean that when an application for child adoption is granted under international human rights 
instruments that the adoptive parents enjoy lesser parenting rights than child’s birth parents.  
An examination of jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights for example 
shows that upon the grant of a child adoption application, full parenting rights are granted to 
adoptive parents and that the Court would enforce the permanent new family created by the 
                                                          
77 323/06. 
78 274/03 et 282/03. 
79 Comm. No. 97/93 (2000). 
80 002/09. 
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adoption process.81  As stated above case law on this point under the African Charter is not 
developed on this point and it is unclear what the position of the African Court of Human 
Rights82 would be if a matter on child adoption is referred to it under Article 18 that deals with 
family life. 
 
Before examining some case study African national legislation on child adoption, this section 
of this chapter will consider if there are other human rights instruments that address the 
question on whether infertile couples have a binding right to adopt in order to meet their 
parenting needs. The principal international instruments to be considered as the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) 83 and the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child84. While the Hague Convention on Protection of Children 
and Co-operation of Intercountry Adoption85 is also a crucial international treaty, a discourse 
of this convention and particularly its focus on inter-country adoption does not form part of 
the scope of this chapter. This is because inter-country adoption does not form the focus of 
this chapter which is primarily concerned with whether child adoption is an effective 
mechanism for dealing with infertility challenges in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Both articles 20 and 21 of the UNCRC and article 24 of the African Charter on the Rights 
and the Welfare of the Child recognise child adoption on the paramount ground that it is in 
the best interest of the child. Again in focusing solely on the best interest of the child, it is 
doubtful whether these Conventions can be used to support the early traditional family law 
position where child adoption was created solely for the benefit of infertile people. It is 
arguable for example if adoptive parents can rely on Article 24 of the African Charter on the 
                                                          
81 See for example Kuijper v Netherlands (2005) 41 E.H.R.R. SE 16 a 17; Söderbäck v Sweden 
(2000) 29 EHRR 95. 
82 This court is said to complement the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights.  
83 General Assembly Resolution 44/25 of November 1989 entry into force 2 September 1990. 
84 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). 
85 Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption referred to as Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption. 
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Rights of the Welfare of the Child which requires state parties to provide parents and legal 
guardians with the assistance need to carry out child rearing responsibilities as a basis for 
the right to adopt or enjoy full parenting rights under child adoption. This is because a 
counter argument could be raised that strict Islamic law in its recognition of the institution of 
Kafalah or customary child adoption does not prohibit parents from effectively carrying out 
child rearing responsibilities and as such the state does not need to provide further 
assistance to infertile couples who employ these quasi-adoptive structures to rear children. 
This is because the international child rights regime so properly described does not set out 
to create rights for infertile parents outside its primary objective of protecting the best interest 
of a child. The rights of infertile persons to found a family is not considered therefore to be as 
fundamental as the overarching concern of catering for the best interest of a child. In this 
sense, it can be argued that the rights of infertile people have been subsumed within the 
broader policy concern of the best interest of the child.  
 
This is clearly demonstrated in the Harroudj86 case discussed above where the court saw no 
reason to grant full adoption that would have provided Mrs. Harroudj with the filial link she 
desired with the child as the court held that the  child’s best interest was already addressed 
in the Kafalah guardianship under Islamic law. The review of these international human 
rights treaties therefore shows that it is impractical to continue to argue that child adoption 
should serve as the primary infertility management mechanism in developing countries that 
practise a legally pluralist system of governance. The review of these treaties therefore 
suggests that the international rights regime is not as concerned as it is for the rights of 
infertile people as it is concerned with promoting the best interest of a child. 
 
What is left therefore for consideration in this chapter is whether the national statutory 
framework on child adoption in Sub-Saharan Africa provide adoptive parents with an 
                                                          
86 See Harroudj v France (note 68) above. 
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alternative regime of parenting rights outside the restrictive approach adopted by Islamic law 
and customary law. The basis of this investigation will be based on the child adoption 
legislation in Nigeria and South Africa. Judicial cases from these two countries have already 
formed some basis for the earlier discourse in this chapter. The following section of this 
chapter focuses on the legislative regimes of child adoption that apply in these countries  
with a view to determining whether it is right to continue to insist that child adoption should 
serve as the primary infertility management mechanism in this region of the world.  
 
5.5 The Status of Adoptive Parents under National Law: Case study Examples of 
National Legislation on Child Adoption 
Nigeria and South Africa have been chosen as case example countries to discuss the 
legislative framework on child adoption in Sub-Saharan Africa and whether this framework is 
fit for purpose in providing a suitable infertility management regime that caters for the 
parenting needs of infertile people in this sub- continent. As highlighted in chapter four of this 
thesis, Nigeria demonstrates the challenges of implementing a statutory regime on child 
adoption in a country that actively applies legal pluralism due to its diverse ethnic and 
religious make up. In addition, Nigeria is a country that faces over-population concerns as 
well as having a high prevalence of infertility. It therefore provides an interesting discourse 
on whether child adoption should be presented as the key infertility management option for 
involuntarily childless people within the Sub-Saharan African region.  
 
The legislative framework of South Africa also provides an interesting discourse as its early 
child adoption legislation were primarily developed during the apartheid regime for the 
benefit of ‘white people wanting to adopt white people’87 and as such were not applied to the 
indigenous populations. This however has changed due to the enactment of further national 
                                                          
87 Phiri S., Tolfree D., Family and Community Based Care for Children affected by HIV/AIDS: 
Strengthening the Frontline Response  in Foster G., Levine C., Williamson J., (eds.) A generation at 
risk: the global impact of HIV/AIDs on orphans and vulnerable children (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) 29. 
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legislation which has widened access to statutory child adoption to other non-white 
communities that constitute the bulk of the South African population.88 The widening of 
access to statutory child adoption to these communities offers useful insights on whether 
child adoption can be made ‘a truly beautiful and rewarding experience’89 for Sub-Saharan 
African infertile couples as argued by health specialists who canvass for child adoption to be 
treated as the primary mechanism for infertility management in the region. 
 
5.5.1 The Nigerian Child Rights Act 2003 
The question has been raised on whether there is a national legislative framework for child 
adoption in Nigeria. The historical development of the statutory framework for child adoption 
in the post-colonial Nigeria shows that child adoption was the subject of legislation first on a 
regional basis and thereafter on a state by state basis. The first known regional legislation 
after independence was the Adoption Law of 1965, of what used to be known, as the 
Eastern region of Nigeria.90 A similar enactment was adopted in Lagos State in 1968 with 
other state legislation following.91 It is significant to note that states within the Northern 
region failed to follow suit.92 The absence of state specific child adoption legislation in this 
region of Nigeria continues to hold sway, with the exception of Plateau and Nassarawa 
States. It is important to explain the reason for this lack of legislative effort on child adoption 
in Northern Nigeria. As earlier highlighted in chapter four of this thesis, the key ethnic 
groupings within the region of Nigeria are the Hausa-Fulanis who predominantly practice the 
Islamic faith. In line with their religious beliefs, they will rather practise guardianship 
structures such as Kafalah and not the full child adoption system conceived under received 
Western law.  
 
                                                          
88 Ibid. 
89 Toubia (note 6) above. 
90 Atojoko- Omovbude O., Adoption of Children in Nigeria: Practice and Procedure (Bloomington, 
AuthorHouse, 2011) p 25. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ojelabi O., Osamor P., Owumi B., Policies and Practices of Child Adoption in Nigeria: A Review 
Paper (2015) 6(1)1 Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences p 75 at p 77. 
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The impact that child adoption practised under received English Law has on the retention of 
the genetic ties between a child and its biological parents was offered as one of the reasons 
why law makers from Northern states actively opposed the passage of the Federal statute of 
the Child Rights Act 200393 and the right for it to be applied on a nationwide basis. 
Notwithstanding these objections, the National Assembly did enact the Child Rights Act 2003 
in furtherance of the international obligations that Nigeria had entered into by its ratification 
of international treaties on children rights such as the UNCRC.94  However, there is 
continuing debate on whether this piece of Federal legislation has universal domestic 
application in all states of the Federation of Nigeria.95 
 
This is because there are questions on whether the Federal legislature has the legislative 
competence to pass an Act of universal applicability on a matter which does not fall under its 
sole reserve as one of the matters contained in the exclusive list of the Nigerian 
Constitution.96 Further, it is argued that because Child rights is not included in the concurrent 
list which enables the Federal Government to legislate on matters concurrently with the 
states of the Nigerian Federation, the Child Rights Act is not automatically applicable to all 
states in Nigeria and each state will have to re-enact it if it is to have applicability within the 
state.97 Accordingly, despite the fact that section 273 of the Child Rights Act states that its 
provisions supersedes all previous laws that regulate child rights issues including child 
                                                          
93 Act No 26 of 2003. 
94 See for example Egede E., (2007) Bringing Human Rights Home: An Examination of the 
Domestication of Human Rights Treaties in Nigeria 51 Journal of African Law p 249 at p 250 where it 
is pointed out that Nigeria had earlier ratified these international instruments in 1991 and 2001 
respectively. The enactment into law was to comply with section 12 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution 
which requires international treaties to be implemented into Nigerian legislation before their provisions 
can legal effect under the Nigerian legal system.  
95 Ibraheem T., Adoption practice in Nigeria: An overview (2013) 19 Journal of Law, Policy and 
Globalization p 7 at p 8. 
96 Ibid. 
97 See the unedited version of the Committee on the Rights of the Child fifty-fourth session 
consideration of reports submitted by states parties under article 44 of the Convention 
CRC/C/NGA/CO/3-4, 11 June 2010 which urges constitutional reforms that will ensure that Child 
Rights is included within the concurrent list of the Nigerian Constitution. 
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adoption, it is questionable whether it can be enforced on the states in the Nigerian 
Federation that have refused to enact it.98  
 
However, some Nigerian Public International Law specialists99 query whether the Child 
Rights Act needs to be included in the concurrent list for it to have universal application in all 
parts of the country.  This is because the Child Rights Act domesticated the provisions of an 
international treaty, the UNCRC and as such the Federal Government under section 12 of 
the 1999 Constitution has the legislative powers to enact the Act. They argue that since the 
Act transposes the international obligations of the Nigerian State, it would have universal 
application upon all states in Nigeria.100 While this argument is certainly tenable, it is 
pertinent to note that the Committee on the Rights of the Child as recently as June 2010 still 
called for constitutional reforms to include Child Rights on the concurrent list of the 1999 
Nigerian constitution. This shows that there still remains some uncertainty on whether this 
Act can be considered as having universal application in Nigeria particularly in Northern 
Muslim states that have refused to re-enact it or if they have re-enacted the Act, they have 
refused to give full effect to its provision.101 
 
Notwithstanding these observations, it is correct to state that the Child Rights Act has 
domesticated inter alia article 20(2) of the UNCRC which requires state parties to the 
Convention to provide alternative care for children who are deprived of a family environment 
or who are in existing family environments not conducive to their best interests. The 
alternative care requirement set out in article 20 can be the system of child adoption or other 
guardianship structures such as foster parenting. Since the Nigerian Child Rights Act 2003 
was essentially enacted to comply with international obligations under the UNCRC, it has 
child welfare and the best interest of the child as the epicentre of its legislative objectives. 
                                                          
98 Ibid at paragraphs 7 and 52. 
99 See Egede E., above at note 94 at p 250. 
100  Ibid. 
101 See the unedited version of the Committee on the Rights of the Child fifty-fourth session 
consideration of reports (note 97) above at paragraph 7. 
 
 
 
182 
 
However, a close examination of the Nigerian Act establishes that it also implements other 
functions of legal adoption which includes providing adoptive parents with full parenting 
rights and responsibilities and establishing legal kinship between an adopted child and its 
adoptive parents. For example, section 125 (1)(C) of the Child Rights Act requires that the 
adoption services established by states and the Federal Government of Nigeria must not 
only cater for the needs the adopted child and its parents or guardians, but that these 
services should also cater for the needs of persons ‘who have adopted or may adopt a 
child’.102   
 
With regard to the first function that child adoption must cater for the best interest of the 
child, it can be argued that other systems of law operating under the Nigerian pluralistic 
system would have no difficulties with this objective since the Islamic system of Kafalah103 
and the customary guardianship under different variants of Nigerian indigenous law also 
recognize the need to provide a family environment to disadvantaged children.104 However 
as identified in earlier sections of this chapter, the difficulty lies with the other functions of 
child adoption as provided for example in section 141 of the Child Rights Act which vests 
adoptive parents with full parenting and kinship rights similar to those of biological parents. 
This as earlier highlighted explains why most of the States in the Northern region with a 
dominant Muslim population have not enacted state specific legislation related to the Federal 
Child Rights Act. This may be attributed to the Islamic stance that prohibits such legal 
kinship particularly those that sever its genetic links with its biological parents, including its 
right to retain their family name.105  
 
                                                          
102 Section 125 (1)(C) of the Child Rights Act 26 of 2003. 
103 Assim UM., Sloth- Neilson J., Islamic Kafalah as an Alternative Care Option for Children deprived 
of a Family Environment (2014) 14 African Human Rights Law Journal p 322 at p 327. 
104 Isiugo-Abanihe U., Child fosterage in West-Africa (1985) 11(1) Population and Development 
Review, 11 (1) p 53 at p 57. 
105 See Ibraheem at note 95 above at p 11. 
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The uncertainty as to the scope of the application of the Child Rights Act and whether it 
applies in all states of the country poses some significant implications for infertile couples. 
The key concern relates to couples who want to adopt in states that have not re-enacted the 
Nigerian Child Rights Act or who do not have provision for child adoption in their existing 
laws? Should they be content with adopting other guardianship options such foster parenting 
or the Kafalah system under Shariah law? Alternatively, can they pursue statutory adoption 
in the other states that allow for such mechanisms of adoption with full parenting rights?106 
This may create a situation of an internal conflict of laws which discussion is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Notwithstanding that this issue extends beyond this thesis, it does raise 
some provide interesting jurisdictional questions on the applicable choice of law and what 
court will have jurisdiction over the cause of action that may arise as a result of domestic 
inter -state adoptions.  
 
In conclusion, while it may be said that the introduction of the Nigerian Child Rights Act has 
made some definite strides in providing infertile people with a legal model of adoption that 
provides them with rights similar to those enjoyed by their counterparts with biological 
children, its current limitation lies with the scope of its application especially in states in 
Northern Nigeria with large Muslim populations. It is therefore unclear whether its provisions 
would radically alter or reform the restrictions placed in parts of the country where Islamic 
and customary law rules are applied in personal family life and the restrictions they place on 
a child adoption regime that supports legal kinship rights between an adoptive parent and an 
adopted child. 
 
5.5.2 The South African Legislative Approach to Child Adoption 
South Africa is a country in Sub-Saharan Africa that practices a mixed legal or pluralist 
system which provides equal footing of the customary law system of law with its statutory 
                                                          
106 It is however a positive development as pointed out by the 54th session of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child that as of June 2010, 24 states of the Nigerian Federation had so far enacted state 
specific laws on Child Rights. See Note 97 above at paragraph 3.  
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law.107 What makes South Africa an interesting case study example on whether adoption 
can be a suitable alternative that replaces the desire for infertile couples to have biological 
children is the high number of orphaned children that the country has due to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.108 This makes it a discussion site on the appropriateness of placing the social 
burden of parenting this category of children on involuntarily childless couples? Some have 
argued109 that child adoption is a viable model of care for HIV/AIDs child orphans in South 
Africa. While there may be some social science evidence on this, a pertinent question arises 
as to whether the legislative framework for child adoption in South Africa provides adequate 
incentives for involuntarily childless couples to take up parental responsibility of this group of 
vulnerable children in the care of the state, or who are destitute or in other forms of distress.  
 
The current South African legislative framework on child protection and care is contained in 
the Child Care Act 1983, the Children’s Act 2005 as well as the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa. General regulations110 regarding children under the Children Act 2005 were 
enacted in April 2010. The Children’s Act 2005 and the general regulations regarding child 
adoption set out the rights and duties of adoptive parents. Child adoption within the South 
African framework is recognised as a key model of child welfare, but unfortunately out of the 
1.5 estimated orphans and vulnerable children, only 1,913 adoptions were registered in 
2007-2008 under the Adoption Register of the Director General in the Department of Social 
Development.111  
 
                                                          
107 Rautenbach C., The Contribution of the Courts in the Integration of Muslim Law in the Mixed Fabric 
of South African Law in Koppel A., Matter M., Palmer V., Mixed Legal Systems, East and West 
(Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2014) p 226. 
108 The number of estimated children orphaned or in vulnerable circumstances were as of 2008 
estimated at 1.5 million. See the National Action Plan for Orphans and other Children made 
vulnerable by HIV and AIDS: South Africa 2009-2012 (Johannesburg: The Department of Social 
Development, 2009) p 3. 
109 Harber M.,Transforming adoption in the 'new' South Africa in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
(1999) 23 Adoption and Fostering 6. 
110 General Regulations Regarding Children in Terms of the Children’s Act, 2005 (Act No. 28 of 2005). 
111 Di Siena D., Jackson J., Adoption Law in South Africa, Eversheds, October 27, 2009. 
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The model of child adoption provided under the Children Act 2005 provides legal recognition 
of the permanent nature of new parenting ties between the adopted child and its adoptive 
parents. Section 229 (b) of the Act states that one of the two fold purposes of child adoption 
is to: 
 
‘Promote the goals of permanency planning by connecting children to other safe and 
nurturing family relationships intended to last a lifetime.’ 
 
Full provision of parenting rights and responsibilities are also envisaged in the model of child 
adoption under the Children’s Act 2005 as set out in Section 231(2) (a). Accordingly, it may 
be argued that the legislative framework on child adoption in South Africa provides infertile 
couples with adequate parental rights, including the right to provide the child with their family 
name which as discussed in previous sections of this thesis are censured in Islamic law and 
certain customary rules. If this is the case, then arguably the South African legislative model  
can be described as progressive regime of statutory rights for infertile people as well as 
meeting the child welfare objective of placing vulnerable children within nurturing family 
relationships intended to last for a last time as set out in section 229 (b) of the Children’s Act 
2005. However, the constitutional recognition of customary law within the South African 
Constitution, and the fact that customary law is given the same legal footing as statutory law 
raises questions on the full extent of the parenting rights that adoptive parents are entitled to 
under South African Law. Moreover, Section 240(1) of the Children’s Act also requires the 
court to take into account the religious and cultural background of a child when considering 
an adoption application.   
 
It therefore can be argued that although South Africa may not face the same complications 
that Nigeria faces in balancing religious rules with statutory rules; customary law will still play 
a role in the court’s decision on whether or not to grant an application for child adoption. 
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However, this may not pose so much concern because as pointed out in chapter four of this 
thesis, there is considered South African case law such as Maneli v Maneli112 and Kewena v 
Santam Insurance113 that establishes that customary child adoption provides legally 
enforceable rights under South African law. Notwithstanding the progressive nature of the 
South African legislative regime on child adoption; the regime like other child adoption 
regimes is a child centred regime and not a parent centred regime. Accordingly, an 
application for child adoption will normally be undertaken in the best interest of the child. 
This means that if the cultural background of the child is taken into consideration, then other 
forms of parenting such as kinship care which do not necessarily grant full kinship rights to 
adoptive parents may be seen as still serving the best interest of the child.114  
 
The emphasis on a child centred model of adoption may not pose too much of a concern in 
countries where infertility is not socially stigmatised. But in regions of the world where 
infertile and other involuntary childless people (particularly women) are social stigmatised, it 
is questionable whether it is appropriate to treat child adoption as an institution to primarily 
cater for the best interest of the child and not one that also caters for the needs of the 
infertile adoptive parents.   
 
This chapter therefore argues that it is time to introduce possible reforms to the legal 
framework on child adoption at both the international and national levels. It would be helpful 
if the reforms proposed introduce measures that ensure that the institution of child adoption 
not only serves the best interest of the child, but also the best interest of socially stigmatised 
involuntary childless people. Until these reforms are incorporated into the child adoption 
framework, it will be meaningless to treat child adoption at the primary form of infertility 
management in Africa or other parts of the developing world where legal pluralism thrives. 
                                                          
112 1993 (4) SA 771(TkA). 
113 2001 (3) SA 1142 (T). 
114 Martin P., Mbambo B., An exploratory study on the interplay between African customary law and 
practices and children’s protection rights in South Africa (South Africa, Save the Children, 2011). 
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To do so will place an inequitable social burden on the involuntary childless in the region, 
especially when the legal system in which they operate does not give them a complete 
guarantee that they can have full parenting rights over such children in family structures 
where customary and religious rules also apply.   
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The focus of this chapter has been to consider whether child adoption can serve as the 
primary infertility management mechanism in legally pluralistic systems in developing 
regions of the world such as Sub-Saharan Africa. In doing so, it explored the status of child 
adoption under African customary law, as well as under religious legal rules such as Islamic 
law. In the case of customary law, it argues that, even where there is recognition of child 
adoption, there is still some uncertainty on the full nature of rights that it creates for the 
individual adoptive parent or whether the customary law recognition of child adoption in 
those cases relates more to the agnatic right of the clan to take care of its own?  The chapter 
also considered Shariah law which plays a key role in the personal status and family law in 
many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The appraisal of this system showed that in its purist 
form, Shariah law does not recognise a system of child adoption that severs the legal kinship 
between a child and its biological parents. Moreover, Islamic law and to some extent 
customary law, also restricts both the rights of adopted parents and adopted children in 
matters of succession and inheritance. While the Kafalah system of taking care of 
disadvantaged children is a definitive positive as lauded by many scholars, it does not fully 
address the parenting needs and desires of involuntary childless women, particularly their 
desire to share their family name with the child under their guardianship 
 
Since this is the case, this chapter queried why there is fixation amongst policy makers for 
the infertile in Africa to bear the social burden of parenting vulnerable children like children 
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who have become orphaned as a result of the HIV/AIDS epidemic or war conflicts in the 
continent? Further, it questioned whether child adoption should be placed at the forefront of 
infertility management, instead of widening access to fertility treatment, as has been so 
forcibly argued in some policy quarters. 
 
It recommends that if policy-makers still seek to present child adoption as a key alternative 
to involuntary childlessness in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, then significant legal 
reforms both at the international and national level will have to be made to the current child 
adoption regime which it argues is not fit for purpose in meeting the parenting needs of 
childless adults within the region. The reforms required must address the conflict of rights (or 
lack of rights) that involuntary childless adults face in a legal pluralistic Sub-Saharan African 
state. Moreover, the reforms must provide a balancing regime that not only focuses on the 
best interest of the child but also recognises that in regions, where the infertile are socially 
stigmatised, more needs to be done to create a parallel system of protection that also 
focuses on the best interest of a vulnerable infertile adopting parent. 
 
Notwithstanding the reforms suggested to make the child adoption process more attractive 
to childless adults in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is still no getting away from the fact that until 
cultural and social attitudes which promote the stigmatisation of infertility are changed, child 
adoption can never replace the deep rooted need for childless couples to have biological 
children of their own. Accordingly, the case for widening access to reproductive treatment for 
such groups of people rather than being diminished becomes more critical in regions, where 
there is still significant social pressure on the infertile to have children before they are 
afforded full social status and acceptance in their community. The next chapter will therefore 
consider if there is a legally recognised right to universal access to reproductive health care 
and whether this right can be deployed to support the case for widening access to affordable 
health care for involuntarily childless people within the region.
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Chapter Six 
Universal Access to Reproductive Health Care and the Case for Widening Access to 
Affordable Reproductive Technologies in Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
 6.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers whether there is a legally binding right to universal access to 
reproductive health care. It will also consider whether the right if it exists includes access to 
affordable fertility treatment in developing regions of the world. It will further explore whether 
this right is realisable in low resourced and densely populated regions of the world such as 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
Health care providers, until recently did not consider infertility in Africa and other parts of the 
developing world as a major health issue that required public health expenditure. Where 
available, infertility treatment, using assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) was normally 
offered to patients through the private sector. However, more awareness has been created 
on the deleterious health and socio-economic effects that infertility has on women within this 
region. This led to recommendations from the World Health Organisation (WHO) that 
infertility should be treated as a global public health issue with greater attention being given 
to widening access to safe and affordable infertility treatment to developing countries.1  In 
response to this, the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) 
inaugurated a special task force2 on widening access to low cost ARTs in the developing 
world, including countries in the sub-Saharan African region. Private initiatives, notably the 
                                                          
1. Vayena E., et al. eds., Current practices and controversies in assisted reproduction. (Geneva, 
World Health Organization, 2002) 404 pp. 
2 European Society for Human Reproduction (ESHRE). Task force for infertility in developing 
countries. Available at: http://www.eshre.eu/Specialty-groups/Task-Forces/Task-Force-Developing-
Countries-and-Infertility.aspx (accessed on July 15 2015).  
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Walking Egg Foundation have also been established to facilitate wider access to infertility 
care in the developing world. 3 
The proponents of these initiatives have underpinned these efforts on Goal 5 of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which provides for universal access to reproductive 
health care by the year 2015.4 These infertility specialists argue that Goal 5 of the MDGs 
should not only cover access to abortions and contraceptives but also the right to fertility 
treatment for the childless. They however5 accept that there is little or no mention in the legal 
literature to confirm whether there is a legally binding right to universal access reproductive 
health care that encapsulates access to ARTs. In order to facilitate wider access to 
affordable ARTs, these clinicians have medicalised the social stigmatisation of involuntary 
childlessness in developing countries and considered infertility in these parts of the world to 
be treated as a global reproductive health problem.6 It is therefore necessary to begin this 
chapter with a discussion on the recent efforts to medicalise the social construction of 
involuntary childlessness in the developing world. 
6.2 The Medicalisation of the Social Construction of Involuntary Childlessness 
Infertility is normally said to occur when a couple seeking to have children have had 
continuous sexual intercourse without contraception for a period of time without achieved the 
desired pregnancy. Normally the period of time is calculated between twelve months to two 
years. 7 Other fields outside medicine such as the field of population studies would like to 
see a longer extension of the baseline as to when people can be considered to be infertile.8 
                                                          
3 Ombelet W., The Walking Egg Project: Universal access to infertility care – from dream to reality 
(2013) 5(2) Facts Views Vis Obgyn. pp 161–175. 
4 Ibid at p162. 
5 Ombelet, 2013 (note 3) above at p 163; Ombelet W., Global access to infertility care: The Walking 
Egg Project (2014) Facts Views Vis Obgyn pp 1-3. 
6 Ombelet, 2013 (note 3) above at p 162. 
7 DHS Comparative Reports ‘Infecundity, Infertility, and Childlessness in Developing Countries’ 
(Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2004) p 3. 
8 See for example Mascarenhas M., Cheung H., Mathers CD., Stevens GA., Measuring Infertility in 
Populations: constructing a standard definition for use with demographic and reproductive health 
surveys (2012) 10(17) Population Health Metrics page 3 where the study sets the measurable 
baseline for determining primary and secondary infertility at five (5) years. 
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The desire of population experts to extend the baseline for infertility is to some extent based 
on Malthusian9 concerns to do with overpopulation in the developing world. While there may 
be justifiable policy considerations for setting a base time line as to when a person can be 
considered as infertile, such definitions should not ignore the fact that women can culturally 
be defined as ‘barren’ and ‘unproductive’ by their families and communities long before the 
baseline period provided by the clinical and demographics definitions on what constitutes 
infertility.   
In some extreme situations in Nigeria, the site of investigation for thesis, members of the 
extended family, friends and other members of the community have been known to suggest 
that there is infertility when there has not been pregnancy within a year of marriage. This 
issue is so graphically described by Osagie10 as follows: 
‘In Nigeria, a wife is supposed to be pregnant even before the wedding day, or at 
least within the first year of marriage. If she has the misfortune of not being pregnant 
within this time frame, she is in a whole lot of trouble, especially with her mother-in-
law who will complain to whoever will care to listen that her son has married a man 
like himself.’ 
In such cases, well-meaning observers will counsel or badger infertile couple to take 
proactive measures to deal with infertility as quickly as possible. This is largely due to the 
social cultural construction that the primary goal of marriage is to reproduce and that any 
delay in achieving this goal should be addressed as quickly as possible. In this sense the 
approach adopted by population experts to extend the base line for determining when a 
person can be considered as infertile to five years ignores the socio-cultural context in which 
these individuals live.  
                                                          
9 Obono O., Life Histories of Infertile Women in Ugep, Southern Nigeria (2004) 19(2) African 
Population Studies p 63. 
10 Osagie C., The Man from Africa: The Cultural Differences Experienced by an African Immigrant 
Living in the United States (Bloomington, IUniverse: 2011) p 3. 
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However as highlighted in preceding sections of this thesis, there is now a growing 
appreciation in the international public health community of the social construction of 
involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa and what it means to be infertile in this 
region of the world.11This may explain why there has been an increasing drive on the part of 
public health specialists to medicalise the problem of involuntary childlessness. This drive to 
medicalise the problem of involuntary childlessness and to treat it as a major health 
condition is particularly critical to decisions that govern the allocation of state resources. 
Some argue that due to the social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness, there is a 
justifiable case for arguing that state funding should be made available to treat the condition 
of involuntary childlessness in cash strapped states with limited resources.12 They further 
canvass that involuntary childlessness should not just been perceived as the failure to 
achieve a social desire to procreate but one which is a public health condition requiring 
medical care. 13 
This is because if involuntary childlessness is merely seen as a social construction and not 
as a medical condition that is deserving of reproductive health treatment, then cash strapped 
states may argue that childless couples should adopt rather than the state having to fund 
their fertility treatment. However while child adoption may provide some parenting relief, as 
chapter five of this thesis has shown, legal pluralistic societies that practise non-Western 
rules such as Shariah law and indigenous customary rules makes it difficult for child 
adoption to be considered as the primary means of infertility management in these 
jurisdictions. This is because of the reluctance of such norms to allow for a complete legal 
severance of the genetic ties between a child and its biological parents.14 
Another aspect of the social construction of involuntary childlessness which may have also 
contributed to the increasing drive to medicalise infertility and involuntary childlessness in 
                                                          
11 See Vayena 2002 (note 1) above of this chapter. 
12 Vayena E., Rowe PJ., Peterson HB., Assisted reproductive technology in developing countries: why 
should we care? (2002) 78 Fertility and sterility pp 13–15. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See chapter five of this thesis. 
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the developing world is the African communitarian concept that individuals are meant to 
provide procreative value to their societies. This is a point that Hellum15 considers in her 
work. She argues that in African traditional communities like the one she undertook field 
work in; marriage is embedded with procreative obligations which arise from the bride price 
that has been paid by the groom’s extended family when a marriage is contracted. In this 
sense, when individuals particularly women are unable to procreate, they are perceived as 
having morally failed their families and communities.   It is this moral sense of failure to the 
community that triggers the social stigmatisation of infertility.  
Accordingly, owing to a better understanding of the procreative obligation that individuals are 
presumed to owe to their communities, public health bodies have doubled their efforts to 
medicalise what arguably could be considered as a socially constructed problem. Some in 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) have pragmatically pointed out that the social stigma 
associated with involuntary childlessness requires some intervention by states to provide 
wider access to ART services.16 They see this as a way to alleviate the social suffering that 
involuntary childless people face as a result of their inability to reproduce in pronatalist 
societies. 
6.3 Infertility and Involuntary Childlessness as Public Health Conditions 
To provide a better sense on why there is a growing medicalisation of the condition of 
involuntary childlessness in the developing region of the world, it is necessary to provide 
some perspectives on the definitions of ‘public health’ and ‘health.’ There are several varying 
definitions on what constitutes public health and its core objectives. The Institute of Medicine 
                                                          
15 See Hellum A., Stewart J., Women's Human Rights and Legal Pluralism in Africa: Mixed Norms and 
Identities in Infertility Management in Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe: Mond Books, 1999). pp 141-144. 
16 Butler P., Assisted Reproduction in Developing Countries: Facing up to the issues (2003) 63 
Progress (Geneva, World Health Organisation) p 2. 
 
 
 
194 
 
(IOM) for example in its landmark study the Future of Public Health17 explains that the key 
objective of public health is: 
‘Fulfilling society’s interest in assuring conditions in which people can be healthy.’  
What stands out so clearly in the IOM definition is that promoting health is a collective 
societal responsibility. Further, it suggests that it is in the interest of society to endeavour to 
provide conditions that assures the health of those who live in it. Yet, it is important to note 
that the IOM explanation on the objective of public health does not provide a definition for 
health. For this definition, recourse is made to the preamble of the 1948 constitution of the 
World Health Organisation (WHO)18 which defines health as: 
‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity.’ 
This definition has been criticised as being too broad and opaque.19 Further it has been 
argued that the focus on complete well-being has led to the ‘medicalisation of society.’ 20 
However the definition is still considered to be valid as it is yet to be amended or replaced by 
the WHO or a body that is comparable to its authority.21 It is therefore considered to be the 
most authoritative definition on health. 22 The utilisation of the WHO definition of health is 
specifically relevant to this thesis particularly from its well-being perspective. This is because 
the WHO definition requires the health of the individual to be holistically conceived as 
embodying the physical, mental and social well-being of the individual. 
                                                          
17 IOM, The Future of Public Health (Washington, National Academic Press, Winslow, CEA 1988) 
untitled field of public health. 
18 Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the International 
Health Conference, New York, 19-22 June, 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 
States (Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on 7 
April 1948. 
19 Callahan D., 'The WHO Definition of Health" (1973) 1(3) Hastings Center Studies p 77. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Huber M et al How should we define health (2011) British Medical Journal 343:d4163 
22 See for example Guidotti T., Health and Sustainability: An Introduction (New York, Oxford 
University Press: 2015) 23. 
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On grounds of achieving holistic well-being of the individual, it can be argued that there is a 
health objective of widening access to ARTs in developing regions of the world. This is 
because the provisioning of such service may not only provide the involuntary childless with 
more prospects of achieving a desired pregnancy, but would also lessen the mental and 
social anguish they experience as a result of their inability to conceive. The same broad 
based concept of health as constituting total well-being is also enshrined in WHO documents 
that deal with reproductive health and in the International Conference on Population and 
Development’s programme of action.  
Reproductive health is defined by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as: 
 ‘A state of physical, mental, and social well-being in all matters relating to the 
reproductive system, at all stages of life’.23 
Similarly, the International Conference on Population and Development paints a holistic 
picture of what reproductive health should constitute below. 
‘People are able to have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the 
capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when, and how often to do so. It 
also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and 
personal relationships, and not merely counselling and care related to reproductive 
and sexually transmitted diseases.’ 24 (Emphasis mine). 
Yet, it is important to note that WHO in its clinical definition defines infertility as covering 
‘diseases of the reproductive system defined by the failure to achieve a clinical pregnancy 
after 12 months or more of regular unprotected sexual intercourse.’ 25  In limiting infertility to 
                                                          
23 WHO Interpreting Reproductive Health – ICDP +5 Forum, The Hague, Netherlands, 8-12 February 
1999. 
24 International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994, paragraph 7.2). 
25 Rowe P.J., Comhaire F.H., Hargreave T.B., Mellows H.J., WHO Manual for the Standardized 
Investigation and Diagnosis of the Infertile Couple. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 
1993); Zegers-Hochschild F., Adamson GD., de Mouzon J., Ishihara O., Mansour R., Nygren K., 
Sullivan E, van der Poel S: The International Committee for Monitoring Assisted Reproductive 
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diseases of the reproductive system, this clinical definition provided by WHO appears to 
have ignored the equally important aspects of its other definition on reproductive health 
which ‘include mental and social well-being in all matters relating to reproductive health.’26  
This narrow definition of what constitutes infertility has led to the use of involuntary 
childlessness. As discussed in chapter two of this thesis, unlike infertility in its narrow sense, 
involuntary childlessness is not confined to a physical disease of the reproductive system. It 
is a condition that can occur when a person who is reproductively capable is unable to do so 
due to an underlining condition of a spouse or partner. This is why as pointed out chapter 
two of this thesis, involuntary childlessness has been utilised to explain the social 
stigmatisation of the inability to have children. This is because in many cases, shrouded 
male infertility may be the underlining cause of involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and yet it is the woman who is considered to be infertile and unproductive. 
Paradoxically, this point has been raised by radical feminist thinking to argue against the 
case for widening of reproductive technologies which they view as ‘public sanctioned 
violence against women.’27  These feminists have argued that it is wrong to subject women 
who are not medically infertile to invasive fertility treatment when the root cause of their state 
of childlessness has to do with underlining male infertility. While this thesis shares some of 
the concerns of this feminists about the negative feminisation of infertility, it does not 
subscribe to the view that women who autonomously submit to such treatment are 
necessarily exposed to public sanctioned violence.  In this case it could be argued that these 
women are exercising an autonomous reproductive decision to access ART services which 
may help them to achieve a desired pregnancy. This aligns with the ICPD definition of 
reproductive health especially its emphasis on reproductive autonomy. It is therefore 
inconceivable to treat such autonomous reproductive decisions as state sanctioned violence. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Technology (ICMART) and the World Health Organization (WHO) Revised Glossary on ART 
Terminology, 2009. (2009) 24(11) Hum Reprod pp 2683–2687. 
26 See WHO Interpreting Reproductive Health (note 23) above. 
27 Raymond J., Women as Wombs: Reproductive technologies and the battle over women’s freedom. 
(Melbourne: Spinifex, 1995) ix. 
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Instead, the ability to access ART services that could help in achieving a desired pregnancy 
can be regarded as one of the ways in which women can express reproductive autonomy 
especially if they have been scapegoated by their community as being responsible for the 
state of childlessness in their family.   
6.4 Involuntary Childlessness and the Allocation of Scarce Resources in Reproductive 
Health Care 
The importance of making a distinction between the narrow clinical construction of infertility 
and the broader definition of involuntary childlessness is also important when decisions are 
to be made on how scarce public resources for reproductive health care should be allocated 
in developing countries.  While there have been positive developments in medicalising the 
inability to have children, the pertinent question arises on whether public funding for infertility 
treatment should be restricted to those who have a clear disease of the reproductive disease 
or whether such funding should be extended to other groups of reproductively capable 
individuals. For example, some may argue that those who have normal reproductive 
functions, but choose not to follow the natural process of having children as a result of their 
sexual orientation should not be allowed to access scarce public resources to achieve their 
reproductive goals.  Yet, in many liberal Western countries, the idea that people can be 
denied access to fertility treatment on grounds of sexual orientation is increasingly becoming 
inconceivable due to the development of an equality rights regime that safeguards the rights 
of sexual minorities.28  
This is because the equality rights regime in such jurisdictions has made it discriminatory to 
refuse to provide ARTs on grounds of sexual orientation. Arguments have been raised that 
sexual minorities should be allowed to access ARTs since they like other individuals have 
                                                          
28 De Wert G et al ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 23: Medically Assisted Reproduction in 
Singles, Lesbian and Gay Couples, and Transsexual People.’ (2014) 29(9) Human Reproduction, p 
1859 at p1860; Penning G., Ethical issues in fertility treatment (2012) 26 Best Practice & Research 
Clinical Obstetrics and Gynaecology 853–863. 
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the right to express their procreative liberty. 29 This is because the expression of procreative 
liberty is seen as an ‘important element of the autonomy of ‘individual’ persons.’30 Although 
this thesis is not focused on the rights of sexual minorities, the use of the equalities regime 
to facilitate wider rights for this group does offer some useful lessons on how equal 
citizenship31 and procreative liberty can be utilised to strengthen the rights of involuntarily 
childless people in developing parts of the world.  
Based on grounds of equal citizenship and procreative liberty, it is questionable why 
involuntary childless people in the developing world should not be allowed to pursue their 
procreative goals through the widening of access to affordable reproductive technologies. 
The concept of equity of health would require that if other groups such as sexual minorities 
are allowed to access public funding for fertility treatment on grounds of equal citizenship 
and procreative liberty, the same rights should also apply to involuntary childless people in 
developing regions of the world. This is particularly critical when consideration is given to the 
social stigmatisation that they face in such regions of the world. On health equity and social 
justice grounds, it does seem inequitable to require involuntary childless people in the 
developing world to rely solely on child adoption or other non-biological parenting needs to 
meet their parenting needs when there are medical facilities that could enable them 
achieved a desired pregnancy.  
This however presupposes that there are justifiable social justice grounds to canvass for the 
prioritisation of the health needs of the involuntary childless in the developing world. Social 
justice has been described as ‘the judicious treatment of inequalities of all kinds’.32 The 
notion of social justice is inextricably connected to the distribution and allocation of 
resources, including the provisioning of health care. There are a number of theories that 
have been canvassed to argue for a social justice case for the provisioning of scarce health 
                                                          
29 Ibid, De Wert G., at p 1860. 
30 Ibid. 
31Ibid. 
32 Brian B., Why Social Justice Matters (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005) pp 7-8. 
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care resources. Key among these theories are the needs based justice theory advanced by 
Miller33 and the Rugers’ health capability theory.34  Millers’ needs based justice is premised 
on the notion of ‘each according to his need.’35 Miller however accepts the difficulty of 
distributing resources based solely on a needs basis especially in situations of relative 
scarcity. He also argues that the differences in cultural identities and growing globalisation 
may also make it difficult to prioritise resources on a needs basis.36 Despite these concerns, 
Miller maintains that there is still some place for the needs based justice theory as it does in 
its own way help to foster consistency in the treatment of individuals and groups. 
Similarly, Rugers’ health capability theory advocates an ‘ethical demand for equity in 
health’.37 Her health capability theory seeks to ensure that the right to health as enshrined in 
international rights instruments is used to obliterate what she considers as ‘unconscionable 
health inequalities’38 in the world. Although Rugers focuses on the reduction of health 
morbidity, her health capability theory appears to have been deployed by public health 
specialists in the field of reproductive health care who seek to reduce what they conceive to 
be health inequalities in the provisioning of ARTs in the developing world. They argue that 
infertility and involuntary childlessness should be regarded as a global public health 
condition.39  Prioritising these conditions as public health issues is seen as a key way of 
dealing with the social stigmatisation of infertile and involuntary people in pronatalist regions 
of the world. 
Yet in canvassing for the right to allocate resources to enable individuals achieve a desired 
pregnancy on social justice and health equity grounds, there are still difficult questions to 
answer. The most important is whether there is a binding right to reproduce that is supported 
                                                          
33 Miller D., Principles of Social Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999, 2001) pp 203- 
206. 
34 Ruger J., Health Capability: Conceptualization and Operationalization. (2010) 100(1) American 
Journal of Public Health pp 41-49.   
35 Miller (note 33) at p 203.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Ruger J., Toward a Theory of a Right to Health: Capability and Incompletely Theorized Agreements 
(2006) 18 Yale Journal of Law and Humanities. p 273 at 278.  
38 Ibid. 
39  See Ombelet (note 5) above. 
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by the law? Even if the WHO holistic definition of reproductive health suggests a broad 
based sense of reproductive health and well-being, does this automatically entitle individuals 
with the positive right to reproduce?  In other words, should state or public resources 
particularly in poor resourced states in developing regions of the world such as Sub-Saharan 
Africa be allocated to fund a right to reproduce? This concern will be addressed below. 
6.5 An Appraisal of the Right to Reproduce 
The question on whether there exists a binding right to reproduce has always been a heated 
topic of debate. Those in the school of procreative liberty like Robertson40 will suggest that 
there is a right to reproduce. However, while Robertson is a strong advocate of procreative 
liberty, it interesting to note that he does not necessarily accept that the right to reproduce is 
a right that will permit state funding of procreative goals.41 His arguments that procreative 
liberty should be funded at the private level and not through scarce state funding or public 
insurance fund like Medicare has been criticised. Dorothy Roberts for example42 is 
particularly critical of Robertson’s position especially from a race and class perspective. She 
queries why procreative liberty and access to ART services as espoused by Robertson 
should be limited to the rich and middle class who in most cases are from a privileged racial 
group.43 On grounds of social and distributive justice, she calls for more efforts to be 
undertaken to facilitate greater access to ARTs by including them in public funded insurance 
schemes such as Medicare.44 It is critical to note that Roberts does not necessarily 
disapprove of reproductive or procreative liberty or the right to reproduce. Rather what she 
finds reprehensible is the notion that it should be restricted only to a small group of people 
from a particular race.  
                                                          
40 Robertson J., Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press: 1996) 281 pp. 
41  Ibid at p 116 and 117 
42 Roberts D., Race and the New Reproduction (1996) 47 Hastings Law Journal p 935. 
43 Ibid at p 937. 
44 Ibid at p 944. 
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Robertson’s explanation for not placing access to IVF on public insurance funding such as 
Medicare borders on prioritisation of health needs appears to be premised on the 
prioritisation of scarce resources. He argues that the high rate of infertility among the poor 
had to do with poverty, poor nutrition and infectious diseases. Consequently, he queries the 
rationality of treating infertility as a disease requiring public funded treatment when arguably 
on the scale of prioritisation, it would be better to use these scarce resources to treat other 
life threatening diseases of the poor. 45  Again Roberts responds to this on social justice 
grounds that focus on the concern of minimising inequalities between the different classes of 
society. She does however accept that poor disadvantaged ethnic minorities may be best 
served by tackling the conditions that led to their infertility in the first place.46  
The Robertson/Roberts debate on the merits and demerits of procreative liberty raises some 
interesting issues on widening access of affordable ARTs in developing regions of the world 
such as Sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, there are legitimate concerns that regions of 
Africa where there is such a high infertility belt will be best served through the allocation of 
scarce resources towards tackling the causes of infertility such as sexually transmitted 
diseases (STDs). This is the argument that scholars such as Okonofua47 have raised against 
the case for widening access to ARTs in Sub-Saharan Africa.  As earlier stated, this is also 
coupled with Malthusian concerns that widening access to ARTs in the developing world will 
exacerbate further the demographical concern of over-population.48 This is a point that is 
actively discussed by Roberts in her response to Robertson’s theory of procreative liberty. 
She points to the fact that the disadvantaged ethnic minorities in America are stereotyped as 
                                                          
45 Robertson (note 40) at p 117. 
46 On this point, she and Robertson appear to be in agreement. See N 42 above at p 948. 
47  Okonofua F., ‘The case against new reproductive technologies in developing countries’ (1996) 103 
British Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology p 957. 
48 Obono (note 9) above. 
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contributing to excessive population growth and this may explain why there is a reluctance to 
provide them with access to ARTs.49  
From a social justice perspective, Roberts again criticises a situation where the provisioning 
of ARTs reinforces what she describes as ‘the disparate values placed on members of social 
groups.’50 This disparity or divide between the social groups in America is akin to health 
equity concerns raised against the disparity of the provisioning of ARTs between the 
industrialised North and the developing South of the global community. Some particularly in 
the international public health field have argued that there should be the closing of the gap of 
the disparity between the provisioning of ART facilities in these two broad regions of the 
world.51 Yet, this issue has to be discussed within the context of the continuing debate on 
whether there is a legal right to reproduce. 
Chief among the works on this issue is Shanner’s discourse on the right to procreate.52  She 
queries whether there is a right a reproduce and opines that: 
‘framing procreative decisions in terms of rights claims is a problematic ethical 
project, which in turn creates difficulties for the articulation and establishment of legal 
procreative rights.’ 
This is because human rights law and other specialisms of law make a clear distinction 
between negative and positive rights. Early works such as Kant53 characterise negative 
rights (or liberty rights) focus on the rights of individuals to be free from interference with 
their activities in a certain area. This could include the right to be free from state or other 
third party interference in matters to do with procreation. These acts of interference could 
                                                          
49 Roberts (note 42) above at p 941. See also Shanley ML., Infertility, Social Justice and Equal 
Citizenship in McClain LC., Grossman JL., Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women’s Equal 
Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at p 328. 
50 Ibid at p 944. 
51 See Ombelet’s works for example in notes 3 and 5 above. 
52 Shanner L., The Right to Procreate: When Rights Claims Have Gone Wrong (1995) 40 McGill Law 
Journal. 823. 
53 See further discussions in works like Fullesdal A., Reidar M., Kantian Theory and Human Rights 
(New York, Routledge, 2014) 210 pp.  
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include forced sterilisation. These liberty rights are recognised as binding and enforceable 
rights in most national laws and international human rights instruments. However the case 
cannot be said of positive rights or welfare rights. These rights may ‘require others to take 
action or to provide means or resources, not simply to refrain from interfering.’ 54  
In terms of whether individuals should be able to access reproductive health care, Shanner 
argues that the concept of rights in claims for reproductive health care should only be limited 
to non-interference rights such as the freedom to free from forced sterilisation and abortion.55  
She however accepts that a woman’s claim to abortion is not just limited to a forbearance 
(negative) right but also consists of some elements of positive rights. She however attempts 
to provide some justification for why abortion should be funded by state resources as 
opposed to infertility treatment. She argues that unlike her counterpart who seeks an 
abortion treatment to restore her forbearance right of not sharing her body with a fetus, the 
infertile woman who seeks public funding for fertility treatment is primarily seeking for a 
welfare (positive) right and not for the enforcement or protection of a forbearance (negative) 
right. On the other hand, the woman who seeks to abort a fetus seeks to be restored back to 
her forbearance right of not sharing her womb with a third party (the fetus). She therefore 
concludes that considerations of the prioritisation resources should come into play when 
considering whether to support a welfare right claim to fertility treatment. 
This thesis strongly differs from this viewpoint raised by Shanner for a number of reasons. It 
subscribes more broadly with the works of Cook56 and Dillard57  who adopt a more nuanced 
approach on whether positive (welfare) rights claims to fertility treatment should be 
supported in the same way as when a woman seeks for an abortion. Dillard for example 
                                                          
54 Lo B., Resolving Ethical Dilemmas (Philadelphia: Walter Kluwer, 2013) p 115. 
55 See Shanner (note 52) above from pp 840 -843. 
56 Cook R., International Human Rights and Women's Reproductive Health (1993) 24 Studies in 
Family Planning 73, Cook R., ‘International Protection of Women's Reproductive Rights’ (1992) 24 
N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 645. Cook’s work is discussed in Shanner’s article, see for example page 835. 
57 Dillard C., Rethinking the Procreative Right (2007) 10(1) Yale Human Rights and Development 
Journal p 1. See also Shanley, (note 49) above at pp 329-330 where she argues on social justice 
grounds for the right to assistance for family formation.   
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accepts Robertson’s notion of procreative liberty that permits an individual to take steps to 
reproduce but qualifies it by arguing that any such right to reproduce must always be for the 
public good.58 She argues that one of the key determinants on whether the right to 
reproduce should be permitted on grounds of public good, is the question on whether it is 
central to human personhood. This particular point of the right to reproduce being central to 
human personhood is a matter that requires further consideration. 
In discussing this point further, recourse is made again to Shanner’s article which sets the 
reasons why welfare rights to fertility treatment should not be encouraged in the same way 
as the funding of abortion services. Her major argument hinges on the fact that the refusal to 
publicly fund fertility treatment would not infringe a forbearance or non-interference right in 
the same way that it would if a woman is denied the right to abort a fetus.59 The difficulty with 
Shanner’s proposition is that it is appears to be premised on a Western understanding of the 
role that procreation plays in the centrality of human personhood. Her argument appears to 
be premised on the social realities of the industrialised West where infertility and involuntary 
childlessness are not necessarily socially stigmatised in the same way as other parts of the 
world.  
The earlier chapters of this thesis have sought to demonstrate through an analysis of the 
body of literature that the condition of infertility and involuntary childlessness is socially 
stigmatised in developing parts of the world such as Sub-Saharan Africa. It will therefore be 
wrong to argue that the denial of fertility treatment to women in pronatalist regions of the 
world would not impact on a forbearance or negative right. It can be argued that forbearance 
rights such as the right to human dignity and the right to be free from discrimination and 
inhumane treatment are infringed when involuntary childless individuals are socially 
stigmatised or scapegoated by their families or communities for the inability to conceive.  
                                                          
58 Ibid at p 63. 
59 See Shanner (note 52) at p 843. 
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If as Shanner argues that the basis for providing abortion services is to safeguard the 
forbearance right of bodily integrity, then surely the same argument can be used to canvass 
for the provisioning of ARTs treatment for involuntary childless women if these services will 
help them to achieve a desired pregnancy which alleviates their social stigmatisation in their 
community. To deny them of such treatment when it can be deployed to protect their right to 
human dignity and to be free from discrimination will go against the feminist objective of 
protecting women’s welfare and empowerment.  
This thesis therefore argues that the characterisation of the social stigmatisation of the 
conditions of infertility and involuntary childlessness in the developing world should be seen 
as an act of discrimination and inhumane treatment which goes contrary to the inherent right 
of human dignity. If this is the case then there are human rights, public interest and social 
justice imperatives for canvassing for the case of the provisioning of affordable ARTs to 
involuntary childless women in this region of the world.  Further consideration does however 
need to be given to the extent to which states under international, regional and national laws 
are obligated to provide access to reproductive health care. This matter will be addressed in 
the following section of this chapter. 
6.6  The Status of the Right to Reproductive Health Care under International, 
Regional and National Human Rights Laws 
As stated above, the public health specialists who are currently canvassing for wider access 
to affordable assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) are unclear as to whether there 
actually exists a binding right to reproductive health care.60 In advocating for wider access to 
ARTs they point to goal 5 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)61 which provides for 
universal access to reproductive health care by the year 2015. However, it is important to 
point out from the onset of the discussion on the status of the right to reproductive health 
                                                          
60 See Ombelet (notes 3 and 5 above.) 
61 Ibid. Note in particular target 5b of goal 5 of the MDGs.  
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care; that the MDGs and the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)62 which set out a 
2030 agenda for sustainable development are considered as soft law. They therefore do not 
have binding legal status under international law. The discussions below will therefore turn to 
existing binding international instruments to determine whether states are obligated to 
provide universal access to reproductive health care. 
 
6.6.1 The Right to Reproductive Health at the International Level 
Developing further on the discussion on whether forbearance or negative rights such as the 
right to human dignity and freedom from discrimination and inhumane treatment can be 
deployed to reinforce the case to provide wider access to ARTs in Sub-Saharan Africa, this 
section will consider whether states are obligated to provide universal access to these 
reproductive technologies. The first matter to consider is whether the right to health 
embodies the right to highest attainable standard of reproductive health care.  
The concept of the right to health first came to international focus in 1946 through its 
inclusion in the 1946 WHO constitution. The legal recognition of this right was thereafter 
recognised in Article 25(1) of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.63 This right to 
health is enshrined in other human rights treaties such as Articles 11(1) (f), 12 and 14(2) (v) 
of CEDAW and Articles 25 and 26 of the Convention on the Rights of Disabled peoples64 
also enshrine the right to health. However, Article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)65 is seen as the ‘cornerstone provision’66 for 
the recognition of a binding right to health under International Human Rights Law.  
                                                          
62 See Target 3.3 of goal 3 which sets out a target that universal access to sexual and reproductive 
health care services should be reached by 2030. See the SDGs available at 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics . 
63 General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) 10 December 1048. 
64 The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol (A/Res/61/106 
adopted December 13, 2006. 
65 General Assembly Resolution 2200 (XXI) of December 16, 1966 entry into force January 3 1966. 
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It is generally accepted the Article 12 of the ICESCR provides a binding right to health, like 
other economic, social and cultural rights, it is seen as a right with ‘undertakings of a 
progressive nature’67 On the other hand the obligations under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 are seen immediately realisable.68  Accordingly, civil 
and political rights enshrined in the ICCPR may be described as negative (forbearance) 
rights while the rights enshrined in the ICESCR are deemed as positive (welfare) rights 
border on a state’s capabilities especially in terms of resources.69 
To provide some clarity on the status of article 12 of the ICESCR, paragraph 8 of the 
General Recommendation70 of the ICESCR Committee states that: 
‘The right to health is not to be understood as a right to be healthy. The right to health 
contains both freedoms and entitlements. The freedoms include the right to control 
one's health and body, including sexual and reproductive freedom, and the right to be 
free from interference, such as the right to be free from torture, non-consensual 
medical treatment and experimentation. By contrast, the entitlements include the 
right to a system of health protection which provides equality of opportunity for 
people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health.’ 
The ICESCR Committee’s explanation of what the right to health entails suggests that the 
right to health consists of both negative and positive rights. The negative rights embodied in 
article 12 will include the right to control one’s health and body, including sexual and 
reproductive freedoms. At the same time, Article 12 contains positive or welfare rights which 
are progressively reliable. These progressive realisable rights will be contingent on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
66 Dettels R., et al., Oxford Textbook on Global Public Health (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 
p 278. 
67 Trubeck D.,  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Third World in Meron T., (ed.) Human 
Rights in International Law : Legal and Policy Issues.(Oxford: Clarendon Press) 1986, pp 205-271 
discussed in Rehman J., International Human Rights Law (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2003) at p 
106. 
68 Ibid. 
69 See article 2 of the ICESCR. 
70  ICESCR General Comment 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12) 
General Comment No. 14 (11/08/00) (E/C.12/200/4). 
 
 
 
208 
 
availability of resources to fund a health care system especially developing countries. Yet, it 
is important to note that the Committee goes further to assert that states do have an 
obligation on grounds of non-discrimination and equal treatment to ensure that they do not 
inappropriately allocate resources.71 The Committee goes further to describe what 
inappropriate allocation of resources means. This occurs when states: 
 
‘favour expensive curative health services which are often accessible only to a 
small, privileged fraction of the population, rather than primary and preventive health 
care benefiting a far larger part of the population.’72 (Emphasis mine). 
 
This concern of not allocating resources for expensive curative health care has been used to 
bolster the case against widening access to reproductive health technologies especially in 
poor resource countries.73  Yet, international health specialists who canvass for the widening 
of access to reproductive technologies will point to ground breaking medical developments 
that facilitate the production of affordable reproductive technologies (ARTs). They argue that 
the cost of these treatments can be brought down significantly through new scientific 
developments. For example, efforts are currently being made to bring down the cost of a 
single cycle of IVF to $200.74 Since the cost of fertility treatment has now been significantly 
reduced by these ground break developments, why should ARTs still be characterised as 
expensive curative treatment?  Is it not preferable to characterise affordable fertility 
treatment as falling under basic or primary health care that is deserving of public funding.75  
Yet, it remains debateable whether a $200 per IVF cycle can be considered as affordable for 
involuntary childless people in low resourced countries in Sub-Saharan Africa? This is 
                                                          
71 Ibid at paragraph 19. 
72 Ibid. 
73 See Okonofua (note 47) at p 957. 
74 Depotter S., (2008) Fertility treatment in developing countries: a cycle of IVF for less than $200 
(ESHRE Public Release, Meerstraat, Belgium). 
75 See Ombelet, 2014 (note 5) above. 
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because many individuals in poor resource developing countries live on a daily income of $ 1 
to $2 a day.76 
Yet the benefits of affordable fertility treatment cannot be overlooked by states as they 
provide vital reproductive health care to involuntary childless women who otherwise would 
be stigmatised by their society if they do not get such access to healthcare that can help 
them reproduce. This argument finds some support in paragraph 21 of the ICESCR General 
Recommendation77 set out below. 
‘To eliminate discrimination against women, there is a need to develop and 
implement a comprehensive national strategy for promoting women's right to health 
throughout their life span. Such a strategy should include interventions aimed at the 
prevention and treatment of diseases affecting women, as well as policies to provide 
access to a full range of high quality and affordable health care, including sexual and 
reproductive services. A major goal should be reducing women's health risks, 
particularly lowering rates of maternal mortality and protecting women from domestic 
violence. The realization of women's right to health requires the removal of all 
barriers interfering with access to health services, education and information, 
including in the area of sexual and reproductive health. It is also important to 
undertake preventive, promotive and remedial action to shield women from the 
impact of harmful traditional cultural practices and norms that deny them their 
full reproductive rights’ (emphasis mine). 
In considering paragraph 21 above, a valid argument could be raised that it would be wrong 
to treat access to ARTs as expensive curative treatment since this treatment can help to 
protect women from the impact of harmful discriminatory cultural practices arising from the 
                                                          
76 African Development Bank Group, Income Inequality in Africa (Briefing Note 5, March 7 2012) p 2. 
Available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-
Documents/FINAL%20Briefing%20Note%205%20Income%20Inequality%20in%20Africa.pdf 
(accessed May 21 2015). 
77 ICESCR General Comment 14 (note 70) above. 
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negative feminisation of infertility. This particular argument again provides a good 
opportunity to revisit Shanner’s forbearance rights theory78 earlier discussed in this chapter. 
If as Shanner argues, the positive right to access abortion or contraceptives is justifiable on 
grounds that it protects the forbearance rights of women, a similar argument can be raised 
that state funding should be provided for ART treatment since such treatment would protect 
the forbearance rights of women to be free from harmful discriminatory practices associated 
with the negative feminisation of infertility. But the difficulty still remains on whether state 
funding of ARTs should become immediately realisable in low resourced regions of the 
world. A further evaluation of this point is undertaken through an appraisal of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (otherwise known as the Banjul Charter)79 which is 
the regional human rights instruments that applies to sub-Saharan Africa. It is worth noting 
that other African regional human rights instruments such as the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (also known as the 
Maputo Protocol)80 and the African Charter on Childs’ Rights81 also provide for the right for 
health.82  However, this chapter will focus on the Banjul Charter and the Maputo Protocol 
since these rights instruments have a greater relevance to the question on whether the right 
of health can be utilised to tackle the negative feminisation of infertility that results in the 
social stigmatisation of involuntary childless women within the Sub-Saharan African region. 
6.6.2 Right to Reproductive Health at the African Regional Level 
The difficulties on whether the right to health should be treated as an automatic and binding 
state obligation is a very critical issue in Sub-Saharan Africa due to the limited availability of 
state resources to fund the obligations set out in this right and other socio-economic rights. 
                                                          
78 Shanner (note 52) above. 
79 Adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1986. 
80 Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, Maputo, CAB/LEG/66.6 (Sept. 
13, 2000); reprinted in 1 Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J. 40, entered into force Nov. 25, 2005.  
81 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force Nov. 29, 1999. 
82  See article 14 of the Maputo Protocol and article 14 of the African Charter on Child Rights.  
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Unlike the ICESCR at the multilateral level and other regional instruments in other 
jurisdictions, some have argued that the Banjul Charter places economic, social and cultural 
rights on the same footing as political and civil rights.83 This is the viewpoint of scholars such 
as Odinkalu84 and Ouguergouz85 who argue that social, economic and cultural rights can be 
considered as on the same footing as political and civil rights in the sense that they are 
enforceable and justiciable rights.  Odinkalu goes further to argue that most of these rights 
can be treated as immediately realisable.86 Yet other scholars such as Mbazira87 and 
Jibriel88 question whether the economic resources of several African states permits for an 
immediate realisation of such rights. They argue that the very nature of economic, social and 
cultural rights suggests a progressive realisation of such rights based in line with the social-
economic realities of the states concerned. They also point to other comparative African 
regional treaties such as the Maputo Protocol and the Children’s Rights Charter which treat 
the right to health as a progressive realisable right instead of an immediate realisable right.89 
Besides the academic debate, it is necessary to refer to the direct works and decisions of the 
African Commission on Human Rights as the body charged with the responsibility of 
interpreting the Banjul Charter. The Commission’s Principles and Guidelines on the 
implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (Guidelines)90 provides extensive guidance on what constitutes the right 
to health. This guidance document is more comprehensive that the General 
                                                          
83 See Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights Law In Africa (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2007), at 237 discussed in Jibriel B, The justiciability and enforcement of the right to health under the 
African Human Rights System (2012) 1(2) Haramaya Law Review at p 33. 
84 Odinkalu C., Implementing economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights in Evans M., and Murray R., (Eds.) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: The System in Practice 1986-2000 (2002) 181.  
85 Ouguergouz F., The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for 
Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy (The Hague: Martins Nijihoff: 2003) pp 764 and 765. 
86 Odinkalu (note 84) above. 
87 Mbazira C., Enforcing the economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: Twenty years of redundancy, progression and significant strides 6(2) African Human 
Rights at p 340. 
88 Jibriel B., The Justiciability and Enforcement of the Right to Health under the African Human Rights 
System (2012) 1(2) Haramaya Law Review at pp 37-39. 
89 Ibid.  
90  Adopted at the 50th ordinary session at Banjul, Gambia, October 24 to November 7 2011. 
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Recommendation on the right to health by the ICESCR Committee. Paragraph 13 of the 
Guidelines accepts that the nature of social, economic and cultural rights means that these 
rights are to be progressively realised within the context of available resources of the states. 
However, paragraph 17 of the guidelines asserts that there are minimum core obligations 
within the social, economic and cultural rights as set out in the Banjul Charter that can be 
immediately realised by states. These minimum core obligations apply ‘regardless of the 
availability of resources’91 and are deemed as ‘non-derogable’.92  
A case that illustrates this point is Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia (2003)93 where the 
Commission found that Gambia had breached certain rights in the Banjul Charter, including 
the right to health. While the Commission accepted that the realisation of social, economic 
and cultural rights were subject to the economic realities of African states,94 it found that this 
did not excuse African states from fulfilling the minimum core responsibilities enshrined in 
these rights.  
Regarding the right to health, the minimum essentials or obligations are set out in paragraph 
66 of the Commission Guidelines. They include the ‘right of access to health facilities, goods 
and services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalised 
groups.’ States are obligated to immediately take steps to realise these minimum essential 
or core obligations by a proper prioritisation of their available resources. Since the 2010 
Commission Guidelines does give some basis for immediate realisation of the minimum core 
essentials of social, economic and cultural rights; it is debateable why writers like Jibriel95 in 
her 2012 article still maintains the stand that Commission restricts itself to the progressive 
realisation of these rights. 
 
                                                          
91 Paragraph 17 above. 
92 Ibid. 
93 See Communication 241/2001, Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, (2003), AHRLR 96(ACHPR 
2003) (16th Activity Report) (Purohit Case), para. 84.   
94 Paragraph 84 of the decision. 
95 See Jibriel (notes 83 and 88 above) at p 39. 
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6.6.2.1 The African Regional Rights System and Core Minimum State Obligations for 
Vulnerable Groups of People 
Beyond the debate on whether all elements of the rights to health should be treated as 
progressively realisable, this thesis would like to turn its attention to the other fundamental 
aspect of paragraph 66 of the Commission Guidelines which requires that the minimum core 
obligations under the right to health should on a non-discriminatory basis cater for the needs 
of vulnerable or marginalised groups. This raises an interesting perspective on whether 
involuntary childless people, especially women should be treated as vulnerable people due 
to the social stigmatisation of childlessness in pronatalist states? Paragraph 1 of the 
Guidelines which provides for the interpretation of terms utilised in the guidelines defines 
vulnerable groups as: 
‘Vulnerable and disadvantaged groups are people who have faced and/or continue to 
face significant impediments to their enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
rights. Vulnerable and disadvantaged groups include, but are not limited to, women, 
linguistic, racial, religious minorities, children (particularly orphans, young girls, 
children of low-income groups, children in rural areas, children of immigrants and of 
migrant workers, children belonging to linguistic, racial, religious or other minorities, 
and children belonging to indigenous populations/communities), youth, the elderly, 
people living with, or affected by, HIV/AIDS, and other persons with terminal 
illnesses, persons with persistent medical problems, child and female-headed 
households and victims of natural disasters, indigenous populations/communities, 
persons with disabilities, victims of sexual and economic exploitation, detainees, 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered and intersex people, victims of natural 
disasters and armed conflict, refugees and asylum seekers, internally displaced 
populations, legal or illegal migrant workers, slum dwellers, landless and nomadic 
pastoralists, workers in the informal sector of the economy and subsistence 
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agriculture, persons living in informal settlements and workers in irregular forms of 
employment such as home-based workers, casual and seasonal workers.’ 
This broad and encompassing definition of who can be considered as falling under a 
vulnerable group is arguably broad enough to include involuntary childless women. Indeed 
women regardless of whether they are fertile or infertile are classified as being part of a 
vulnerable group under this heading. More fundamentally, it can be argued infertile or 
involuntary childless women constitute a group within the group of women that have a 
persistent medical problem that is socially stigmatised due to the negative feminisation of 
infertility and involuntary childlessness. 
Although there is a continuous reference to vulnerable persons throughout the Commission’s 
Guidelines, there is no reference to vulnerable people in article 17 or other articles of the 
Banjul Charter itself. The Maputo Protocol also does not appear to refer to vulnerable groups 
particularly within the context of Article 14 which deals with the reproductive and health 
rights of women. However, both the Banjul Charter and the Maputo Protocol recognise the 
needs of the disabled. Article 18(4) of the Banjul Charter for example states that ‘the aged 
and the disabled would have special measures of protection in keeping with their physical 
and moral needs’. The Commission on Peoples and Human Rights in its guidelines and 
principles in paragraph 67 also states that the minimum core obligations on health should 
include the requirement of providing health care to those who are disabled. It goes on to 
include persons with psychosocial, intellectual and physical disabilities as deserving of 
prioritisation in access to specific health services that will enable them to have a full 
enjoyment of their life.96 The Maputo Protocol also provides relevant protection for women 
with disabilities under Article 23 and for women in distress under Article 24. However both 
the Banjul Charter and Maputo Protocol fail to provide a definition of what constitutes 
disability.97 The failure to provide a definitive statement on who is a woman living with 
                                                          
96 See paragraph 67 of the Principles and Guidelines. 
97 See for example Article 1 (the interpretation article) for the Maputo Protocol. 
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disability is also evident in the general comment on the Maputo Protocol.98 Recourse is 
therefore made to other human rights instruments that address the rights of disabled people. 
The first place to turn is the Convention on the Rights of Peoples with Disabilities and its 
optional protocol.99 Article 2 of the Convention which deals with definitions does not 
specifically define disability but it does provide a definition on what constitutes discrimination 
on the basis of disability. This is defined as:  
‘Discrimination on the basis of disability" means any distinction, exclusion or 
restriction on the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or 
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, 
civil or any other field. It includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of 
reasonable accommodation.’ 
There is also a regional draft protocol in Africa for people with disabilities which is yet to 
come into force. This is the draft 2014 protocol on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 
Africa.100 Article 1(c) defines people living with disabilities as: 
‘those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, developmental or sensory 
impairments which in interaction with environmental, attitudinal and other barriers 
hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.’ 
From these instruments, it is clear that disability is much wider than physical handicap and 
that it can includes other forms of disability, including barriers arising from social attitudes, 
stigmas and prejudices that impede an individual or groups of individuals from being able to 
fully participate in society. This is described as the social model of discrimination and 
                                                          
98 See the General Comments pertain to Article 14(1)(d) and (e) of the Protocol to the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa adopted by the  
52nd Ordinary Session, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission).  
99 See The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol (note 64) 
above. 
100  Draft II, March 14 2014, Updated from Draft (following meeting of Working Group on Older Person 
and Persons with Disabilities (WG) held in Banjul, The Gambia, on February 28- March 1 2014. 
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feminist works such as Irhorn and Bharadwaj have argued that the social stigmatisation of 
involuntary childlessness in developing regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia should 
be characterised as falling within this model of discrimination.101 
One key reason why these writers advocate that involuntary childlessness should be treated 
as a disability is that it ‘disrupts the ability of individuals to fulfil normative social roles as 
mothers and fathers.’ 102 They also argue that the social stigmatisation of infertility and 
involuntary childlessness in regions such as Africa can lead to a ‘social disablement in the 
multiple realms of marriage, family, friendship and community life.’103  They further view the 
social oppression that involuntary childless women are subjected as presenting another 
strong ground for treating infertility particularly as a social disability.  
This thesis however expresses some reservation on whether it will be expedient to 
characterise involuntary childless women as disabled for the purposes of trying to prioritise 
their health needs under international and regional rights instruments. This is because 
treating infertility or involuntary childlessness as a disability could result in unintended 
consequences for involuntary childless women. It could lead to a situation where involuntary 
childlessness is not just viewed under the social construct of disability but rather as a form of 
physical failure that should be further censured and stigmatised. If treated as the latter, an 
involuntary childless woman may end up not only being stigmatised for her inability to have 
children but also scorned for being handicapped and inferior to her fertile counterpart. 
This thesis therefore advocates that due to the socio-cultural context prevalent in pronatalist 
regions of the world, the plight of involuntary childless women should not be solely treated as 
a disability concern, but as an issue falling under the broader context of the 
disenfranchisement and discrimination of women in developing countries. The counter 
                                                          
101 Inhorn M., Bharadwaj A., Reproductively Disabled lives: Infertility, stigma, and suffering in Egypt 
and India in Insgtad B.,, Whyte S., (eds.) Disability in Local and Global Worlds (Berkeley: Univ. Calif. 
Press, 2007) pp 78-106. 
102 Ibid 
103 Ibid. 
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argument can of course be raised that the social construct of disability is wide enough to 
embrace the disenfranchisement and disempowerment that involuntary childless people face 
within their communities. Yet the continuing delay in the adoption of the African draft protocol 
on the rights of disabled persons exemplifies why solely characterising infertility and 
involuntary childlessness as a socially constructed form of disability may not be the most 
expedient way of strengthening the reproductive health care rights of this group of women.  
Involuntary childless African women may therefore be better served if more work is done in 
the area of developing a rights regime that prioritises the combating of the social 
stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness not only from disability rights 
perspective but on the wider grounds that their health needs should be prioritised on the key 
ground of protecting their forbearance rights which include the right to free from 
discrimination. To what extent this prioritisation of health needs of involuntary childless 
women can be undertaken particularly at the national level will be considered next.  
6.6.3 Universal Access to Reproductive Health Care for the Involuntary Childless: An 
African State Obligation? 
The right to health is also recognised by various states at the national level. The Kinney and 
Clark’s 2004 study104 also shows that 67.5 of National constitutions105 have the right to 
health enshrined in their constitution. The enshrinement of the right to health in several 
national constitutions poses interesting queries on whether there is a human right to 
universal access to reproductive health care. Once more, the question arises on whether the 
right to health enshrined within the national constitutions justiciable or binding rights? This is 
a contentious debate particularly in the developing world that faces the constraints of 
resources. 
                                                          
104 Ibid at p 279. 
105 Ibid. 
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Nigeria, as a case study country illustrates this position by placing the right to health in 
chapter two of the constitution which deals with non-justiciable Fundamental Objectives and 
Directives Principles of State Policy. The right to health is therefore not included in chapter 
four of the Nigerian constitution which deals with binding and enforceable human rights. In 
this way, the framers of the Nigerian Constitution have treated the right to health as an 
aspirational state goal which cannot be enforced against the Nigerian State. This does not 
mean that the Nigerian state cannot give binding enforceability to certain aspects of the right 
to health in its domestic legislation. This position was set out by Nigerian Supreme Court in 
the case of the Attorney General of Ondo v. Attorney General of the Federation of 
Nigeria106where the court held that the fundamental objectives and directive principles set 
out in chapter two of the Nigerian Constitution were mere declarations which could not be 
enforced until they were enacted into law by the Nigerian National Assembly. The Nigerian 
National Assembly has enacted on the right to health with the most recent legislation being 
the National Health Act 2014.107 
S.1 of the Act establishes a national health system which is to: 
‘protect promote and fulfil the rights of the people of Nigeria to have access to health 
care services.’108 
S. 11 of the Act provides for the establishment of a Basic Health Care Provision fund which 
is financed by the Federal Government Annual Grant constituting of at least 1% of the 
Consolidated Revenue funds and also by grants from international donor partners; funds 
from any other source. Part of the objectives of the fund is to provide for and maintain 
primary health care facilities and services. 
                                                          
106 S.C. 26/2006 
107 In force on December 9 2014. 
108 See s 1 (1) (e) of the Act. 
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In enacting the National Health Act 2014, it can be said that the Nigerian state has taken 
steps to carry out its non-justiciable duty set out in section 17(3) (c) (d) of the Nigerian 
Constitution which states that: 
3) The State shall direct its policy towards ensuring that- 
 (c) the health, safety and welfare of all persons in employment are safeguarded and not 
endangered or abused; 
(d) there are adequate medical and health facilities for all persons. 
It has taken Nigeria some considerable time to enact legislation to bring about the realisation 
of state obligations regarding the right to health set out under Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
The length of time in which it has taken the Nigerian State to enact this Act confirms that 
although many African states may have enshrined the right to health in their national 
constitutions, this right is a progressive right that is subject to the availability of state 
resources.109  This is not the first Act that Nigeria has enacted in its bid to ensure a 
progressive realisation of the right to health. The country also has a Nigerian National 
Insurance Health Act (NNHIS) 1999 which focuses on widening health insurance to those 
who do not have coverage. However, the 2014 National Health Act goes further than the 
NNHIS in the sense that it seeks to provide universal access to primary health care. But as 
Nwabueze, a leading scholar in Nigerian health law points out, while the Nigerian 
constitution and domestic legislation provide laudable black text law on the right to health, 
the infrastructural realities on ground make it difficult for this right to be fully realised. He 
paints a dismal picture of public health expenditure in Nigeria which he places per capita at 
$8. 110 This meagre allocation of resources in this oil rich resource nation places in doubt the 
                                                          
109. See Nwabueze R., The Legal Protection and Enforcement of Health Rights in Nigeria in Flood C., 
Gross A (eds.) The Right of Health at the Public/Private Divide: A Global Comparative Study 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) p 372. 
110 Ibid at p 376. 
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state capability or resolve to realise the desired objectives of primary health care as set out 
in the National Health Act 2014. 
While there are concerns on the availability of resources available to fund access to primary 
health care, it does become necessary to ask the question on the Act means by primary 
health care. The Act in its interpretation section111 states that primary health care services 
means: 
‘such health services as may be prescribed by the Minister to be primary health care 
services.’ 
This definition of primary health services unfortunately does not explain what services the 
Minister will deem as primary health care services. Recourse has to be made to earlier rules 
to provide some explanation on what constitutes primary health care in Nigeria. Nnamuchi 
and Metibobu112 refer to the Nigerian National Health Policy and Strategy to achieve Health 
for all Nigerians (National Health Policy)113 revised in 2004. They argue that this policy 
statement underpins the NHIS and National Health Act and other subsidiary legislation in 
Nigeria.114  The National Health Policy includes family planning as part of maternal and child 
health care that falls under primary health care services. Such family planning services 
include: 
‘Services offered to couples to educate them about family life and to encourage them 
to achieve their wishes with regard to preventing unwanted pregnancies, securing 
desired pregnancies, spacing of pregnancies; and limiting the size of the family in 
                                                          
111 S. 64 of the Act. 
112 Nnamuchi O and Matiboba S., Health Care Organisation and Financing in Irehobhude IO., 
Nwabueze RN., (eds.) Comparative Health Law and Policy: Critical Perspective on Nigerian and 
Global Health Law (Farnham, Ashgate, 2015) p 16 
113 Revised National Health Policy (Abuja: Federal Ministry of Health, 2004). 
114 Nnamuchi and Matiboba (note 112) above at p 16. 
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the interest of the family health and socio-economic status. The methods prescribed 
shall be compatible with their culture and religious beliefs.’115 (Emphasis mine). 
It is clear from the wording of the National Health Policy and the National Health Act that the 
provision of family services which falls under primary health care is meant to include the 
provisioning of services that would help couples achieve desired pregnancies. Yet, the 
evidence shows that the provisioning of fertility treatment such as ARTs is not publicly 
funded in Nigeria.116 This means that involuntary childless couples who seek to achieve 
desired pregnancies must privately fund their fertility treatment despite the current legislative 
framework which seeks to widen access to primary health care in the public health care 
sector. 
Again, this gives credence to the fact that the right to health can only be realised according 
to the availability of resources especially in the context of what the state considers as its 
priorities. Indeed, it has been argued by leading health specialists that to fund fertility 
treatment at the public health level in developing countries such as Nigeria would be inimical 
as this would be an unnecessary drain of resources that could be allocated to other pressing 
problems.117 This of course is not just a developing country concern. Several developed 
industrialised countries also do not fund ARTs as the public health level. Even when it is 
available at the public health level as in the case of countries like the United Kingdom, Israel, 
Netherlands and Germany there are restrictions on how many cycles that would be available 
to couples to help them achieve desired pregnancies.118   
                                                          
115 Nigerian National Health Policy, Chapter 3 at paragraph 3.2 which is titled Health System based on 
Primary Health Care. 
116 Giwa-Osagie O ARTs in Developing Countries with particular reference to Sub-Saharan Africa in 
Vayena E., Rowe PJ., Griffin PD., Current Practices and Controversies in Assisted Reproduction. 
Report of a Meeting (Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2002) at p 23. 
117 Okonofua F., Obi H., “Specialized Versus Conventional Treatment of Infertility in Africa: Time for 
3a Pragmatic Approach” (2009) 13(1) African Journal of Reproductive Health pp. 9 – 11. 
118 See Ravitsky V, Dupras-Leduc R., Emerging Issues in Joly Y., Knoppers BM., Reproductive 
Technologies in Routledge Handbook of Medical Law and Ethics (Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge: 2015)  
p 225. 
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This is because there is no running away from the fact that ARTs are expensive and a single 
cycle could run into thousands of pounds. How then can it be justifiable or reasonable for 
African resource strapped states to fund ARTs at the primary health care level, even if, as in 
the case of Nigeria, their national health policy and legislation provide for such a laudable 
aspiration? This is the dilemma that countries have to face in determining what health needs 
to prioritise.  However, the underlining argument that has run through this thesis is that the 
quest of African involuntary childless couples to achieve a desired pregnancy goes beyond a  
desire or want. It is tied up to the fact that their worth to their families and communities is in 
many ways tied up to their procreative value.  
If this is the case, as the leading studies119 have shown, then there is a public interest 
objective in providing public funding for involuntary childless couples to help them achieve a 
desired pregnancy. As previously argued, state funding to help socially stigmatised in 
pronatalist countries where social worth is connected to procreative value can be justified on 
the grounds of protecting forbearance (negative rights).  This is akin to the same argument 
that feminists like Shanner have advanced in arguing for public funding for abortions. There 
is also some valid ground to argue that desired pregnancy for involuntary childless couples 
cannot just be characterised as a ‘personal desired pregnancy’ but as a ‘community desired 
pregnancy’. If as the social ordering principles such as Ubuntu, Humwe and Omoluabi 
suggest that procreation is a duty owed to safeguard community survival, then civic amoral 
African states do have some measure of responsibility to help individuals fulfil their 
procreative obligations. This may explain why countries like Nigeria have included as part of 
primary health care services, family planning services that would help couples achieve 
desired pregnancies.  
                                                          
119 See for example Dyer SJ., Abraham N, Hoffman M, Van der Spuy ZM  Men leave me alone as I 
cannot have children: women’s experiences with involuntary childlessness (2002) 17 Human 
Reproduction; Denga DL., Childlessness and marital adjustments in Northern Nigeria (1982) 44 J 
Marr Family 779-802 discussed in Van Balen F. Involuntary Childlessness: a neglected problem in 
poor resource areas in ESHRE Special Taskforce on ‘Developing Countries and Infertility (ESHRE 
Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2008) at p 26. 
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It is also necessary to point out that Article 18(1) of the Banjul Charter also envisages state 
responsibility when it comes to the protection of the family particularly if there are 
existentialist threats to its continuing role as ‘the natural unit and basis of society’.120 Until the 
deep ingrained cultural values and beliefs that subscribe to procreation being the bedrock of 
the family structure in Africa are fundamentally changed, it would be improper for African 
states to ignore the obligation to safeguard the forbearance rights of individuals to enjoy 
human dignity and to be free from stigmatisation and discrimination. It would appear that like 
in the case of safeguarding the forbearance rights of bodily integrity which is touted as a key 
reason for the state funding of abortions, African states can also safeguard the forbearance 
rights of the involuntary childless through the state funding of ARTs. This would help such 
couples achieve desired pregnancies and thereby reduce the social suffering and 
stigmatisation in their communities.   
As earlier highlighted in this chapter, there are positive developments taking place at the 
international level that suggest that there may come a day when the cost of accessing ARTs 
would be affordable in developing regions of the world, including Africa. 121 Yet, as stated 
earlier, there is still concern on whether the projected cost of $200 per cycle will be widely 
available to all the involuntary childless when a majority of the population in some of the 
least developed countries of this sub-continent currently live on an income of $1 or $2 a 
day.122 But this is where the benefits of group support and inter-dependence as exemplified 
in the social ordering principles of Ubuntu, Humwe and Omoluabi can be effectively 
deployed. The literature on the treatment seeking behaviour of involuntary childless couples 
shows that in some communities, extended family members and other goodhearted 
members of the community have been known to provide funding support for fertility 
treatment. Giwa-Osagie succinctly puts it this way: 
                                                          
120 See Article 18(1) of the Banjul Charter. 
121 Depotter (note 74) above. 
122 See African Development Bank Group (note 76) above. 
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‘Because of the premium placed on childbearing, it is common to find that members 
of the extended family and friends contribute to make up the cost of an ART cycle.’123 
If as Ubuntu puts it ‘I exist because you exist’124 it should come as no surprise that friends 
and family members will contribute to the cost of an ART cycle in pronatalist societies where 
children are considered as gold or wealth because of the ontological value they add to the 
continuing survival of African communities. This point will be further discussed in the next 
chapter which considers the role that law can play in facilitating a definitive rights regime for 
involuntary childless women in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has been concerned with the debate on whether there exists a universal right to 
access reproductive health care. An appraisal of the legal framework reveals that the right to 
reproductive health care fall under the general framework of the right to health which is a 
progressive realisable right. Canvassing for a right to universal reproductive health care 
which includes the provisioning of fertility treatment is generally hampered by concerns of 
scarce resources and the need to prioritise health needs. In this regard, many states will 
treat the provisioning of fertility care particularly expensive ARTs as a positive right and not a 
negative right. However, this thesis argues that in pronatalist parts of the world such as 
Africa where individuals are actively encouraged to contribute procreative value to their 
communities, the forbearance rights of the right to human dignity and the right to be free 
from discrimination are directly impacted when people are unable to achieve a pregnancy 
that is desired not only at a personal level but at the community level. If this is the case, then 
as feminist and equality activists have argued for the widening of abortion services based on 
the fact that it helps women to safeguard their forbearance rights of protecting their 
reproductive integrity not to carry a third party in their womb; a similar argument can be 
                                                          
123 See Giwa-Osagie (note 116) above at p 26. 
124 Nabadere D., Afrikology, Philosophy and Wholeness: An Epistemology (Pretoria: African Institute 
of South Africa: 2011) p 18. 
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raised for the safeguarding of the forbearance rights of involuntary childless women to be 
free from discrimination and social stigmatisation brought about by their inability to conceive.  
The next chapter however recommends a further approach to protecting the forbearance 
rights of involuntary childless women which include the right to human dignity and the 
freedom from discrimination and degrading treatment. This approach calls for a legal 
framework or rights regime that proactively the root causes that contribute to the gendered 
social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Chapter Seven 
Towards the Development of a Rights Regime for Involuntary Childless Women: The 
Role of Law and Regulation 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter considered whether there is a binding right to reproduce as well as a 
right to access reproductive health care to facilitate the ability to reproduce. The chapter 
found that there is no legally binding right that requires states to mandatorily provide public 
funding towards universal access for fertility treatment. This finding however does not ignore 
the fact that international human rights instruments provide for the right to health that 
includes reproductive health care. However, the framework for the operation of this right is 
based on the progressive realisation taking into cognisance the availability of state 
resources. 
 
In line with the overarching query of this thesis which focuses on the social stigmatisation of 
infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa and how this  stigmatisation can affect the status of 
involuntary childless women within the region, the current chapter will consider what role law 
and regulation can play in the development of a rights regime for involuntary childless 
women. Developing further on the preceding chapters of this thesis, it is proposed that the 
rights regime should adopt a two-pronged approach. 
 
First, the rights regime should seek to facilitate and promote positive or welfare rights such 
as the right to reproductive health care that will enhance the reproductive capability of those 
who are involuntary childless. Second, it should also focus its attention on ensuring that the 
necessary forbearance or negative rights are in fully operational so that involuntary childless 
people can be protected from social stigmatisation. In continuation with the discussion on the 
right to health undertaken in the preceding chapter, this chapter will first consider the rights 
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regime for involuntary childless women from the angle of positive or welfare rights. It will in 
particular consider how law and regulation can be utilised to provide a package of positive or 
welfare rights that help to facilitate wider access to ARTs. The latter part of the chapter will 
then consider what role law and regulation can play in strengthening the negative or 
forbearance rights that prevent the discrimination and inhumane treatment of involuntary 
childless people. 
 
7.2 The Role of Law and Regulation in Advancing the Positive Right of Access to 
Affordable ARTs. 
 
The preceding chapter had explained that the right to health, including reproductive health 
care is a positive right that is based on progressive realisation and availability of resources. 
Yet, the same chapter also showed that there are minimum core obligations contained within 
the right to health as set out in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 (the 
Banjul Charter) that states are required to immediately realise through the prioritisation of 
state resources. 1 Yet, the question that plagues African states that have scarce resources is 
how best to prioritise resources to achieve core minimum obligations relating to the right to 
health? For example, the market reality in many African nations show that the provisioning of 
ARTs is largely privately funded.2 The provisioning of ARTs through private health care is 
generally prohibitive and access to such fertility care is only available to a small section of 
the population in Africa.  
 
Some may suggest that funding ARTS solely through private health care suggests that there 
is a market failure that requires regulatory intervention by the state. This call for regulatory 
                                                          
1 See paragraph 17 of the African Commission on Human Rights in its Principles and Guidelines on 
the implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted at the 50th ordinary session at 
Banjul, Gambia, October 24 to November 7 2011. 
2 See Giwa-Osagie O., ARTs in Developing Countries with particular reference to Sub-Saharan Africa 
in Vayena E., Rowe PJ., Griffin PD., Current Practices and Controversies in Assisted Reproduction. 
Report of a Meeting (Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2002) at p 23. 
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intervention will be based on the notion that healthcare is not a pure private good, but a 
public good that everyone should be able to access.3 However as chapter six has shown, 
not all aspects of health-care can be said to public goods, especially those that are seen to 
be expensive curative treatment or non-essential treatment. This is why Coggon4 argues that 
there are limits to demarcating healthcare into strict compartments of public and private 
goods. This is because as he further posits, there is a dual responsibility that the state and 
the individual should have in the management of health care.5 If this is the case, to what 
extent should the state, particularly a poorly resourced state in Africa jointly partner with an 
involuntary childless individual in facilitating access to ARTS? Should the state prioritise its 
resources to fund assisted reproductive health care treatment when as we have seen in 
chapter six, there is no binding obligation for it to do so? More fundamentally, and in addition 
to these questions, there is a need to examine the extent to which the law in its regulatory 
role should intervene in ensuring that the funding of ARTS is not treated purely as private 
good limited only to a privileged few, but one that can be accessed by a wider section of 
people who are socially stigmatised in their societies due to their condition of involuntary 
childlessness. These are the questions that this section of this chapter seeks to address. But 
first it is necessary to further debate whether there is actually a market failure in the 
provisioning of ARTs in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is a good starting point to consider 
whether regulatory theory is relevant in facilitating positive or welfare rights for involuntary 
childless women that will enable them access the fertility treatment they desire.  
 
7.2.1 Identifying Key Market Failures in the provisioning of ARTs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Bator6 in his seminal treatise on the Anatomy of Market Failure defines market failure as:  
                                                          
3 Karsten S., Health Care: Private Good v Public Good (1995) 54(2) American Journal of Economics 
& Sociology Inc. (1995) pp 129-144. 
4 Coggon J., What makes health public? A critical evaluation of Moral, Legal, and Political Claims in 
Public Health (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2012) 310 pp. 
5 Ibid at p 40. 
6  Bator F., The anatomy of market failure (1958) 72(3) The Quarterly Journal of Economics p 351. 
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‘the failure of a more or less idealised system of price model institutions to sustain 
‘desirable  activities’ or to stop ‘undesirable activities.’ 7 
 
This definition of market failure is predicated on the application of the allocation theory which 
deals with the ‘efficient deployment and use of resources.’8 The preceding chapter of this 
thesis highlighted the difficulty that many African nation states, especially those with scarce 
resources face in trying to progressively realise the right of health. The application of the 
allocation theory might suggest that it is an inefficient deployment of resources to fund 
expensive curative treatment such as fertility treatment when there are other pressing health 
needs within the economy that require similar funding. If consideration is given to Bator’s 
definition, could there be some basis to argue that the refusal to allocate public funding for 
the assisted reproductive health sector in Africa is a market failure since it fails to sustain the 
desirable activity of reproduction which is seen as adding value to the well-being of many 
African communities? But this begs the question on whether free markets so properly called 
should expect public funding. If health is seen purely as a private good, then it should be the 
responsibility of individuals to fund their health care needs.9  If this is the case then there is 
no need for state intervention as the market has not failed despite the fact that some 
individuals have been priced out due to competitive nature of the market. But as Karsten 
10argues it would be unethical and contrary to social justice goals to treat something as vital 
as healthcare as strictly a private good that should be controlled purely by market forces? 
While the utilisation of health insurance in industrialised countries like the United States can 
be used to explain why health care is treated to some extent as a private good, Karsten 
argues again that the provisioning of health care because of its vital importance to the 
                                                          
7 Ibid p 351. 
8 Gomes L., The Economics and Ideology of Free Trade: A Historical Review (Cheltenham, 2003 
Edward Elgar). 
9 Karsten (note 3) above at p 138.  
10 Ibid at p 136. 
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society should not be treated like other private goods.11  In particular, the principle of 
exclusion which obtains in the supply of private goods in the free market should not be 
applied to an essential commodity like health care. This is why some have gone on to argue 
that health care does have a public characterisation12 and as such that it should be treated 
as a public good which should be available to not just a privileged few but to all due to its 
fundamental importance to the welfare of the society. 
 
Accordingly, from a reproductive health perspective, there is a public benefit ground for state 
funding for ARTs due to the fact that procreation is seen in many pronatalist communities as 
central to the survival of the society. There is therefore some justification on public interest 
grounds to call for regulatory intervention that facilitates the ability of involuntary childless 
people to achieve desired pregnancies if they so desire. This is because in many cases the 
social worth and value of women in many African communities is closely connected with 
their ability to reproduce. This is why some13 have argued for the public funding of affordable 
ARTs since it could assist the involuntary childless in achieving a desired pregnancy and 
help alleviate the social stigmatisation associated with involuntary childlessness. As argued 
in the previous chapter in this thesis, there is a public interest argument for widening access 
to ARTs to reduce the social harm and stigmatisation that involuntary childless women are 
exposed to. This is premised on the protection of forbearance rights which were the key 
grounds that feminists utilised in the past to advocate for the widening of access to 
contraceptives and abortion services for women who do not want to reproduce.14  
 
Yet, it is accepted that other public interest grounds such as child justice and over-population 
will continue to be raised against treating assisted reproductive health care as a public good 
                                                          
11 Ibid at p 136. 
12  Randall F., Darwin R., End of Life Choices: Consensus and Controversy (Oxford University Press: 
2010) at p 6. 
13 Vayena E., Rowe PJ., Peterson HB., Assisted reproductive technology in developing countries: why 
should we care? (2002) 78 Fertility and sterility pp 13–15. 
14 See Shanner L., The Right to Procreate: When Rights Claims Have Gone Wrong (1995) 40 McGill 
Law Journal p 823 at pp 840-843.  
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which requires state intervention and support. The public interest grounds of child justice and 
over-population have been effectively used to limit the use of state funding to fund expensive 
curative treatment for the involuntary childless women. The argument constantly raised 
against rectifying the market failures connected with the assisted reproductive sector is the 
fact that the involuntary childless can provide permanent homes through the mechanism of 
child adoption for the large number of vulnerable children in need of a family life.15  
 
However, as chapter five of this thesis has shown, while child adoption does offer some 
parenting relief for the involuntary childless, its full utilisation in the Sub-Saharan African 
region is hampered by other norms and rules existing side by side with received Western 
law. The key rule or law that hampers the full use of child adoption is strict Islamic law 
particularly that of the Sunni Maliki code which is practised in a number of African countries, 
including Nigeria, the investigation site of this thesis. It is therefore questionable to continue 
to deny involuntary childless people of other options of parenting, including achieving 
desired pregnancies through the use of ARTs. 
 
Since this is the case, this thesis questions whether it is right to leave market forces to 
determine who should be entitled to ARTs particularly when it has been shown that a service 
as critical as reproductive health-care cannot simply be treated as a private good, but one 
that also has the nature and characteristic of a public good. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
thesis’ investigation site, reproduction is seen as a desirable activity and applying Bator’s 
concept of market failure, the failure of a health care service to  provide the means by which 
this desired activity can be sustained for the involuntary childless may suggest that a market 
failure has taken place. Confining the provisioning of ARTs purely to private funding 
promotes the continuity of undesirable social activity such as the failure to provide 
                                                          
15 Toubia N., Social Pressure is not the only reason why people want children (1994) 4 Reproductive 
Health Matters p 94.   
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procreative value to the community. This results in other undesired social activities such as 
the gendered social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness.  
 
Limiting the provisioning of ARTs to private funding may also raise other regulatory 
concerns, the most relevant issue being that of the availability of choice. While it would be 
correct to argue that within the private health care sector, involuntary childless women would 
have the choice to decide what ARTs package they seek to utilise to achieve their 
reproductive goals, the cost of these services still remain out of the reach of many. This may 
not be a major concern if we accept the view that not everyone needs to reproduce or that 
there are other parenting options including child adoption that the involuntary childless could 
consider. But as the earlier chapters of this thesis have shown, in pronatalist societies where 
there is pressure of a gendered nature to reproduce, there is a public interest ground for 
arguing for a wider variety of alternatives for the involuntary childless, including the 
alternative of  providing ARTs in the public health sector. The present situation where only a 
small section of the population can access ARTs is unsatisfactory, bearing in mind the 
pernicious and harmful nature of the social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness and its 
effect on women in this region. While this thesis accepts that the right to health, especially 
access is a positive or welfare right that creates no binding obligation on states to fulfil, it will 
argue that there is a public interest why the identified regulatory failures associated with the 
current provisioning of ARTs in Sub-Saharan Africa need to be addressed through 
appropriate regulatory mechanisms. The discourse on the public interest ground for 
regulatory intervention in facilitating what ordinarily would be considered as positive rights or 
welfare rights will be further explored below. 
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7.3  The Public Interest Regulatory Rationale for Advancing the Welfare Right of the 
Right to Reproductive Health Care for the Involuntary Childless in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Baldwin16 points out the difficulty in articulating a single conception or definition on what 
public interest constitutes.  Despite the varying views on what constitutes public interest, it 
has been said that:  
 
‘Public interest theories attribute to legislators (and others responsible for the design 
and implementation of regulation) a desire to pursue collective goals with the aim of 
promoting the general welfare of the community.’17 
 
This statement raises some interesting perspectives on how regulatory measures can be 
introduced to ensure that collective goals that society consider as desired activities are 
actualised. Turning back to this thesis’ query, if procreation is treated primarily as merely a 
personal and individual goal, then there will be no grounds to argue for state funding for 
ARTs on the grounds of public interest. This is because it does not serve collective goal of 
promoting the general welfare of the community. But as this thesis has argued throughout, 
the case is different in many pronatalist African communities where procreation is seen as 
vital to community survival.  There is therefore a public interest need to introduce regulatory 
measures that will allow for realisation of the positive right to reproductive health care. Such 
health care should include access to affordable ARTs which provide involuntary childless 
individuals with the chance to achieve desired pregnancies that are not only beneficial to the 
individuals alone, but to their communities at large. 
 
                                                          
16 Baldwin R., and Cave M., Lodge M., Understanding regulation; theory, strategy and practice 
(Oxford University Press: 2011 2nd edition) p 41. 
17 Morgan B., Yeung K., An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Material (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) p 17. 
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In having a clearer insight on the public interest ground of regulation, recourse is made to 
the leading work of Johnson and Peterson. 18 This leading work categorises the public 
interest ground of regulation in the assisted reproductive sector into three broad classes. 
They are: 
(i) pure market regulation which is concerned with ensuring that markets operate 
properly and promotes consumer choice;  
(ii) values – influenced market regulation with its emphasis on the role that 
community values and culture play in market based regulation and consumer 
choice; and  
(iii) values based regulation which is concerned with safeguarding core and shared 
values of a society as opposed to the safeguard of the individual rights and 
choice of consumers. 19 
 
Based on these three sub-heads of the public interest ground, they argue that regulatory 
intervention is necessary in the assisted reproduction sector to ensure that the market 
conforms to the shared values and objectives of society. To what extent does this hold true 
for the facilitation of wider access to ARTs in Sub-Saharan Africa? The thrust of this thesis 
especially in chapters two to four has been to show that there is shared value and objective 
of many African states to safeguard group survival through continuing procreation. But as 
demonstrated in the Nigerian example,20 many of these states, due to scarce resources, are 
unable to provide ARTs to the involuntary childless, even if their state health policies or 
domestic legislation allow for this.  The inability to provide public funding has meant that 
ARTs provisioning has been left to the private sector as a means of achieving allocative 
efficiency. But the public interest regulatory function suggests that even when the private 
market holds sway, state regulation is still necessary to ensure that the markets are 
                                                          
18 Johnson M., Petersen K., Public Interest or public meddling? Towards an objective framework for 
the regulation of assisted reproduction technologies (2008) 23(3) Human Reproduction pp 716-728. 
19 Ibid at pp 716-718. 
20 See section 6.6.3 of chapter six of this thesis. 
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operating properly and that they promote consumer choice to seek a variety of resources 
that meet their parenting needs.  
 
The recent survey of private sector ART provisioning in Sub-Saharan Africa shows that cost 
of private funded ART services are already considered as being prohibitive and out of the 
reach of most of the populace.21 For example, in Nigeria, which is the country site for this 
thesis, on investigation into the cost of private funded IVF treatment, it revealed a range 
between US$ 1200 and US$ 4000 per cycle.22 
 
This prohibitive cost of ARTs has made fertility treatment inaccessible to a large section of 
the communities. Yet the pronatalist nature of many primordial African communities requires 
that involuntary childless individuals should do all they can to procreate and have children. 
Since this is the case, there is some ground to argue that the civil amoral state should 
intervene to regulate the market failures that arise when ART provisioning is undertaken 
solely through the private sector. Yet, as the preceding chapter has shown there are limited 
state resources and there is a health rationing argument based on the allocation theory for 
states not to implement what will be classified as a non-binding welfare or positive right. This 
is why some civic amoral states continue to treat the funding of ARTs as expensive curative 
treatment that is best left to private sector funding. It is therefore understandable if this is 
considered strictly from the perspective of allocative efficiency to leave the provisioning of 
ARTs to market forces. This will enable resource pressed states to focus on the more 
pressing public interest concerns such as population control, child justice issues and 
allocative efficiency. If this is the only reasons for regulatory intervention, then the law does 
not need to address the market failure concerns of limiting the provisioning of ARTs to the 
private health care sector. Yet as this thesis will argue, the regulatory function of the law can 
                                                          
21 Giwa-Osagie O., (2002) ART in developing countries with particular reference to sub-Saharan 
Africa in: Vayena E., Rowe P., Griffin P., (eds.) (note 2 above) at p 25. 
22 Ibid. 
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play a much greater role in providing a rights regime for women which extends beyond the 
narrow concerns of maximising economic efficiency. 
 
This is because as Sunstein23 points out, regulation plays an important role in promoting and 
safeguarding the ‘common good’ or substantive values that societies consider as vital for the 
proper functioning and well-being of their societies.24 A similar position is adopted by 
Johnson and Peterson who also argue that one of the key interests that the public interest of 
regulation seeks to protect is the public socio-political interest25. This is a valued based 
regulatory basis that extends beyond the correction of economic market failures, but 
addresses the socio-cultural and political public interests needs of a community.  
 
In advocating for regulatory intervention to facilitate greater access to affordable ARTs in 
Sub-Saharan on the ground that it serves the socio-public interests of African communities 
which see reproduction as a means of protecting the continuity and well-being of African 
communities, there will always be the concern on whether this will promote instances of free 
riding. In other words, is there a regulatory basis for maintaining some form of health care 
rationing particularly when it comes to expensive curative treatment like ARTs? Should many 
involuntary childless couples who may not be able to afford ARTs at the private sector level 
be allowed to ‘free ride’ at the expense of others?26 While this is a valid concern, one 
possible way in which it could be allayed is to require, as Coggon proposed that the funding 
of positive rights such as the funding of ARTs,27 should be seen as the joint responsibility of 
the individual and the state. Individuals, and their families and community who see 
procreation as vital to the survival of their primordial public must be ready to contribute in 
part to the funding of such treatment. These contributions can be made alongside with 
                                                          
23 Sunstein C., After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1990) p 12. 
24 Ibid.  
25 See Johnson, Peterson (note 18) above at pp 717-8.  
26 See Sunstein (note 23 above) at p 49. 
27Coggon (note 4 above) at p 40. 
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Affordable ARTs 
Funding -$200 
per cycle
African States
$60 $25
Individuals and 
Families
Local
Communities
$75 $40
International 
Assistance
funding from the civic amoral state. While this proposal, as Gebauer28  points out, may have 
elements of neo-liberalism, in that it does involve some commodification of health services, it 
also pragmatically recognises that resource strapped regions will find it difficult to solely fund 
the provisioning of ARTs.29 Gebauer however does recognise that there is a place for the 
joint funding of health services through what he describes as ‘entitlements and joint 
responsibility.’ Gebauer’s proposal for a jointly funded scheme or fund that will achieve 
health coverage for all is premised on what he describes as a ‘common solidarity’ based on 
a ‘fair burden sharing.’  
 
Translating this to the narrow focus of health coverage that this thesis is concerned with and 
that is the funding of ARTS, the proposed rights regime for the involuntary childless can look 
to adopting a common solidarity model whereby individuals, the family, extended members 
of their local communities along side with the state and international donors (figure 4 below) 
can create a funding system that will allow for wider availability of ARTs in the Sub-Saharan 
African.  
Figure 4- Funding Model Based on $200 per cycle of ARTs 
 
Developing the ARTS joint responsibility scheme (figure 4 above) may not be a ‘Utopian 
dream’30 due to current efforts by the WHO, ESHRE and private foundations such as 
                                                          
28 Gebauer T., Institutionalising Solidarity for Health in Coggon J., Gola S., (eds.) Ethical, Political and 
Regulatory Challenges (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) p 222. 
29 Ibid at p 227. 
30 See a similar argument canvassed by Gebauer (note 28 above) at p 232. 
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Walking Egg and the Low Cost IVF foundation to provide a cycle of IVF at $200. While some 
may question the proposed sharing formula set out in figure 4 above, it is still a step in the 
right direction. This is because it requires, that pronatalist African states and communities 
which view procreation as vital to community survival, should bear some responsibility in 
supporting the involuntary childless to achieve their desired pregnancies that are seen not 
only to be beneficial to the individuals concerned, but to their wider communities.  
 
This thesis argues that indigenous social ordering principles such as Ubuntu can serve as 
the underlining motivator for this notion of common solidarity of providing wider coverage of 
ARTs in this region.  It however accepts that resource allocation will continue to remain an 
issue particularly when the African continent is faced with other pressing health priorities 
which are also competing for scarce state resources. This is why this thesis advocates also 
that any proposed rights regime for the involuntary childless in the Sub-Saharan African 
continent should not only advance positive rights such as reproductive health care, but it 
must also focus on the equally important role of protecting the negative or forbearance rights 
of  involuntary childless women in the region. This will likely help in some measure to reduce 
the social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness within the region. 
However, this quest for a regime that facilitates negative or forbearance rights for the 
involuntary childless raises the critical question on what legal or regulatory system can best 
achieve this. Should the proposed rights regime be solely premised on received Western law 
or the state law of an amoral civil state or can other systems of norms and governance 
models play a role? This issue shall be further considered below. 
. 
7.4  The Decentring of Regulation and the Facilitation of a Negative Rights Regime 
for Involuntary Childless Women 
One of the key points that can be distilled from the literature is the fact that regulation can 
act as ‘deliberate state influence’31 to modify and influence behaviour. This may explain why 
                                                          
31 Baldwin, 2011 (note 16 above) at p 3. 
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regulation is closely associated with law, apart from the other roles it plays in the fields of 
economics and political sciences. While there is still some debate on whether regulation 
should be seen as a separate field from law,32 a good starting point for its definition will be 
found in the leading work of Selznick who describes regulation as the  ‘sustained and 
focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a 
community.’33 
 
The final section of this chapter will therefore consider whether law in its regulatory function 
is best placed to confront the malaise of the social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness 
and according protect the forbearance or negative rights of women in the Sub-Saharan 
Africa. However, in considering how law in its regulatory function can combat the malaise of 
the social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness, it is again necessary to determine what 
type of regulation would be effective in achieving this task in legally pluralist African 
societies? 
 
This begs the question on whether Selznick’s definition of public agency regulation which 
has been described as providing the ‘central meaning of regulation’ would be the most 
effective way of regulating a culturally sensitive issue such as the social stigmatisation of 
infertility and involuntary childlessness34 As pointed out in chapters two, four and five of this 
thesis, the personal lives and family structures of many African are regulated by indigenous 
customary rules as well as religious laws like Sharia law.  This is why it is necessary to 
explore other definitions of the regulatory role of law other than prescriptive regulation of 
public agencies of an amoral civic state. This thesis therefore draws from works such as 
                                                          
32 This thesis takes note of the continuing debate on whether law and regulation can be considered as 
one and the same discipline or whether regulation as argued in positivist thinking is just ‘one part of 
the genus called ‘law.’ See for example Dubber M., Regulatory and Legal Aspects of Penalty in Sarat 
A., Douglas L., Umphrey MM., (eds.) Law as Punishment/ Law as Regulation (California, Stanford 
University Press, 2011) pp 19-49. 
33 Selznick P., Focusing Organisational Research on Regulation in Nell R., (ed.) Regulatory Policy 
and the Social Sciences (Berkeley: University of California Press,1985) p 363. 
34 Ibid. 
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Black35 which have argued that there should be a decentring of regulation which 
deemphasises the role of state regulation and allows for other governance models and 
regulatory players to play in a regulatory role in society. 
 
Black’s decentred concept of regulation also deemphasises the positivist notion advanced by 
Austin and others that regulation without some element of prescriptive state control cannot 
be considered as a binding norm or rule of law. Rather it recognises that in legally pluralist 
regions like Sub-Saharan Africa that there are a myriad of rules that apply outside 
prescriptive state regulation. Applying a decentred form of regulation will therefore take into 
account the cultural and social experiences of women in Africa where the governance of 
personal and family matters is undertaken at the level of not only prescriptive state law but 
customary law and religious norms.36 The recognition of the role that Western and non-
Western rules play in the regulation of family structures in Sub-Saharan Africa does not 
detract from the fact that states must respect the universality of rights over cultural relativity. 
However, in adopting Black’s decentring of regulation, there is some allowance to recognise 
that the notion of the universality of rights does not necessary mean that there is no 
recognition for cultural diversity especially in legally pluralist societies.  Hellum’s early work 
on infertility management 37 also argues that it is necessary that drafters of international 
rights instruments that seek to protect the rights of women on a global basis should have a 
clearer understanding of the multiple identities that women have to assume in relating with 
their communities and that these identities are not necessarily confined to a Western 
perspective of what rights constitute.38 
 
                                                          
35 Black J., Critical Reflections on Regulation (London: London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 2002) at pp 2- 7. 
36 Moore S., Law as a Process: An Anthropological Approach (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 2000) p 17. 
37 Hellum A., Women's Human Rights and Legal Pluralism in Africa: Mixed Norms and Identities in 
Infertility Management in Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe: Mond Books, 1999) 469 pp. 
38 Ibid see for example s.13.3.3 from p 228. 
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If regulatory intervention is to be effective in achieving a rights regime for involuntary 
childless women in Sub-Saharan Africa, a more nuanced approach to culturally sensitive 
issues such as the social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness is required. The 
decentring of regulation as advocated by Black39 will allow for the implementation of 
universal human rights, regulation and law rooted in Western law but at the same time 
recognising the richness of the cultural diversity that obtains in different jurisdictions of the 
world. Regulators who operate from the notion of the decentring of regulation are better 
placed to appreciate that a complex social problem, such as the stigmatisation of involuntary 
childlessness, can only be tackled when the cultural context of why involuntary childless 
women suffer from harm is fully understood. By having a clear perspective of the cultural 
context in which this group of women find themselves, an appropriate regulatory regime can 
be devised to alleviate their suffering and tackle the harm caused by this stigmatisation.  
 
This is why this thesis at the early stage of its discourse explained in chapter two, what it 
means to be infertile or involuntary childless in a diverse and pluralistic setting as Sub-
Saharan Africa where family life is regulated not only by formalist Western rules, but also by 
cultural and religious norms which all too often venerates the centrality that procreation plays 
in the life of a woman. In utilising Black’s decentred regulatory model, regulators will 
therefore be best placed to develop a rights’ regime for women which not only promotes the 
universality of forbearance rights set out in international human rights regimes such as 
CEDAW, but one that also takes into account the cultural realities in which these women live 
and operate in.  A similar concern has been raised in Hellum’s work where she constantly 
argues on the fallacy of just relying on just one strand of the law to deal with a complex 
socio-cultural problem like the involuntary childlessness in a pronatalist African society.40   
                                                          
39 Black (note 35 above) at pp 16-17 where she recognises the diversity of regulation which she sees 
as being opened to different connotations based on the socio-linguistic meaning given to it by different 
communities.   
40 See Hellum A., Introduction to Human Rights in a Gendered Relational and Plural Legal Landscape 
Derma B., Hellum A., Sandvik K., (eds.) World of Human Rights: The Ambiguities of Rights Claiming 
in Africa (Leiden, Brill, 2013) see chapter six particularly at pp 137-138. 
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The call to take into account the cultural realities of the subjects of human rights will of 
course be met with some criticism due to the ongoing debate on the universality of rights as 
opposed to cultural relativism.41 However, this thesis is not advocating that universal human 
rights embodied in instruments like CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol should give way to 
cultural relativism. Rather it identifies with Black’s notion of a decentred application of 
regulation which allows for the subjects of regulation to benefit from an array of norms and 
governance models that not only entrench the universality of rights, but also recognise the 
place of cultural diversity in legally pluralist societies in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Having said this, the question that needs further scrutiny is how law in its regulatory role can 
act as an agent of change and reformation. This regulatory function of law has been 
described by the eminent jurist, Roscoe Pound as social engineering.42 This of course 
speaks to schools of thought rather than adopting a homogeneous position in respect of 
what will promote women’s welfare. His treatise on social engineering has been the subject 
of discourse in a wide range of literature.43 The key area of interest that this thesis focuses 
on when considering Pound’s theory of social engineering is the role that social engineering 
or law as a tool of social change plays in the ‘maintenance and the advancement of 
civilisation.’44 Braybrooke 45 explains that the role law plays in maintaining and advancing 
civilisation was first considered by Kohler46 and further expounded by Pound.  It is therefore 
                                                          
41 Ibid. 
42  See for example the Pound R., Spirit of the Common Law (Boston, 1921), 195-196. See also the 
Pound R., Interpretations of Legal History (Cambridge, 1923). 
43 See for example McManaman LJ., Social Engineering: The Legal Philosophy of Roscoe Pound 
(2013) 33(1) St. John's Law Review pp 1-47 Available at: 
http://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/1; Braybrooke EK., The Sociological 
Jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound (1961) 5 U.V. AuST. L.R. 288; Patterson EW., Pound's Theory of 
Social Interests in Sayre PL., Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies: Essays in Honor of 
Roscoe Pound (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947) pp 558 – 573. 
44 Hockings W., The Present Status of the  Philosophy of Law and Rights (New Haven: Yale 
University Press 1926) at pp 30-35 discussed in Stone J., Human Law and Human Justice (California: 
Stanford University Press: 1965) at p 190. 
45 Braybrooke EK., The Sociological Jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound (note 43 above). 
46 Kohler, Lehrbuch des Biirgerlichen Rechts II (1906) 37—39 discussed in Braybrooke above. 
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necessary to further explore what these eminent scholars mean by civilisation. Braybrooke47 
suggests that an answer to the question on what constitutes civilisation is embedded in 
Kohler and Pound’s concept of the ‘jural postulates of civilised society.’48 In this sense 
civilisation can therefore be described ‘as the social development of human powers to their 
highest possible unfolding.’49  
 
It is important to note that Kohler and Pound’s understanding of civilisation is centred on 
Western thinking and may not necessarily be representative of all societies and civilisations.  
This is a point that is taken up again by Hellum when she criticises the role that the 
modernisation theory has played in the development of a rights regime which does not 
necessarily provide a one fit size solution for all cultural realities.50 This is a view shared by 
other scholars in the field of law and anthropology. Chief among these scholars is Moore51  
who expresses strong reservations on the utility of applying positivist Western law in the 
social engineering of Non-Western societies. Moore however appears to ignore the reality 
that post-colonial Africans are not only citizens of a ‘primordial public’ where customary rules 
apply, but they are also citizens of an ‘amoral civic public’ and as such will have to engage 
with the positivist nature of law as entrenched in state law and received Western law. 
Notwithstanding this criticism, Moore is right to argue for a deeper understanding of the 
place that Non-Western law plays in legally pluralistic developing regions of the world. 
 
Yet, the social engineering impact of Western received law in Africa cannot be ignored as 
ably demonstrated in Pott’s seminal study.52  This study explored how the National Party in 
South Africa in the period of apartheid successfully deployed law as a change agent to 
                                                          
47 See Braybrooke (note 43) above. 
48 Pound R., Interpretations of Legal History (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1923, 2013) p 
148. 
49 Ibid at p 143. 
50 Hellum (note 37 above) at pp 45-46 and p 413. 
51 Moore (note 36 above) at chapter 2.  
52 Potts LW., Law as a Tool of Social Engineering: The Case of the Republic of South Africa (1982) 
5(1)(2) Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 1. 
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achieve its goal of establishing apartheid society which was ‘characterised by white 
domination and non-white acquiescence’.53 While the apartheid ideology has been rightly 
discredited and denounced as a racist and abhorrent ideology, it does as Pott argues 
provide some demonstrable evidence on how law can be used as a tool for social change 
even when this social engineering results in a clash of civilisations or cultures. Again, works 
such as Moore will question whether it is right to allow for the laws of one civilisation to 
override the laws of other civilisations. Unfortunately, this is the reality that the Sub-Saharan 
African continent has experienced through its colonial history.  
 
Yet, post-colonial Africa through the practice of legal pluralism demonstrates that the current 
role of law as social agent does not necessarily involve the subjugation of one civilisation by 
another, but rather a situation where there is complementarity of different rules operating 
almost at per with each other. 54 This is why Black’s model of decentred regulation is vital in 
understanding how law in its regulatory function can shape or engineer a rights regime for 
involuntary childless women in a legally pluralist society. The decentred notion of regulation 
will allow for a managed utilisation of norms and rules that are obtainable from received 
Western law and also from non-Western law. This managed utilisation of a mixed array of 
norms and rules can help to address the culturally sensitive issues that may arise during the 
process of social engineering. Toufayan55 in his treatise on the role that Taslim Elias, the 
eminent African jurist has played in the formation of the post-colonial African society where 
indigenous and received English rules could collaboratively operate together in what he 
describes as ‘strategic alliance.’56 
 
                                                          
53 Ibid at p 16. 
54 Toufayan M., When British Justice (in African colonies Point two Ways: On Dualism, Hybridity, and 
the Genealogy of Juridical Negritude in Taslim Olawale Elias. Leiden Journal of International Law, 21, 
pp 377-410. doi:10.1017/S0922156508004998 in Onazi O., African Legal Theory and Contemporary 
Problems: Legal Essays (New York, Springer, 2014) p 38. 
55 Ibid at p 35. 
56 Ibid. 
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In recognising such strategic alliances between received Western law and non-Western 
rules, the decentred concept of regulation addresses the negativities prevalent in the 
modernisation theory which, as Hellum57 points out, treats all non-Western norms with 
hostility and suspicion. At the same time, the decentred concept or model of regulation does 
not endorse the position of cultural relativists who tend to want to treat local customs as 
being superior to universal human rights. The decentred notion of regulation will therefore 
allow for a further consideration on whether the State law of amoral civil states and the 
indigenous rules of the primordial public can be effectively managed and utilised to provide 
for forbearance rights that will protect involuntary childless people from social stigmatisation. 
 
Although as Chapter two of this thesis has shown that some cultural practices do assist in 
fostering the social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness, this thesis will 
not go as far as some modernist theorists to ignore the benefits that may ensue from the 
application of indigenous norms. This is because there are clear examples where indigenous 
social ordering rules have been effectively used by the courts to effect radical social 
engineering in African societies. A clear example is the use of indigenous social ordering 
principle of Ubuntu alongside the provisions of the South African Constitution to bring about 
the abolition of the use of capital punishment in the post-Apartheid South African society.58  
This utilisation of Ubuntu alongside received Western law establishes that social engineering 
effected by the law in its regulatory function does not necessarily mean that one civilisation 
has to dismantle or subjugate the values of another civilisation. Rather it recognises the 
existence of universal forbearance rights such as the immutable values of human dignity and 
worth which are inherent in all societies regardless of their ‘socio-cultural linguistic’59 
permutations.  
 
                                                          
57 Hellum (note 37 above) at p 413. 
58 S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 1995 (3) SA 391; 
[1996] 2 CHRLD 164; 1995 (2) SACR 1 (6 June 1995). 
59 Black (Note 35 above). 
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In considering how law can play a role in shaping a rights regime that helps to combat the 
social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness, there is a need to recall to mind the ever-
evolving nature of African indigenous law.  This is a point that has earlier been considered in 
this thesis.60 This point is revisited in this chapter to show that indigenous culture is not static 
and that it can be socially engineered from within through its indigenous customary norms 
and rules. The fact that customary law can evolve and obviate stigmatising customs is 
welcoming because as previously pointed out, African family and personal life is primarily 
guided by rules of customary law. However, as the recent consolidated set of South African 
cases of Bhe & Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and others61 have demonstrated, there are 
limits to trying to reform customary international law from within. In Bhe’s case, the South 
African constitutional court accepted that the rule of male primogeniture is so ‘fundamental to 
the law of customary succession’ and that the impact of its application on gender rights could 
not be corrected on a case by case basis by other rules within the customary law system.’62  
 
Since it was impossible to correct the gender imbalance flaw associated with this customary 
rule of male primogeniture and more particularly because the rule was seen to be contrary to 
constitutional obligation of equality, the court in Bhe’s declared the rule unconstitutional and 
invalid. It further held that the matter on succession had to be determined according to the 
rules of received Western law as set out in the Intestate Succession Act. This case therefore 
demonstrates that it is not in all instances that indigenous African law and its social ordering 
principles such as Ubuntu, Humwe and Omoluwabi can be effectively utilised to change a 
customary rule of law that is antithetical to the values and aspirations of a modern African 
society. In this sense, it may be said that social engineering of a customary rule that 
discriminates against women could only be best addressed under received Western law or 
state law of an amoral civil state.                                                                                         
                                                          
60 See chapter four above. 
61 Bhe and others v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and others Case CCT 49/03; Shibi v Sithole and 
others Case CCT 69/03; South African Human Rights Commission and another v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and another Case CCT 50/03. 
62 Ibid at paragraph 111 and 112. 
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In the context of my central case study country, Nigeria, the national courts have not 
proactively like its Southern African counterparts utilised the social ordering principles like 
Omoluwabi (the equivalent of Ubuntu) to social engineer its legal framework. Yet, they have 
also affirmed that customary law is living law which can be adjusted to ensure that it does 
not become ossified and irrelevant in modern society. The Supreme Court of Nigeria for 
example in the case of Kimdey and others v Military Governor of Gongola State and others63 
held that: 
 
‘one of the characteristics of native law and which provides for its resilience is its 
flexibility and capability for adaptation. It modifies itself to accord with social 
conditions.’64 
 
It is the willingness of courts to treat customary law as adaptable to societal needs that has 
ensured its continuing relevance in society. However, as pointed out in the earlier chapters 
of this thesis, the Nigerian courts have utilised the principles of the principles of natural 
justice, equity and good conscience to determine the continuing validity of a customary rule. 
The use of the principles of received Western law to determine the validity of customary law 
has been the subject of criticism.65  As highlighted in chapter three of this thesis, scholars 
like Otakpor66 have questioned the objectivity of applying received English law principles to 
determine what customary law to retain or to strike down. Otakpor also questions whether 
value judgments on the validity of a specific customary rule should be left to the good 
conscience of ‘lawyers and judges trained in laws imposed by the British colonial 
administration?’67 He further queries whether it is appropriate to rely on the value judgments 
                                                          
63  (1988) 2 NWLR (pt 77). 
64 Ibid p 445 at p 461. 
65 Otakpor N., A woman who is a husband and a father: An essay in customary law (2008) 2(2) CALS 
Review of Nigerian Law and Practice at p 83. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
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of a ‘judicial elite ensconced in a judicial ivory tower’68 completely removed ‘from ordinary 
Nigerians on the other side of the social divide’.69  
 
Otakpor’s criticism is similar to the Moore’s concerns on the appropriateness of the ‘civilising 
effect’ of customary law on customary law and other non-Western rules that are obtainable 
in the Sub-Saharan Africa. While Elias does express similar concerns on this issue, he does 
accept that there is room for English law to collaborate with customary law. He argues that 
despite their differences, Western and Non-Western law shared similar civilising concerns 
based on the ‘unity of all human knowledge and experience.’70  Elias’ conciliatory approach 
to how the two systems of law can complement each other is shared by this thesis.  This is 
because this approach allows for the social engineering and reform of traditions and 
customs that stigmatise involuntary childlessness and infertility to be undertaken of the basis 
of the universality of human rights71, social justice and equality, while at the same time, not 
completely discarding the benefits that norms of living customary law have to offer to 
individual and communities in Africa.  
 
If one accepts the position of jurists like Elias, it can be argued that forbearance or negative 
rights such as the rights of freedom from discrimination, equality and human dignity as set 
out in the international instruments such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights72, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)73 and the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)74 are universal to 
                                                          
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid. 
70 Elias T.,The Nature of Customary Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956, 1972) at p 
6. See also the discussion of Elias’s statement in Toufayan (note 54 above) at p 45. 
71 OHCHR, What are Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (accessed June 3, 2015). 
72 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) proclaimed by the United Nations General 
Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 General Assembly resolution 217 A (III). 
73 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49. 
74 Adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly.  
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humanity75, and accordingly they can be used to modify, change or obliterate any custom, 
social attitudes or public opinion that promotes the negative feminisation of involuntary 
childlessness and infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Yet it is important again to consider the concerns that have been raised by Hellum76 on 
whether the rights regime contained in these international human rights treaties can actually 
address the needs of infertile African women due to the fact that these treaties have been to 
some extent developed through the tenets of the modernisation theory which treats non- 
Western rules with some hostility. She also argues that due to the influence of the 
modernisation theory, international human rights instruments tend to be premised on a 
system of a hierarchy of rights77 that prioritises Western based norms over indigenous 
norms. Hellum78 further posits that this focus on a hierarchy of rights ignores the pluralist 
nature of African societies where women assume ‘multiple identities’ to be able to effectively 
navigate through the requirements of the Western and indigenous rules that regulate and 
govern their daily activities. 
 
While Hellum’s concerns are valid, Elias’ does equally provide a valid counter-argument 
when he argues that no creed or race can claim sole ownership of negative or forbearance 
rights such as human dignity or the right to be free from discrimination and equality.79 This 
thesis further argues that rights such as the right to human dignity enshrined in international 
human rights law are also evident in the indigenous social principles of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This is why the South African Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane and Another 80 was 
able to effectively apply the social ordering principle of Ubuntu in post-apartheid South Africa 
to annul practices such as the death penalty. In the same way, the social principle of Ubuntu 
                                                          
75 OHCHR, What are Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at note 71 
above. 
76 Hellum (note 37 above) at chapter 26. 
77 Ibid at p 418. 
78 Ibid at p 415. 
79 Elias (note 70 above) at p 6. 
80S v Makwanyane and Another (note 58) above. 
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(or its other variants- Humwe and Omoluwabi) also recognises the equality of all human 
beings in its definitional statement which is set out below: 
 
‘I am human because I belong to the human community and I view and treat others 
accordingly.’81  
 
As stated above the post-apartheid courts in South Africa have been extremely effective in 
recognising the shared values that Western received law and African indigenous law have in 
safeguarding rights such as the right to human dignity. They have demonstrated that it is 
possible for the modernising universalist regime of international human rights to interact with 
traditional African cultures to safeguard the rights of human beings. After all the very 
essence of Ubuntu and other African social ordering principles is the inter-dependence of 
human beings based on mutual respect and concern. Some would of course question 
whether the focus of communalism which is the centrality of Ubuntu, Humwe and Omoluwabi 
can be reconciled with the notion of individuality which is the focus of a Westernised regime 
of human rights? This appears to be a key barrier when trying to find a common ground for 
the mutual application of both Western law and indigenous law in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Those who value African norms and traditions will argue that the focus should be on 
collective rights and not individual rights as the individual exists for the community and not 
the other way.  
 
A superficial reading of the definitional statement of Ubuntu will suggest that it focuses only 
on communalism and collective rights. But the latter part of its definitional statement which 
posits that because ‘I am human and that I should treat and view others as human’ confirms 
that Ubuntu does not ignore the rights of individuals. On the contrary, it resonates with the 
Judeo-Christian values which have contributed to the shaping and development of Western 
                                                          
81 Text from the South African Ubuntu Foundation 2013 available at http://saubuntu.co.za/ and 
discussed in Spalthoff U The Spirit of Ubuntu and the Common Good submitted to the Common Good 
Forum, Paris 2013. 
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law.82 The Biblical statement ‘love your neighbour as yourself’ which to a large extent 
underpins the development of the duty in care in Donoghue v Stevenson83 is equally 
premised on both collective and individual rights. Yet some84 would argue that the sole role 
of Tort Law is to protect the individual’s right and has no role in safeguarding collective 
rights. Yet, torts such as public nuisance confirm that while Tort law is individualistic it does 
safeguard the collective rights of the public at large. The principle of deterrence in Criminal 
Law also recognises that there is a collective duty of care not to harm others in the 
undertaking of individual activities. These example buttress the point that while Western law 
does play an active role in safeguarding the rights of individuals, it does not ignore the 
collective rights and responsibilities owed by the individual to the community. 
 
In the same way, although African customary law does predominantly focus on collective 
rights, it also does not ignore the rights of individuals. Indeed the definitional statement of the 
key social ordering principle know as Ubuntu (or Omoluwabi or Humwe) begins with the 
word ‘I am Human.’85 This confirms that African customary law recognises the human dignity 
and worth of each individual. This is because it would be almost impossible to realise the 
collective rights of inter-dependence and group support without recognising the importance 
and worth of each individual that makes up the larger African community. 
 
It therefore appears that the great divide between collective and individual rights which has 
acted as a barrier in trying to find common grounds for the mutual application between 
Western law and indigenous rules is more or less an artificial divide. What matters is how 
societies can find the right balance in safeguarding both collective rights and the rights of 
                                                          
82 Carmen-Smit J, Weisstub D., The Western Idea of Law (London: Butterworths, 1982) pp 195 and 
242. 
83 [1932] UKHL 100.  
84 See Cochcran R., Ackerman M Law and Community: The Case of Torts (Maryland: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 2004) p 179. 
85 See the text from the South African Ubuntu Foundation 2013 (note 81) above. 
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individuals. The South African case of S v. Makwanyane86 provides a thoughtful example of 
how collective and individual rights can be recognised and safeguarded at the same time. 
The denouncement of capital punishment because it violated the individual ‘s right to life and 
the right to be free from cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment clearly demonstrates the 
premium that South Africa places on the rights of individuals. Yet the Court at the same time 
also recognised that the commission of murder went against the collective rights of the 
community. This crime therefore had to be accordingly sanctioned and punished through the 
imposition of a substantial custodial sentence which was to serve as both a form of 
deterrence and rehabilitation which was in line with the notion of group survival and 
community inter-dependence as exemplified in the social ordering principle of Ubuntu.  
 
The similarities between Western and Non-Western rules in safeguarding individual and 
collective rights does provide some indicate why it is unsatisfactory to treat international 
human rights laws and indigenous laws as being completely incompatible and irreconcilable. 
This is because as Toufayan rightly argues, in his treatise on Elias’s works, there are 
commonalities of rights shared by both systems of law.87 The table below is therefore 
provided to illustrate the commonalities between the forbearance and negative rights set out 
in international human rights instruments premised in Western received law and rules and 
norms premised in other non-Western laws such as customary law. It demonstrates that 
contrary to strict cultural relativism, the key fundamental human rights like the rights to 
human dignity, equality and freedom from discrimination, torture, inhumane, degrading and 
cruel treatment are not incompatible with indigenous African social ordering principles. 
Indeed, as the South African jurisprudence88 on Ubuntu shows, social ordering principles 
such as Ubuntu have been effectively used alongside with principles of human rights.  
 
                                                          
86 S v. Makwanyane, see note 58 above. 
87 Toufayan (note 54 above) at p 45. 
88 See for example S v Makwanyane and Another (note 58) above. 
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This is why thesis argues that the field of human rights can be effectively deployed alongside 
positive indigenous social rules to shape an explicit rights regime for involuntary childless 
women particularly in the area of enhancing non-discrimination and gender empowerment 
for such women. Unfortunately, as discussed in Hellum’s work89, the current rights regimes 
on gender equality and the empowerment for women appear to be primarily fashioned on the 
basis of the modernising theory perspective which treats African norms and cultures as 
primitive and not deserving of consideration. However as table 4 demonstrates there are 
commonalities between the rights set out in International Human Rights instruments and the 
values set out in indigenous African social ordering principles. 
 
Table 4- Key Human Rights: Commonalities between African Social Ordering 
Principles and International Human Rights Regime 
Ubuntu International Human Rights 
Personhood of the individual- 
‘I am human because I belong 
to the human community’90 or 
‘Umuntu Ngumuntu Ngabantu’ 
meaning a ‘person is a person 
by or through other people.’91 
 Personhood of the individual – Article 6 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights which states that ‘Everyone 
has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before 
the law.’ 
 
Right to Human Dignity and 
Equality – ‘I am human 
because I belong to the human 
community and I view and treat 
others accordingly.’ 92 
 Right to Human Dignity and Equality- Article 1 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that 
‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
Equality and Non-
Discrimination–Ubuntu as a 
sense of equality and solidarity ‘I 
am who I am because of who 
we all are.’93 
 Equality and Non-Discrimination- Articles 2 and 7 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See for example 
article 7 which states that ‘All are equal before the law and 
are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of 
the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any 
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against 
any incitement to such discrimination.’  
                                                          
89 Hellum (note 37 above) p 413.  
90 Text from the South African Ubuntu Foundation 2013, note 81 above. 
91 Tutu D., Believe: The Words and Inspiration of Desmond Tutu (Colorado: Blue Mountain Arts, 
2007)   p 3.  
92 Text from the South African Ubuntu Foundation 2013, (note 81) above 
93 Hill B., Heinke M., Graner A., The Official Ubuntu Book (Upper Saddle River:Pearson-Prentice Hall, 
2011) Chapter one. 
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Freedom from Torture, 
Inhumane, Degrading and 
Cruel Treatment- Ubuntu as 
humaneness. P. Mabugo More94 
puts it this way in his definition 
of Ubuntu- ‘Ubuntu is a demand 
for respect for persons no 
matter what their circumstances 
may be.’95 
 Freedom from Torture, Inhumane, Degrading and Cruel 
Treatment- Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states no one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
  
 
The commonalities that African social ordering principles share with international human 
rights as illustrated in Table 4 above shows that not all African indigenous norms as 
canvassed by modernising theorists are necessarily inimical to the welfare of women. If 
applied with sensitivity and purposiveness, African social ordering principles are ingrained 
with same attributes of humaneness, fraternity and interdependence which can be utilised 
alongside with international human rights to confront the social stigmatisation of involuntary 
childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa. This issue will be further explored below. 
 
7.5  Key Attributes of African Social Ordering Rules: The Secret to Combating the 
Social Stigmatisation of Involuntary Childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
The preceding section of this chapter has demonstrated how Black’s model of decentred 
regulation can play a role in recognising the complementarity of Western rules and non-
Western rules in achieving universal and immutable rights and concepts like humaneness, 
fraternity, dignity and equality. There is therefore no reason why living customary law or 
indigenous social ordering rules cannot serve as a vanguard for the development of a rights’ 
regime that confronts and tackles the social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness. Due 
to their strong adherence to the principles of inter-dependence and communitarianism, they 
have the potential to serve as a means by which society can provide resources to individuals  
                                                          
94 Mabugo More P., Philosophy in South Africa Under and After Apartheid’ in Wiredu K., (ed.) A 
Companion to African Philosophy  (Oxford, Blackwell, 2006) p 149, 156-7. 
95 Ibid. 
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to help them not only to realise their procreative desires, but to carry out their so-called 
procreative obligation to their families and communities at large. 
 
If this is the case, can Ubuntu in its spirit of humaneness and interdependence not alleviate 
the social burden that is placed on individuals due to the social requirement that individuals 
should provide procreative value to their communities? Can Ubuntu not be utilised to require 
a corresponding obligation from society based on the principles of humaneness and 
interdependence that communities also provide the resources that can help individuals carry 
out their procreative obligations to their families and the community at large? If it is true as 
the proponents of Ubuntu that it operates on the basis of communitarianism and caring for all 
parts of the community, then surely this principle can be utilised to facilitate wider access to 
fertility treatment that helps individuals to fulfil their procreative obligation to their community. 
Since the procreative value of the individual is seen as conferring some public benefit to the 
wider community, then is it not necessary to require the community to come to the aid of its 
vulnerable members who are unable to reproduce without the assistance of ARTs. 
 
These are difficult questions to answer, but Pan-Africanists such as Nyerere96 who hold so 
dearly to such social ordering principles like Ubuntu have argued that:  
 
‘within the culture of Ubuntu…caring for the wellbeing of the sick, children, elderly 
and those with disabilities was a responsibility of each individual member of the 
society, and of society as whole.’ 
 
If this is the case, Ubuntu can be utilised as a social ordering principle to require that the 
State under its responsibilities to the family under Article 18(2) of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights should provide resources for the infertile and the involuntary 
childless so they can fulfil their procreative obligations to the family and the community. But 
                                                          
96 Quoted in Chuwa L., African Indigenous Ethics in Global Bioethics: Interpreting Ubuntu (New York, 
Springer, 2014) at p 83. 
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this is where the social ordering principle of Ubuntu differs from the international human 
rights regime in that collective rights, including caring for members of the community, are 
considered to be forbearance rights that states should protect, and not just positive rights 
where no binding state obligation is owed.  
 
The dilemma this creates is that if collective rights are treated as forbearance rights, then 
African states will have a binding obligation to help individuals realise these rights. But as 
has been highlighted in chapter six, there are difficulties in treating such rights as 
forbearance rights due to the scarcity of resources that are needed to actualise these rights. 
In this sense, African communities must realise the futility in demanding that individuals 
provide procreative value to their communities and must stop stigmatising them when they 
are unable to. To continue with this attitude goes against the grain of Ubuntu 
communitarianism which argues that ‘if one member of the community is suffering, the whole 
community suffers.’ This of course is not peculiar to indigenous African beliefs, it is a belief 
that is also entrenched in Judeo-Christian beliefs which some have argued form ‘the basis of 
the social and legal normative systems in Western cultures.’97 
 
Even if there are difficulties in using Ubuntu as a basis for insisting that states provide 
resources to help individuals achieve the procreative desires as a form of public good to their 
communities, this social ordering principle can still be utilised to facilitate a culturally 
sensitive regime to confront the social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary 
childlessness. This is because as we saw in table 4 above, the rights of human dignity, 
equality, non-discrimination and the freedom to be free from inhumane, cruel and degrading 
treatment is enshrined in the principle of humaneness which is the sine non qua of the 
Ubuntu principle and other indigenous African social ordering principles.  
 
                                                          
97 Zilney LJ., Zilney LA., Perverts and Predators: The Making of Sexual Offending Laws (Maryland, 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2009) p 3. 
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Again, Nyerere98, the former Tanzania president and Pan Africanist is said to have 
commented that: 
‘In Ubuntu, the people with disabilities, the sick, the orphaned, widows or elderly 
members of the society are automatically protected, so that they do not feel insecure 
or inferior to the rest of the members of the society.’ 99 
 
It is unclear why Nyerere did not add the involuntary childless to the groups that deserved 
automatic protection under Ubuntu. However, those within the disability rights’ regime would 
argue that this why it is important to treat involuntary childlessness as a socially constructed 
disability to ensure that it is safeguarded under the human rights regime.100 This statement 
by one of African leading political figures suggest that there may be some benefit for treating 
involuntary childlessness as a socially constructed disability within the indigenous rights 
regime. Yet, beyond disability considerations, the social stigmatisation of involuntary 
childlessness and infertility should can also be tackled through the enforcement of the 
immutable human rights principles of humaneness, human dignity and equality. There is 
simply no reason why African societies which are ordered on grounds of inter-dependence 
and communitarianism should treat weaker and vulnerable members of its society as inferior 
to other members of the society. This is in line with the statement made by P.Mabugo 
More101 that Ubuntu is all about ‘respect for persons no matter what their circumstances may 
be.’  
 
Since this is the case, there is no reason why indigenous social ordering principles such as 
Ubuntu, Humwe and Omoluabi cannot complement the international human rights 
framework in advancing a rights regime that protects the involuntary childless from social 
                                                          
98 Chuwa (note 96) above at p 83. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Inhorn M., Bharadwaj A., Reproductively Disabled lives: Infertility, stigma, and suffering in Egypt 
and India in Insgtad B.,, Whyte S., (eds.) Disability in Local and Global Worlds (Berkeley: Univ. Calif. 
Press, 2007) pp 78-106. 
101 Mabugo- More (note 94) above. 
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recrimination and stigmatisation. The utilisation of such principles that are indigenous to the 
African community may well aid the eradication of negative public attitudes towards the 
involuntary childlessness. If through the use of Ubuntu, African societies begin to appreciate 
and value the involuntary childless based on their intrinsic value and not just their 
procreative value, it may serve as the basis for the utilisation of other parenting mechanisms 
in infertility management.  
 
However, in encouraging the involuntary childless to consider other forms of non-biological 
parenting options like child adoption in realising their parenting ambitions, it is vital to 
recollect the question that was raised in chapter five of this thesis. The question is why 
should the infertile and the involuntary childless be made to sacrifice their procreative 
dreams and aspirations and be left with carrying the social burden of taking care of 
vulnerable children in the society?  This is one of the difficult questions that African states 
and communities would have to grapple with if they are to make some head way in 
safeguarding the rights of the involuntary childless and infertile within their communities and 
at the same time taking proactive steps to tackle the child justice issues of providing 
orphaned and other vulnerable children with loving homes in Africa where they can be 
nurtured and cared for.  
 
While it is important that the involuntary childless explore a variety of parenting options 
including child adoption, a fair and just society based on Ubuntu concepts of humaneness 
and inter-dependence would have to ensure that those who are able to reproduce on their 
own and those who cannot without some form of assisted reproduction are afforded equal 
rights and responsibilities in their communities. The involuntary childless should therefore 
not be seen as the only ones who should shoulder the child justice issue of providing home 
for children who need one. Those who are capable of reproducing should also share in this 
responsibility and permit and support the involuntary childless to achieved desired 
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pregnancies if they so choose. Anything short of this may continue to foster the wrong public 
perceptions that involuntary childless people are less inferior to those who are reproductively 
fertile, and that they have failed their family and societies as a result of their inability to 
reproduce. This goes against the grain of Ubuntu which as discussed above is all about 
Umoja102 ‘a sense of unity, empathy and togetherness’ where members of the community 
support each other to live meaningful lives that testify to the fact that every human being is 
valued for who they are based on the immutable principle of their intrinsic human 
personhood. 
 
It is on this premise, that the principle of Ubuntu can be utilised to develop community 
schemes which will allow members of the extended family and well-meaning members of the 
primordial public to contribute towards the funding of affordable ARTs. These schemes can 
support the involuntary childless and help them achieve desired pregnancies if they so 
choose.  This is in the spirit of Ubuntu which focuses on community inter-dependence and 
communitarianism especially when the amoral African civic state due to limited resources is 
unable to fund expensive curative medicine such as ARTs.  The idea of communities pulling 
together to support valued based schemes that the communities holds as sacrosanct is not 
new. Communities within Kenya for example have in the past developed similar schemes 
where communities pulled together to fund and support community education. This was 
premised on the social ordering principle of Harambee (pulling together).103 Since it is 
evident from the Harambee example, that Africans do support one another as a means of 
actualising the aspirations of their communities, this thesis argues that a similar initiative 
could be developed to help the infertile access affordable fertility treatment which would 
enable them contribute their procreative value to the continuity and progress of their 
communities. Such pulling together by the extended family and wider community will go a 
                                                          
102 Johnson B., Gumbo for the Soul: Here is our Child- Where is the Village (Bloomington: IUniverse, 
2008) p 79. 
103 Swadener B., Kabiru M, Njengo., Does the village still raise the child: A collaborative study of 
changing child rearing and early education in Kenya (New York: Suny Press 2000) pp 25-26. 
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long way to confirm that there is group interdependence and bonding between all members 
of the primordial public (or the Ubuntu).  
 
7.6  Conclusion 
This chapter has been primarily concerned with two inter-connected issues regarding the 
regulator role of the law in effecting a rights regime for involuntary childless women. First, as 
a follow up to the question explored in chapter 6, it considered whether the law on a public 
interest ground should play a regulatory role in tackling the market failures associated with 
restricting the provisioning of ARTs to the private sector as is currently the case in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Second and more fundamentally, it considered whether the law can be 
utilised as a social engineering tool to develop a rights regime for involuntary childless and 
infertile women within this region of the world. In doing so, it considered the ongoing debate 
of the universality of rights and cultural relativism and how these issues affect the fashioning 
of a rights regime for people living in legally pluralist societies such as post-colonial African 
states. It then highlighted the commonality between international human rights and 
indigenous social ordering principles such as Ubuntu, Humwe and the Omoluwabi principles. 
It concluded by arguing for the development of a socially cultural sensitive human rights 
regime that utilises indigenous African social ordering principles to promote the universal 
acceptability of key fundamental rights like human dignity, equality, non-discrimination and 
freedom from inhumane, degrading and cruel treatment.  It argued that the utilisation of 
these African social ordering principles would help to alleviate concerns that human rights 
are imported Western concepts. This is because the principles of humaneness and equality 
enshrined in Ubuntu and other social ordering principles are not far removed from the goals 
and objectives of the international human rights regime. 
 
It concludes by accepting that while there is not one singular approach to tackling the social 
stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness in Africa, the law can play a social engineering 
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role in the development of a rights regime for involuntary childless people. It suggests that 
this rights regime should embrace some level of public funding to widen access to fertility 
treatment on grounds of public interest. This is because the realisation of desired 
pregnancies would not only enhance the well-being of the individual, but also provide some 
public benefit to the societies that treat procreation as a sine non qua for group survival. Yet, 
in arguing for such regulatory intervention by the law in the widening of ARTs treatment, this 
chapter argues that the wider objective of the law should be to alleviate and ultimately 
eradicate the social recrimination and stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness in Africa.
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Chapter Eight 
General Conclusion and Recommendations 
8.1  Conclusion 
This thesis examined the negative feminisation of infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
socially stigmatising effect that this has on involuntarily childless women in the region. It 
further considered how this stigmatising social perception which views, infertility as primarily 
a female problem, can affect the sense of self and identity of involuntarily childless women in 
the different levels of their interaction with their communities in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
While the deleterious consequences and effect of the social stigmatisation of involuntary 
childlessness is extensively discussed in the fields of medicine, public health and the core 
social sciences, legal researchers particularly in the African feminist fields have not been as 
proactive in championing the cause of involuntary childless women in the region. The 
research shows that other female issues such as female genital mutilation (FGM), access to 
safe abortions and contraceptives, maternal health and more recently human sexuality have 
formed the core concerns for legal feminists and activists in the Sub-Saharan Africa region.  
Yet the fields of medicine and the public health continue to focus their attention on the social 
stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness as a public health concern and activists within 
these fields have recently canvassed for wider access to affordable ARTs in this sub-
continent and in other regions of the developing world. Whereas the medical and public 
health fields continue to actively advocate for wider access to ARTs, some leading voices 
within the field have expressed some reservations on the scarcity of legal research in this 
area particularly with regard to whether there is a universally binding right of access to ARTs 
under the International Human Rights framework. There is also concern on whether the law 
as it stands has recognised the full extent of the negative feminisation of infertility and 
involuntary childlessness in the region and the impact that this gendered characterisation of 
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infertility and involuntary childlessness has on the well-being of women within this region of 
the world. 
 
This thesis has sought to address these concerns through its overarching query on what the 
law’s role in safeguarding the welfare of women should be with regard to combating the 
social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness and infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
considering this hypothesis, the following research questions were raised and explored in 
the body of the thesis. They are: 
i.  How is infertility perceived in Sub-Saharan Africa and how do public attitudes 
to infertility affect the status of involuntary childless women in this region of 
the developing world? 
ii. What is the social meaning of motherhood in Sub-Saharan Africa and how 
does the social construction of motherhood affect the legal status and identity 
of involuntary childless women in the region? 
iii. How effective is the current management of infertility and involuntary 
childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa and how do the demographical concerns 
of over-population as well as child justice concerns impact on the 
reproductive health care rights of infertile women in the region? 
iv. Can widening access to Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTS) in Sub-
Saharan Africa enhance the reproductive making choices of involuntary 
childless women in the region? If yes, how can widening access to ARTs 
contribute to the reduction of social stigmatisation of infertility in African 
communities?  
v. How law and its regulatory processes can assist in widening access to 
affordable fertility treatment in the developing world and strengthen the rights 
of involuntarily childless women in Sub-Saharan Africa?  
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In answering these questions, this thesis evaluated how the different strands of 
multidisciplinary research have problematized the tragedy of the social stigmatisation of 
infertility and involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, the literature 
review undertaken in chapter one considered the existing empirical studies in the social 
science fields that depict the social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. The social sciences particularly the fields of the anthropology and 
sociology also provided a detailed discourse on the socio-cultural causes for the social 
stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness and infertility. Social scientific evidence has to a 
large extent provided the impetus and resolve for public health specialists and clinicians at 
the international level to advocate for the medicalisation of involuntary childlessness in the 
region and to call for wider access to its treatment within the region. However apart from 
ground breaking research undertaken by leading works such as Hellum1, chapter one of this 
thesis points out that no major work has been undertaken with the legal field, especially in 
African legal feminism to canvass for the development of a legal regime that proactively 
protects and safeguards the rights of involuntary childless women in the region against the 
social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness and infertility. Throughout the body of the 
thesis, the question is asked why the law has not been as proactive as other fields in 
problematizing this issue and more particularly in combating its deleterious effects on 
women in the region. 
The concerns of the first research query as to how the conditions of infertility and involuntary 
childlessness are perceived in Sub-Saharan Africa, are further addressed in chapter two 
which considered through a socio-legal lens how public attitudes in Sub-Saharan Africa 
contribute to the social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness within the 
region. It explained how a socio-legal understanding of public opinions and attitudes can 
assist policy and law makers in the development of suitable legal framework to address 
social issues and concerns. In grasping how public attitudes and opinions are formed, the 
                                                          
1 Hellum A., Women's Human Rights and Legal Pluralism in Africa: Mixed Norms and Identities in 
Infertility Management in Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe: Mond Books, 1999) at p 45. 
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thesis adopted an interdisciplinary theoretical framework through the utilisation of political 
science and sociological theories on this issue. Key among the theories it considered were 
the two step wave theory in the field of sociology and more particularly the modernisation 
theory in the field of political sciences. However, as Hellum2 points out, modernisation theory 
in particular has not completely portrayed African norms in a good light. Rather it treats 
African norms as primitive and antithetical to the safeguard of women’s rights in post-colonial 
states in the developing world.  
This thesis however did not ignore the concerns raised by proponents of the modernisation 
theory that some African norms are incompatible with the current day realities of modern 
society. Chapter two provides some examples of African customs and norms that contribute 
to the social stigmatisation of involuntary childless women in the region. This point is further 
addressed in chapters three and four of the thesis which discussed the importance that 
African societies attach to the institution of biological motherhood and the impact that the 
veneration of motherhood has on involuntary childless women. While this thesis accepts that 
the modernist concerns should not be ignored, it did try to counter-balance its negative 
characterisation of African norms and traditions with a discourse on the positive role that 
indigenous social ordering principles like Ubuntu, Omoluwabi and Humwe play in re-shaping 
public attitudes and opinions in Sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis especially in chapters two 
and seven points to the example of the Ubuntu principle which has been positively utilised to 
reshape societal attitudes. It demonstrated this through recent South African case law3 
which has seen the abolition of the death penalty based on the application of the social 
ordering principle of Ubuntu. However, this is not to say that there are not some concerns to 
do with the role that these social ordering principles have played in the continuing public 
perspective that each individual of marriageable age should contribute his or her procreative 
quota to the continuing existence and survival of their primordial communities.  
                                                          
2 Ibid at p 45. 
3 See for example S v. Makwanyane (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3. 
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The inability of individuals to procreate is seen as an existential threat to the continuing 
survival of primordial public and this may explain why infertility and involuntary childlessness 
is socially stigmatised in these societies or at the very least treated not just as personal grief 
but as a communal tragedy. Chapter two of this thesis points to literature4 that shows that 
women are often scapegoated when infertility occurs in a family. This public opinion of 
infertility thrives even when medical evidence establishes the root cause of the infertility to 
be male related.  The reasons for the scapegoating of women has been described as the 
negative feminisation of infertility.5  
In addressing this research query, this thesis considered whether this scapegoating of 
women is known to African feminism. Chapter three of the thesis shows that African 
feminists in the Humanities and Social Sciences are well acquainted with the negative 
feminisation of infertility and have offered perspectives on how women can overcome this 
social scapegoating and stigmatisation. The thesis identified that much of the discourse on 
this issue has been situated within the schools of African Womanism and African Motherism. 
Yet, this thesis argued that African Motherism in its veneration of motherhood as the key 
way in which women are socially empowered may have unintentionally contributed to the 
social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness. It however considered the 
contrary viewpoint that African Motherism is merely responding to the socio-cultural 
environment in which it operates in. This may explain why it advocates that involuntary 
childless women should take all possible steps to overcome the condition of involuntary 
childlessness in order to enhance their social status within their communities. However, this 
thesis considered whether this quest to attain the procreative goal of achieving a desired 
pregnancy necessarily safeguards the welfare of all involuntary childless women. It therefore 
turned to the legal specialism of African feminism to see if it provided other perspectives in 
                                                          
4 See Pearce T., She will not be listened to in public: Perceptions among the Yoruba of infertility and 
childlessness in women. (1999) 7 (13) Reproduction Health Matters pp 69–87. 
5 Odinga A.,   I am not Tassa, he is not a man like other men': feminising infertility and masculinising 
fertility in South Nyanza, 1945-1960 in Tamale S., (ed) African Sexualities: A Reader (Oxford: 
Pambazuka Press, 2011) chapter 48. 
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promoting and enhancing the welfare of involuntary childless women outside those offered 
by other disciplines of African feminism. 
In considering this issue, it appeared that indigenous African legal feminists were not as 
vocal as to the plight of the involuntary childless women as their counterparts in other 
specialisms of feminist literature. The thesis investigated why this is the case and why the 
Maputo Protocol (the regional variant of CEDAW) failed to give much focus to the negative 
feminisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness as it had done with other issues such 
as FGM that affected the well-being and welfare of women. Again it considered whether this 
seemingly neglect of involuntary childlessness by African legal feminists is due to the 
influencing role that the modernisation theory 6and other Western influences have played in 
the shaping of the international human rights framework on gender equality. While the thesis 
welcomed the positive role that the modernisation theory has played in shaping rights for 
women on a global level, it identified with Hellum’s 7 position that those who seek to promote 
the well-being and welfare of women should not ignore the socio-cultural environment that 
women have to engage in.  
This is why chapter four of this thesis, and in line with its second research query, provided a 
critical socio-legal discourse on the socio-cultural construction of motherhood in Africa and 
how this impacts on the status of involuntary childless women in the region. It critically 
evaluated why the non-biological construction of motherhood as touted by some in the 
modernising theoretical school may not necessarily be the most appropriate panacea for 
tackling the social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The chapter explained how non-Western constructions of motherhood situated within 
indigenous African cultures and in Islamic norms affirm the superiority of biological 
motherhood over non-biological motherhood. Since this is the case, the thesis questioned 
whether it is right to dismiss infertility and involuntary childlessness as some African legal 
                                                          
6 Hellum (note 1 above) p 45. 
7 Ibid at p 108. 
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feminists have done or to require that the problem of infertility should be resolved primarily 
through non-biological parenting options such as child adoption.        
This point remained a live concern of the fifth chapter of this thesis, which considered the 
reluctance of policy makers to extend wider access to fertility treatment due to child justice 
and over-population concerns in the region. In addressing these concerns, the chapter 
considered the legal framework for child adoption in Sub-Saharan Africa. In consonance with 
the third query of this thesis, this chapter considered the challenges associated with making 
child adoption the primary way of tackling infertility and involuntary childlessness in legally 
pluralist societies in Sub-Saharan Africa where multiple legal rules apply. 
It explained that although Islamic law as practiced in many African Muslim communities and 
some localised indigenous African rules do not ignore child justice issues, such as ensuring 
that vulnerable children find a loving home where they can grow up in, these rules do not go 
as far as recognising child adoption as the appropriate mechanism for achieving this 
objective. The Maliki jurisprudence for example is not adverse to the utilisation of other non-
biological parenting options such as the Kafalah system to achieve child justice goals. 
However this parenting mechanism falls short of providing involuntary childless couples with 
full parenting rights that child adoption provides under a Western family law framework.8 
Since this is the case, the thesis argues that it is wrong to limit infertility management to non-
biological parenting mechanisms such as child adoption. 
Recognising the limits of non-biological framework within legally pluralist societies in Sub-
Saharan Africa, chapter six of this thesis considered whether there is a legally binding right 
to provide wider access to affordable ARTs as canvassed by specialists in public health and 
medicine. This chapter spoke squarely to the fourth research query of this thesis. It 
approached the query from two primary premises, the first of which was whether there is a 
                                                          
8 Ishaque S., Islamic Principles on Adoption: Examining the Impact of Illegitimacy and Inheritance 
Concerns in Context of a Child’s Right to an Identity (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy 
and the Family p- 401-402. 
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right to reproduce. Its consideration of the literature shows that the right to reproduce is 
considered to be a positive welfare rights which states are not legally obligated to fund. It 
however considers whether the social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary 
childlessness in pronatalist regions of the world could justify a case for treating the funding of 
affordable ARTs as a negative or forbearance right. In considering this issue, it relies on 
earlier feminist works like Shanner9 that explain how the funding of safe abortions was 
treated as having some element of a forbearance right due to the fact that offering such 
services were considered to protect the forbearance rights of women such as the right to 
bodily integrity. This thesis argues that funding of ARTs in pronatalist societies where 
women are socially stigmatised for involuntary childlessness should also be treated as a 
forbearance right since such funding can help to safeguard the forbearance rights of human 
dignity, the right not to be subject to cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment and the right 
not to be discriminated against. 
The thesis also considered the equally important concern on the extent to which the right to 
health as set out in the international human rights framework such as the UDHR, ICESCR, 
the Banjul Charter and the Maputo Protocol respectively could facilitate the right to access 
affordable ARTs. Central to this question was whether the right to health should allow for 
state funding of ARTs to help couples achieve desired pregnancies. A live concern was 
whether this is appropriate or feasible in light of the allocation theory of resources. 
Nevertheless, in response to the social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness and on 
social justice and anti-discrimination grounds; there is strong support for arguing that the 
state funding of ARTs should be treated as a basic primary health care as opposed to its 
normal categorisation as expensive curative treatment. 
Developing further on this issue and keeping in line with its fifth query, this thesis in chapter 
seven investigated the law’s regulatory and social engineering role in developing a discrete 
                                                          
9 Shanner L., The Right to Procreate: When Rights Claims Have Gone Wrong (1995) 40 McGill Law 
Journal. 823. 
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and specific rights regime for involuntary childless women in Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet as 
pointed out in chapter six, there are legal limitations that makes it difficult to argue that states 
are currently legally obligated to provide ARTs to their citizens. This is because the right to 
reproduce is considered as a positive right which states have no legally binding duty to fund. 
Further, on the basis of the allocation of resources theory, it will be inappropriate to allocate 
scarce state resources to the funding of ARTs which many have argued is expensive 
curative treatment.  
However, this thesis argued that there is a public interest ground for the law to play a role in 
widening access to ARTs in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is because the current way by which 
involuntary childless women can access ARTs in this region of this world is through the 
private sector which is extremely expensive and inaccessible to most women due to its 
prohibitive costs.  This raises the concern on whether the right to reproductive health should 
be seen as a public good that law in its regulatory role should support. In this sense, the call 
for regulation goes beyond rectifying market failure which is the key concern of the economic 
version of the regulatory theory. Rather it falls within what Sunstein 10describes as the 
substantive political role of regulation which seeks to advance what society consider as 
‘good’. Applying this to the African context particularly its indigenous social ordering 
principles where individuals are considering as doing good to their societies when they 
reproduce, there is a public benefit to argue for requiring wider access to ARTs in the region 
despite Malthusian’s concerns of over-population and child justice considerations.  
More fundamentally and in line with the overarching concern of this thesis, the key public 
interest ground for canvassing for a regulatory interventionist approach by the law, is the 
gendered social stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness and infertility in the region. How 
can it be right that women should be socially stigmatised or scapegoated for the inability to 
reproduce? Surely from a social engineering perspective, there is a current regulatory gap 
                                                          
10 Sunstein C., After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1990) p 12. 
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that the law can address in order to protect and safeguard the rights of this group of women. 
This thesis argues and recommends that this role must go further than enabling the wider 
access to ARTs as part of the reproductive health care system for this group of women. In 
addition, the law in its social engineering and reformatory role can be further utilised to 
combat and tackle the social stigmatisation of infertility and involuntary childlessness. It can 
do this by strengthening the forbearance rights of this group of women to human dignity, the 
right to be free from discrimination, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment.  
In canvassing for the social engineering and reformatory role of the law, this thesis 
recognises that it falls within the realm of universality of rights and cultural relativism debate. 
It however recognises like Hellum11, that the reason why international rights regimes appear 
to have failed in safeguarding the rights of women in developing regions like Africa is that 
they fail to recognise the fact women in such regions operate under ‘complex legal 
situations.’12 This is due to the fact that they are obligated to assume multiple identities in 
order to effectively engage in the legal pluralist societies that they live in.13 This thesis 
however goes further to argue in chapter seven that there are commonality of rights that are 
universal to all human beings. These rights include the right to human dignity and the right to 
be free from discrimination. It argues that no single culture can lay claim to the ownership of 
these rights. This is because as the examination of indigenous social ordering principles 
such as Ubuntu, Omoluwabi and Humwe has demonstrated, the right to human dignity, the 
right to free from discrimination and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment are applicable 
in these specific indigenous social ordering principles and other such similar variants that 
exist in African communities. The commonalities between these social ordering principles 
and the international human rights regime are demonstrated in table four in chapter seven of 
this thesis.  
                                                          
11 Hellum A.,  Legal Pluralistic Perspectives in Scandinavian and African Women’s Law in Papendorf 
K., Machura S., Hellum A., (eds) Eugen Ehrlich’s Sociology of Law (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2014) p 103 
and p 108-9. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
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There is therefore no reason why these rules cannot be utilised side by side with the existing 
human rights framework to ensure an effective rights regime that protects the forbearance 
rights of women in this region. While this thesis does not ignore the concerns of modernists 
that there are some African norms and customs that negatively impact on the well-being of 
involuntary childless women, it points to current African case law that treats customary law 
as a living law which is amenable to change if required. It however accepts as demonstrated 
in the South African jurisprudence, that there are times when the transcendental social 
ordering principles such as Ubuntu will be ineffective in correcting the anomalies of 
customary law that is abhorrent or contrary to modern realities and expectations. In this 
regard the courts may be faced with no other choice but to apply received Western law to 
strike down the offending custom and to ensure that the rights of individuals are protected 
and safeguarded.14  
8.2  Recommendations 
It is on this concluding premise that this thesis canvasses for the following reforms. This 
includes the recommendation that international human rights instruments such as CEDAW 
and the Maputo Protocol which focus on gender equality and rights of women should be 
reviewed to clearly incorporate a rights regime for involuntary childless women. This does 
not mean proposals for new amendments to these instruments. Rather what may be useful 
at this stage is to canvass that the Committees responsible for the implementation of these 
instruments become more proactive in working to ensure that the needs of involuntary 
women are more fundamentally addressed in their working methods and in their general 
recommendations. This thesis argues that there is considerable scope within the articles set 
out in these instruments to accommodate the needs of involuntary childless women. For 
example articles 2 and 12 already provide a framework for addressing the social malaise of 
                                                          
14 See for example Bhe and others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and others (CCT 49/03) [2004] ZACC 17; 
2005 (1) SA 580 (CC); 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (15 October 2004). 
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the stigmatisation of involuntary childlessness and as well as facilitating the rights of women 
to access infertility treatment. However, as the Chair of the Working Group on Discrimination 
against Women in Law and in Practice, the Special Rapporteur pointed out, the CEDAW 
committee is still yet to give proper recognition to the right to the highest standard of physical 
and mental health in its Post- 2015 Development Agenda especially in the areas of sexual 
and reproductive health and rights15 
While the Chair does make a valid point that the right to the highest standard of reproductive 
health is yet to be fully realised; the issue of the social stigmatisation of involuntary 
childlessness and the corollary concern of wider access to affordable ARTs are 
conspicuously absent in the list of positive measures set out in the agenda document. These 
positive measures are seen as requirements that states need to undertake to ensure ‘access 
to safe and affordable sexual and reproductive services.’16  Yet the lack of attention to what 
can be considered a critical female problem confirms again Dyer’s statement that infertility is 
the ‘Cinderella of reproduction health.’ 17 
This thesis therefore recommends that the issue of the negative feminisation of infertility and 
involuntary childlessness which is extensively documented in the body of literature in the 
social sciences, medicine and public health be given more attention than it has been given 
by the CEDAW committee and other bodies that are involved in the realisation and 
protection of women’s rights. The same recommendation is made to the Special Rapporteur 
on the Rights of Women in Africa which is the mechanism established by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights to give specific attention to the problems of 
                                                          
15 See the mandates of the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the issue of 
discrimination against women in law and in practice, the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, and the Committee 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women dated November 3 2014 available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/OpenLetter4Nov2014.pdf (accessed July 29 
2015). 
16 Ibid. 
17 Dyer S., Barrenness among plenty (2007) 13(2) South African Journal of Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology p 32 available at http://www.sajog.org.za/index.php/SAJOG/article/download/76/52 
(accessed July 29, 2015.  
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women in Africa. 18 The mechanism of the Special Rapporteur has been actively involved in 
combating FGM, tackling the disproportionate effect that HIV/AIDS has on women and in 
preventing and eliminating child and forced marriages.19 To date it has undertaken in ten 
(10) fact finding missions around Africa to determine the level to which the rights of women 
have been actualised in the country.20  In one mission, the Special Rapporteur, 
Commissioner Soyata Maiga reported that: 
‘Countries must be held accountable to commitments they have made. Progress has 
been seen in the enactment of family laws, laws banning Female Genital Mutilation 
(FGM), and others guaranteeing sexual and reproductive health and rights 
(SRHR).’21 
Although the Special Rapporteur mentions the guaranteeing of sexual and reproductive 
health and rights for women, these rights on the overall have been largely confined to the 
provisioning of safe abortion, contraceptives and maternal health care. It would therefore 
appear that the Special Rapporteur and other mechanisms responsible for the facilitation of 
the rights of women in Africa are yet to give proper attention to the social stigmatisation of 
involuntary childlessness in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This thesis recommends that the advocates and campaigners for gender and women issues 
under the gender equality framework of CEDAW and Maputo Protocol need to exercise the 
same will and resolve that has been utilised to tackle for example female genital mutilation 
(FGM) in Africa and likewise confront the problem of the negative feminisation of infertility in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. For far too long, human rights instruments that protect the rights of 
                                                          
18  See the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 25th Ordinary Session held in 
Bujumbura, Burundi, from 26 April to 5 May 1999 which adopted resolution ACHPR/res.38 (XXV) 
99 on the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa. 
19 See the Intercession Report by Me Soyata Maiga, Commissioner/Special Rapporteur on the Rights 
of Women in Africa (Banjul, African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), 2009) 
20 See the mandate and bibliographic notes of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in 
Africa available at http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/rights-of-women/about/ (accessed July 29 
2015). 
21 See SOAWR Breathing Life into the Maputo Protocol (SOAWR Members’ Meeting Report, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, 24-26 January 2015) at p 12. 
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women particularly in the area of reproductive rights have focused too much on fertility 
control to the exclusion and detriment of facilitating wider access to fertility treatment and 
assistance to alleviate the conditions of infertility and involuntary childlessness. This thesis 
commends the current efforts to proactively address gender violence and domestic abuse in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, yet there are concerns that these efforts fail to tackle the negative 
feminisation of infertility which is a key cause of gender violence in the domestic setting in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.22    
To be clear, this thesis is not arguing that it is wrong for activists and organisations involved 
in the protection of the rights of women in Africa to treat for example the eradication of FGM 
and gender violence as primary concerns. However, while tackling these discriminatory 
practices against women, the legal field and women’s rights groups should not ignore the 
abusive and discriminatory practices meted out against involuntary childless women. 
Medicine23 and social sciences24 have been in the forefront of trying to right these wrongs 
against involuntary childless women, this thesis argues that it is time for the law in its role as 
a vehicle for social change to follow suit. The failure to do so would mean that the law has 
missed the opportunity to serve as a tool of social engineering to reform or obliterate 
practices that are contrary to the norms and expectations of a changing and evolving 
society. 
This thesis however accepts that the law alone cannot solely bring about the reforms that 
are required in combating the social malaise of the stigmatisation of involuntary 
                                                          
22 See the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa African Centre for Gender and Social 
Development (ACGSD) Violence against Women in Africa: A Situational Analysis, September 2010 
available at http://www1.uneca.org/Portals/awro/Publications/21VAW%20in%20Africa-
A%20situational%20analysis.pdf (accessed July 29 2015). See also empirical studies such as Ameh 
N., Burden of domestic violence amongst infertile women attending infertility clinics in Nigeria 16(4) 
(2007) Nigerian Journal of Medicine pp 375-7 that discuss the role that infertility plays in domestic 
violence in Nigeria which is the primary investigation site for this thesis. 
23 See for example Ombelet W., Global access to infertility care: The Walking Egg Project (2014) 
Facts Views Vis Obgyn pp 1-3. 
24 Inhorn MC., Van Balen F., (eds.) Infertility around the Globe: New Thinking on Childlessness, 
Gender, and Reproductive Technologies: A View from the Social Sciences (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press; 2002). 
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childlessness.  Education, particularly in the area that motherhood is not the beginning and 
the end of womanhood, can also play a role in confronting the negative feminisation of 
infertility that encourages discriminatory practices in Sub-Saharan Africa. But as earlier 
recommended, the educational programmes must start with policy and law makers who are 
involved in the protection of the rights of women in this region of the world. This in part is 
what this thesis has set out to do by highlighting what it means for a woman to be involuntary 
childless in Sub-Saharan Africa, and how negative social perception of this condition can 
contribute to a loss of worth and status of the childless in society. It therefore calls for more 
proactive action on the part of legal feminists in the region to confront this problem in the 
same manner that they have tackled other discriminatory practices against women. This 
would go a long way in empowering and enhancing the status of involuntary childless 
women in the region.   
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